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ABSTRACT 
 
ANDREW J. RINGLEE: The Romanovs’ Militant Charity: The Red Cross and Public 
Mobilization for War in Tsarist Russia, 1853-1914 
(Under the directon of Louise McReynolds) 
 
This dissertation analyzes the creation and evolution of the Russian Society of the Red 
Cross to understand the possibilities for and limits to the development of civil society in 
authoritarian political structures. Founded in 1867, the Russian Red Cross’s chartered mission 
was to provide civilian medical aid for wartime relief. By signing the Geneva Convention of 
1864, tsarist Russia embraced a European humanitarian movement geared toward aiding 
individuals wounded in war and victims of natural disasters. Over the next five decades, the Red 
Cross grew into one of the largest charities in tsarist Russia. This study reveals how the ruling 
Romanov family and members of educated society found a common space in which both parties 
could promote the empire’s welfare by tending to its neediest subjects. However, Russia’s 
decision to mobilize educated society for national relief proved to be a double-edged sword for 
the tsarist regime. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905, limited funds, bureaucratic mismanagement, and scandals in the press incited 
members of educated society to demand greater oversight of Russia’s Red Cross, calls that 
undermined the political regime’s legitimacy during moments of crisis. Despite these challenges, 
the Red Cross did provide an avenue for women to enter the nursing profession, although 
Russian nurses never achieved the professional status enjoyed by their colleagues in the West. 
Given that one part of the Red Cross’s mission involved delivering medical aid to belligerents 
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in foreign conflicts, members of the tsarist state and society used this organization as a unique 
instrument with which to conduct “soft power” imperialism by dispatching teams of doctors and 
nurses to intervene in conflicts in the Balkans and Africa.            
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation analyzes the creation and evolution of the Russian Society of the 
Red Cross (Rossiiskoe Obshchestvo Krasnogo Kresta) during the last seven decades of tsarist 
Russia (1853-1914) to explore the bonds between the autocracy and educated society in 
prerevolutionary Russia. Founded in 1867, the Russian Red Cross’s chartered mission was to 
provide “private aid” (chastnaia pomoshch’) for wartime relief. Private aid consisted of 
dispatching civilian doctors, nurses, and privately donated medical supplies to set up 
hospitals near the front, operate mobile ambulances at the front, and staff temporary medical 
facilities in rear areas. This association was voluntary because its members chose to join as 
members or donate to its philanthropic campaigns. Even though Romanov empresses headed 
this Red Cross and ministers and other elite handled its day-to-day governance, this 
organization did not depend on the state to conduct its missions. Members within the 
organization had a degree of leeway to innovate with new types of institutions and projects. 
Additionally, this charity and its obligations shifted with need, capacity, and public opinion. 
My first objective is to try to understand why tsarist Russia, an illiberal, undemocratic 
state, embraced a humanitarian movement that originated in Geneva and encouraged tsarist 
subjects to participate in Red Cross chapters and programs. I contend that the Russian Red 
Cross reveals how the Romanovs and tsarist subjects found a common space, which enabled 
both parties to serve Russia. Peter I (1682-1725) instilled in the autocracy the moral 
imperative to guide and improve Russia, and his most prominent successors continued this
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 mandate.1 Peter I’s contribution, while incredibly painful and crude, was a state capable of 
mobilizing human and material resources to make Russia a European power. Catherine II 
(1762-1796) exemplified noblesse oblige. She gave the empire educational, cultural, and 
legal institutions that raised Russian culture to rival European achievements in the arts and 
sciences. Alexander I (1801-1825) devoted his energies toward protecting Russia from the 
European crises emanating from the French Revolution and Napoleonic disruption; his 
successor, Nicholas I (1825-1855) continued to insulate Russia from European perils by 
instilling the ideology of Official Nationality. All four of these rulers viewed the state as the 
instrument by which they would carry through the autocratic moral imperative. By the 
middle of the nineteenth century, however, the need to confront modernity and keep up with 
European rivals left the autocracy unable to continue this project without the involvement of 
the educated public.  
The Russian Red Cross sought to alleviate the plight of the wounded in war and to 
reduce the woes of disaster-stricken civilians. For the autocracy, patronage of a national 
relief organization gave the Romanovs legitimacy because it helped locate philanthropy at 
the center of the tsarist regime’s concerns. For Russian subjects, participation in this 
organization affirmed bonds with the autocracy and enabled the donor to participate in the 
moral imperative to improve Russia. The key donors and activists who worked for the Red 
Cross were the Russian subjects who felt they had the strongest connection with the 
autocracy. This dissertation explores how, even in an authoritarian, undemocratic political 
                                                     
1 I borrow this concept from Vasilii Kliuchevskii, who summed up the Petrine paradox in the line: “Autocracy 
as a political principle is in itself odious. Yet we can reconcile ourselves to the individual who exercises this 
unnatural power when he adds self-sacrifice to it, and although an autocrat, devotes himself unsparingly to the 
public good, risking destruction even on difficulties caused by his own work.” See Vasili Klyuchevsky, Peter 
the Great, trans. Liliana Archibald (London: MacMillan & Co, 1958), 271-72.  
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system, state and society can work in tandem—rather than in competition—to fulfill an 
essential responsibility of the modern state: to promote the welfare of its subjects. In late 
imperial Russia’s case, civil society did not solely exist as a division between tsar and 
people, but it also linked people to the ruling dynasty.  
 Guided from above yet sustained from below, the Red Cross served as a means for 
the autocracy to introduce and channel educated society’s involvement in promoting the 
empire’s well-being. Educated society could also sway its Red Cross to take on certain tasks, 
but the autocracy and bureaucrats running this organization often controlled how far 
campaigns would go. I seek to understand why this association intervened in certain cases 
and what it hoped to gain from these campaigns. Tied to this question is the difference 
between philanthropy and charity. By philanthropy, I mean a gesture or act directed toward 
eliminating the root causes of misfortune or malaise. Authority and power are embedded 
within this activity, in particular, the authority to identify the problem, decide on the solution, 
and determine when the threat has been nullified. Charity, I define as the direct assistance to 
those immediately suffering. These definitions are important because they can help determine 
tsarist subjects’ attitudes toward the Red Cross. Russians used both “charitable 
(blagotvoritel’nyi)” and “philanthropic (filantropicheskii)” when describing the Red Cross, 
but this organization was always more oriented toward charity, in this case relief of sudden 
pains, of which there were many, especially in war, than alleviating all plight in a huge, 
multiethnic empire. And the reading public’s lofty expectation that a national relief 
organization would be able to fill all the holes in Russia’s military medical services in war 
and overcome all the empire’s disasters undermined support for the Red Cross and the 
Romanov dynasty when these hopes went unfulfilled. Mobilizing educated society for 
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national relief, as this dissertation demonstrates, proved to be a double-edged sword for the 
tsarist regime. Limited funds, scandals in the press, and complaints of bureaucratic 
indifference or inaction tempted members of educated society to call for greater public 
oversight and control of Russia’s national relief organization.  
Since women within the Romanov court played an instrumental role in creating the 
Russian Red Cross and guiding many of its early endeavors, this dissertation considers the 
challenges and possibilities for women’s involvement in philanthropy in tsarist Russia. 
Romanov empresses acted as the nominal heads of the Red Cross, the organization’s stated 
aim was to prepare women as wartime nurses, and the majority of this institution’s members 
were female nurses. These characteristics encouraged tsarist subjects to view the Red Cross 
as a women’s philanthropic institution, but, at the same time, this organization’s mandate as 
the empire’s national relief organization for war and natural disaster meant that male generals 
and bureaucrats occupied all important leadership posts. Therefore, the Red Cross occupied a 
paradoxical position among Russian charitable institutions in that it was a women’s 
organization dedicated to the masculine task of war-making.  
This dissertation considers the Red Cross in the context of historian Adele 
Lindenmeyr’s interpretation of the difficulties women’s philanthropic institutions faced in 
tsarist Russia. Women participated widely in tsarist charities, but they often eschewed 
leadership roles within organizations and hesitated to call for legal reforms because they 
feared charges of political radicalism. In one telling speech from 1891, when key tsarist 
cultural figures called on educated society to fight a famine that threatened most of European 
Russia, the renowned historian V. O. Kliuchevskii contrasted in a public speech F. M. 
Rtishchev and Juliana Osor’ina, two figures he considered heroes of Russian charity. 
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Rtishchev, a close adviser to Tsar Alexis (1645-76), designed policies to enable the Russian 
state improve its subjects’ welfare, while Osor’ina, the widow of a provincial nobleman, 
embodied the selfless Orthodox woman, dedicated to relieving the suffering of those 
surrounding her. The Red Cross struggled with its position within this binary, as tsarist 
cultural attitudes asked women to serve this organization out of feminine Christian and 
patriotic duty, but the grave nature of this institution’s mission often required the masculine 
tasks of policy making and social reform. Furthermore, Lindenmeyr assets that tsarist women 
hesitated to adopt ideas on scientific philanthropy emanating from the West because they 
deemed these methods un-Russian and unfeminine.2 The Russian Red Cross, as this 
dissertation explores, suffered from similar challenges. In 1904, zemstvo advocates, members 
of provincial governing boards, denounced the Red Cross for corruption and amateurism 
after a decade of agricultural and military disasters and founded their own national aid 
organization to conduct war and famine relief. The zemstvo advocates motivation for this 
move was to reform Russia’s national relief organization into an institution that would 
undertake the masculine task of addressing the empire’s social ills with policy changes and 
employ the newest scientific methods to these problems.3             
This dissertation also asks what role the Red Cross played in the military history of 
tsarist Russia. I begin with historian Geoffrey Best’s characterization of nineteenth-century 
thought on war as a contest between war and peace movements. Best locates the Red Cross 
within the peace movement, but he then supposes that, as the century progressed, 
                                                     
2 Adele Lindenmeyr, “Public Life, Private Virtues: Women in Russian Charity, 1762-1914,” Signs 18, no. 3 
(Summer 1993): 562-91.  
 
3 The zemstvos were local government boards in many Russian provinces created by a legal reform in 1864. 
These boards gave local elites greater power to manage provincial and county affairs, especially in the areas of 
agriculture, economic development, education, and medicine.  
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humanitarianism became militarized.4 This dissertation tests this theory by considering how 
the Red Cross advanced militarism, the intentional application of military structures and 
values to civilian society, in tsarist Russia. How did this organization balance its 
commitments to wartime and peacetime endeavors? Conversely, I consider, when possible, 
what the Russian military, especially its medical practitioners, thought of the Red Cross. The 
relationship between the army and its national relief organization sheds new light on civil-
military relations in tsarist Russia and on autocrat-military relations as well.  
Since the Red Cross’s primary mission was supplementing army medical services in 
wartime, this dissertation must address the history of the medical profession. Russian doctors 
bemoaned the poor state of the empire’s health, and many blamed the autocracy for not 
empowering them to enact widespread reforms to improve public health or develop medicine 
as an independent profession. Military doctors often felt the most marginalized, since the 
state and officer corps simultaneously obstructed them.5 In wartime, however, physicians 
often found a warm bedfellow in the Red Cross. The Red Cross, as an independent agency, 
had the ability to conduct the type of medicine that it chose. This organization also had 
greater resources to purchase medical supplies and devices. Thus civilian doctors often 
signed up for wartime Red Cross work in hopes of reaching new discoveries and advancing 
the science of medicine. For a small but prestigious coterie of doctors, the Red Cross served 
as a way of advancing the medical profession. But if this organization proved beneficial for 
one type of medical professional, it restricted another. Nursing as a profession, which 
established itself in Britain and, to a lesser extent, Germany, did not develop as an 
                                                     
4 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 131-35, 141. 
 
5 John Hutchinson, Politics and Public Health in Revolutionary Russia, 1890-1918 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 24-25. 
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independent medical profession in tsarist Russia. This dissertation seeks to understand why 
the Red Cross prevented nursing from becoming an independent profession in tsarist Russia. 
As a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1864, the international conference that 
granted national relief organizations a role in war and codified some rules for the treatment 
of the wounded, the Russian Red Cross mediated in foreign conflicts between member-states 
by dispatching material aid and sanitary brigades. These missions were popular with the 
tsarist public, but the Russian state did not always see eye-to-eye with newspaper readers, 
who usually backed one side in these conflicts. The bureaucrats controlling the Red Cross, 
especially after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, knew better than to let popular pressures 
drive Russia to violate the Concert of Europe. When the tsarist Red Cross sent aid workers to 
intervene in foreign conflicts, especially on behalf of anticolonial or nationalist movements, 
they made sure these initiatives were undertaken according to international agreements on 
humanitarian intervention and carefully controlled these campaigns. This dissertation seeks 
to explore how an undemocratic state responded to popular pressures to send aid workers 
abroad and what these projects meant for Russian subjects. 
Lastly, I must address a question that has consumed far too much attention from 
Russian historians. Did the Red Cross, which valued self-initiative and personal contribution, 
lead to the political democratization of Russia? No, but political reform was never the goal; 
most members of the Russian Red Cross feared political change and sought to strengthen the 
regime. My intention in this dissertation is not to explain why the 1917 revolutions happened 
in Russia or, as historian Joseph Bradley put it, to identify “what did not happen” that caused 
the Romanov regime proceed down its ill-fated Sonderweg. Instead, I seek to explore the 
possibilities for and limits to the development of civil society in an autocratic political 
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structure. In this case the focus is on associational activities intended to supplement the 
state’s role in protecting the welfare of its subjects.6  
Historiography 
My methodology draws upon three subdisciplines of history: social history, to 
determine how this voluntary association contributed to the development of civil society in 
Russia; institutional history to trace the development of the Red Cross as an organization; 
and military history, to analyze how Russia mobilized civilian resources for war. The few 
works on the Russian Red Cross focus heavily on gender, but I begin with Joseph Bradley’s 
paradigm for understanding the political role of voluntary societies in tsarist Russia.7 On the 
surface, the Russian Red Cross fit most of Bradley’s criteria for modern voluntary 
associations.8 The Russian Red Cross’s membership was voluntary, it was governed by a 
charter, it enjoyed a degree of license to determine its activities, and it printed its own 
materials. This organization always asserted it was a “private society” (chastnoe 
obshchestvo) participating in the “associational life” (obshchestvennost’) of the country. But 
Bradley made no mention of the Red Cross in his monograph on voluntary associations in 
                                                     
6 For portraits of the diverse number of avenues that tsarist subjects used to develop civil society in 
prerevolutionary Russia, see Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West, eds., Between Tsar and 
People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991).    
 
7 John Shelton Curtiss, “Russian Sisters of Mercy in the Crimea, 1854-1855.” Slavic Review 54 
(March 1966): 84-100; P. P. Shcherbinin, Voennyi faktor v povsednevnoi zhizni russkoi zhenshchiny v XVII – 
nachale XX v. (Tambov: Iulis, 2004), 292-408; Laurie R. Stoff, Russia’s Sisters of Mercy and the Great War: 
More than Binding Men’s Wounds (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015).  
 
8 Using the Free Economic Society as his template, Joseph Bradley believed that voluntary associations in 
tsarist Russia had to be governed by a self-written charter, made up of voluntary members, possess their own, 
independent structure of authority, enjoy a degree of license to pursue the society’s own pursuits, and print 
materials the members deemed relevant to the society’s mission. See Joseph Bradley, “Subjects into Citizens: 
Societies, Civil Society, and Autocracy in Tsarist Russia,” The American Historical Review 107, no. 4 (October 
2002): 1094-1123.  
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tsarist Russia, a curious omission.9 His final criteria for a voluntary organization was that it 
must possess an independent structure of authority, a murky condition for the Russian Red 
Cross. Even though the organization’s governing board was elected, the titular heads of the 
organization were always empresses, and the state or Romanovs often intervened to subsidize 
Red Cross activities. Therefore, I contend that this organization was a voluntary one, and it 
certainly contributed to the development of civil society in Russia, but it occupied an unusual 
place among voluntary organizations because of its association with the autocracy. 
Expanding its activities to include peacetime medical and disaster relief, the Russian 
Red Cross became an instrument for promoting public health and philanthropy.10 The 
scholarship on public health in imperial Russia often centers on the contestation between the 
autocracy and the medical profession over how to ensure the wellbeing of the population.11 
Searching for reasons why Russian liberals failed to avert the Bolshevik victory in 1917, 
these studies fault either the autocracy for not giving doctors the autonomy to practice their 
craft effectively, or medical professionals for backing away from the mission to serve the 
                                                     
9 See Joseph Bradley, Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
 
10 There are several Russian-language works on the history of the Red Cross in tsarist Russia. See M. V. 
Beliaeva, “Rossiiskoe Obshchestvo Krasnogo Kresta v istorii Rossii 1867-1921 gg.” (Ph.D. diss., Stavropol 
State University, 2002); E. N. Kozlovtseva, Moskovskie obshchiny sester miloserdiia v XIX – nachale XX veka 
(Moscow: PSTGU, 2010); A. M. Oleshkova, “Evoliutsiia organizatsii i deiatel’nosti Rossiiskogo obshchestva 
Krasnogo Kresta vo vtoroi pol. XIX v. – 1917 g. (na materialakh Urala)” (Ph.D. diss., Nizhnyi Tagil State 
Pedagogical Academy, 2012); E. V. Okseniuk, Deiatel’nosti Rossiiskogo Krasnogo Kresta v nachale XX veka 
(1903-1914) (Moscow: PSTGU, 2014). 
 
11 Richard G. Robbins, Famine in Russia, 1891-1892 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975); Nancy 
Freiden, Russian Physicians in the Era of Reform and Revolution, 1856-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981); John F. Hutchinson, Politics and Public Health; Laura Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness: Sex 
and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Harley D. 
Balzer, ed., Russia’s Missing Middle Class: The Professions in Russian History (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996); 
Adele Lindemeyr, Poverty Is Not a Vice: Charity, Society, and the State in Imperial Russia (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); Charlotte E. Henze, Disease, Health Care and Government in Late Imperial 
Russia: Life and Death on the Volga, 1823-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2011) 
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masses. This study of the Russian Red Cross pushes the conversation in a new direction: I 
seek to identify not what the state refused to do for medical professional, but what it did do.12   
The Red Cross’s mission also made it unusual among Russian voluntary 
organizations, but not unique among national relief organizations.13 In the modern era, states 
have monopolized war-making, and to expect a government to refuse to direct and intervene 
in the activities of its national aid society runs counter to teleological narratives that have 
viewed the nineteenth century as a period when revolutions in manpower, managerial 
capacity, and industrial output have increased the magnitude of violence armies could 
deliver.14 Therefore, the Russian Red Cross was hardly unique in that it was always under the 
close purview of the state. The German Red Cross was closely aligned with the monarchy 
and military, the Japanese Red Cross was an auxiliary of the military, and, by the turn of the 
twentieth century, the French, British, and even American aid societies had begun to move 
closer to the state.15 But none of these governments totally absorbed their Red Cross societies 
in the decades prior to the First World War, even though the Japanese came very close. 
Membership and donations were usually voluntary, and Red Cross societies possessed 
                                                     
 
12 Jacqueline Lee Friedlander, “Psychiatrists and Crisis in Russia, 1880-1917” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
California, Berkeley, 2007); Elisa M. Becker, Medicine, Law, and the State in Imperial Russia (New York: 
Central European University Press, 2010); Galina Kichigina, The Imperial Laboratory: Experimental 
Physiology and Clinical Medicine in Post-Crimean Russia, The Wellcome Series in the History of Medicine 
(New York: Rodopi, 2009). 
 
13 Pierre Boissier, From Solferino to Tsushima (Geneva: Henri Dunant Institute, 1985). 
 
14 John F. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 
27. 
 
15 Jean H. Quataert, Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women and the National Imagination in Dynastic 
Germany, 1813-1916 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), 243-46; Olive Checkland, 
Humanitarianism and the Emperor’s Japan, 1877-1977 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1994), xii-xiii; Julia F. Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s 
Humanitarian Awakening (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Marian Moser Jones, The American Red 
Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). 
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freedoms to choose which peacetime endeavors to undertake and how to conduct these 
campaigns. My work contributes to this conversation by exploring how the Russia’s national 
aid organization related to the tsarist state, and I analyze how this organization negotiated its 
obligations between wartime mobilization and peacetime benevolence.   
Sources 
The most substantial repository of information on the Russian Red Cross are located 
in the records of this organization’s Main Directorate (Glavnoe upravlenie) in the Russian 
State Military History Archive in Moscow (RGVIA, f. 12,651). This repository contains the 
minutes from the Main Directorate’s meetings, financial reports, policy briefs, 
communications with other ministries, and reports from agents in the field. A second helpful 
resource is the personal files of Maria Fedorovna, the matron of the Russian Red Cross, 
located in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF, f. 642). This microfilm 
collection includes numerous reports on Red Cross projects and activities. The State 
Historical Museum in Moscow holds a small archive with the records for the General 
Zemstvo Organization (GIM, f. 84) and the Moscow Women’s Committee (GIM, f. 17). The 
Central Historical Archive of Moscow houses the files for the Moscow Governor-General, 
another collection with materials on the early Red Cross organization (TsIAM, f. 16). In St. 
Petersburg, I consulted collections for two important figures in the Red Cross, P. M. von 
Kaufman (RGIA, f. 954) and N. P. Balashev (RGIA, f. 892), at the Russian State Historical 
Archive. These documents provided insight into actors who were in the Red Cross during the 
famine-relief campaign of the 1890s and the Russo-Japanese War.  
The Russian Red Cross was by no means modest when it came to informing the 
public of its accomplishments. The organization published an official newsletter, beginning 
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in 1870, Vestnik obshchestva popecheniia o ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh (Herald of the Aid 
Society for Wounded and Sick Soldiers). In 1877, the Russian Red Cross changed the name 
of its newsletter to Vestnik narodnoi pomoshchi (Herald of People’s Aid) and began 
publishing it biweekly. Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, this periodical altered 
its name again to Vestnik Rossiiskogo obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta (Herald of the Russian 
Society of the Red Cross). And once more, after the Russo-Japanese War, they renamed the 
publication Vestnik Krasnogo Kresta (Herald of the Red Cross) and expanded the format into 
a longer, monthly journal. This source reproduced reports from Red Cross institutions, 
transcripts from meetings, treatises on the application of private aid to war, and memoirs 
from Red Cross members. These publications are detailed and informative, but they present 
little criticism of the organization or its members.  
Red Cross agents nearly always produced postwar or campaign reports that detailed 
every action and expense. The Red Cross’s own press or those of Russian state ministries 
published these accounts. After the Russo-Turkish War, for example, several of the surviving 
agents penned lengthy accounts of what the Red Cross accomplished.16 Not long after the 
Russo-Japanese War, the organization synthesized the reports from all of the agents into a 
thick, two-volume set.17 These works were likely published to show the public that the Red 
Cross was accountable for its donations and to prove to the army that this organization made 
a significant contribution to the war effort. Another small but useful set of documents are 
                                                     
16 For example, see S. Kolomnin, Obshchii meditsinksii ocherk Serbo-Turetskoi voiny 1876 g. i tyla armii v 
Bessarabii i Rumynii vo vremia Turetskoi voiny 1877 goda, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: A. Suvorin, 1878); P. A. 
Rikhter, Krasnyi Krest v Rumynii i Severnoi Bolgarii 1877-1878. Otchet glavnoupolnomochennogo obshchestva 
popecheniia o ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh (St. Petersburg: Rossiiskyi Krasnyi Krest, 1879); N. Abaza, Kransyi 
krest v tylu deistvuiushchei armii, 1877-1878, vols. 1-2 (St. Petersburg: Rossiiskoe Obshchestvo Krasnogo 
Kresta, 1880). 
 
17 Otchet o deiatel’nosti Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta vo vremia russko-iaponskoi voiny, vols. 1-2 
(St. Petersburg: Glavnoe upravlenie udelov, 1911). 
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official histories and published collections of documents. Although the official histories often 
present a simplistic and triumphalist view on the state of this organization, these volumes 
offer an encyclopedic synthesis of all of the Red Cross’s activities.18 
Famous physicians would either be commissioned by the Red Cross to inspect 
medical facilities during campaigns and produce book-length reports, as the famous surgeon 
N. I. Pirogov did in 1877, or they published independent studies of medical projects.19 As 
informative as the Red Cross’s official works, these accounts proffer more criticism and 
recommendations. Memoir sources, although they very in quality, sometimes provide 
interesting commentary on what kind of people worked for the Red Cross and what they 
thought about their experiences.20 
Finally, I tapped medical and military journals. Such publications as Vrach 
(Physician), Moskovskaia meditsinskaia gazeta (Moscow Medical Gazette), Meditsinskii 
vestnik (Medical Herald), and Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal (Military-Medical Journal) 
contained accounts about the application of private aid in war. The two most famous military 
journals in tsarist Russia, Voennyi sbornik (Military Miscellany) and Morskoi sbornik (Naval 
Miscellany) offered a few articles on the Geneva Convention and foundation of the Russian 
                                                     
18 See, for example, M.M. Fedorov and V. F. Botsianovskii, Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel’nosti Rossiiskogo 
Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1896); Rossiiskoe Obshchestvo 
Krasnogo Kresta, sostoiashcheee pod Avgusteishim pokrovitesl’stvom ee imperatorskogo velichestva 
gosydaryni imperatritsy Marii Feodorovny. Ocherk vozniknoveniia i deiatel’nosti Rossiiskogo Obshchestva 
Krasnogo Kresta (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1913). 
 
19 N. I. Pirogov, Voenno-vrachebnoe delo i chastnaia pomoshch’ na teatre voiny v Bolgarii i v tylu 
deistvuiushchei armii v 1877-1878 gg., vols. 1-2 (St. Petersburg: Glavnoe upravlenie Obshchestva popecheniia 
o ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh, 1879); E. V. Pavlov, Na Dal’nem Vostoke v 1905 godu, vol. I (St. Petersburg: 
Shmidt, 1907). 
 
20 I located almost all of the memoirs cited in this dissertation using Petr Zaionchkovskii’s index of 
prerevolutionary Russian personal narratives. See, Istoriia dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii v dnevnikhakh i 
vospominanniakh: annotirovannyi ukazatel’ knig i publikatsii v zhurnalakh, vols. 1-5 (Moscow: Kniga, 1976-
1989).  
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Red Cross. I also examined the newspaper Golos (Voice), which supported the Red Cross 
during the Russo-Turkish War, and Novoe vremia (New Time), for its coverage of the Italo-
Abyssinian War, to gain an understanding of how newspapers reported on this organization.  
Structure 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters that chronologically follow the Red 
Cross’s evolution in tsarist Russia. The first chapter analyzes the precursor to the Red Cross, 
the Exaltation Society of Nurses, that Elena Pavlovna created during the Crimean War. A 
visionary Romanov, Elena Pavlovna created this society to alleviate suffering, support 
Russia’s war effort, and respond to British and French projects to mobilize women for war. 
N. I. Pirogov led a detachment of these women and published numerous accounts of their 
exploits in the most widely read journal of the period because he wanted to begin to develop 
nursing as a female profession in Russia, and, inspired by the beginning of the Great Reform-
era, he saw value in expanding public roles for women. The Exaltation Society nearly failed 
because the military would not give the remaining nurses permission to work in army 
hospitals and the nursing order had no peacetime mission or endowment. This chapter 
demonstrates that Russia experienced a precursor to private aid in wartime in the Crimean 
War, so there were supporters of the Red Cross in the tsarist empire before this institution 
existed.  
Chapter 2 shifts the narrative to Europe, where Henri Dunant brought delegates from 
several countries to sign the Geneva Convention in 1864. I consider why Russia waited to 
embrace this movement and then analyze how a small coterie of tsarist subjects with 
connections to the Romanov court convinced the tsar to create a national aid society. These 
activists ran into trouble with Metropolitan Filaret Drozdov, who disliked the secular nature 
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of Russia’s national aid society and felt it was too European for Russia. But autocracy 
trumped Orthodoxy, and the Russian aid society came into being because the court supported 
it, albeit with a few unpopular changes to please Filaret. This chapter identifies some of the 
difficulties of relocating European institutions to Russia, but it demonstrates that Russians 
with connections to the Romanov court could lead reform initiatives.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the Russian Red Cross’s first activities in peacetime. This society 
did not know how to expand its membership or endowment because of the empire’s low-
level of cultural and economic development and because Russia was at peace. What the 
Russians most admired was the United States Sanitary Agency, an organization that taught 
them to consider private initiative and innovation without political subversion. During the 
early years, the Russian Red Cross developed a newsletter to advertise its mission, but the 
organization struggled to attract interest from medical professionals. The Franco-Prussian 
War convinced the Russians that a properly organized, sizeable aid agency could perform 
great feats in war. In chapter 4, I consider how the Russians learned from the Franco-
Prussian War that they needed to conduct peacetime activities to convince the public to 
support the Red Cross. In the 1870s, the Russian Red Cross welcomed private initiative to 
create barracks hospitals for civilians and to raise funds to relieve peasants during the famine 
of 1874. This push to expand the Red Cross into the Russian provinces coincided with the 
implementation of universal conscription in Russia, a reform that private aid advocates 
believed might benefit their organization. By 1875, this society had the capability to manage 
small-scale, isolated philanthropic projects, such as temporary hospitals, and quickly 
organize large-scale famine-relief campaigns. For the Red Cross, visibility was key; the 
project to support troops in Central Asia accomplished little, but that was not the point. 
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Russians had to see their aid organization to understand that it was active and they could 
contribute to it.   
By 1875, the Red Cross was active but not yet popular. The South Slavic uprisings 
against the Turks in the Balkans quickly changed this situation. Chapter 5 discusses how 
Russians embraced the idea of intervening on behalf of their Orthodox coreligionists. The 
missions to assist the South Slavs ran counter to the autocracy’s foreign policy, and mission 
creep, the tendency for military interventions to expand their size and list of objectives as 
new challenges arise, in the Balkans pulled Russia into a war for which its armies were 
unprepared. This chapter considers the Red Cross’s accomplishments in the Russo-Turkish 
War, when this organization drew widespread support from many sides of society. Still, the 
military had to subsidize the Red Cross during this conflict, and many postwar commentators 
believed that private aid was too detached from the military. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the Red Cross during the interwar decades. Largely ignored by the 
military, the Red Cross expanded its activities to target urban populations and continued the 
large-scale famine relief campaigns. I consider the impetus behind these projects and what 
the autocracy and Red Cross planners sought to gain. Lastly, I offer an explanation for why 
nursing did not develop as a profession in tsarist Russia during these years.  
Chapter 7 describes the Red Cross’s efforts at delivering relief during the Russo-
Japanese War. Even though the society was unprepared for war in 1904, the Red Cross 
mobilized tremendous resources for the campaigns in the Far East. I show how doctors used 
the Red Cross as a means to experiment and develop the field of wartime psychiatry. I end by 
discussing a new rival to the Red Cross, the General Zemstvo Organization, a national body 
created by provincial governing bodies to handle wartime relief, and the campaigns in 1905 
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and 1906 to relieve famine in rural Russia. Here the contrast between the ethos of 
philanthropy and charity starkly appear. The Red Cross wanted to help peasants in immediate 
need; the General Zemstvo Organization wanted to transform the peasants so there would be 
no more famines.   
In the final chapter, I discuss three of the Russian Red Cross’s humanitarian missions 
abroad in the decades before World War I. I argue that these missions enabled Russians to 
affirm their status as a European power, use medicine as a form of diplomacy, and alleviate 
domestic pressures. Unlike the humanitarian interventions in the Balkans in 1876, these 
missions were carefully controlled by the state to coincide with Russia’s foreign policy 
interests.  
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CHAPTER 1 – THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE EXALTATION SOCIETY 
Russia possessed a precedent for the Red Cross in the voluntary nursing brigades 
created by Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna during the Crimean War. Amid the strict 
conservatism of Nicholas I’s reign, progressive members of the Romanov court organized 
brigades of volunteer nurses to tend to wounded soldiers in the Crimea. And educated society 
followed these women’s exploits; Morskoi sbornik (Naval Miscellany), the most progressive 
journal of the era, serialized news on the nurses at the front and published their memoirs after 
the war ended in 1856. Therefore, the cultural framework for the foundation of the Russian 
Red Cross did not derive solely from Western imports.21 True, the Geneva Convention of 
1864 and Western influences shaped the structure of and the activities that Russia’s national 
aid society eventually undertook, but the groundwork for what Russians expected this 
organization to accomplish was established by developments in Crimea.       
With Europe’s largest army and a small number of military doctors, Russia’s 
participation in the Crimean War was virtually assured to be a disaster for tsarist soldiers. 
Even though recent scholarship on the Crimean War has questioned whether Russian military 
medical services lagged that far behind their Western adversaries, eyewitness reports and the 
Ministry of War’s immediate reform of the military medical establishment after the Peace of 
Paris in 1856 indicates that contemporary Russians believed the empire desperately needed 
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improvements.22 The Russian Red Cross came to play a role in the project to improve 
military sanitation by training and mobilizing women and civilian doctors to work in wartime 
hospitals, and it encouraged the Russian public to donate medical supplies and monies for 
wartime aid. 
This society’s activity served two purposes. First, the Red Cross drew the educated 
public toward the autocracy, which needed greater participation from below to manage a 
multinational empire struggling with the challenges of modernity. Second, civilian 
participation in relief in the Crimean War enabled the public to know of and correct some of 
the worst abuses within the army, the most important institution in the Russian state. Civilian 
doctors and nurses in the Crimea, as direct agents of the autocracy, possessed an unusual 
capacity to identify corruption within the ranks and police violators. For this reason, when 
Russia created its Red Cross, the early advocates in this project, who had participated in the 
Crimean War, insisted this organization be independent from the military and bureaucracy 
but still under the patronage of the autocracy. The Romanovs’ imperial mandate, therefore, 
gave this organization leeway in deciding how best to conduct wartime relief. This chapter 
analyzes how three exceptional figures, Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna, N. I. Pirogov, and E. 
M. Bakunina, the early head of nurse of this movement, built upon historical precedents and 
established Russia’s first wartime nursing brigades.        
Nursing Societies under Nicholas I     
In many ways similar to the West, Russia possessed a small network of nursing 
societies (obshchiny sester miloserdiia) prior to the Crimean War, and these houses served as 
one type of institutional precursor that would be brought under the auspices of the Russian 
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Red Cross after 1867. France led the way in European nursing with its large network of Saint 
Vincent de Paul’s Filles de la Charité, or Sisters of Charity. This Catholic movement 
emerged during the seventeenth century as a way to reengage the laity by promoting social 
welfare after the French Wars of Religion; by the nineteenth century, the Saint Vincent de 
Paul order had spread chapters across the globe.23 These institutions contracted with 
hospitals, orphanages, and schools to provide trained women to serve as nurses, apothecaries, 
and teachers.24 In Central Europe, the Lutheran Evangelical Theodor Fliedner established the 
Deaconess Institutes in Dortmund in 1844 and in Berlin in 1847. These institutes won the 
support of King Frederick Wilhelm of Prussia, and the network of houses spread to more 
than thirty locations with nearly 1600 deaconesses by the time of Fliedner’s death in 1864. 
Britain and Ireland also possessed communities of Catholic and Anglican nurses in the 
Sellonites in Devonport and Elizabeth Fry’s Institute for Nursing Sisters.25 All of these 
nursing societies had strong religious components, and, while these orders might take on new 
tasks in wartime, the founders emphasized the peacetime missions of caring for the poor, 
sick, and homeless.  
Russia had a strong tradition of Orthodox lay communities, which began to emerge 
after Catherine II reduced the number of female monasteries in 1764. With less opportunity 
to join regular monasteries and the cloistered life of an Orthodox nun unappealing to some, 
lay communities became a space where women, often from the lower estates, could devote 
                                                     
23 Susan E. Dinan, Women and Poor Relief in Seventeenth-Century France: The Early History of the Daughters 
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24 See Colin Jones, The Charitable Imperative: Hospitals and Nursing in Ancien Regime and Revolutionary 
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25 Helen Rappaport, No Place for Ladies: The Untold Story of Women in the Crimean War (London: Arun, 
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themselves to religion and practice charity. These communities usually developed around a 
pious matron who established or managed almshouses in rural Russia. Metropolitan Filaret 
Drozdov, the most important figure in the Russian Orthodox Church from 1821 to 1867, 
encouraged lay communities by providing them with spiritual guidelines and enabling some 
to transform into monasteries. These communities filled a niche in the Russian empire; they 
borrowed the commitment to charity, practiced by some Catholic religious communities in 
the western provinces, and combined this direction with Orthodox piety and peasant 
generosity.26 For practitioners of Russian Orthodoxy, the individual’s selfless donation of 
alms to the suffering was necessary for salvation. What Orthodoxy lacked was Protestant 
Evangelicalism’s commitment to social mission. Mainstream Orthodox believers cared less 
about whether the beggars proved themselves worthy of alms or what they did with the help 
than that the pious frequently made donations to the needy.27 
The Romanov women showed their dedication to Russia by establishing state-
sponsored charities. Catherine II established a number secular institutions, such as foundling 
homes and schools for girls, but her successor, Maria Fedorovna (1759-1828), née Sophie 
Dorothea of Württemberg, the wife of Tsar Paul I (1796-1801), set the imperial standard by 
greatly expanding the number of state-sponsored charities and bringing them under the 
organizational management of the Institutions of Empress Marie, a division of the 
government. Noblewomen followed the empress’s lead by setting up their own charities. 
During the reign of Nicholas I, philanthropic activities emerged as one avenue for ambitious 
                                                     
26 Wendy Rosslyn, Deeds, Not Words: The Origins of Women’s Philanthropy in the Russian Empire 
(Birmingham: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, the University of Birmingham, 2007), 138-44. 
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women to overcome legal restrictions that forbade female participation in voluntary 
associations.28 Russian women prior to the 1870s enjoyed no opportunities in state 
institutions of higher or professional education, but aristocratic culture preferred highborn 
women be trained in European refinements. Under the guidance of private tutors, gentry 
princesses learned French, gained a familiarity with the fine arts, and developed the requisite 
social graces to entertain guests and manage the household.29 A few women transcended 
confinement at home and sought liberation in philanthropic pursuits. The Grand Duchess 
Elizaveta Fedorovna, wife of Nicholas I, and the nobles E. V. Golitsyna and N. Trubetskaia 
were among a small number of women who founded private clinics.30 Others created 
Women’s Charitable Committees (Damskie komitety), the most famous of which was the 
Women’s Patriotic Society, originally founded in 1812 to provide aid to victims of the 
Napoleonic Wars. These women’s committees proliferated during the 1850s and 1860s as an 
outlet for female patriotism.31 
The empire’s wealthiest women established nursing confraternities, which turned 
philanthropy into a full-time occupation.32 The inspiration for Russia’s humanitarian nursing 
communities came from foreign sources. Small communities of the Catholic Sisters of Mercy 
existed in Riga and Vil’na (Vilnius), which had likely been imported from France to the 
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Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before tsarist Russia acquired these provinces. These 
orders managed hospitals and wards for the poor and assisted prisoners.33 Prussia’s 
humanitarian, quasireligious nursing organizations, which were usually tied to patriotic 
leagues for women (Valerländische Frauenvereine), surely also influenced the Romanov and 
other elite Russian women that set up nursing societies. The German nursing orders gave 
“outpatient care” (weibliche Krankenpflege) to the needy and emphasized monarchism, class, 
and patriotism among aristocratic women. 
Two key characteristics of the Prussian-type of nursing societies narrowed their 
appeal to elite women. First, these orders did not pay the nurses, whose devotion was 
supposed to come from maternal love and Christian piety. This policy also ensured that the 
nurse’s lifestyle was really available to aristocratic women only in early nineteenth-century 
Prussia. Second, the nursing orders were quasireligious, meaning these institutions’ members 
were often pious and their mission statements, rules, and names often reflected Christian 
themes. However, Protestant anticlericalism gave little possibility for religious orders to 
develop in Prussia, and these nursing orders avoided several key characteristics of Catholic 
religious orders. Prussian nurses usually took vows pledging loyalty to the order and its 
mission, but, unlike priests or nuns, they could walk away at any time. Also, members of 
Protestant nursing orders could own and inherit property, so long as it remained in the care of 
family members while they resided in the community. Thus elite Prussian women did not 
have to give up their aristocratic pretensions when they signed up for these orders.34 This 
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type aristocratic institution appealed to the Russian nobility during reign of Nicholas I, which 
wanted to expand its social mission without surrendering class pretentions. 
Grand Duchess Aleksandra Nikolaevna and Princess Theresa Ol’denburgskaia 
established Russia’s first nursing community, the Holy Trinity Society (Sviato-Troitskaia 
obshchina), in St. Petersburg in 1844. This society received an imperial charter in 1848,  
which listed a clinic, hospice, school, and reformatory at the facility.35 The purpose of this 
institution was not merely to relieve suffering and care for the sick but also to improve 
behavior, “to lead those who have fallen on the path to truth.”36 The first leader of this 
society, S. A. Biller, was a British Quaker raised in Russia.37 In Moscow, F. P. Gaaz, a doctor 
and renowned prison reformer, and S. S. Shcherbatova founded the Nikolai Community, a 
society associated with the Women’s Ward for the Poor, to treated victims of the cholera 
epidemic of 1848.38   
These early nursing societies began from patriotic and philanthropic desires to relieve 
the sick or help with orphans, particularly girls, and they were not professional medical 
institutions.39 Even though they employed religious symbols and slogans, these institutions 
were not part of the Orthodox Church. A women’s committee headed by Princess Aleksandra 
Nikolaevna and staffed by noble women and other court favorites oversaw the Holy Trinity 
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Society.40 Women between the ages of twenty and forty were permitted to join or leave the 
society freely, so long as they passed the probationary training period and remained 
unmarried. Nurses could own property, but it had to stay with their parents or remain in the 
care of financial institutions while they served.41 These communities even lacked the 
requirement that nurses be Orthodox. However, the societies regulated behavior, visiting 
hours, work regiment, and uniforms. Nurses were not allowed personal clothes or items, and 
any monies that they earned became the property of the society.42 The lifestyle may have 
mandated simplicity, but the fact these women acted as full-time philanthropists made them 
atypical for Nicholaevan Russia. Each nursing home employed a doctor tasked with 
instructing the women in all medical procedures associated with the feldsher (paramedic) 
trade except bloodletting.43 And nurses taught at the primary school for poor girls as well.44  
Prior to the Crimean War, Russia’s nursing communities conducted poor relief and 
gave limited medical assistance. In times of national emergency, these organizations might 
provide some assistance to wounded soldiers, but that was not their full-time occupation. 
Once Russia was drawn to war with Turkey in 1853, and Britain, France, and several minor 
states intervened the following year, concern for the substantial number of wounded led 
Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna to create the first nursing community specifically designed 
for war relief, the Exaltation of the Cross Society (Krestovozdvizhenskaia obshchina), the 
true precursor of the Russian Red Cross. This institution enjoyed success at the front and in 
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the press due to two principle actors: Russia’s most exceptional woman of her era, Grand 
Duchess Elena Pavlovna, and the empire’s most renowned surgeon, Nikolai Ivanovich 
Pirogov, who led the Exaltation Society during its wartime trial.  
Elena Pavlovna 
Born Princess Friederike Charlotte Maria of Württemburg in 1806, the future Grand 
Duchess Elena Pavlovna’s life in many ways resembled her German predecessor Empress 
Catherine II’s experiences in Russia. Both princesses moved to Russia at young ages for 
nuptial arrangements; neither enjoyed a happy marriage; and both dedicated considerable 
effort toward improving their adopted empire. Educated in Paris at the private lycée of 
Madame Campan, the future Elena Pavlovna moved to St. Petersburg in 1823 to marry 
Mikhail Pavlovich, Tsar Alexander I’s younger brother. Like her renowned Pomeranian 
predecessor, Elena Pavlovna quickly mastered Russian and converted to Orthodoxy. She 
displayed a deep interest in science, art, and medicine, and possessed Peter I’s compulsion to 
learn directly from leading specialists.45 The marriage to Mikhail Pavlovich proved trying, 
since he was an awkward martinet, who, similar to his father, disdained the company of 
intelligent women and sought escape on the parade ground. Even though the Russian court’s 
formalities bored Elena Pavlovna, her charm and tact left a deep impression on all those she 
encountered. Maria Fedorovna, Elena Pavlovna’s mother-in-law, placed the network of state-
sponsored charitable institutions, the Department of the Institutions of Empress Maria, at the 
young princess’s disposal in 1828.46 This department managed a web of medical and 
educational institutions and possessed capital reserves that grew to equal some state 
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ministries.47 Empowered by talent, wit, and, the most precious of tsarist commodities, 
proximity to the sovereign, “the scholar of the family,” as Nicholas I labeled her, soon 
broadened her interests from philanthropy to legal reform.48          
Around 1845, Elena Pavlovna began hosting a salon at the Mikhailovskii Palace that 
drew a diverse group of Russian bureaucrats, nobles, and even some nonaristocratic 
professionals. The atmosphere of the salon shifted from charades and literary aesthetics to 
political debates and reform projects after Mikhail Pavlovich’s death in 1849.49 Nicholas’s 
Russia may have become more closed after the Revolutions of 1848, but Elena Pavlovna’s 
clique remained the clubhouse for the coterie of men Bruce Lincoln labeled the “enlightened 
bureaucrats.”50 Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, the minister of the navy; Prince D. A. 
Obolenskii, minister of justice; the Miliutin brothers, future ministers interior and war; 
historian K. D. Kavelin; and Prince V. A. Cherkasskii frequently attended these soirees. This 
group closely followed the Slavophile-Westernizer debates of the 1840s and 1850s and 
dissected ideas coming from European progressives. Devoted to “a better order in Russia,” 
this company envisioned the autocracy as the only viable engine for change.51 Protected by 
their proximity to Nicholas I, who resided in the building next door, this group began to 
experiment with minor innovations during the Crimean War as the “Iron Tsar’s” health 
                                                     
47 Adele Lindenmeyr, Poverty is Not a Vice, 75. 
 
48 W. Bruce Lincoln, “The Circle of the Grand Duchess Yelena Pavlovna, 1847-1861,” The Slavonic and East 
European Review 48, no. 112 (July 1970): 375. 
 
49 Paige Lincoln Thorner Snoddy, “A Jewel of the Crown: Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna’s Crusade for 
Autocratic Reform in Mid-Nineteenth Century Russia,” (M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina – Chapel 
Hill, 1996), 25-44.  
 
50 Lincoln, “The Circle,” 374-5. 
 
51 Ibid., 380; D. A. Obolenskii, “Moi vospominaniia o Velikoi Kniagine Elene Pavlovne,” Russkaia starina 137 
(March 1909): 505. 
 28 
 
faded. Subsequently, during the reign of Alexander II, the same group of statesmen who 
graced Elena Pavlovna’s salon came into their inheritance and introduced reforms into every 
corner of the Russian state and society.  Elena Pavlovna was not merely hostess to the 
reformers: She actively involved herself in the emancipation of the serfs by chairing a key 
inquiry on the serf question from the German spa of Wilbad in 1857, by experimenting with 
emancipation plans on her estate in Karlovka, and by personally goading Alexander II into 
action, all of which shaped the legislation Russia implemented in 1861. She also expanded 
Russian charities during the 1860s and promoted the fine arts by founding the Russian 
Musical Society with A. G. Rubenshtein and Iu. F. Abaza in 1868.52    
The most remarkable Russian woman of her era, Elena Pavlovna’s ambition, position, 
and connections to the best the tsarist empire had to offer enabled her to create the Exaltation 
of the Cross Society, Russia’s first wartime nursing society and precursor to the Red Cross, 
during the Crimean War. In order to give this project legitimacy and ensure it had a chance at 
success, she turned to Russia’s most prominent doctor of the nineteenth century, N. I. 
Pirogov, for direction.     
N. I. Pirogov 
Nikolai Ivanovich Pirogov bore the most responsibility for promoting the idea that 
Russia needed wartime nursing. Pirogov not only led groups of Exaltation Society nurses to 
the Crimean theater of war, but he also advocated on behalf of women’s future in medicine 
by praising these nurses in one of the most progressive journals of the 1850s, Morksoi 
sbornik, the Ministry of the Navy’s official publication. One of tsarist Russia’s most famous 
surgeons and a hero to the nineteenth-century intelligentsia, Pirogov was the second most 
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important backer these women could have secured. Educated progressives such as Pirogov 
demanded and steered the Great Reforms and, in this case, scientific and patriotic renown 
lent legitimacy to the foundation of and support for the Russian Red Cross. 
At an early age, fate guided Pirogov toward medicine. While the future surgeon 
attended V. S. Kriazhev’s private school for noble children, Pirogov’s father, a low-level 
civil servant, found himself involved in a scandal resulting from the disappearance of thirty 
thousand rubles of state funds. Investigators held the father responsible for repaying this 
debt, a burden that ruined the family’s finances and caused them to lose their property. 
Without tuition money to continue secondary studies, Pirogov prepared independently for the 
entrance exam of the Medical Faculty of Moscow University.53 As scholars such as Nancy 
Frieden have shown, medicine was hardly a profitable career in tsarist Russia.54 At age 
fourteen, with the help of a forged document that increased his age to the state-mandated 
sixteen, Pirogov entered the Medical Faculty. A talented student in a dour institution, Pirogov 
left Moscow to continue his studies at Dorput University, a German-speaking institution, at 
which the aspiring surgeon first encountered Western medical innovations and liberal ideas 
about education.55 Pirogov defended his dissertation on the abdominal aorta in 1832 and left 
for further study of surgery in Berlin and Paris. During one of these trips in 1837, the young 
Pirogov first encountered women serving as nurses in a Parisian hospital, an experience that 
convinced him of the possibilities of employing women in medicine.56 At the end of the 
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decade, he returned to Dorput to teach surgery and became a traveling sensation in the Baltic 
provinces, meandering from town to town to perform surgeries. The 1830s brought Pirogov a 
profession and popularity, but in the 1840s he achieved scholarly repute. 
Pirogov left Dorput for the Medical-Surgical Academy in St. Petersburg, Russia’s 
flagship medical institute. In 1838, the Russian state transferred management of the Medical-
Surgical Academy from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of War. Recognizing 
opportunity in this bureaucratic reshuffling, Pirogov persuaded the new director, Count P. A. 
Kleinmikhel’, to open a surgical clinic for medical students. Kleinmikhel’ promoted Pirogov 
to Professor of Hospital Surgery and appointed him to run the facility in 1841. Five years 
later, Russia founded the Institute of Anatomy and again made Pirogov the director. During 
the 1840s, Pirogov developed an interest in etherization, an innovation that became one of 
tsarist Russia’s most famous contributions to Western surgical practice. Beginning with 
experiments on animals, he soon moved to painless operations on unconscious humans.57  
In 1847, the Ministry of War commissioned Pirogov to travel to the Caucasus to 
instruct doctors on etherization in an active theater of war. At the time, Russia faced an 
ongoing insurgency in the Caucasus, and the inhospitable terrain of mountain warfare, 
mobile adversaries, and the distance from St. Petersburg caused this corner of the empire to 
become the laboratory for imperial military and political innovations. Pirogov witnessed the 
siege of Salta, at which he conducted medical procedures in unorthodox, makeshift 
lazarettos. This experience provided him with the human subjects who led to several studies 
                                                     
56 N. I. Pirogov, Sevastopol’skie pis’ma, ed. Iu. G. Malis (St. Petersburg: M. Merkushchev, 1907), 6; N. I. 
Pirogov, Sevastopol’skie pis’ma i vospominaniia, ed. S. I. Shtrakh (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1950), 
196. 
 
57 Malis, N. I. Pirogov, 36-37, 39-40, 46. 
 31 
 
on gunshot wounds, battlefield amputation, starch dressings, and anesthesia in surgery, the 
last of which soon became a staple of Russian military medical practice before it was widely 
practiced in the West.58 The following year Pirogov returned to St. Petersburg and answered 
an invitation from Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna, who wished to make the acquaintance of 
the ambitious surgeon. Encouraged by the grand duchess to give free reign to his 
experiments, Pirogov busied himself studying Asiatic cholera, which had reached epidemic 
proportions in Russia in 1848. For the next six years until he left for the Crimea, he ran the 
Department of Hospital Surgery and conducted procedures or gave consultations in the 
largest hospitals of St. Petersburg.  
War drew Pirogov to the Crimea, and, as a talented surgeon and patriotic Russian, he 
submitted an application to serve as a volunteer doctor for the military. At first Pirogov’s 
petition went unanswered, but he soon thereafter received a letter from the grand duchess 
informing him that she had interceded on his behalf. Elena Pavlovna invited Pirogov to lead 
the project to send nurses to the front, giving him full freedom to select the doctors for this 
mission.59 Pirogov consented to the project and began training the nurses at his clinic to dress 
wounds and care for patients. Even though he admitted that the nurses were hastily trained 
and sometimes poorly selected, he staked his reputation on the project and embarked for the 
Crimea with the first group of twenty-eight nurses in October 1854. 
In the Crimea, Pirogov worked closely with nurses in Simferopol and Sevastopol, 
only leaving for a short trip to coalesce during the summer of 1855. The war taught him to 
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treat wounded extremities with gypsum dressings, opting to let wounds heal instead of 
rushing to amputate. He introduced an efficient system of triage at the Nobles’ Assembly, the 
main lazaretto during the Siege of Sevastopol.60 Here he observed that infections spread in 
unclean, closed facilities and advocated for ventilation to counter deadly miasmas. Never 
bashful when confronted with malpractice, Pirogov railed against hospital administrators’ 
mismanagement and staffers’ criminality in the wards.61 He found an ally in the nurses, 
whom he tasked with bedside care and housekeeping duties and whom he praised for keeping 
male sanitary workers in line. Following the fall of Sevastopol, he retreated north with the 
remaining Russian forces, treating evacuated soldiers in Simferopol and in southern Russia 
until the end of the war. Pirogov later published a guidebook on wartime surgery, The 
Universal Principles of Battlefield Surgery, which appeared in German in 1863 and in 
Russian two years later.62  
Pirogov ceased practicing medicine during the early period of Alexander II’s reign 
and devoted himself to reshaping Russia through education, a pursuit that won him a 
reputation as a visionary rather than as a pragmatist. His greatest publication of the period, 
“Questions of Life (Voprosy zhizni),” argued that future citizens required a diverse education 
rooted in the humanities, an idea that became fundamental to early reform efforts in 
education.63 Invited by Minister of Education A. S. Norov to serve as the curator of the 
school districts of Odessa and Kiev, Pirogov introduce numerous changes to curricula, 
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classroom practices, and extracurricular activities. His most controversial measures expanded 
educational opportunities for women, Jews, Muslims, and adults. As historian William 
Mathes suggested, these reforms probably went too far, too quickly, and the Ministry of 
Education stripped Pirogov of his powers by reassigning him in March 1861.64 For the next 
five years, Pirogov traveled and worked on special projects for the Ministry of Education 
before retiring to his estate in Vishnia, Ukraine, where he resumed practicing medicine until 
his death in 1881. A favorite of the Russian Red Cross, Pirogov resurfaced during the 
Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish Wars to inspect and compose reports on wartime 
medical facilities and practices.               
This physician’ vision helped Russia recognize the benefit of a national aid society, 
staffed by well-trained nurses. Even though he lacked the subtlety for tsarist politics, Pirogov 
shared many of the same characteristics as the enlightened bureaucrats who implemented the 
Great Reforms and later served the Russian Red Cross. Similar to many midcentury 
progressive bureaucrats, he was destined for state service due to his family’s limited financial 
means. Education in Dorput, a command of German, and travels abroad exposed him to 
progressive ideas emanating from Europe. A stint in the Caucasus provided Pirogov with the 
impetus for innovation and a laboratory in which to experiment. The Crimean War forced 
him to reckon with Russia’s weaknesses and sparked new innovations: in this case, the 
introduction of civilian medical workers to war. Lastly, by advocating on behalf of expanded 
educational opportunities for women, Pirogov opened the door for women to enter the 
medical profession in Russia. His collaboration with Elena Pavlovna was the first step toward 
the creation of the Russian Red Cross. 
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Russian Nurses in Crimea 
All three of the major combatants in the Crimean campaign—Russia, Britain, and 
France—mobilized women for service during this conflict, a coincidental development that 
was by no means an historical accident. Educated readers in the three major powers shared a 
common discourse, and the ideas for mobilizing women to serve in military hospitals 
informed one another across European borders. English-speaking scholars have long drawn 
attention to how an exposé in The Times on 12 October 1854 spurred public opinion to 
demand improvement in sanitary conditions for the British wounded, and Florence 
Nightingale, propelled by this outcry, wrangled permission from reluctant officials to 
organize a nursing brigade to sail to the East.65 Nightingale enjoyed success in this endeavor 
and is today the chief heroine of Crimea.  
Britain, with its liberal traditions of private property and proud experience with 
private initiative, led the way in mobilizing civilian resources and public opinion in this 
conflict. Nightingale was one of many civilians: Alexis Soyer, the celebrated cook, taught the 
army to manage its canteens; Sir Joseph Paxton and Sir Thomas Peto built roads and 
railroads in the Crimea; and W. S. Lindsay, the shipping magnate, saw expeditionary warfare 
as boon to business.66 But the success of Nightingale’s mission was by no means 
preordained. Her pestering of bureaucrats won nurses access to military hospitals in Scutari 
and Balaklava, far from the front, and British commanders, anxious the nurses would 
undermine discipline or generate scandals if killed or captured, did as much as they could to 
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forbid these women from proceeding anywhere near the fighting.67 Nightingale’s nurses were 
hardly the only British women in the theater of war. Many women traveled to the Crimea as 
state-sanctioned wives and laundresses, accompanying the troops “on the strength,” or 
following the armies as privileged officers’ wives, stowaways, or tourists.68 Nightingale’s 
vision of officially recognized, secular brigades of nurses, who were skilled in medicine and 
fulfilled a peacetime as well as wartime role in hospital care, affected the early advocates of 
wartime nursing in Russia.  
 By war’s end, Nightingale had hired, trained, and paid over two hundred women to 
work in Scutari and other British medical facilities in the East. All nurses signed a contract 
with the state that entitled them to pay of twelve to eighteen shillings a week, a good salary 
for a laboring British woman. Despite her preference for unattractive, lower-class women 
who lacked a certain allure, Nightingale had to dismiss many of her nurses for drunkenness 
and lechery in the hospitals. However, in the end, Nightingale succeeded in winning over 
public opinion to the plight of the wounded, and in 1860 she set up a training school at the St. 
Thomas hospital to reproduce her vision of nurses professionally trained in medicine.69     
The French had trained nurses from the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul and 
cantinières, women who were permitted to follow the army to sell victuals to troops. In fact, 
Thomas Chenery’s report in The Times on the deplorable treatment in Scutari, the very article 
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that prompted Nightingale’s success, sparked the British to action by reminding readers that 
the French already had Sisters of Charity in the theater of war.70 The French Military Medical 
Services actually drafted these women, but their perceived role as consolers instead of 
medics earned them ire from Florence Nightingale, who sought to establish nursing as a 
secular profession.71 Educated Russians learned of Nightingale’s actions from British 
newspapers, but they contributed to this same dialogue as well. Elena Bakunina, a Russian 
nurse in the Crimea, published letters in The Times.72 The tsarist public, however, could not 
force change on its own because of the autocratic political structure that required all change 
to come from above. In Russia’s case, the introduction of voluntary aid workers to war came 
from within the Romanov family itself, a peculiarity that led to a significant difference 
between the adversaries’ experiences with nurses in the Crimean War. British commanders 
did all they could to keep Nightingale away from the front, but Russian nurses, armed with 
Elena Pavlovna’s mandate, dispatched to where they were needed the most, besieged 
Sevastopol, a testing ground that blurred the division between front and rear.  
It took the embarrassment at the Battle of Alma in 1854, at which tsarist military 
medical authorities proved woefully unprepared to treat the wounded, to prod Elena 
Pavlovna to action.73 After hearing news of this engagement, the grand duchess turned to 
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Minister of War V. A. Dolgorukov and persuaded him to issue a decree founding the 
Exaltation Society оn 28 October 1854, Russia’s first nursing society devoted to wartime 
service. She advertised soon after for volunteers and petitioned V. V. Pelikan, the head of the 
Military Medical Department, to train the nurses in the Second Military Hospital in St. 
Petersburg. Elena Pavlovna never confessed where she got the idea for creating this society, 
but she surely was aware of the urban nursing societies in Russia and knew of Nightingale’s 
efforts in Great Britain. D. A. Obolenskii, an intimate of the Grand Duchess’s salon, wrote 
years later that during the war the fate of the wounded was never far from her mind, and 
Pirogov had been petitioning her with projects to aid the wounded since 1854.74 
The idea to mobilize women for the front was quite radical for Russia at the time 
since military discipline insisted that women be forbidden from working in military hospitals 
and by their nature were incompatible with the “exclusive preserve of the military 
profession.”75 The Russian commander in the Crimean theater, A. S. Menshikov, surmised 
that the nurses would spread syphilis in the ranks.76 N. O. Sukhozanet was reported to have 
told the emperor that junior officers would “knock up” (obriukhatit’) the nurses.77 Emperor 
Nicholas I supposedly viewed women attending at the beds of soldiers as “unforgivable 
freethinking.”78 But Elena Pavlovna found a sympathetic ear in Grand Duke Konstantin 
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Nikolaevich, who permitted female nurses to work in two naval hospitals. Chartered in 
October 1854, the first group of thirty-two Exaltation nurses assembled for a quick training 
course in a wing of the Kalinkinsk Hospital and departed for the Crimea in early 
November.79 Even Pirogov, the leader of these nurses, wrote to his wife that he harbored 
reservations about the project in December 1854. He admitted to A. A. Pirogova that “up to 
this time there is no word of amorous intrigues with the officers, but [they] have already 
begun to speak of it, so I forbade nurses from being dispatched to junior officers, all the more 
so since there are few serious patients [among them].80 These concerns, it seems, proved 
unfounded, and Pirogov would later become the loudest advocate for wartime nursing.   
In total, slightly more than 160 Russian women answered the call to serve as nurses 
of the Exaltation Society during the war and postwar evacuation to the Russian interior. 
Seventeen of these women perished during the conflict. Additionally, at least eighty-five 
Compassionate Widows from the St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa Women’s Shelters 
served in some capacity as nurses in Crimea.81 Unlike British nurses who received salaries 
from the state, Russian private aid was truly private. The grand duchess paid for the nurses’ 
uniforms, travel, and supplies with two hundred thousand rubles of her own funds and 
supplementary donations from Nicholas I and private sources, but none of the volunteers 
received monetary remuneration for their efforts.82 A few of the patriotic Russian women 
came from the elite ranks of society—E. K. Bakunina or A. P. Stakhovich even had 
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connections at court—but most nurses were military wives or other commoners.83 After the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Paris in March 1856, nurses in the Crimea and along the Black 
Sea coastline assisted with the evacuation of the wounded back to central Russia. And, as 
indicated by one memoir source, a few women from Finland served as nurses during the 
bombardment of Sveaborg fortress outside Helsinki in 1855.84 The number of Russian 
women who volunteered in the Crimean War may have been limited, but the numerous 
letters and memoirs that appeared in Morskoi sbornik suggest that a clique of bureaucrats was 
encouraged to know of the female contribution to the war effort. 
Russian Nurses in the Press  
The heroic descriptions in the press of the Exaltation nurses’ wartime exploits 
situated these women among the ranks of the heroic defenders of Sevastopol, a myth that 
pervaded the Russian memory of war up to the present. During the Crimean War, however, 
as Louise McReynolds has argued in her work on the mass-circulation press, Russian readers 
had limited access to news from the front in their native language.85 In contrast to Britain, 
Nicholas I refused to enable a market-based public sphere to develop because of concerns 
that Russian literature would degenerate into a dissolute gabfest or be inundated with 
subversive political rhetoric. Thus, when Russian readers turned to their newspapers for 
tidings on the war, they found mostly official bulletins. Even though tsarist readers’ access to 
information on the war was limited, educated Russians could find detailed information on the 
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pages of Morskoi sbornik.86 This periodical, which during the Crimean War enjoyed 
unprecedented freedom to publish on a wide variety of political, social, scientific, and even 
philosophical themes, quickly became one of the most widely read “thick journals” in 
Russia.87 Although Morskoi sbornik contained advertisements for women to volunteer as 
nurses in 1854, the first articles documenting the Exaltation nurses’ accomplishments 
appeared in spring 1855, after Nicholas I had died.88 These articles combined lengthy 
quotations from Pirogov’s reports to Elena Pavlovna and excerpts from letters by individual 
nurses describing daily activities at the front, and this content suggests that these publications 
were compiled with the grand duchess’s assent.89 
Literary accounts on the nurses began to appear in Morskoi sbornik at this time for 
three important reasons. First, educated society awoke to the errors of Nicholas I’s reign 
during the war. The “Iron Tsar” expired on 2 March 1855, and while he would not have 
agreed with A. V. Nikitenko’s appraisal of the entire reign as “a mistake,” rumor had it that 
he pined for change on his deathbed. At war under a new tsar, Russia stood at critical 
juncture in its history. Amid this uncertainty, new opportunities for shaping policy arose that 
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depended on public opinion. In a society primarily made up of illiterate serfs, public opinion 
remained largely confined to government elites, the same individuals who read Morskoi 
sbornik and possessed the talent and connections to prompt the young tsar to enact reforms.90 
Second, the nurses had recently arrived in the theater of war as part of a new project, which 
supporters wanted to see succeed. Historian Iu. A. Naumova speculated that these essays may 
have been published to allay conservative generals’ fears that the nurses undermined 
discipline at the front.91 She is probably correct in this assertion, since Elena Pavlovna knew 
there were more than a few critics of her project among the office corps. Third, the head of 
the Russian navy, Konstantin Nikolaevich, the man responsible for turning Morskoi sbornik 
into novel forum for political discussion and reform, was an inner member of Elena 
Pavlovna’s salon and supporter of the Exaltation nurses. Personal and familial connections 
thus surely played a role in bringing these accounts to print. 
These accounts emphasized that nurses were integral to the war effort and they did 
their part as patriotic members of Russian society, serving selflessly and rooting out 
corruption where it occurred. All of the contemporary accounts stressed the danger and 
courage of the wartime experience. While no women or civilians participated in combat, the 
nurses suffered through bombardments, epidemics, shortages of supplies, sleepless nights, 
and tireless labor at gruesome tasks. One source stated, “Everyday, under enemy fire, with 
danger for our own lives at the dressing stations, nurses not only tended to the wounded, but 
dressed them and aided the medics with amputations.”92 Another recounted a scene in which 
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a soldier whom she was dragging to safety had his head blown apart by an exploding shell.93 
An account from the bombardment of Sveaborg mentioned that the shelling lasted forty-six 
hours. After transporting and dressing patients throughout this engagement, nurses collapsed 
on the floor and slept between the patients.94 Later Russian volunteer aid workers, in part 
because of the precedent set during siege warfare in the Crimean War, believed efforts to 
relieve suffering were best performed as close to the battlefield as possible. When Russia 
went to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1877, the Russian Red Cross continued this tradition 
by outfitting independent units to act in the theater of operations immediately behind the 
front lines.                    
These published letters also appealed to patriotic sentiments among the Russian 
public to win donations for the wartime medical effort. Many of the letters ended with 
grocery lists for specific items. For example, Pirogov personally asked for a sanitary 
chemical solution produced by the Zhdanov factory, and the editor of this compilation of 
letters reminded readers of Morskoi sbornik that donations for the Exaltation Society could 
be delivered to the Ministry of the Navy’s Commissariat Department.95 Subsequent requests 
asked for food, tobacco, and medical supplies.96 And Morskoi sbornik published lists of 
donors and made a point to register the names of the volunteers who served in the Exaltation 
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Society.97 These rosters identified the husbands or fathers of each nurse, providing the reader 
with a social profile of the group. Some members of the group were daughters or wives of 
landowners and state councilors, but more than a few came from the families of lower-tiered 
officers, burghers, or merchants. The decision to publish these lists showed the readers of 
Morskoi sbornik that the Exaltation Society was based on egalitarian principles. By 
encouraging the readers to donate supplies and money for the maintenance of the Exaltation 
Society and by proclaiming the nursing brigades open to energetic women of all estates, 
Morskoi sbornik sought to inspire the public to play a greater role in supporting the welfare 
of all the empire’s subjects.  
Pirogov himself advocated on behalf of greater opportunities for women as nurses 
and supported private aid in war in a published report to Elena Pavlovna and his “Historical 
Survey of the Activities of the Exaltation of the Cross Society Nurses,” both of which first 
appeared in Morskoi sbornik.98 In these essays, Pirogov historicized the exploits of the 
Exaltation nurses and offered recommendations on how to employ medical volunteers in 
future wars. By listing the exploits of individual nurses, Pirogov sought to make E. M. 
Bakunina, E. P. Kartseva, A. P. Stakhovich, and others household names for a Russian public 
eager for tales of heroism. He detailed how these women were dispatched to numerous 
hospitals and lazarettos in Sevastopol, Simferopol, Kherson, and other towns in Crimea and 
Southern Ukraine. At the most critical hours of the siege, Pirogov recounted, the nurses 
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tended to hundreds of wounded at the Nobles’ Assembly, the main lazaretto in Sevastopol, 
and worked under bombardment from enemy fire. These women were “indifferent to fear and 
revealed no aversion to the most frightful destruction of human bodies.”99  
Nursing brigades, Pirogov argued, worked best when they were small and had 
members assigned to specific duties, which he listed as “housekeepers, apothecaries, and 
wound-dressers.” He tasked nurses with keeping written records of any shortages or 
derelictions they observed in the wards.100 The nurses’ oversight improved morale, overcame 
patients’ mistrust, and compelled the military hospital workers to stop pilfering from the 
wounded.101 Pirogov concluded his survey by asking future generations to judge to what 
extent this society carried out its mission, a call to educated Russian to expand opportunities 
for women in public and professional life.102 The “Historical Survey” must have drawn 
attention from the reading public because sections of this work and Pirogov’s reports to 
Elena Pavlovna quickly appeared in other prominent publications such as Severnaia pchela 
(The Northern Bee).103  
The two most prominent medical surveys of the Crimean War, Pirogov’s General 
Principles of Battlefield Surgery and Doctor Kh. Ia. von Giubbenet’s Essay on the Medical 
and Hospital Divisions of Russian Forces in Crimea, 1854-1856, praised the work done by 
the nurses and envisioned deployments for trained nurses in Russia’s future wars.104 Pirogov 
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admitted he was surprised “weak women” bustled day and night for the wounded. He saw 
great promise in the women who led the evacuation, claiming “they followed the transports, 
going from one cart to the other and warming the frozen with wine, and at night they poured 
them warm tea and coffee.” In the winter, they dressed the evacuees in warm clothing so that 
mortality rates among the evacuees were not much higher than sedentary patients. Pirogov 
concluded that Russia should found a wartime “medical transport command made-up of 
doctors, feldshers, and nurses.” This voluntary aid society, a proto-Red Cross, would relieve 
military medical authorities of having to handle evacuation and treatment in the rear, thereby 
freeing more personnel to serve at the front. For the aid society to be most beneficial to the 
military, it must be free to acquire the skills it deemed necessary and “enjoy full 
independence in its activities.”105 Pirogov viewed independence as a crucial starting point for 
private aid in war because his experience in Crimea taught him to mistrust the military to 
deliver support services effectively.  
In a much later letter from 1876, titled “On the Exaltation of the Cross Society,” 
addressed to Countess E. F. Raden,106 Elena Pavlovna’s secretary, Pirogov argued that the 
experiment with dispatching nurses in the Crimean War had been successful because of the 
women’s feminine tact, sensitivity, and independence from service requirements, all of which 
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enabled them to counter staff officers’ abuses. Although he admitted there were some 
problems with gossips, uneducated nurses, and insubordinates, Pirogov still felt this project 
had great potential. But this potential hinged on the independence needed to develop nursing 
into a scientific, secular profession. Unlike in the West, where nursing societies were often 
under auspices of religious denominations, Pirogov insisted: “Our Sister of Mercy should not 
be an Orthodox nun.” Instead, she should possess “practical intellect” and a “solid technical 
education” but still “preserve a sensitive heart.”107 Always the humanist, Pirogov articulated 
that expanding female education and opening new professional opportunities for women 
would enable talented women to improve Russia’s health. 
Pirogov’s medical rival, Kh. Ia. von Giubbenet, a professor from Kiev, shared the 
view that Russia’s experiment with nurses in the Crimean War produced fruitful results.108 
Von Giubbenet’s account located the impetus for action with Konstantin Nikolaevich, who at 
the beginning of the war encouraged civilians and government workers to donate medical 
supplies and foodstuffs to a special committee to aid wounded sailors. The result of this 
drive, von Giubbenet contended, was that sailors had much better medical and provisional 
support at the beginning of the war.109 Once Elena Pavlovna and Maria Aleksandrovna, the 
wife of the future Tsar Alexander II, heard of this private initiative to aid sailors, they 
organized the Exaltation Society and dispatched Pirogov and von Giubbenet to lead the 
brigades.110 Von Giubbenet believed that the Exaltation Society’s activities gave female aid 
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in war a more “defined and permanent character.” Since it was no secret that Russia’s 
wartime losses were frightfully high, even among doctors and medical students, it came as 
little surprise that Pirogov and von Giubbenet both agreed Russia needed to mobilize as 
many civilian doctors and nurses as possible in future conflicts.111  
Eyewitnesses to the Crimean War created a small but important discourse in the 
military and medical press that advocated for civilian medical workers, especially women, to 
participate in wartime relief. Russia’s greatest bard at the time, Leo Tolstoy, even included 
two commonplace vignettes of female nurses in his Sebastopol Sketches, a choice that 
suggested readers were well aware of these women’s involvement in the recent war.112 But 
postwar plans for the Exaltation Society were ambiguous. Since the Exaltation nurses only 
agreed to one-year commitments during the war, it seems that Elena Pavlovna had never 
decided what to do with this institution after the conflict. In the decade from the Treaty of 
Paris to the foundation of the Russian Red Cross in 1867, the empire’s number of nursing 
societies increased, but questions persisted on how these institutions were to be structured 
and funded and what role they were to play in medicine and charity. Also, there was 
confusion at the top over the proper relationship between the nursing orders and the 
Orthodox Church. Russians asked: Should the nursing societies resemble religious orders in 
the West, or should they have a secular character?  
These questions arose during an era of profound change in Russia. The younger and 
more energetic Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) encouraged freer debate on political topics 
and listened to voices within the state bureaucracies calling for change. Over the next two 
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decades, Russia reformed nearly every state institution, abolished serfdom, expanded 
education, opened associational life to private initiatives, welcomed industrialization, and 
expanded the empire’s borders into Central Asia. Even though the Slavophile-Westernizer 
debate pervaded all state policies during the era, and no shortage of Russians voiced 
suspicions that changes had gone too far, Russia had made great strides in modernizing its 
governing institutions by the end of Alexander II’s reign. The creation of the Russian Red 
Cross portrayed the possibilities and limitations of the Great Reform-era. After some 
reservations, Russia began to restructure many of its disparate nursing societies into a 
national Red Cross organization from 1867 onwards. The last section of this chapter and the 
next tells the story of how a small group of Russians, with ties to the court and nursing 
movement, embraced the idea that public initiative, under autocratic oversight, could aid 
tsar’s soldiers in war.   
E. M. Bakunina 
Ekaterina Mikhailovna Bakunina, the Russian version of Florence Nightingale kept 
the Exaltation Society together following the Crimean War. Elena Pavlovna entrusted her 
with running the Exaltation Society due to her service in the war and good rapport with 
Pirogov and other elites. Born into a family of service nobles in 1810, Bakunina at first 
embraced the domestic comforts her station provided. Her father, M. M. Bakunin, served as 
the governor of St. Petersburg. Both of her brothers followed similar career paths. Her 
mother, née Varvara Golenishcheva-Kutuzova, was a patroness of the theater and a gifted 
writer. No talent was lost on the elder sisters of the family, Evdokiia and Praskov’ia: One 
grew up to be a famous artist, and the other a popular poet. The black sheep of the family 
turned out to be the cousin, Mikhail Bakunin, the famous anarchist, whom Ekaterina visited 
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in the Schlüsselburg prison as Mother Superior of the Exaltation Society. Ekaterina’s youth 
corresponded closely with the position afforded by her birth, carefree studying under elite 
private tutors and dabbling in music, dancing, and art. When she reached her twenties, the 
family’s financial position became strained. A suitable dowry for Ekaterina may have been 
beyond the family’s means, and this shortcoming probably influenced her decision to eschew 
the aristocratic lifestyle.113 With the graces of an aristocrat, the devotion of an intelligent, and 
the piety of an Orthodox Russian, Bakunina became the archetype of the tsarist Sister of 
Mercy. 
Her memoir recounts that, in the summer of 1854, while vacationing in Vladimir with 
a friend, she first heard that France and Britain had entered the war.114 A few days later, 
everyone knew of the Russian defeat at Alma in September 1854. In October, she returned to 
Moscow, where she read in newspapers that the French used nurses in wartime hospitals; 
soon thereafter, she learned Nightingale had sailed east. Around this time, Elena Pavlovna 
decided to organize the Exaltation Society and sought volunteers with a newspaper 
announcement. The idea of doing her part captivated Bakunina, and, despite feeble attempts 
by her relatives to dissuade her, she resolved to join the Exaltation Society. Seeking a way to 
offer her application to the grand duchess, Bakunina first approached S. S. Shcherbatova, a 
well-known Moscow philanthropist. Shcherbatova forwarded Bakunina to Countess Anna 
Golitsyna in St. Petersburg, an intimate of the grand duchess, to whom Bakunina wrote. 
When a reply finally came, Bakunina learned that she had missed the muster for the first 
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brigade of nurses, and, since a second group would follow, she should ready herself for 
medical service. An additional letter to E. F. Raden won Bakunina with an invitation to come 
to St. Petersburg to begin her training at the Second Infantry Hospital. Her voyage to the 
Crimea began in December, a long and arduous journey by carriage in the winter. On the 
way, her detachment of eight nurses received a letter from Pirogov that split the group, some 
travelling to Kherson and others, including Bakunina, to Sevastopol.115   
Bakunina spent the period from January to August 1855 in Sevastopol working 
directly under the supervision of Pirogov in the main hospital at the Noble’s Assembly. Her 
memoir describes toil among the wounded and provides some unflattering descriptions of the 
other nurses. She decried hospital workers who stole patients’ compensation for wounds. 
After the death of E. A. Khitrovo, the leader of the nurses in Sevastopol in February 1856, 
Elena Pavlovna named Bakunina as the head nurse. Following the war, she continued her 
management of the Exaltation Society at its new location in St. Petersburg. These years 
brought uncertainty to the society, which suffered from Elena Pavlovna’s determination to 
transform the order into a religious institution, a lack permanent housing, financial troubles, 
and ambiguity over its peacetime role. Bakunina coped with these problems for a while, but 
disputes with Elena Pavlovna over whether or not the order should be secular drove her to 
abandon the Exaltation Society and found her own clinic for peasants in Tver’ Province, in 
1860. Her clinic in Kozitsyno later attracted the attention of Empress Maria Aleksandrovna 
and the local zemstvo, which provided funds to run the establishment. In 1877, Bakunina 
accepted an invitation to participate in the Russo-Turkish War and led nurses in the 
Caucasus. After the war, she returned to Kozitsino and continued to treat peasants until her 
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death in 1894.116 Bakunina oversaw the Exaltation Society during the frustrating transition 
following the Crimean War. As a noblewoman who dedicated herself to unpaid, patriotic 
service, she made the ideal Russian Sister of Mercy. The issues she faced as head of this 
uncertain institution—impoverishment, ambiguity of purpose, and frustrations gaining access 
to hospitals—remained unresolved for the Russian Red Cross throughout much of the tsarist 
period.    
Nursing Societies Following the Crimean War 
Surprisingly, the debate over the peacetime character of the Exaltation Society pitted 
Pirogov and Bakunina against Elena Pavlovna. The grand duchess, inspired by Christian 
nursing orders in the West, considered the idea of transforming the Exaltation Society into a 
quasireligious institution similar to the European nursing societies during the postwar years. 
Following the Peace of Paris, Elena Pavlovna toured Europe. In France, she met with Father 
Étienne, the head of the Catholic Order of Saint Vincent de Paul. Impressed with the French 
Sisters of Charity, Elena Pavlovna allegedly promised Father Étienne to increase the links 
between the Exaltation Society and the Catholic orders and to petition the tsar about 
expanding the Catholic nurses’ activities in Poland.117 The grand duchess’s moves in this 
direction concerned Pirogov and Bakunina, who fought to keep the Exaltation Society 
secular, what they called a “moral-philanthropic institution.” Sharing a view with which 
Nightingale would have found common cause, Pirogov disdained the idea of turning nurses 
into nuns. He thought that institutions such as the French Sisters of Charity were holdovers 
from the Middle Ages and unsuitable for the modern world. He advocated that the nursing 
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societies should have strict standards of professional competency, without interfering with 
the nurses’ free time. But nursing was more than a mere job for an Orthodox Russian 
gentrywoman. Bakunina responded that she wanted good nurses who joined “for love of the 
work and self-sacrifice, and not [only] to meet their material needs.”118  
To learn from foreign nursing societies, Bakunina traveled to Berlin, Paris, and 
Bruges in 1858. The Evangelical deaconesses she visited in Berlin disappointed her because 
most of them had entered the society for money rather than from a love of aiding others. This 
society, named Bethany, preferred peasants because of their religious convictions and 
shunned nobles such as Bakunina. German Catholic nunneries appeared to Bakunina as 
medieval relic designed for saving souls and ill-suited for engaging social problems. The 
French Order of Lazarists in Paris impressed her more, and she was pleased to see that these 
women worked in military hospitals. Still, nothing in the West seemed a good fit for Russia. 
Bakunina wanted to direct the Exaltation Society to address Russia’s secular needs, 
an alignment that corresponded closely to the intelligentsia’s social mission to serve the 
empire’s unenlightened masses. She noted “the Exaltation Society is the result of patriotic 
sentiment that sought to take part in the common good; [it] professes sympathies for the 
suffering of many and a preparedness to share in mutual misfortune and labors.”119  Wartime 
relief may have been the original “principle of our order,” but the Exaltation Society needed 
a new mission in peacetime. Frustrated with the grand duchess’s flirting with the Catholic 
orders, Bakunina repeatedly contemplated quitting the Exaltation Society.  These 
uncertainties continued until the end of the decade, as evidenced by the fact that Pirogov 
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wrote Bakunina in September 1859 begging her to ignore the present troubles and continue to 
head the Society.120 Pirogov also met with Elena Pavlovna that December and implored her 
to maintain the society’s secular character, but the grand duchess was unflinching in her 
intention to transform the society into an institution that resembled European nursing orders. 
A month later, Bakunina retired to Kozitsino, and E. P. Kartseva, another veteran nurse from 
the Crimean War, took over the Exaltation Society. Kartseva served as its head for the next 
decade and also resisted the spiritual direction, and the society never turned into a nunnery.121 
Instead, like most Russian nursing orders, the Exaltation Society acquired some trappings of 
a convent, such as a permanent priest who sat on the board of directors and a requirement 
that all members be Orthodox, but this institution remained outside the jurisdiction of the 
Holy Synod, and its primary mission was decidedly secular – to relieve the suffering of sick 
and wounded soldiers.  
Many of the Exaltation nurses professed a desire to continue their duties serving 
soldiers after the Crimean War, but no one knew where they would practice this craft or how 
to fund these services. Initially, once the Exaltation Society nurses returned from the Crimea, 
they housed the order in the Mikhailovskii Palace in St. Petersburg.122 Elena Pavlovna 
petitioned Alexander II in October 1856 to turn the Exaltation Society into a permanent 
institution with the backing of the Russian state, and Konstantin Nicholaevich encouraged 
the grand duchess to expand the number of nurses and prepare them to serve in naval 
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hospitals.123 Soon after, however, Elena Pavlovna left Russia for the spas of Europe and did 
not return for two years. With the grand duchess away, the state delayed granting the 
Exaltation Society a peacetime charter, funds dried up, and the Ministry of War refused to let 
the nurses work in army medical facilities.124 In early 1857, Pirogov implored V. I. Tarazov, 
the chief physician of the Exaltation Society, to be resolved in the face of prohibitions against 
nurses in military hospitals. This letter also mentioned that the nurses had become 
demoralized and many had been reduced to poverty.125 Bakunina recounted that epidemic 
diseases killed several nurses in both the Mikhailovskii Palace and in an apartment the nurses 
inhabited in Kronstadt, a naval base near the capital.126 Anecdotal evidence suggested that 
commanders of military hospitals did not want the nurses impinging on their workspace, a 
source of revenue for pilferers from the army’s quartermaster corps, and they kept the nurses 
at bay with bureaucratic indifference, legal restrictions, and tactless rumors of political 
subversion.127    
The Exaltation Society survived because of the needs of the navy and the personal 
support of Konstantin Nikolaevich. Even before the Crimean War ended, the grand duke 
ordered twenty-four thousand rubles be set aside to assist the nurses during peace.128 
Following the evacuation from Crimea, the navy was the first institution to welcome 
Exaltation nurses into its own hospitals, admitting forty nurses to work in the naval hospitals 
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on Kronstadt and another eight in the St. Petersburg Naval Hospital in 1856. Later another 
six nurses were assigned to the Kherson Naval Hospital.129 While the army dallied, the navy 
ensured some of these women had a place to practice their craft.  
The Ministry of War delayed admission of the nurses to army hospitals until the 
1860s, a moment when the Exaltation Society’s fortunes suddenly reversed. Pirogov had 
enjoyed a modicum of success in introducing nurses into the Kiev Military Hospital, which 
admitted a dozen nurses in 1859. That same year, the Exaltation Society drew up its first 
peacetime charter, which required that all nurses undergo a one-year training period before 
they were recognized as fully fledged nurses.130 Military service was the stated purpose of 
the Exaltation Society, but other philanthropic activities fell within the purview of its 
mission. Also in 1860, the Exaltation Society acquired a property at 154 Fontanka 
Embankment in St. Petersburg, where they housed the nurses and set up a small hospital 
ward and school for girls. The Ministry of War’s recognition of this society came the 
following year, and the result of this decision ensured Exaltation nurses would gain 
employment in military hospitals. 
 In January 1860, the Minister of War, N. O. Sukhozanet, convened a committee to 
restructure the command of military hospitals in hopes of eliminating the problems with 
supply and corruption that had distressed Russian facilities in the Crimean War. The goal of 
this committee was to reorganize hospitals so military doctors would be empowered vis-à-vis 
the quartermaster commissariat, the alleged source of graft. One item this committee 
discussed was the placement of nurses in military hospitals, a question that divided the 
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members of the committee. Critics of nursing in Russia stressed that these orders thrived only 
in Catholic countries, where the Church was more strongly connected to the people, and that 
these institutions were obsolete holdovers from the Middle Ages. Furthermore, opponents 
believed that the Crimean War was no proof that the Ministry of War would find qualified 
women, since many of the Exaltation nurses had joined the society during the conflict out of 
patriotic fervor and left after 1856. Finally, nurses would cause more, not less, bureaucratic 
problems, and their cost would exceed two hundred thousand rubles per year, a sum better 
spent on improving the pay and training of the male hospital staff.131  
Although dissenters on Sukhozanet’s committee predicted future problems, the 
majority held that the female nurses gave care that was more “sympathetic and attentive” 
than the male feldshers and orderlies. Nursing proponents naturally looked to the Crimean 
experience and postwar employment in naval hospitals to show that women added a vital 
component to military medical care. State Councilor Pal’tsev, the senior doctor at the 
Kherson Military Hospital, proclaimed at one of Sukhozanet’s committee meetings that forty 
Exaltation nurses had helped greatly when his own facility was overburdened with five 
thousand patients during the evacuation in 1856.132 In any case, the committee refused to 
reach a final verdict, electing to expand the project gradually to more institutions because “to 
reject this project based on similar experiences, which more or less benefits the wounded 
servicemen, would not accord with the unceasing care the state provides for the wellbeing of 
the army.”133  
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To silence critics, the Ministry of War committed itself to monitoring the 
management, training, and selection of nurses as well as establishing careful guidelines for 
their employment in military hospitals. A Russian law made these positions permanent and 
promised the nurses benefits from the Ministry of War, such as salaries, housing, and funeral 
expenses.134 Also, the First Infantry Hospital in St. Petersburg welcomed a limited number of 
nurses at this time, and the committee agreed to expand the project to military hospitals in 
Moscow, Brest-Litovsk, Warsaw, Riga, and Kherson in 1860 to ensure a supply of trained 
nurses in key military districts.135 A legal directive dated three years later, in 1863, 
established the ground rules for employment of nurses in military hospitals. The Ministry of 
War obliged itself to pay these women a salary just under two hundred rubles per annum for 
“care of the sick and to ensure that the hospital orderlies performed their duties correctly.” 
Heeding Pirogov’s advice on women’s attentiveness to abuses, the law called on the Mother 
Superior of the nursing society to report any misappropriation of food, drink, bedding, or 
dressings to the commander of the hospital or military district. The law made no mention of 
the nurses performing medical functions; instead, their tasks were to console the sick, 
observe standards of cleanliness, and assist the priest.136 The next year, another law referred 
to sixteen Exaltation nurses who worked in the First Infantry Hospital in St. Petersburg. This 
hospital provided three rooms for the nurses to inhabit and tasked the women with policing 
orderlies, maintaining sanitation, and consoling the sick. The law failed to discuss pay for the 
nurses, but it established state pensions of one hundred rubles per year for nurses who served 
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for twenty-five years in good health or fifteen years for those whose careers were cut short 
due to illness.137 Still, evidence suggests the Ministry of War continued to harbor doubts 
about opening its doors to female nurses. 
The Ministry of War’s own journal, Voennyi sbornik (Military Miscellany), published 
two articles that laid bare the two sides of this debate. The first, A. Runovskii’s “A Few 
Words on Hospital Personnel,” questioned what duties women should perform in a wartime 
hospital. This polemic admitted that women had earned a place within wartime medicine, 
admiring the “well-known” feminine love of “order and tidiness,” but Runovskii also limited 
women’s duties to those of cooks and laundresses. He alleged that older women lacked the 
physical strength for difficult tasks and young women threatened discipline. Sexual 
indiscretion concerned Runovskii the most, and he warned that patients’ nudity within the 
hospitals, idleness during recovery, the lower classes’ relaxed views on sexual intercourse, 
and strong feelings of arousal that accompanied recovery put men at risk from nurses’ 
presence in hospitals. Women, he believed, were fit for only two duties in the hospital: to be 
comforters, sitting at the bedside of the most serious patients (sidelki), or to oversee the 
distribution of medicine to patients, replacing the corrupt and drunken feldshers who usually 
performed this task. The greatest difficulty, Runovskii foresaw, was finding enough 
responsible women to fill these roles. He stated that nurses produced an undoubted benefit to 
the quality of care in military hospitals, but he was unwilling to admit more than one or two 
per hospital to work as observers or comforters, a miniscule role in facilities that often 
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numbered several hundred beds.138 Runovskii, it seems, believed women had a role in 
military medicine, but it was extremely narrow.  
In 1864, N. Ivanina, one of very few women to pen an article for Voennyi sbornik, 
argued for greater employment of nurses in military hospitals. She presented the traditional 
argument that women’s temperament and upbringing made them more disposed to caring for 
the sick. And while there were many positions in hospitals that these women could fill, she 
acknowledged that education limited the number of qualified candidates. One solution was a 
project at the Ekaterinodar (Krasnodar) Women’s School that taught pupils care for the 
wounded and sick because the Cossacks in this region had poor access to doctors. She 
conceded that the Ministry of War should try out candidate nurses for a few weeks to see if 
they possessed the moral and educational qualities needed for the job.139 The successes these 
advocates won were limited at best; the Ministry of War admitted few women and provided 
them with inadequate pay, medical training, and opportunities for advancement. At the same 
time, rights to a salary, pension, and housing, must have appealed to some women who 
sought a patriotic calling and a degree of independence.     
Although the Ministry of War frustrated proponents of military nursing, peacetime 
philanthropic nursing societies continued to expand as associational life blossomed during 
the Great Reforms. Many of these societies needed wealthy backers to acquire property and 
hire doctors. The Grand Duchess Aleksandra Petrovna founded the Pokrovskaia Society in 
1859 to tend to the poor and sick in St. Petersburg. Four years later Countess Golytsina 
established a shelter in Moscow with a hospital and nursing society. In 1865, the aristocrat 
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M. M. Dondukova-Korsakova spent forty thousand of her own rubles to found a society of 
village nurses in Pskov Province named the Mary Magdalene Sisters of Mercy. This rural 
society was unique because the nurses were supposed to travel the countryside attending to 
the sick, teaching literacy to the newly emancipated peasants, and watching over peasant 
children during planting and harvest periods.140 These societies possessed state charters and 
occupied themselves with medicine and philanthropic assignments. The Nikolai Community, 
which previously had worked in prison hospitals, was renamed Assuage My Fears (Utoli 
moia pechali) under the direction of Countess N. B. Shakhovskaia. This organization 
acquired property in the Lefortovo region of Moscow for clinics with the aid of private 
donors and grew into one of Russia’s prominent nursing communities.141 The Great Reform-
era witnessed a spread of every type of charity across Russia, and elite women led many of 
these endeavors.  
Conclusion 
Two exceptional Russians, Elena Pavlovna and N. I. Pirogov, created nursing 
brigades to attend to tsarist troops during the Crimean War. This project occurred in dialogue 
with developments in France and Britain that permitted a female role in military medicine. 
Elena Pavlovna’s patronage enabled this society to come about in Nicholas I’s Russia, a 
regime that sought to limit most forms of private initiative. During and after the war, 
Konstantin Nikolaevich lent his support to this project by publishing memoirs and accounts 
that emphasized the positive role these women played in reducing suffering in armed 
conflict. No one knew what would happen to the Exaltation Society, which was chartered in 
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war and given a solely military mission, after the cannon fire ceased in 1856. This nursing 
order altered its purpose and continued to operate in peacetime due to the patronage of key 
figures in the court. The creation of the Exaltation Society shows the development of a 
nascent civil society in tsarist Russia that drew upon the autocracy and state for support. 
Russian women of many social backgrounds joined this society, and this reveals that 
membership in wartime was open to anyone. In reality, however, the ideal nurses were 
women similar to Bakunina, who presumably possessed the economic means, education, and 
drive to serve Russia’s most unfortunate subjects without remuneration.   
By the 1860s, Russia possessed a number of nursing societies committed to 
philanthropic work, institutions that mirrored similar associations in the West in their mission 
and purpose. These nursing orders were small, isolated, and often under-funded, but the 
public spirit of the Great Reforms encouraged Russian subjects to think of themselves as 
agents active in the empire’s betterment. Developments in Western Europe—in particular, 
debates about mobilizing civilian aid workers for war—drew Russia into the conversation of 
how best to provide for armies engaged in combat. Even though Russian generals harbored 
doubts, the opportunities provided by the Geneva Convention of 1864, which mandated 
national aid societies in member countries, resonated with members of the Romanov court. 
By decade’s end, these individuals had overcome resistance from military and religious 
figures and established a national aid society for Russia. This group of advocates convinced 
themselves that the European mission to devote civilian resources toward alleviating the 
plight of the wounded was within Russia’s best interests and a national Red Cross society, in 
dialogue with foreign aid societies, was the best means for managing this project. 
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CHAPTER 2 – RUSSIA AND THE GENEVA CONVENTION 
Russia was more hesitant to embrace the Geneva Convention of 1864 than its 
European counterparts, but, as European states ratified the convention one by one and Prussia 
revealed in the German Wars of Unification how valuable private aid workers in war had 
become, the tsarist autocracy refused to stay idly for long. Elena Pavlovna had created the 
Exaltation Society in the Crimean War to provide supplementary sanitary workers to the 
armies, so the precedent for private aid workers in war was already in place, even if the 
Russian Ministry of War expressed doubts this type of project was necessary. Activists at the 
Romanov court in the 1860s convinced Empress Maria Aleksandrova and by extension, 
Alexander II, to embrace the humanitarian movement and create a national aid society. The 
creation of the Russian Red Cross was not an entirely seamless ordeal for Russia, and the 
reluctance from conservatives reveals limitations on the autocrat’s ability to effect immediate 
change. The head of the Orthodox Church and elites in Moscow at first opposed a Red Cross-
type organization because it appeared too foreign for Russia. This resistance, however, was 
only temporary, and by the end of the 1860s Russia possessed a chartered national aid society 
with a broad membership and limited financial resources. This chapter first traces the history 
of the Geneva Convention and locates Russia’s limited role in the effort to create this 
compact. The latter half of the chapter analyzes the efforts by well-connected Russians to 
create a national aid society and the resistance they faced from conservatives and doubters.  
The classic narrative of the European humanitarian movement begins with Henri 
Dunant, the co-founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the activist most 
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responsible for hosting a series of conferences in Geneva in 1863 and 1864 on improving the 
plight of the wounded. Born in Geneva, Dunant spent his young life dabbling in religion, the 
Christian Unions, which were the German precursor of the YMCA, and colonial business 
ventures. Fate and economic misfortune led him to Castiglione, a village near Solferino, 
Lombardy, in hopes of ingratiating himself with Emperor Napoleon III and winning 
concessions for an unlucky business venture in Algeria. Instead of crossing paths with the 
emperor, Dunant found himself witness to the aftermath of the Solferino engagement, 
Europe’s bloodiest battle since Waterloo. This experience prompted Dunant to change his 
life’s work from conquering Africa with European capital to alleviating pain on the 
battlefield, the crusade for which he is most remembered.142 
Technically a draw, Solferino proved significant because the French paid little 
attention to deploying military sanitation services prior to the battle. As a result of this 
mishap, when Dunant entered Castiglione, he met tens of thousands of wounded who had 
little hope of finding medical care. Appalled by the grisly spectacle, Dunant volunteered his 
own services in consoling the wounded and purchasing supplies. This experience moved him 
deeply, and the next year he penned his famous A Memory of Solferino as an exposé on the 
horrors of modern warfare and the insufficient attention European armies paid to the 
wounded. In the latter half of this volume, Dunant asked, “Would it not be possible, in times 
of peace and quiet, to form relief societies for the purpose of having care given to the 
wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified volunteers?” These 
societies, although permanent, could remain inactive in peacetime but always be ready for 
war. He drew special attention to the work of Elena Pavlovna and Florence Nightingale in the 
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Crimean War, predicting that these women could have accomplished great feats if their 
brigades had been at Solferino. Since, “the personnel of military field hospitals is always 
inadequate,” then the only possible answer was “to turn to the public.”  And so he proposed 
that all nations establish a convention for aid societies, which must be agreed upon in 
peacetime because, once hostilities commenced, belligerents would not work in concert with 
one another. Dunant expressed confidence that no government would hesitate to deny aid to 
its wounded nor would any public withhold contributions for the wounded; however, he 
warned that wars would become more deadly as weapons advanced.143    
Initially, Dunant self-published 1,600 copies of A Memory of Solferino in late 1862 
and sent volumes to Europe’s ruling families, politicians, military men, and newspaper 
reporters. The book appealed to a broad audience and even drew praise from Victor Hugo 
and Charles Dickens, but Florence Nightingale and Jean-Charles Chenu, the former head of 
the French military’s medical department, considered Dunant’s proposal foolhardy, since, the 
state bore responsibility for caring for the wounded.144 Nevertheless, one copy of the memoir 
reached Gustav Moynier, a lawyer and philanthropist in Geneva, who endeavored to turn 
Dunant’s idea into an international agreement. 
Moynier inspired a small group of generals and military doctors to create the 
International Committee for Relief to the Wounded in Wartime, a board that devised plans to 
make aid to soldiers an issue of international concern. This committee also discussed 
methods for improving sanitary technologies and increasing the number of nurses, and they 
determined that belligerents should give aid workers free access to distribute relief in 
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wartime and be recognizable by a common symbol. The members concluded that the only 
way to ensure that European nations followed these principles was to reach an international 
covenant between states, so they sent invitation letters to a welfare congress in Berlin in 1863 
and copies of A Memory of Solferino to rulers and officers throughout the continent.145     
By the time the International Committee met again, they had received approval for 
the covenant from several states including Prussia. Uplifted by this support, they encouraged 
countries to set up their own relief societies at meeting in March 1863. To ensure that 
militaries accepted these societies, the International Committee proffered three rules: Relief 
societies must be state recognized, voluntary nurses must be subordinate to military 
discipline, and the nurses must demand no cost from the armies. At the third meeting of the 
International Committee, Moynier reported that the Berlin welfare congress had been 
cancelled, so the five members decided to hold their own congress in Geneva. Fearing 
European governments would dismiss this proposal as the pipe dream of idealists, Dunant 
canvassed the continent to drum up support for the Geneva congress. During conversations 
with European military men, Dunant decided to add the idea of neutrality for medical 
personnel to the docket of issues to be discussed in Geneva, a decision that Moynier 
considered fraught with risk because it impinged on the question of who was a belligerent in 
war.146   
In total, thirty-one individuals from sixteen states and four philanthropic societies 
attended the meeting in October 1863, the precursor of the First Geneva Convention. 
Delegates often were members of general staffs or medical officers.147 Russia’s emissaries to 
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this first congress were M. E. Esakov and A. A. Kireev, favorites of the two Romanovs 
pressing for Russia to establish a national aid society, Elena Pavlovna and Konstantin 
Nikolaevich. Alexander Kireev was Konstantin Nikolaevich’s adjutant and would later 
become an important Slavophile writer. M. E. Esakov’s background was more obscure, but 
the transcript of the 1863 Geneva conference listed him as the librarian for Elena 
Pavlovna.148 These two delegates did not officially represent the Russian state. Rather, they 
served as personal emissaries for the grand duke and duchess. Dmitrii Miliutin, who, as the 
minister of war, had the power to bind Russia to an international agreement, informed the 
congress by letter that he received his invitation too late to dispatch an official delegation.149 
In reality, the minister of war was occupied at the time with putting down an uprising in the 
Congress of Poland.  
During the four days of debate, three major issues concerned the delegates: the 
employment of volunteer nurses, neutrality for medical workers, and an emblem to identify 
neutrals. The first point of contention, over female nurses, pitted Prussia against France and 
Great Britain. The Prussians supported deploying voluntary nursing brigades to permanent 
facilities in the rear only because military objectives trumped those of philanthropy.150 The 
British and French disagreed with the Teutons; British generals claimed they had solved the 
problems from the Crimean War by reforming the army’s medical services, and the French 
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stressed that civilian volunteers would burden its professional military.151 The delegates 
surprised their Swiss hosts by reaching agreements easily on the other two issues. They chose 
a red cross on a white ribbon as the symbol for neutral agents on the battlefield. For the last 
issue, neutrality for medical workers, there was an historical precedent. The Prussians cited a 
1759 treaty with France that neutralized the wounded and suggested that this accord be 
extended throughout Europe. The conference ended with praises for Dunant, and the 
International Committee pledged to serve as a consultative organ for states in setting up the 
aid societies.152 
The 1863 Conference and Russia 
The Russians’ participation in the congress came in two forms. First, Miliutin may 
not have been sitting at the table, but he made his presence known at the conference. On the 
first day, he addressed the delegates by letter in which he stated the Russian military had 
begun to reform its sanitary services and encouraged further international discussion on this 
theme. He also warned the delegates to avoid any discussion of international law and “leave 
this part of the question to the initiative of states and their competent organs.”153 At the time, 
Russia was in the process of enacting comprehensive reforms of its military sanitary services 
intended to avoid the disasters of the Crimean War.154 It seems likely that Miliutin thought in 
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terms similar to the British and French: He wanted to give military reform a chance before he 
was willing to permit civilians to interfere with his army.  
Following this initial conference, Miliutin set up a special committee to review the 
Geneva project’s designs to use private aid in wartime, and this committee came out against 
deploying civilian volunteers on the battlefield. The Russians’ dilemma came from having to 
deal with an uprising in Poland. The discussions in Geneva centered on deploying 
nonmilitary actors in conventional wars between European states, but, in Poland, Russia 
faced civilian insurgents, revolutionaries, and terrorists. Konstantin Nicholaevich, who 
briefly served as Viceroy of Poland, nearly lost his life to an assassin’s bullet outside a 
Warsaw theater the following year. This type of warfare gave the Russians pause to think: 
Why give Polish terrorists privileges when they certainly would not return the favor?   
The Geneva conference’s call to neutralize the wounded and all medical workers, 
thereby giving them the status of inviolable nonbelligerent, restricted the methods Russian 
generals had available to quash rebellion in Poland. If red cross logos awarded anyone free 
access to the battlefield, then the line between insurgent and aid worker might disappear 
completely, as the Prussians would discover with French civilians in 1870.155 g dilemma 
became further complicated by the fact that the Polish lands were split among three European 
states. Too much trouble might begin calls for intervention, especially if the Russians became 
the first to violate the Geneva compact. Lastly, Miliutin probably feared what would happen 
to Russian aid workers if they became too intimate with the military operations in Poland. 
Radicals and students were the most vociferous opponents of the 1863 campaign in Poland, 
and their protests encouraged Russian officialdom’s welcoming attitude toward public 
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discussion of national affairs to cool after the first round of reforms in the early 1860s.156 As 
a result of these uncertainties, Miliutin canceled the project to discuss the International 
Committee’s recommendations, and Russia sent no delegates to the conference that produced 
the Geneva Convention of August 1864. 
Konstantin Nikolaevich and Elena Pavlovna objected to the minister of war, and their 
positions found supporters in Russia. M. E. Esakov presented a report on the Exaltation 
Nurses in the Crimean War as an example for other states to emulate at the fourth session of 
the 1863 Geneva conference. In this speech, he argued that nurses overcame the military’s 
initial ill will and earned the respect of soldiers, society, and the press. Following the war, 
many of these nurses found positions in military and civilian hospitals, where they continued 
to hone their skills, he claimed.157  
Less than a year later, the translator of Voennyi sbornik’s account of the Geneva 
conference, Dr. N. Zaborovskii, provided commentary to his summary with which 
Konstantin Nikolaevich and Elena Pavlovna would have sympathized. He acknowledged that 
the Russian military had undertaken medical reforms, but he believed that a relief society 
would be a welcome addition and set forth guidelines for how Russia should create this 
society. He suggested that this society should be overseen by trained professionals with 
access to the collection of medical instruments at the Medical-Surgical Academy, Russia’s 
school for military doctors. All civilian personnel must be subordinate to the military medical 
services, he recommended. If the volunteers did not want to work in military hospitals, then 
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they should open their own hospitals, as the members of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem 
had done in Second Schleswig War of 1864. Lastly, he argued that Russia should form a 
relief society so that it did not have to rely on foreign aid as it had in the Crimean War, when 
the Russians hired American doctors to supplement overtaxed medical workers.158 He 
concluded, “Our aid societies can manage without invited or uninvited guests. They should 
be for the Russian people, and because of this requirement, they will certainly enjoy united 
support – the more the matter belongs to the people, then the more efficient it is.”159 
But advocacy, no matter how committed or loud the apostle, did not translate into 
sudden changes when it encountered the tsarist bureaucracy. It would take two more events 
for Russia to charter its own national aid society and adopt the Geneva Convention. First, 
Prussia’s military machine had to remind everyone how beneficial private aid workers could 
be in war. Second, a personal campaign within the Romanov court, the same type of finesse 
that enabled Elena Pavlovna to found the Exaltation Society, prompted Alexander II to 
endorse the Russian Red Cross’s establishment in 1867.      
Meanwhile, in the West, the 1863 Geneva congress had not bound any states to 
follow the rules it proposed. None of the delegates possessed the power to enact policies on 
behalf of their governments, and there was no method for policing these stipulations had they 
been accepted as law. In the final resolutions of the conference, the delegates only agreed to 
establish aid committees and accepted the red cross symbol as universal.160 
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Following the congress, Moynier and Dunant knew that they needed to get European 
states to recognize the neutrality of medical personnel in order to safeguard voluntary 
workers in future conflicts. Only an international convention of government representatives 
could transform the suggestions from the 1863 conference into law. The International 
Committee spent the early months of 1864 petitioning the Swiss Federal Council to broker an 
international convention in August 1864. Meanwhile, European states began to set up aid 
societies, the most significant of which was that formed by Prussia with eighty-five local 
chapters. By year’s end, a dozen countries responded positively to the invitation for the 
convention in Geneva, including Prussia and France.161     
The opportunity to test the proposals from the 1863 conference arose when a sudden 
war between Prussia and Denmark broke out over Schleswig and Holstein in January 1864. 
Louis Appia, an original member of the International Committee, agreed to serve as an aid 
liaison to Prussia and toured private hospitals during the conflict. Following the war, Appia 
published a report that reached two important conclusions for the development of the future 
Red Cross societies. First, he witnessed civilian aid workers collecting wounded on the 
battlefield itself and endorsed this type of relief work. Second, the Hamburg committee’s 
performance in this conflict convinced Appia that Dunant was wrong: Aid committees should 
prepare for future wars by collecting funds and materials during peacetime and coordinating 
with general staffs on logistics.162 A major problem that arose during this short war was how 
to protect medical staff from the enemy. Appia noted in his report that Danish doctors 
retreated with the army, abandoning patients in field hospitals to advancing Prussian forces. 
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Therefore, a question the 1864 convention would have to address was how to give army 
doctors the right to practice their craft without undermining military responsibilities.163  
In the eighteenth century, Western armies usually neutralized medical services and 
the wounded at the outset of conflicts, but these agreements were limited to specific wars, as 
the Prussian arrangement with the French was in 1759. What the Geneva Convention sought 
to do was to dictate universal standards of behavior for future wars. The August 1864 
conference went surprisingly smoothly, and the delegates agreed to neutralize hospitals, 
medical personnel, the wounded, and all aid workers. In theory, this policy meant that 
doctors would remain with the wounded if captured or overrun by enemy forces. Also, no 
person or structure displaying the Red Cross’s logo was supposed to be targeted or molested 
by either belligerent army. The major issue of contention centered on the question of 
voluntary nurses. The French and Prussians quarreled over whether to permit nurses to 
operate near the front, and no mention of voluntary nurses appeared in the final wording of 
the convention. 164 Short and intentionally vague, the ten articles of the Geneva Convention 
of 1864 succeeded because they left states a degree of latitude for interpretation. What the 
convention failed to create was any method or body for enforcing these rules, a position 
general staffs across the continent may have preferred. Any state’s adherence to the statues of 
the 1864 convention was entirely voluntary.165 During the two years following the 1864 
convention, a number of European states ratified the document and formed aid societies.  
                                                     
 
163 Boissier, From Solferino, 96, 100; Hutchinson, Champions, 58-64. 
 
164 Boissier, From Solferino, 115-16. 
 
165 Hutchinson, Champions, 46-50. 
 73 
 
In May 1865, Prussia sponsored an essay contest among European figures in the Red 
Cross movement on how best to organize private charity during military conflicts. Gustav 
Moynier submitted the winning essay, which he later published as the volume War and 
Charity (La guerre et la charité).166 This work, as Hutchinson labels it, presented the first 
“theoretical explanation” to justify aid societies’ intervention in military medicine.167 
Moynier began by demonstrating that, despite recent improvements, military sanitation 
services had failed in modern wars. He then stated that, since the state conscripted soldiers 
for limited terms of service from all strata of the population, it had an obligation to treat these 
soldiers as if they were dependents. The state, therefore, replaced the family as the guardian 
of its dependents, the soldiers. Since no existing military medical service would suffice in a 
large, modern war, a task for which the state was responsible, then “it is its [the state’s] duty 
to allow others to do that which it is not able to do by itself.”168 In other words, private 
initiative had the obligation to fill in for the state’s shortcomings. This idea may not have sat 
well with Miliutin, whose reforms of the military sought to eliminate any shortcomings in 
supply, or the Russian autocracy, which did not permit tsarist subjects to take the lead in 
proffering reforms. Thus, Moynier’s admission that the tsarist state would never be able to 
fulfill its obligations to its dependents and civilian society needed to take up the slack 
subverted one of the principle intentions of the Great Reforms.    
                                                     
166 G. Moynier, La guerre et la charité; traité théoretique et pratique de philanthropie appliqués aux armées en 
champagne, par G. Moynier et L. Appia (Geneva: Librairie Cherbuliez, 1867). This work was later translated 
into English as Help for Sick and Wounded, Being a translation of La Guerre et la Charité by Gustave Moynier 
and Louis Appia, John Furley, trans. (London: John Camden Hotten, 1870).  
 
167 Hutchinson, Champions, 67. 
 
168 Moynier, War and Charity, 29, 31-31, 40. 
 74 
 
For Russia, military innovation soon succeeded where diplomacy had failed. Prussia’s 
success in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 demonstrated to the Russians the usefulness of 
mobilizing private aid societies in war. At the outbreak of this conflict, the Prussian Ministry 
of War declared that it would unilaterally abide by the Geneva Convention. Prussian medical 
personnel received armbands with red crosses, and the Ministry of War integrated its aid 
society in war plans, which made Europe’s most developed relief organization ready at the 
outbreak of hostilities. In total, the Prussian aid committee sent seventy trainloads of supplies 
and over one thousand civilian medical workers to the theater of war. Although the Prussian 
aid society began the conflict with only 20,000 talers in its central coffer, by the end of the 
war it had raised 4,000,000 and mobilized 1,500 workers for the relief effort.169 Conversly, 
Austria-Hungary possessed several patriotic and aid societies but did little to exploit their 
potential or even trust the Geneva Convention. The result of these practices proved a cruel 
burden on Austrian soldiers because doctors retreated with the army, abandoning the 
wounded to die in unattended lazarettos.170 By the war’s end, Austria acceded to the Geneva 
Convention to avoid problems such as these in the future.171  
Russia watched Prussia’s successes and Austria’s failures. Two reports on Prussian 
medical services appeared in Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal (Military Medical Journal), the 
Russian Ministry of War’s medical journal, soon after the war. The first, by Dr. Adolf 
Marsikani, mentioned that, despite Prussia’s having the largest number of doctors in Europe, 
after two weeks of fighting they had to mobilize civilian and foreign physicians.172 Later, 
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Marsikani impressed upon the reader that many students, nurses, and members of religious 
orders “in Prussia more than anywhere else place themselves at the disposal of the lazarettos 
in wartime with true selflessness.”173 Russia’s second commentator on Prussian medical 
services, Dr. I. F. Geifel’der, remarked that on June 15 the Prussian state had appealed to aid 
societies to organize hospital beds in private facilities. In total, civilians organized almost six 
thousand hospital beds, and these facilities seemed to observers better than military hospitals 
because they were smaller and staffed with more passionate relief workers.174 These two 
accounts gave some Russian medical professionals the opportunity to recognize the benefits 
of employing voluntary aid societies in war. While it was unlikely that many casual readers 
sought out Voennyi-meditsinskii zhurnal for its coverage of foreign wars, several doctors 
close to the Romanov court did participate in the small group that oversaw Russia’s adoption 
of the Geneva Convention.    
Less than after the Austro-Prussian War, on 3 May 1867, Russia founded its own aid 
society, the Aid Society for Sick and Wounded Soldiers (Obshchestva popecheniia o 
ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh).175 Nineteen days later, Russia informed the International 
Committee that it had agreed to the Geneva Convention. Personal campaigns within the 
court, similar to Elena Pavlovna’s push to found the Exaltation Society, led Russia to create 
its national aid society. 
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The Creation of the Russian Aid Society for Wounded and Sick Soldiers 
Russia participated in the original Geneva conference of 1863, but Alexander II 
initially refused to ratify the Geneva Convention of 1864 or found a national aid society until 
1867. The foundation of the Russian aid society reveals the difficulties of importing a 
Western idea into the tsarist empire. Similar to Elena Pavlovna’s creation of the Exaltation 
Society, Russia’s aid society required four ambitious individuals working personal 
connections within the Romanov court to turn this project into a reality. One founder, Dr. 
Filipp Iakolevich Karel’, came from Revel, Estonia, and had studied with Pirogov in Dorput 
in the late 1820s. He later became a military doctor and served as a personal physician to 
Nicholas I and Alexander II.176 Another was P. A. Naranovich, the head of the Medical-
Surgical Academy and a contemporary of Pirogov.177 M. S. Sabinina was a concert pianist, 
who, beginning in 1860, taught music at the Romanov court. Even more obscure was M. P. 
Frederiks, the daughter of General P. A. Frederiks. Both Sabinina and Frederiks served as 
ladies-in-waiting for Empress Maria Aleksandrovna. This clique followed cultural 
developments in the German states and knew of Prussia’s encouragement of wartime aid 
societies. They also became intimate with the most active German-born philanthropist at 
court, Elena Pavlovna, and her circle of progressives. Sabinina and Frederiks did not view 
private aid as a passing fad, nor did they fear getting their hands dirty. Both toured Prussian 
medical facilities during the Franco-Prussian War and led nursing brigades in the Balkans in 
the 1870s. Naranovich and Karel’ remained involved in the Russian Red Cross’s governing 
board during the first decade of its existence.   
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How to transplant a Western idea into Russia proved a challenged for the founders of 
this organization because, as this group knew, Russian society lagged far behind the West in 
education and material well-being. The majority of the empire’s subjects were recently 
emancipated serfs, illiterate and mistrustful of the state. Metropolitan Filaret, the head of the 
Orthodox Church, disapproved of any project that might divert the Church’s resources or 
alter its institutions to follow Western models. He found the Red Cross movement too liberal 
in its interaction between the sexes and disliked the secular orientation of its mission and 
activities. Also, the rivalry between St. Petersburg, the “Window to the West,” and Moscow, 
Russia’s religious capital and more authentic representative, presented early challenges to 
this society. Lastly, the Russian Aid Society was supposed to welcome members from all 
layers of Russian society. This all-encompassing ideal, based on European notions of 
citizenship, struggled with the reality of a tsarist state that did not permit the lower classes or 
subversive minorities any role in managing the empire. As a result of these concerns, the 
upper levels of the Russian Red Cross remained a nest for high-ranking bureaucrats and court 
favorites until 1917; there was no Clara Barton, who began as a school teacher, in tsarist 
Russia.   
An edited collection of documents first published in the journal Istoricheskii vestnik 
(Historical Herald) in 1892 to mark the Russian Red Cross’s twenty-fifth anniversary 
provides the best account of the foundation of this organization.178 These documents 
originally lay in Sabinina’s personal archive, and they emphasized her and Frederiks’s 
initiatives to create the society and the resistance the planners faced from Metropolitan 
Filaret and conservative Muscovites. Celebrating the Red Cross as an essential tsarist charity, 
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these documents shed little light on the likely resistance to this organization from within the 
military or Council of Ministers. Russian bureaucrats and generals surely wanted keep the 
civilians from impinging on the state’s military policies and duty to care for the wounded in 
war. The sources, however, remain silent on these concerns. According to Sabinina’s 
narrative, the proposal to establish an aid society first came about as a way to commemorate 
the Danish Princess Dagmar’s arrival to Russia in September 1866. 
Initially betrothed to marry Tsarevich Nicholas Aleksandrovich, the eldest son of 
Alexander II, Dagmar’s first match with a Romanov proved unlucky when Nicholas 
suddenly died in the spring of 1865. On his deathbed, Tsarevich Nicholas allegedly 
expressed a desire to pass Dagmar to his younger brother, Alexander Aleksandrovich, the 
future Tsar Alexander III (1881-1894). This decision pleased the wishes of their father, 
Alexander II, who sought to prevent his sons from marrying German princesses, the 
traditional consorts for Romanov bachelors.179 To mark the wedding of the herculean 
Alexander Aleksandrovich to the delicate Dagmar, the court surgeon, P. A. Naranovich, who 
had recently returned from Berlin where he witnessed Prussian medical services during the 
Austro-Prussian War and had brought back a collection of the newest medical instruments, 
proposed to Dr. Karel’ and Sabinina that they found a modern clinic based on Prussian 
models. Sabinina contended that a national aid society was more pressing, since the idea was 
“already widespread throughout Europe, except in Russia and Turkey.”180 She was somewhat 
mistaken on this note; the sultan had adopted the Geneva Convention on paper in 1865, but 
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the Ottomans made no effort to set up an aid society.181 Karel’, also aware of aid societies in 
the Austro-Prussian War, intended for women to play a major role in the Russian 
organization from the beginning because of their allegedly natural inclinations for nursing 
and caregiving.182 Sabinina and her clique set about ordering charters and literature on 
Europe’s national aid societies.183 The wealth of information, planning, and state sponsorship 
needed to establish this organization required time and preparation, and these hurdles caused 
Sabinina to miss her initial target of putting the organization in place by the royal wedding on 
28 October. Dagmar herself seemed to play no role in the creation of the aid society, but 
later, after she married Alexander Aleksandrovich, converted to Orthodoxy, and assumed the 
name Maria Fedorovna, she became the royal patroness, or symbolic head, of the Russian 
Red Cross from the late 1870s to the fall of the Old Regime in 1917.  
The first meeting of the aid society occurred in Baroness Frederks’s quarters in the 
Winter Palace on 14 December 1866. In addition to Frederiks, Sabinina, and Karel’, the head 
military doctor Kh. B. Ritter, P. A. Naranovich, and his son, the physician A. P. Naranovich, 
also attended the meeting. The discussion centered on how to adapt examples of wartime aid 
organizations from Prussia, the United States, and other European powers to organize a 
national aid society for Russia. The Naranovichs, for example, admired Prussian aid 
societies, which they had witnessed in action during journeys the father-and-son pair had 
made during the Schleswig-Holstein campaign of 1864. However, the group acknowledged 
that Russia suffered from structural weaknesses: “The social conditions that brought forth 
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sanitary activities in other countries to a large extent do not compare with those that exist in 
Russian society,” and “only when these ideas become fully ours, Russian, can they be 
implanted in our society and put to use.” Conceding that the group of six had little chance of 
raising the cultural level of Europe’s most populous and backward power, the participants 
settled on three important questions to discuss at later meetings: They asked when and how 
they should organize this society; they asked what this society would do in war and 
peacetime; and, most importantly, they considered how to fund this society.184  
Naranovich the elder came out as the most aggressive participant at the initial 
meeting, calling for the Russian aid society to be founded then and there, with those present 
as the initial members. He insisted that membership be voluntary and open to all classes of 
society, a tenet set forth by Dunant and shared among European relief societies. During 
peacetime, Naranovich believed, the Russian aid society would limit its activities to 
preparing materials needed for moments when “war severed the normal course of affairs.”185 
This statement, which was in line with Dunant’s and Moynier’s views on warfare, ignored 
Russia’s regular conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia, as we shall see, 
distributed private aid and upheld the provisions guaranteed in the Geneva Convention in 
conventional wars against other signatories only. Additionally, the presumption that the Red 
Cross would engage solely in war work changed quickly as the realities of managing a poorly 
developed empire necessitated continuous aid to needy subjects. This meeting made clear 
that several concerned Russians had committed themselves to founding a national aid 
society. They knew that in order for this organization to succeed, it required state support, 
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which could only come from an imperial charter guaranteeing the agency oversight of 
Russia’s wounded. 
The next day Frederiks and Sabinina approached Empress Maria Aleksandrovna for 
help founding the society. The empress embraced the idea, offered to place the society under 
her patronage, and promised to speak with the emperor about confirming a legal charter for 
the society. The following morning, Karel’ mentioned the society to the sovereign, who, 
having been briefed by his wife on the project, told Karel’ to seek consultation with Prince A. 
M. Gorchakov, the minister of foreign affairs, on the details of the “Treaty with 
Switzerland.” Russia at this time had not yet adopted the Geneva Convention, but protocol 
stated that a government inform the Swiss Federal Council and International Committee to be 
considered a signatory of the Geneva Convention. Soon after, Naranovich produced a charter 
consisting of nineteen articles, and Sabinina forwarded the document to K. P. Pobedonostsev, 
the chief legal reformer in the Ministry of Justice. The initial draft of this charter must have 
been ill-conceived because Pobedonostsev objected to the eighth article, which stated that the 
society’s “Main Directorate (Glavnoe upravlenie) should be permanent, fixed, and additional 
members would not possess the right to vote in decisions.” This rule contradicted the 
society’s egalitarian ideals and permanent mission, Pobedonostsev warned. He instructed 
Sabinina to consult other military doctors and sanitation experts to define more narrowly the 
society’s intended activities. We can infer little on whether Naranovich and Karel’ made any 
effort at learning from military doctors how to organize voluntary sanitary brigades to suit 
the army’s needs, but when they printed the final charter in 1867, the plans for employing 
medical volunteers in wartime remained vague. Nevertheless, the members of the nascent 
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Russian aid society believed that they took all of Pobedonostsev’s reservations under 
consideration and amended the draft according to his wishes.186  
The next step for the planners was to solicit members for the society, and the empress 
aided Sabinina and Frederiks in this task by suggesting potential candidates, such as Avrora 
Demidova, an ideal choice due to her Russian name, significant wealth, and propensity 
toward benevolence, and the court priest, Father V. B. Bazhanov. Some of the candidates 
seemed apprehensive to participate; several invitees declined the offer, but many later 
backtracked and became members. Some early members who answered the call were 
Admiral K. N. Possiet and his wife, Rozaliia Ippolitovna, Countess M. Orlova-Davydova, 
one of Maria Fedorovna’s ladies-in-waiting, General E. I. Totleben, the fortification expert 
and veteran of Sevastopol, and P. A. Morits, a military surgeon. This group met almost daily 
in Frederiks’s apartment, where they continued to work on the charter.  
After several rounds of revisions, this group printed a few copies of the charter to 
drum up interest in the society. At this point, Totleben received notes from the Ministry of 
War expressing concern that the society sought to impinge on its prerogative of caring for the 
wounded. The Ministry of War requested that the aid society be subordinate to the military, 
but the members rejected this measure as inadmissible for a voluntary society and contrary to 
the Geneva Convention.187 As the revisions increased, the size of the charter grew from 
eighteen to eighty-four articles, and each new paragraph prompted further disagreements 
over how this society should function. By 6 March 1867, they had a charter ready for 
Pobedonostsev, who endorsed the document and proclaimed that the society “forms a new 
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era in the history of the social development of our country.”188 Pobedonostsev did not 
elaborate on what meant by this line, but he may have thought this group of planners had 
found a way to adopt a European institution for Russian realities. If so, these organizers 
would soon be disappointed with the way some Russians reacted to the proposal. Existing 
nursing orders, the Orthodox Church, and influential Muscovites all expressed concern that 
they were being forced to accommodate a Western idea at their own expense.    
One important element that the organizers had not considered was how to employ 
nurses from the existing orders in the society. Russia’s nursing societies possessed state 
charters that determined their charitable activities, so the aid society could not simply order 
them around. Baroness Frederiks wrote Princess A. V. Golitsyna, the head of a nursing order 
in Moscow, to inform her of their project and let her know that Totleben was traveling to 
Moscow to consult with her about how nurses might be employed in wartime. Frederiks also 
suggested that Golitsyna correspond with Mademoiselle Lize Krotkova, a manager of a 
private hospital, and Father Antonii Medvedev, the head of the St. Sergius Monastery in 
Sergeev Posad, the most influential monastery in Russia, on preparing nurses. Finally, 
Frederiks mentioned that Metropolitan Filaret Drozdov, the head of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, should already know about the project, because the empress commissioned General 
Totleben to report to him first of all. Sabinina much later commented that this letter from 
Frederiks was evidence that the founders of the Russian aid society had envisioned that the 
existing nursing societies would play a fundamental role in this organization from the 
beginning.189  
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But this letter was also brusque. Read from Golitsyna’s perspective, the women of the 
court were making plans to send nurses already dedicated to assisting poor civilians away to 
war. Golitsyna replied to the letter, stating that she embraced this movement but would not 
provide any funds for it. Golitsyna’s nursing society was located at the St. Sergius 
Monastery, and she feared that organizers in St. Petersburg were trying to increase the size of 
her nurses beyond her capacity to feed or house them. She likely wanted to keep her nursing 
order associated with the Church, and she asked Frederiks to write Father Antonii and ask 
him for funds from Metropolitan Filaret, because the monastery in Sergeev Posad was 
wealthy and the nursing society received none of this money.190 The Orthodox Church in 
these letters appeared apprehensive about a private organization that pressured to turn nuns 
into military nurses, and Filaret struck back with a challenge that threatened to alter the entire 
form of the organization. 
The first group with which Totleben met comprised of Metropolitan Filaret and a 
number of aristocratic Muscovites. After this session, Totleben penned a letter to Frederiks 
and Sabinina dated 10 March that repeated the Muscovites’ concerns over the character that 
the Petersburg organizers wanted to give to the society. At the meeting with the Muscovites, 
it seemed that Totleben was blindsided by complaints that “no clergymen were named on the 
list of participants” in St. Petersburg, and Metropolitan Filaret was confused why they did not 
solicit help from the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg in setting up the society.191 How could an 
aid society that represented all of Russia exclude the Orthodox Church? And the patriarch 
found the mixture of sexes in local chapters unacceptable. “His Holiness does not allow that 
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women manage together with men in the committees; women must be completely separate,” 
Totleben transmitted to Frederiks. This attitude toward reform was characteristic of Filaret. 
As Gregory Freeze has argued, in the era of the Great Reforms, Filaret remained a tserkovnik 
in the age of chinovniki, a “cleric” in an era of “statesmen,” or a staunch defender of 
ecclesiastical privilege, hierarchy, and independence. Reformers’ egalitarian and permissive 
leanings, such as the insistence that all of Russia participate in the aid society, offended 
Filaret, who harbored deep reservations about the emerging women’s movement in Russia. 
And the designs to mobilize the clergy and Church for aid to the wounded, a secular pursuit 
and a mission that would be neither cheap nor easy, were highly suspicious to the guardian of 
Russian Orthodoxy.192 
The Muscovites also demanded that they have their own agency that would enjoy 
independence from the Main Directorate in St. Petersburg.193 They asked to increase the 
number of merchants and doctors in the society and insisted that female participation be 
confined to women’s committees (damskie komitety), secular philanthropic boards for 
noblewomen.194 The Muscovites did acknowledge women may be admitted as “founding 
members” of the society, which would enable them to vote at general assemblies, but the 
proportion of male to female “founding members” must be forty men to twenty women. 
Lastly, the Muscovites expressed concern that all of the society’s capital would be held in the 
State Bank in St. Petersburg, a rule that might make it difficult for the Moscow chapter of the 
organization to access its capital.  
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Totleben relented to some of the Muscovites’ ideas. He recognized the need to 
concentrate capital in the empire’s largest cities such as Moscow, Odessa, and Kazan, where 
they would create local (mestnye) chapters with greater autonomy. Totleben also wrote Dr. 
Karel’ an admission that the secular, Western-style aid society they advocated for might be 
impossible to arrange in Orthodox Russia. He noted that as soon as he arrived in Moscow, he 
learned that success was most easily achieved when “the metropolitan, most-esteemed 
throughout all of Russia, takes the matter into his own hands.” Furthermore, the Third 
Rome’s influence should not be understated: “This was what Moscow preferred, and 
Moscow undoubtedly has much greater meaning throughout the empire.” He added in the 
postscript to this note that “here they do not like Petersburg; Moscow is unwillingly 
subordinate to Petersburg.”195  
The organizers in the capital discussed the consequences of this letter at a 14 March 
meeting at General A. K. Baumgarten’s residence. Baumgarten was a logical choice to 
consult on the society because he was a career military man, a decorated veteran of the 
Caucasus and Crimean War, and held an important role within the Ministry of War as the 
reformer of the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff.196 This session produced a document 
that addressed some of the Muscovites’ concerns, but the St. Petersburg organizers refused to 
budge on the secular orientation of the society or Filaret’s demand that they segregate the 
sexes within the society.197 The organizers declared that there should only be only one 
society, and it should be headquartered in St. Petersburg because all the state ministries were 
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located there. Communication with these ministries, especially in wartime, the organizers 
insisted, was required for the aid society to fulfill its mission.  
In regard to the question of autonomy for local chapters, the Petersburg clique 
recognized that it had to grant local organizations a degree of latitude to decide their own 
affairs, so long as they stayed true to the organization’s mission. On the question of 
membership, the founders agreed that the leaders of the central organ in St. Petersburg would 
come from influential persons, well known throughout Russia. They conceded that the 
number of clergy within the governing board of the relief society should be increased from 
the current two, but the organizers insisted on granting the clergymen membership as 
“honorable members,” without voting rights in organizational affairs. When they selected 
candidates for the Main Directorate, the early members did not place any high-ranking 
clergymen on this board. The organizers dismissed the Muscovites’ request to increase the 
number of merchants, and they failed to explain why they sought to exclude this group.198 
These concessions raised little alarm among the founders in St. Petersburg, and the empress 
approved of these changes.199  
Metropolitan Filaret’s insistence that meetings must be single-sexed deeply upset 
Baroness Frederiks, who wrote to Totleben complaining that Filaret believed the separation 
of men and women was necessary for the organization to be successful. She told the general 
that she envisioned no role for women within the administration of the Main Directorate, but 
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she believed that women should be utilized to collect funds and materials, especially in the 
local chapters, because it was impossible to predict whether educated society in the provinces 
would embrace a national aid society. She added that Filaret thought “women, outside the 
realm of family responsibilities, should fulfill a modest share of the activity, but, in all states 
that are the most enlightened, women refuse to play a modest role, instead participating in 
charity together with men.”200 She found the metropolitan’s attitude toward women 
unflattering and that the committee should inform him of this displeasure. She then turned to 
the question of who should head the society. Totleben, she named as a worthy candidate, but 
he had too many responsibilities in the Ministry of War to head the society. The empress 
suggested naming A. A. Zelenoi, the head of Ministry of State Domains, an able candidate, 
having served in the navy and army. Wounded at Sevastopol, he played a major role in the 
emancipation of serfdom. The first general meeting of the Russian Red Cross selected 
Zelenoi as its chairman on 18 May.201   
Totleben responded to Frederiks’s letter, stating that he met with two influential 
Muscovites, General A. P. Akhmatov, a former member of the Holy Synod, and Prince 
Trubetskоi, to discuss the issue of women’s participation in the society. Totleben and 
Trubetskоi then approached Filaret and explained to him that similar societies in America 
and Prussia existed without the strict separation of the sexes. Filaret, scoffed at this line: 
Russia was not to displace tradition to slavishly follow the West. Frustrated, Totleben 
returned from Moscow and met with the emperor and empress on 23 March, at which he told 
the ruling couple, “His holiness would not remain a member of the society, nor sign up for it 
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if the society refused to observe the rule on the separation of the sexes.”202 This harsh 
pronouncement from the Orthodox Church dismayed the founders, especially because they 
believed that the Church would be one of the Red Cross’s most prominent supporters. 
Additionally, the organizers hoped that they could use Orthodox parishes as collection points 
for donations in the provinces. These hopes seem to have been dashed by the decision of one 
uncompromising metropolitan. 
This disappointment did not end the organizers’ efforts. The State Council approved 
the charter on 3 May. This charter, consisting of eighty-six articles, laid out the rules for how 
the organization would function. The aid society’s purpose was to work with the “military 
administration” to deliver aid to the wounded in war. To accomplish this task, the society 
would provide materials and medical workers of both sexes to the military. The organization 
would consist of members of several ranks: “honorable members” (pochetnye chleny), or 
those who belonged to the Romanov family, heads of state ministries, and the Church; 
“charitable members” (blagotvoritel’nye chleny), those who donated at least one hundred 
rubles at once or ten rubles per year; “active members (deistvitel’nye chleny), those who gave 
fifty rubles at once or three rubles per year; and “junior members” (sorevnovateli), those who 
gave less money or donated materials.  
The charter organized the Russian Red Cross into three levels: the Main Directorate, 
provincial chapters, and women’s committees. In a concession to Filaret, the charter confined 
women’s roles to the women’s committees. The Main Directorate consisted of a twenty-five-
member board under the patronage of the empress, who selected the chairman and two 
deputies. The members of the society voted for candidates for this board at yearly general 
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assemblies. As the head governing body of the society, the Main Directorate collected yearly 
reports from all local chapters and had the right to order subordinate chapters to deliver funds 
and supplies to where they were needed. Also, the Main Directorate represented the society 
in all relations with state ministries, the zemstvos, and other voluntary societies. Local 
committees needed at least thirty members in a town to form, and these branches required 
permission from the provincial governor, who was usually a member. In an apparent 
concession to the Muscovites, the charter permitted local committees to store their funds in 
state or other banks, so long as they reported all accounts to the Main Directorate once a 
year. Women’s committees acted as the feminine half of the local committee, and the charter 
tasked them with raising funds for the society, collecting sanitary supplies, and overseeing 
training programs for nurses.203  
The charter listed special guidelines for the organization’s wartime activities. If war 
broke out, the Main Directorate would deliver inventories of its stores to the Ministry of War. 
The aid society was responsible for forming brigades and conducting relief activities in the 
theater of war. To ensure smooth coordination between relief workers near the front and 
military commanders, the society planned to send agents to the Main Headquarters of the 
army. The empress named these agents, and their duty was to command all relief workers in 
the theater of war. The charter left instructions for the agents’ activities vague, which meant 
that, when Russia went to war with the Turks a decade later, confusion and apprehension 
prevented the smooth delivery of private aid to Russia’s armies at the front.  
Two weeks after the State Council confirmed the aid society’s charter, the organizers 
met in the Ministry of State Domains to choose a chairman and Main Directorate for the 
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society on 18 May. In addition to the selection of Zelenoi as chairman, they also named A. K. 
Baumgarten and A. D. Bashmakov as deputy chairmen. The rest of the Main Directorate 
comprised of twenty-one high-ranking military officers, statesmen, famous doctors, and court 
favorites.204 By no means a cross-section of Russian society, these men’s talents and 
connections to state ministries ensured the aid society served its purpose. At the same time, 
by taking over membership in the Main Directorate, this group of bureaucrats and generals 
blocked women such as Sabinina and Frederiks from leadership of the organization they 
helped create. A published list of the two hundred founders of the society listed few women 
among the ranks of the organizers. This list included many nobles, generals, statesmen, and 
only a spattering of professionals. In its composition, the Russian Red Cross at the beginning 
resembled the French aid society, the Société de Secours aux Blessés Militaires, a nest of 
aristocratic privilege, but it differed in that many of the Russian organizers served in the 
tsarist bureaucracies or military.205 Merchants, writers, and medical professionals were 
conspicuously absent from the ranks of the Russian aid society. For the next fifty years, 
outside critics would fault the Russian Red Cross for being too opaque and too closely 
associated with the bureaucracy and court.   
This association also needed to address the “women’s question” that Metropolitan 
Filaret had posed to the organizers. Sabinina felt the charter unjustly sidelined women and 
wanted to establish a Russian Women’s Society similar to the German Frauenverein founded 
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in Leipzig in 1865. She envisioned that this women’s society would be a national women’s 
organization with peacetime roles fighting poverty, training nurses, caring for orphans, aiding 
after disasters, and teaching the population “moderation, thrift, and domestic skills.” During 
wartime, the women’s society would be subsumed under the Main Directorate to conduct 
relief. After receiving criticisms that this plan was too ambitious for tsarist Russia, Sabinina 
backed down and accepted a proposal by Zelenoi and Baumgarten to channel women’s 
participation into women’s committees.206 Soon after, the St. Petersburg Women’s 
Committee formed a warehouse located in the Ministry of State Domains. Managed entirely 
by women—most of whom were married to men on serving the Main Directorate—this 
warehouse became the first institution within the Russian Red Cross to begin accumulating 
dressings and supplies for war.207 Sabinina and more than a few of the early members were 
frustrated with the charter’s restrictions on female participation; one of the first alterations 
they made to the charter the next decade was to rewrite this provision. 
Conclusion 
The Russian precedent for voluntary aid in war, the deployment of the Exaltation 
Society nurses in the Crimean War, succeeded because of a personal campaign within the 
Romanov court. Equally important to the foundation of the Russian Red Cross were related 
developments in the West. Dunant’s and Moynier’s ambitions to mobilize civilians toward 
aiding the wounded took hold across Europe in the decade following the Crimean War, and 
Russia could not stay out of this movement for long. Private aid societies, if properly trained 
and deployed, proved their value in Prussia’s wars of the 1860s. When the Russian military 
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informed its officers on the pages of Voennyi sbornik that it now possessed a national aid 
society, the author admitted that the Italian, American, and Prussian wars had shown the 
value of “the participation of society, not only in monetary and material donations, but also 
in direct [relief] activities.” Miliutin may have eyed this movement as impractical or 
intrusive, but he could not prevent certain Russians from believing that they needed such 
organization or stop the movement at court to found a national aid society. After all, 
everyone including the military blamed the medical failure in the Crimea on shortages of 
supplies, personnel, and corruption. 208 Still, the popular demand for a private aid 
organization was quite small. As in the Crimean War, it took a careful effort by a group of 
well-connected subjects to entice the dynasty to permit a state-chartered, private Red Cross 
organization to take root in Russia.  
During the next decade, the Russian Red Cross evolved from a group of founders 
with a charter to an empire-wide, state-supported institution that conducted relief work for 
Russia’s soldiers and civilians at home. This organization also intervened on behalf of 
humanitarian and Slavophile causes abroad, such as the Balkan uprisings against the Turks in 
the 1870s. The 1860s saw numerous voices contribute to a discourse on how to organize an 
aid society for Russia and what causes to champion. This organization’s initial purpose was 
to mobilize civilians for war, women in particular, a task that Elena Pavlovna began during 
the Crimean War. As one introduction to the Russian Red Cross’s charter stated:  
The Russian people are aware of their obligation to care for those who sacrifice life 
and health for their defense and honor. With joy they enter a union with the goal of not only 
satisfying Christian charity and compassion but also of fulfilling their holy duty to the 
defenders of the Russian land and to Russian soldiers. Russian women, of course, enter this 
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union with joy, which gives them the capability of participating in the defense and protection 
of the fatherland, all the more so as this concern is a truly a women’s task.209      
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CHAPTER 3 – THE RUSSIAN RED CROSS DURING ITS FIRST DECADE 
The Russian Red Cross faced two questions following its chartering in May 1867 and 
the state’s recognition of the Geneva Convention in September of the same year. First, even 
though tsarist generals still harbored suspicions about how to employ civilian aid societies in 
war, Russia had committed itself to this aspect of the humanitarian movement in 1867 and 
had to determine plans for using civilian relief workers in war. Second, no one knew how to 
develop a wartime relief society in peace. What activities should the Russian aid society 
pursue to advertise its mission, expand its endowment, and convince women to become 
nurses? Russians looked abroad for answers to these questions, and they sent delegates to a 
series of international conferences in the 1860s and 1870s to learn more about how to deploy 
a national aid society in war. The decade from the Russian Red Cross’s founding to the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 was largely a period of confusion for this organization. 
Activists struggled to generate interest in a wartime aid society during periods of peace, and 
this challenge would vex the Russian Red Cross throughout its existence.  
In 1869, Russia dispatched General A. K. Baumgarten and doctors Kh. Ia. von 
Giubbenet and P. A. Naranovich to the Second International Conference of Aid Societies in 
Berlin in 1869, a congress that raised the question of how aid societies from neutral powers 
might provide medical assistance to warring nations. As the Russians articulated, neutrality 
might only be preserved in wartime if a committee composed entirely of nonbelligerent 
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powers doled out relief to the needy.210 This critique should not be surprising. Tsarist Russia 
possessed tremendous manpower resources but industrial underdevelopment and shortages of 
medical personnel burdened its armies. Also, Russia had also recently waged war with 
Britain, France, and Turkey, while the neutral observers Austria-Hungary and Prussia 
remained inactive. As a latecomer to the Geneva Convention, the tsarist state wanted to 
ensure that it would receive aid from neutral powers if it went to war in the future. And the 
Russians believed they were at the forefront in the international movement to limit the 
harmful effects of warfare. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration convinced European powers 
to ban explosive bullets under a certain size because they caused needless suffering. Most of 
the European delegates at the 1869 Berlin conference, reluctant to relinquish their authority 
to a committee of five civilians in Geneva, ignored Russia’s position and endorsed the 
principle that a nonbelligerent nation could assist warring countries’ aid societies.211 Geneva 
would not be the middle man to ensure that each belligerent in a conflict received equal 
foreign aid. In the decades that followed, Russia would receive little help from foreign aid 
societies when it made war against the Ottoman Empire or Japan, both conflicts that 
Europeans generally blamed Russian imperialists for starting. At the same time, Russia 
invested little in foreign conflicts in which it did not have a vested interest in backing one 
side.    
The Prussians’ other point of contention in 1869 is far more relevant for the 
discussion here. Prussia wanted aid societies to work in concert with the central military 
authorities and limited their role to support in the rear only. This idea won little sympathy 
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from the other nations at the Berlin conference, many of which believed too much interaction 
between aid societies and militaries deprived the former of independence, altruism, or 
flexibility. On this point, Prussian militarism lost, but independence for the aid societies led 
to a third question: What should these organizations do in peacetime? One Prussian delegate, 
Dr. Brinkmann, suggested that societies prepare themselves for war by struggling against 
epidemics, hunger, and natural disasters, and he saw female nurses as the perfect agents to 
carry out these campaigns. This proposal found both supporters and objectors among the 
delegates. The French feared that their aid society would expend all of its resources on 
peacetime endeavors and be unprepared for war, but other representatives believed public 
hygiene might be a cheap and worthwhile activity in which to partake.212 Russia’s delegate, 
von Giubbenet, objected to the idea of peacetime humanitarianism, fearing public health 
would waste resources and make the wartime aid society responsible for an impossible task 
in the tsarist empire.213 Von Giubbenet’s proposal won widespread support, and the delegates 
committed the movement to regarding war work as the raison d’être of the Red Cross.214 
Russia later would turn about-face on the issue of peacetime relief in response to pressures 
within the Red Cross to do more to spread its mission to the public in the wake of the Franco-
Prussian War. During these early years, however, the Russians had little clue how to conduct 
wartime relief until the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 provided an example of what was 
possible in an autocratic state.  
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The next two chapters explore how the Russian Red Cross evolved from a charter to a 
national organization dedicated to protecting the health of Russia’s soldiers and civilians 
during the nine years from its foundation in 1867 to the uprising of Balkan Christians in 
1875. The Red Cross in this era expanded its numbers of chapters, but it struggled to increase 
its endowment or draw medical professionals to its ranks. With limited private capital to 
draw from and an unclear peacetime mission, the Red Cross serves as means for identifying 
some of the possibilities and limitations for public initiative in reform-era Russia. To trace 
this development, an apt starting point is not the Russian Red Cross itself, but what it most 
certainly was not, the United States’ Sanitary Commission (USSC), an institution Russians 
admired yet acknowledged was probably impossible for tsarist society to create or the 
autocracy to tolerate.         
The United States’ Sanitary Commission 
The Crimean War initiated the question of how to employ civilian relief workers to 
military conflict, but the American Civil War demonstrated to European observers what 
civilian support for war would look like in the wars of the future. Russian commentators on 
the American Civil War recognized that there was something different about this conflict: 
The North and the South fought over competing ideologies. Ideology, coupled with the 
popular support needed to sustain it, had enabled both the North and the South to mobilize 
tremendous resources for war. Russian commentators knew that the application of military 
force more efficiently might avoid a repetition of the defeat in the Crimean War; however, as 
reformers recognized, opening the door toward popular participation in war came at a 
political cost. Free and voluntary participation in military conflict led civilians to demand a 
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voice politics, and the Russians needed to find a way to sharpen one edge of this sword while 
blunting the other.   
Founded in 1861 to provide material and medical support to Federal armies in the 
American Civil War, the USSC enjoyed unprecedented support from the Northern public and 
grew to become the largest voluntary association in United States by 1865. Russian 
knowledge of this society came primarily from Thomas W. Evans, a representative for the 
USSC in Europe and later dentist to Napoleon III, who traveled throughout Europe to solicit 
donations during the American Civil War.215 The Main Directorate of the Russian Red Cross 
even hosted Evans at a meeting in January 1868.216 Those Russian reformers who met Evans 
expressed a respect for American ingenuity and self-initiative in creating the commission, 
and they envied the American-sized sums of capital this organization raised from the public. 
D. I. Zavalishin, a former naval officer and Decembrist, authored the first Russian 
work to celebrate the American national aid society in 1867.217 Zavalishin believed the 
Russians should learn several lessons from the Americans. He emphasized that, in order for 
this institution to “satisfy the most pressing demands, private charity needed to operate 
independently from the bureaucracy.” In America’s case, this independence posed new 
problems. Lincoln’s army initially viewed the USSC as a group of amateurs who would 
inevitably create a “fifth wheel,” hindering the Union Army on campaigns. Support from the 
press and sound management by men such as Valentin Mott, a physician, and Frederick Law 
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Olmstead ensured that the USSC won public approval and did not diverge from its mission. 
The USSC conducted careful statistical surveys on the sanitary conditions of Federal 
soldiers, which enabled relief workers to provide the supplies most desperately needed. In 
total, donations to the USSC reached several hundred million dollars, and the commission 
spent these monies outfitting 214 hospitals with 133,800 beds as well as numerous relief 
stations, sanitary trains, and ferries. Lastly, the USSC informed relatives of wounded soldiers 
when their sons had perished. This task strengthened the bonds between the subject and the 
state, or as Zavalishin put it, “this attention by the fatherland to the citizen, giving his life for 
his country, was extremely comforting for their relatives; it gave them the possibility of at 
least finding the place where those that gave their lives were buried.” Even after the war, the 
USSC continued its activities, transforming wartime hospitals into invalid homes and 
providing welfare for widows and orphans. The American example might be impossible to 
replicate in autocratic nations such as Russia, but Zavalishin believed members of the Red 
Cross should know the enviable precedent the Americans set in the Civil War. This pamphlet 
emphasized no European nation had approached the Americans in what was possible.218  
Two years later, N. Geinats, a military doctor, translated Charles J. Stillé’s History of 
the United States Sanitary Commission into Russian and published selections from the work 
in Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal (Military Medical Journal).219 This lengthy essay repeated the 
idea that the American Civil War represented a new type of war that was rooted in political 
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ideology and conducted according to public opinion.220 Popular participation in the war effort 
benefitted army and society in that it enabled the public to support the state in its 
responsibility for caring for the army.221 The British had experimented with these ideas 
before in the Crimea, but the Americans took this level of participation to an entirely new 
level. Stillé emphasized the female role in raising funds and volunteering for the USSC, 
which he claimed was prompted by a combination of domestic virtues peculiar to the fairer 
sex and the widespread participation of American women in charitable activities before 
1861.222 The USSC also took precautionary measures such as commissioning scientific 
works on military sanitation to instruct American doctors in the Union Army, many of 
whom, the work implied, had little experience with military medicine.223 USSC agents, who 
numbered between 150 and 700, inspected military hospitals to inquire of their material 
needs.224 Finally, Stillé’s survey emphasized that the USSC’s purpose was to supplement but 
not replace the government’s sanitary facilities. For Russian readers, American citizens did 
not merely demand special care for their wounded from the state; instead, a free people 
delivered this aid on their own.225    
The question that vexed the Russians the most was how to accomplish this task in an 
illiberal autocracy. Russian conservatives wanted to mobilize private resources without 
surrendering decisions on how these resources would be spent. In a speech to the Kievan 
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Association of Doctors in 1868, von Giubbenet repeated the concern that the increased scale 
and frequency of modern warfare necessitated that private aid societies assist the wounded. 
The first author in this discourse to use the term “civil society (grazhdanskoe obshchestvo),” 
von Giubbenet believed civilian assistance was needed to supplement Russia’s traditional 
strength: its endless supply of “healthy conscripts.” In the modern era, “civil society has 
come to recognize that if it sends its sons to battle, then it is obligated to not commit them to 
hemorrhaging blood from wounds or dying torturous deaths from hunger and thirst.”226  
Von Giubbenet argued that modern warfare had prompted the formation of aid 
societies, such as the Exaltation Society, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich’s special 
committee to collect sanitary materials for the navy, and Florence Nightingale’s nursing 
brigades. These efforts were all admirable, von Giubbenet admitted, but the USSC surpassed 
all of the above in its ability to deliver aid, even if it received a cold shoulder from the 
American government and Union Army. The press and public opinion were crucial for the 
USSC to overcome official resistance, and he noted that the Russians encountered similar 
doubts from generals in the Crimean War. But Russia’s political structure and social 
landscape were not those of America. Russia, like Germany, had created its own national aid 
society under the patronage of the empress in peacetime. The leadership might support the 
Red Cross, but the educated public remained indifferent or hostile to this kind of patriotic 
venture. He continued, “In Russia, in all probability, barely one-hundredth of the population 
even knows about the existence of these societies: otherwise donations and offerings for this 
good and Christian pursuit would come in completely different sizes.”227 Russia wanted what 
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foreign nations possessed, but there appeared little clue how to achieve this goal in peacetime 
when educated society remained uninvolved in this project. 
A second work from this same year, penned by the military physician Fedor Zatler, 
also sought to win support for private aid. This work, a small volume priced to sell at twenty 
kopecks, emphasized the changes to the relationship between society and army that resulted 
from universal military conscription in Europe.228 Russia at this time did not have universal 
conscription, and no one was sure whether or not the Ministry of War would succeed in 
pushing through this reform. Still, Zatler believed that the introduction of universal 
conscription changed the public’s view of military service. With military service obligatory 
for each subject, soldiers now served for the love of their fatherland. Therefore, any soldier 
donating his life and health for his country “receives the right to demand that if he is 
wounded, he will receive all measures that science and experience have at their disposal to 
save his life and restore his health.”229 Zatler briefly recounted the Prussian and Austrian 
experiences in the Schleswig-Holstein War before providing a lengthy description of the 
USSC. In America, civilian society refused to limit its role to sewing bandages and collecting 
monies. Instead, the USSC established its own hospitals according to innovative designs and 
supplied these facilities excellently. Zatler did not delve into the political relationship 
between the USSC and the state, or how Russia might apply these lessons, but he did believe 
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that, as a result of this organization, American soldiers had superior sanitary equipment and 
the Union was able to reduce casualties.230  
The American examples provided the blueprints for the activities that the Russian 
Red Cross might perform in the future. The size and scale of the USSC won the admiration 
of the Russians, who hoped that their own relief organization might evolve into an 
organization of similar breadth as the cultural level of the population increased, but two other 
lessons remained crucial. The Russian Red Cross needed to inspire civilian society to fund it 
and volunteer as medical workers, which was difficult in times of peace, and the USSC’s 
independence gave it leeway to ensure that government services fulfilled their duties. The 
second lesson seemed impossible for an autocracy that refused the educated public a role in 
matters as important as war making or oversight of government institutions. As the 1870s 
progressed, the tsarist state succeeded in educating Russian readers about the Red Cross and 
its potential to intervene in crises, but, at the same time, the autocracy failed to keep public 
opinion from swaying how the Red Cross would be used and what consequences these 
endeavors would have on foreign policy.    
The Russian Red Cross’s Early Activities 
Once Alexander II approved the Red Cross’s charter in May 1867, the Main 
Directorate began meeting almost weekly at the Ministry of State Domains. One of this 
organization’s most pressing tasks was to spread news of its formation throughout Russia to 
solicit members and create provincial chapters. At a meeting on 27 May, members of the 
Main Directorate heard reports that they had sent 1,025 circulars on the Red Cross and 9,000 
copies of the charter to provincial governors, mayors, members of the nobility, chairmen of 
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city and provincial zemstvo boards, and prominent community members. Additionally, they 
published accounts of the organization in newspapers and periodicals that aligned with the 
political sympathies of the founders.231  
This initial drive prompted tsarist subjects to form eight provincial committees by the 
end of the year, but delays remained in Moscow.232 All provincial chapters were required to 
send 10 percent of their funds to the Main Directorate. Of the 90 percent that remained with 
provincial committees, two-thirds of the endowments were to remain untouched in 
anticipation of war, and the remaining third spent to help wounded or crippled veterans.233 
Moscow had numerous individuals who sympathized with this organization—one source 
listed up to 190—but it took a while for Russia’s second capital to embrace this organization. 
Even petitions by willing Muscovites to Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, the governor-general of 
the province and an important figure in Russian associational life, proved unsuccessful at 
first.234 Headway was difficult in other provinces, often because the zemstvos were occupied 
with more pressing concerns or because they regarded aid to soldiers as a second-rate activity 
in peacetime.235  
Despite the early frustrations, the Red Cross expanded its membership quickly across 
the empire. A published report from the Red Cross’s congress of 19 May 1869 listed 40 
provincial committees, 26 women’s committees, 40 county boards, around 7,500 members, 
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and a capital of approximately 170,000 rubles. 236 By then, the largest and most active 
provincial committees existed in the empire’s principle cities: St. Petersburg, Moscow, 
Warsaw, Odessa, and Kiev. St. Petersburg raised by far the greatest amount of revenue, 
taking in 63,313.85 rubles in the year 1868, while Odessa came in second place with 
14,194.60 rubles.237 Thirty-one of the provincial committees existed in European Russia, 
while peripheral parts of the empire such as the Caucasus had four, Siberia added another 
four, and Tashkent even formed a committee to aid the forces stationed in Turkestan.238  
The women’s committees played the most active role in fundraising, collecting on 
average twice the number of rubles as the provincial and county chapters.239 For example, the 
Franco-Prussian War prompted a windfall of donations; in 1871, 126 local chapters raised a 
total of 226,332.44 rubles, but the empire’s 29 women’s committees raised 80,546 rubles on 
their own.240 St. Petersburg and Moscow each had multiple women’s committees, while 
another fourteen provincial cities, ranging in size from Kiev to Tula and Irkutsk, each 
possessed a single board of this type.241 In the capital, the women’s committees were headed 
by the elite founders of the society, women such as Baroness Frederiks, Princess E. M. 
Ol’denburgskaia, Countess E. F. Tizengauzen, Countess E. N. Geiden, and others. Although 
their members were often well connected and ardent in their work, the women’s committees 
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retained a subservient role to the provincial committees in the first draft of the charter. Not 
until 1873, six years after Filaret died, did the Red Cross’s leadership rewrite the charter to 
permit women to serve with men on the provincial committees. Even after this change, few 
women elected to dissolve the women’s committees and join the provincial committees. By 
the Russo-Turkish War, less than one quarter of the provincial committees had female 
members.242  
Funds for the Red Cross came from two sources. Membership dues from the roughly 
seven thousand members brought in around fifty thousand rubles per year early on, and this 
sum grew each year. However, it seemed that many members failed to pay their dues, and 
this problem worsened as the decade progressed.243 Large private donations, the second 
source of revenue, often came from Romanovs and other elites, while military commanders 
or units themselves made often made smaller donations.244 Additional income derived from 
collection boxes placed in churches and public places. During the seven-year period from 
1868 to 1875, the St. Petersburg collection points took in over forty-two thousand rubles. 
Later they followed a British example and began kopeck drives in the countryside that sought 
a small donation from each member of the village. Viatka Province, which had one of the 
most active provincial committees, conducted kopeck drives that collected several thousand 
rubles per year.245  
The Red Cross’s Reserve Fund grew to over half a million rubles by 1876. The 
Franco-Prussian War and famine-relief campaigns of 1874 seemed to have prompted the 
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greatest interest, if the growth of the endowment is used as a criterion for measuring 
enthusiasm. Even though the records are incomplete, the following charts exhibit these 
trends:  
Table 1. Donations to the Main Directorate in St. Petersburg, 1867-1875 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Osnovanie Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta, vol. 1, 109. 
Besides St. Petersburg, the most successful provincial committees at fundraising were 
those in Warsaw, Moscow, Viatka, Tambov, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Tula, and Vladimir. 
Yearly donations appear to have been based on the wealth of the province and the zeal of its 
members. For example, populous St. Petersburg raised 8 kopecks per resident, Odessa raised 
about 5 kopecks per resident, the Amur region raised more than 3 kopecks per resident, but 
Warsaw managed only about 1.5 kopecks per resident.246 This income made the Red Cross a 
wealthy charity in tsarist Russia, especially because the organization spent little during its 
first years of peace. 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
246 Ibid., 111. 
Year Funds Raised 
1867 28,995.02 rubles 
1868 37,756.81 rubles 
1869 23,833.11 rubles 
1870 29,792.21 rubles 
1871 132,727.33 rubles 
1872 No records 
1873 122,130.01 rubles 
1874 No records 
1875 51,771.93 
(incomplete record) 
Total for 1867-1875 427,006.42 rubles 
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Table 2. Main Directorate Expenditures, 1867-1875 
Year Amount 
1867 2,462.51 rubles 
1868 4,437.98 rubles 
1869 7,181.94 rubles 
1870 56,259.45 rubles 
1871 91,918.48 rubles 
1872 No records 
1873 169,555.93 rubles 
1874 12,322.35 rubles 
1875 41,601.51 rubles 
Total 384,739.96 rubles 
 
Source: Osnovanie Rossiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta, vol. 1, 112. 
Expenditures during the first seven years remained relatively low, with the exception 
of outlays for relief work during the Franco-Prussian War. Provincial committees, with fewer 
resources from which to draw, spent far less during this period, but expenditures increased 
during the 1870s.247 Most expenses for the society went to publishing reports, paying clerks 
and guards, manufacturing and placing collection boxes, and preparing examples of bedding 
and dressings to be sent to the provincial committees.248 The establishment of a nursing 
community might have posed a major investment for a provincial or women’s committee, but 
there were very few of these set up during the first decade of the Red Cross’s existence. Had 
Russia found itself at war during this period, the society’s endowment would have been far 
too meager to provide substantive relief for long. Still, when compared to most private 
charities in tsarist Russia, the Red Cross’s endowment seemed impressively large and grew at 
a significant rate.249 Organizers hoped that expanding the national relief society’s footprint 
                                                     
247 Ibid., 112. 
 
248 Otchet glavnogo upravleniia, 18. 
 
249 Adele Lindenmeyr provided a limited view of the sizes and expenditures of Russian charities at the turn of 
the century. If we use these statistics as a starting point, the Red Cross would be in the top ten percent (and 
 110 
 
throughout Russia and broadening its mission to include new types of activities would win 
more donations in the coming years.     
Press and Advertising 
From its beginnings, the Red Cross recognized that accountability to the public 
encouraged frequent donations, and advertising was needed to increase membership. In 1867, 
Chairman Zelenoi asked several newspapers to publish a newsletter for the society. The 
editor of Moskovskie vedomosti, M. N. Katkov, announced that he would publish all of the 
society’s protocols for 250 rubles per year, and the editors of Russkie vedomosti agreed to 
perform the same task for double the price, but the Main Directorate was not keen on these 
offers.250 Rather than outsourcing their publications to newspapers, many members of the 
Main Directorate thought that they should have their own newsletter. The members of the 
Moscow Provincial Committee offered to print a bimonthly newsletter, but the Main 
Directorate did not want this publication to be controlled by the Moscow chapter and refused 
the bid.251   
Not until 1870 did the Red Cross began publishing its own journal, Vestnik 
obshchestva popecheniia o ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh (Herald of the Aid Society for 
Wounded and Sick Soldiers). Edited at first by S. V. Maksimov, this journal appeared 
monthly for its first seven years. After several issues, the Main Directorate replaced 
Maksimov with Dr. I. V. Bertenson, Pirogov’s student and biographer, who edited the 
newsletter for the next six years. In 1876, the editorship went to A. D. Marsikani, another 
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military doctor. The cost of printing during the first decade ran slightly over a thousand 
rubles per year, and most of this cost was for paper and ink, since the Second Section of the 
Imperial Chancellery printed the newsletter for free. To publicize the Red Cross’s activities, 
the board sent issues of Vestnik to all provincial chapters, Russian medical societies, 
governors’ offices, zemstvo boards, and peace courts.252 
The Vestnik reported the progress the Red Cross had made and never became 
professional publication. This distinction surely suited the needs of the autocracy and men 
running this organization. Copies of the Vestnik provided detailed summaries of all of the 
organization’s activities, campaigns, and funds. They included translations of important 
European works on military sanitation and comprehensive reports on foreign Red Cross 
societies’ projects. What this publication would never become, however, was a trade journal 
for Russian nurses or Red Cross workers. The editors of the Vestnik removed any mention of 
politics or criticism of the Red Cross. They reprinted summaries of the transcripts from 
international conferences on warfare and humanitarianism, but this journal did nothing to 
promote a similar discussion within Russia. The Vestnik seems to have been designed to 
convince Russian donors that their monies were well spent. This publication tells us lots 
about what the Red Cross did in tsarist Russia, but it provides little clue as to what the 
participants in this organization thought of their labors.  
The Red Cross also sought to raise funds and spread its message by publishing 
brochures and pamphlets. They produced and sold copies of Zatler’s essay “The Fate of the 
Wounded in War” and von Giubbenet’s brochure titled “On the people’s participation in 
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aiding wounded and sick soldiers and memoirs from the Crimean campaign”253 The Viatka 
provincial committee even drafted a brochure designed for literate peasants.254 Planners 
viewed national minorities in the Western borderlands as ideal candidates for membership. A 
report from 7 October 1874 suggested that the Russian Red Cross should produce written 
materials in German to solicit donations from non-Orthodox colonists in the Baltics, Volga 
provinces, and Ukraine. The Protestant population of Russia, this report noted, was 
“extremely wealthy and industrious,” and involvement of these populations held further 
importance because they “often live in areas close to the theater of war.” The Main 
Directorate apportioned over three hundred rubles toward producing German-language 
booklets and sent copies to Lutheran churches in these areas.255  
This propaganda worked, convincing local elites, zemstvo members, and even 
Orthodox clergy to establish provincial chapters. The more difficult task proved transforming 
enthusiasm into nursing orders, the society’s peacetime goal. During the first decade of its 
existence this organization struggled to attract medical personnel. 
Nurses 
In the 1860s, few women in Russia possessed the education and desire to make a 
career of nursing, especially in dirty hospitals during the mundane periods of peace. But the 
need for talented nurses was great. Military planners estimated that Russia must be prepared 
to accommodate eighty thousand wounded and sick soldiers in the case of war. If the 
Ministry of War’s norm was to assign six nurses to every two hundred patients, then the Red 
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Cross needed to have 2,400 nurses at hand, a number that exceeded the total nurses in the 
Crimean War by tenfold.256 It would take the Red Cross decades to train this many women, 
in a large part because the nursing societies insisted that Sisters of Mercy should be elite and 
they should not be personally remunerated for their labors. 
The Red Cross received a break when the Ministry of War granted nurses the right to 
work in military hospitals on 5 June 1868. As noted earlier, this privilege had been given to 
Exaltation Society nurses in January 1863, but now the Ministry of War expanded this 
program to include larger numbers of women in the future. In addition to this endorsement 
from the Ministry of War, the Main Directorate received a letter from Dr. V. A. Milliot 
expressing support from the Russian medical community. Milliot promised that Russian 
civilian doctors would work with the Red Cross to enable it to widen its activities. In 
response to this positive report, the Main Directorate sent a circular to provincial chapters 
informing them to begin cooperating with local medical societies.257 These measures, 
however, made little headway in attracting medical professionals during the Red Cross’s 
formative years, and the insufficient number of trained nurses and doctors caused planners to 
fear that they would not fulfill their mission if war broke out. 
Nursing societies succeeded in the largest cities only under the management of 
exceptional patronesses with elite connections. For example, N. B. Shakhovskaia and the 
Moscow Women’s Committee founded the community Assuage My Tears (Utoli moia 
pechali), which had twenty nurses in 1870. Generous donations from Moscow elites enabled 
the community to establish its own orphanage and a three-hundred-bed hospital in the 
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Lefortovo neighborhood. By 1875, Assuage My Tears had one hundred nurses who worked 
in Moscow’s hospitals and traveled outside the city for special projects.258  
The second major society established during this decade was St. George Community 
(Georgievskaia obshchina) in St. Petersburg. Founded by the empress, Princess E. M. 
Ol’denburgskaia, and Countess E. N. Geiden with the participation of the five St. Petersburg 
women’s committees in 1869, this community drew its first members from the Exaltation 
Community. S. P. Botkin, one of Russia’s most famous physicians, served as the 
community’s head doctor and chief instructor, a position for which he received payment. 
Other famous medical professionals in the capital, such as Dr. Levkovich and Dr. Bystrov, 
provided gynecological and pediatric expertise in special cases. The nurses, in accordance 
with common practice, did not receive salaries for their services at the community’s 
headquarters, but they did get free housing, food, clothing, and small stipends for travel.259 
Additionally, the nurses were permitted to work part-time for pay in private homes. Many 
patients visited the community from the beginning: Over seventeen thousand visitors sought 
medical consultations in 1871, and nearly twenty-nine thousand in 1872.260 Mortality rates 
among patients hospitalized at the community were high because most patients arrived in 
rough shape. The number of nurses in this community remained small because, it seems, 
there were few educated women who wanted this lifestyle; in 1872, the community only had 
twenty full members, but size did not prevent them from adding feldsher courses in 1872 and 
an orphanage in 1873. Word of the St. George Society’s activities spread beyond the capital, 
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since a few women from Kaluga, Tambov, and Tula sought training at its hospital.261 By the 
1880s and 1890s, this society treated tens of thousands of patients per year.262 The success 
the nursing societies enjoyed in Russia’s largest cities was much more difficult to replicate in 
the provinces.  
 A report on a project to found a nursing society in Novgorod illustrates the 
challenges local elites faced when they tried to establish nursing communities in provincial 
cities. Novgorod’s nursing society celebrated its opening on 17 July 1873 at a ceremony 
hosted by the provincial governor. Local members of the Red Cross had wanted to establish a 
nursing community three years prior, but they had failed to entice any candidates to train as 
nurses. Later, salaries attracted six women to begin the training process. Of Novgorod’s six 
nurse-trainees, four were nobles, one belonged to the clerical class, and one was the daughter 
of a soldier. Three of the women were in their late thirties, while the younger three were in 
their earlier twenties, and all were either widowed or unmarried. The provincial committee 
rented a two-story building near the military and zemstvo hospitals to house the nursing 
community. The author of this report expressed dismay that it took so long for Novgorod to 
establish a nursing community, but the upside was that, in the future, the city might use nuns 
from nearby monasteries, of which Novgorod had several. Female monasteries had to 
provide nuns with food, clothing, and shelter, so their employment as nurses caused less of a 
financial commitment to the Red Cross.263 Small, poorly funded nursing communities were 
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the norm (if they existed at all) in provincial Russia during the first decade of the Red 
Cross’s existence.         
For most provincial boards, the greatest challenge to establishing a nursing 
community was locating funding for these projects. Assistance from the Church and 
zemstvos was almost always a must, but the Church was often reluctant to help the Red 
Cross, and the state restricted zemstvo budgets. Some Red Cross activists believed that 
converting monasteries into hospitals and nunneries into nurse training centers presented a 
tempting way to reintegrate Orthodox monasticism into Russian social life and erase some of 
the most harmful of Peter I’s reforms.264 In most cases, the Orthodox Church refused to 
answer outside calls to restructure monasteries. Nunneries, for example, cited rules in their 
charters that forbade the nuns from fraternizing with men within their walls.265 In only a few 
cases did the Orthodox Church allow doctors to train nuns. The Kazan Provincial Committee, 
for example, initiated a program with the help of the Bogorodichnii Women’s Monastery, 
which agreed to provide five nuns to train as nurses in the local military hospital.266 The 
women’s community at the Rozhdestvo Bogoroditsa Cathedral in Vologda promised to 
educate thirty of its members to care for the wounded, and Mother Nansiia, the abbess of the 
Voznesenskii Monastery in Moscow, committed to training twenty-five Moscow nuns as 
nurses. These nuns, the program envisioned, would earn one hundred rubles a year working 
in city’s hospitals. In reality, very few of Russia’s nurses came from the Orthodox nunneries; 
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most nurses were lay members of the quasireligious nursing orders (obshchiny sester 
miloserdiia). 
Secular authorities sometimes provided limited assistance in helping to set up nursing 
orders. Women’s committees in Poltava, Viaz’ma, and Podolsk offered stipends to attract 
candidates, and the zemstvos proposed to house and train the women in their own hospitals. 
In Kharkov, the Ministry of Education permitted the university to train nurses in its surgical 
clinic in 1871. In total, the nursing communities produced far too few trained women during 
the 1870s to satisfy Russia’s needs. An official history of the Russian Red Cross blamed 
shortages of funds as the greatest factor limiting the success of these endeavors.267 An author 
in the society’s Vestnik believed that the shortage of nurses resulted from a lack of press and 
upper-class women’s disdain of peacetime nursing as a dirty trade for the uneducated. Only a 
small portion of nurses viewed care for the sick “not simply as work, but as the citizen’s duty 
or Christian service.”268 In total, the Russian Red Cross could only count nine fully operating 
nursing communities with 186 trained nurses by 1875.269  
To address the shortages of nurses, the Main Directorate created a special committee 
of doctors in 1869 to discuss how to attract and train female nurses from the upper orders of 
society. Meeting notes indicate that this committee encountered dissension from one female 
member of the St. Petersburg Women’s Committee, Countess E. N. Geiden, who offered that 
women from the military caste be recruited as nurses because they were already accustomed 
to military discipline and habits (voennyi byt). Because of these women’s low social status, 
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Geiden believed they were ideal for the difficult tasks of hospital work, a prejudice that 
Florence Nightingale also shared. Geiden suggested that the local committees fund salaries 
for the nurses, but the Main Directorate members split over whether the provincial 
committees would be able to raise funds year in and out. She proposed that they construct a 
special ward in the Second Infantry Hospital, where nurses and students from the Medical-
Surgical Academy would undergo practical training.270 Geiden’s suggestions did not sit well 
with the doctors on the special committee, who believed that paid nurses were unreliable and 
the ideal nurses were educated, preferably noble, volunteers such as Bakunina in the Crimean 
War: 
According to the opinion of the committee, the thought of training women from the 
lower estates, such as soldiers’ wives, burgher women, and peasants for the most 
common hospital tasks, with the goal of training these women to be sanitary workers 
in wartime, presents a significant hardship for the Society, such that the women who 
belong to these estates are more predisposed to care about their salaries and how they 
can feed their families.271 
 
Soldiers’ wives were deemed unreliable because they were likely to follow their husbands’ 
regiments instead of remaining at medical facilities in the rear. Furthermore, the Ministry of 
War had limited active-duty soldiers’ ability to marry by a decree on 17 June 1866. 
Therefore, the commission believed, the number of soldiers’ wives, which Geiden viewed as 
talent pool from which to recruit nurses, would disappear quickly.272 
Service requirements for nurses presented a second vexing problem for the Main 
Directorate. Organizers hoped that the nursing courses would produce many trained nurses 
                                                     
270 RGVIA, f. 12651, op. 1, d. 1, ll., 81, 110. 
 
271 RGVIA, f. 12651, op., 1, d. 1, ll. 110-11. 
 
272 RGVIA, f. 12651, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 111-12. 
 119 
 
spread throughout the country, but there was no consensus on how to ensure these women 
performed their duties as nurses. Since nurses were not in the military, the state placed no 
legal obligation on them to perform wartime service; since the Red Cross was outside the 
auspices of the Orthodox Church, lay nurses had no religious commitment to fulfill; and, 
without salaries, there was little incentive besides patriotism to keep women in nursing. This 
question worried Red Cross officials because the failure to deliver nurses to the army upon 
the outbreak of hostilities was no way to endear the Ministry of War to the idea of private aid 
in war. However, as planners pointed out, demanding service in wartime by legal 
requirement or paying nurses for their services went against the spirit of volunteerism that 
nation relief organizations supposedly epitomized. N. I. Miller, one member of the Main 
Directorate, complained that Russia already suffered from too many doctors forced into state 
service in exchange for free education. These state employees showed little love for the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which they viewed as the autocracy’s obstacle to the 
development of a free medical profession in Russia.273 The question of salaries for nurses 
worried advocates who believed that the nurse’s calling should be based on selfless 
patriotism. If nurses demanded and received payment for wartime services, then nursing 
might develop as a free profession in Russia, and thus it contrasted with the physician’s craft, 
which was tightly controlled by the state, as several doctors argued.274 In the end, members 
of the Main Directorate concluded that there was no one way that the society could compel 
women to serve besides relying on the trust and commitment of the nurses.275  
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Consensus over the curricula of nurses’ training courses was easier to reach. Some of 
the best medical minds in the empire, doctors and professors such as S. P. Botkin and others, 
set up a standard curriculum for a nursing course in 1875. Graduates of this course received 
training and a title similar to physician’s assistant (lekarskaia pomoshchnitsa). Writing to the 
Vestnik, A. P. Val’ter, a military doctor, distinguished between the nurses or Sisters of Mercy 
in the Red Cross and bedside attendants (sidelki). Bedside attendants were needed to comfort 
the sick and clean the wards, but these were tasks that any women in tsarist Russia could 
fulfill. Nurses, conversely, possessed an education that enabled them to perform medical 
procedures and care for the wounded.276 
Early discussions of training male nurses or Brothers of Mercy (brat’ia miloserdiia) 
failed to win support from the Ministry of War or attract male volunteers. The Main 
Directorate flirted with the idea of training monks in this capacity, an idea the Orthodox 
Church ignored, and the Ministry of War viewed male volunteers at the front as unnecessary, 
because the Great Reforms had increased the number of stretcher bearers to two hundred per 
division, a number in line with Prussian military norms, the most sophisticated in Europe.277 
In sum, when the Russian Red Cross dispatched medical brigades to intervene in the Balkan 
wars of the late 1870s, men volunteered as orderlies and agents, but plans to create reserves 
of male aid workers never got off the ground due to lack of enthusiasm and funds. The 
difficulty of attracting and retaining talented nurses during peacetime vexed the Red Cross in 
tsarist Russia up until the outbreak of the First World War.       
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Feldshers and Doctors  
Acquiring the services of feldshers (paramedics) and doctors proved another 
difficulty for the Red Cross. Russia suffered from shortages of these professionals in the 
Crimean War, and Miliutin devoted attention to increasing the number of doctors and 
feldshers in the military medical corps as part of his reforms.278 At one point, members of the 
Russian Red Cross discussed hiring 50 surgeons and 120 female feldshers to create a 
permanent medical staff, but the peacetime costs of paying these workers appeared 
prohibitive. Moreover, civilian facilities to train feldshers were already overtaxed, so any 
complement of feldshers would take years to create. 279 
At first, the Main Directorate instructed provincial committees to solicit support from 
the zemstvos in training or supplying feldshers. Only two provincial committees, Vladimir 
and Kostroma, convinced the zemstvos to train feldshers for the Red Cross in provincial 
medical centers.280 Facing a critical shortage of feldshers, Empress Maria Aleksandrovna and 
the St. Petersburg Women’s Committee founded a feldsher school for nurses in 1872. This 
course attracted twenty-four students at first, but only seven were women. Over the next 
three years, 111 students began this course, but only 14 finished, hardly an impressive 
number. Later in the decade, a few provincial committees and nursing societies established 
medical courses to train nurses in the feldsher trade. Saratov opened a feldsher school in 
1873, and the Mariinskaia Community in Moscow also established a women’s feldsher 
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course, but shortages of funding and biases against women practicing a traditional male craft 
prevented this program from taking off in the 1870s. The problem, it seems, was that the 
Mariinskaia Community housed its female feldsher course in a military feldsher school for 
men, and conservatives viewed this mixing of the sexes as “a serious obstacle to success in 
academic affairs.”281 
To address problems with the women’s feldsher courses, the Main Directorate again 
asked some of the empire’s best medical minds, men such as S. P. Botkin and I. V. 
Bertenson, to assess current problems with training women in male feldsher courses. The 
committee retreated from the ambitious goal of introducing female feldsher courses 
throughout the empire and focused on building up the programs established by the St. 
Petersburg Women’s Committee and the Georgievskaia Community.282 These professors of 
medicine devised a comprehensive course for female feldshers that included practical 
training in surgery, medical procedures, and medicines, as well as abstract scientific subjects 
such as biology, physics, Latin, and chemistry. Academically ambitious, these courses 
suffered from poor graduation rates. The number of candidates studying in the St. Petersburg 
Women’s Committee’s course grew from nineteen in 1873 to sixty-four in 1875, but only 
fourteen women graduated. Programs sponsored by the Georgievskaia Society and provincial 
committees in Vladikavkaz and Saratov attracted fewer candidates and suffered similarly 
high attrition rates.283 Desperate for graduates, the Main Directorate decided to draw from its 
wartime reserves to pay stipends for these women’s education and living expenses.284 
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Despite these measures, the Red Cross enjoyed little progress in training a cohort of 
feldshers, and aid workers lamented this shortage during the Russo-Turkish War.  
If feldshers were costly, doctors were even more difficult to hire. The Main 
Directorate initially shot down a plan by the Warsaw Provincial Committee to pay stipends to 
students at the Medical-Surgical Academy in exchange for a term of service after they 
completed their studies. The Ministry of Internal Affairs already employed a similar project 
to procure the services of civilian doctors, but, as N. I. Rozov mentioned, the state never 
recuperated the cost for the educational stipends from the young doctors.285 If the state found 
itself unable to make medical education profitable, then a private charity would have little 
chance of recouping this expense. The state and military likely viewed any attempts by the 
Red Cross to lure away its doctors with suspicion. Even though the tsarist state had made 
progress during the Great Reforms in increasing the number of graduates at the empire’s 
medical schools, tsarist Russia lagged behind all European powers in the ratio of physicians 
to subjects. Indentured to the military or other state ministries, the autocracy resisted letting 
its physicians leave their posts for service in a wartime aid society during a period of peace.  
In 1870s, General M. N. Annenkov, the father of Russian military railroads, 
conducted a survey of the Red Cross’s activities during the first three years of its existence. 
He noted, “in the case of war, there would be no shortages of monetary and material 
donations, but the capital collected up to this point would provide benefit without training 
competent surgeons, feldshers, and nurses beforehand.” In view of this shortcoming, 
Annenkov proposed they decentralize the women’s committees and provincial chapters by 
enabling them to spend up to 90 percent of their donations and membership fees on hiring 
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and training personnel. Autonomy and greater funds, Annenkov hoped, would spark 
enthusiasm.286 These recommendations inspired no change in policy, but Annenkov’s 
concern motivated the Main Directorate to petition the government to lend physicians in case 
of war.   
With most civilian doctors employed by the Ministry of Interior during this period, 
the state controlled the wellspring of medical talent that the Red Cross needed to fulfill its 
mission. The Main Directorate requested that the state provide the Red Cross with doctors 
and recognize relief work as part of physicians’ mandatory term in state service. In exchange, 
the Red Cross agreed to grant these doctors free membership and provided some students 
with stipends for their work. The Ministry of Interior, which had succeeded in raising the 
number of physicians in its employ during the 1860s and 1870s, turned down both offers 
with a decree on 13 January 1876. The Main Directorate then solicited volunteers to serve in 
case of war, but four provincial committees were able to obtain commitments from only 
eighty-five doctors, and all but nine of these physicians demanded compensation, numbers 
that were not encouraging for an organization with an expensive mission and few 
resources.287   
The quest to attract medical students with stipends did not go smoothly either. P. P. 
Zablotskii-Desiatovskii devised a plan in 1873 to pay students from the Medical-Surgical 
Academy or universities 325 rubles per year and cover fees for tuition. In exchange for the 
stipend, the young doctors committed to working in the Red Cross’s nursing schools and 
barrack hospitals for two years. The doctors also had to promise to return if war broke out 
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during the next ten-year period. This program failed to gain much support from medical 
students who felt they could earn higher salaries in state or zemstvo service. The number of 
medical students that volunteered to work for the nursing communities in St. Petersburg 
ranged between four to eight students during the first half of the 1870s.288  
When Russia intervened in the Balkans at the end of the 1870s, the Red Cross hastily 
contracted civilian and retired military doctors to fill the ranks of its medical detachments, 
and they succeeded at this task. Patriotic physicians and nurses appeared from the woodwork 
in wartime, but the Red Cross’s limited funds prevented it from creating a permanent staff of 
medical professionals in peacetime. This deficiency restricted the organization’s ability to 
reach out to the Russian military and population during the first decade. 
Conclusion 
In 1873, the Main Directorate solicited member N. V. Isakov to conduct a report on 
the organization’s inventories and wartime capacities. A well-known figure in associational 
life in St. Petersburg, Isakov belonged to Miliutin’s circle of reformers and oversaw the 
reforms of military secondary education. This report found that the Red Cross was woefully 
unprepared for wartime relief. Isakov noted that the inventories of supplies were inconsistent 
and did not correspond with the needs of the army: “The committees collected supplies of 
hospital items in undefined amounts, depending on the irregularity of donations and without 
any coordination,” and “this irregular acquisition of materials was fruitless and should not be 
allowed.” He concluded: “Clearly the system of constant acquisition has not fulfilled the 
society’s various tasks” and “the sums [of capital] that the society possesses are an 
insignificant sum in comparison with the sums that the state will need for war.” With sums of 
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capital too small for wartime relief, Isakov recommended that they refocus on training nurses 
and medical personnel. He also believed that the Main Directorate must take a greater role in 
directing the provincial societies to outfit standardized field hospitals. Lastly, the Red Cross 
must seek assistance from the zemstvos to subsidize the salaries of nurses during peacetime, 
a cry for professionalization of nurses.289 This critique drew attention to the basic problem 
hindering the Red Cross at the time: Peace encouraged to lethargy. An official history of the 
Russian Red Cross recorded that nobles and educated individuals in the provinces far too 
often displayed indifference to the organization’s mission or activities: “Yearly reports by 
these institutions were boring and colorless; a general meeting might attract only five or six 
of the most punctual members.”290  
But this picture also obfuscates some of the progress the Russian Red Cross made 
during its first decade. True, the Russian Red Cross enjoyed neither American popularity nor 
German state support, being conceived in peacetime, but not all of its campaigns during the 
early 1870s failed to attract attention. War has a tendency to turn indifferent populations 
toward national aid societies, and even a foreign war excited Russian humanitarians to travel 
abroad to serve the wounded. Germany’s successes in the Franco-Prussian War caused 
Russians to pay renewed attention to their military and national aid society. Prussian 
achievements in military sanitation demonstrated to Europe what a well-organized military 
and society might accomplish if they worked together. Universal conscription enabled 
Helmuth von Moltke to amass Napoleonic-sized armies more quickly and cheaply than had 
been previously imagined. None of these lessons were lost on Russia.  
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The next chapter discusses how, in the context of renewed conflicts in the 1870s and 
Dmitrii Miliutin’s greatest military reform, the introduction of universal conscription in 
Russia in 1874, the Red Cross experimented with different missions to win support from the 
educated society, the masses, and the military. The Red Cross privileged publicity in these 
endeavors because it believed that the educated public had to see Russia’s national relief 
organization in action to convince tsarist subjects to lend donations and support to this 
association. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, UNIVERSAL CONSCRIPTION, 
AND THE RUSSIAN RED CROSS, 1870-1875 
 
The Franco-Prussian War showed Europe how military sanitary services, when 
properly organized, could drastically reduce losses from infectious diseases, the greatest 
calamity to armies on campaign prior to the modern era. This conflict also demonstrated the 
possibilities and limitations of private aid’s use in war. France revealed to everyone how not 
to organize a national aid society, but Prussia’s successes did not necessarily come as a result 
of its excellent Red Cross. Instead, Prussian sanitary achievement was as much the result of 
military reform as it was the consequence of public fervor for the troops.291 For Russian 
observers, however, the Prussians possessed a wartime medical system to emulate, and an 
integral component of this medical system was organized private aid.292 
The Franco-Prussian War demonstrated that the French Société de Secours aux 
Blessés Militaires des Armées de Terre et de Mer (hereafter Société de Secours) was 
unprepared for war in 1870. At the beginning of the conflict, the Société de Secours 
committed itself to sending mobile ambulances to the front under the direction of Professor 
Léon LeFort, a competent medical professional. But LeFort’s expertise offended many of the 
aristocrats who funded the Société de Secours, so they ousted him shortly after the war’s 
outbreak. Henceforth, improvisation, poor supply, and aristocratic pretentions undermined 
this organization’s performance in the war. Without adequate instructions on where to 
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deploy, most sanitary brigades went to the wrong places or fell into Prussian hands. France’s 
first experience with private aid might have cursed the project throughout Europe had its 
adversaries not presented the opposite picture. 
Following the precedents from the previous two wars of German unification, the 
Prussians incorporated private aid societies into wartime sanitation plans. Unlike past 
conflicts, when German commanders tolerated aid societies operating independently at the 
front, the Prussian general staff confined these workers to rear facilities in 1870. This change 
was possible because, prior to the war, the Prussians created the position of surgeon-general 
(Generalstabarzt) in charge of all medical services and separated this service from the 
army’s regular command. Aid societies entered the plans as auxiliaries of the military 
medical services in the rear, and all private brigades operated under the oversight of a crown-
appointed inspector general, who coordinated with the Ministry of War. The Prussian Red 
Cross in this conflict benefitted from a clear chain of command and state oversight. The 
Prussians also welcomed foreign assistance from member states of the Geneva 
Convention.293 
The Russian contribution to international relief in the Franco-Prussian War was little 
more than “a drop in the ocean” as Kiev Professor A. P. Val’ter wrote to Russian Red 
Cross’s journal. In terms of Russia’s monetary commitment, he was not far from the mark. 
Donations to the Main Directorate totaled 1,130 rubles for wartime relief.294 In contrast to the 
Russians, the British raised more than one million rubles for relief work through penny 
drives, opened a two-hundred bed hospital in Versailles, and sent nearly 250 surgeons to the 
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theater of war.295 But the Russians refused to sit by indifferently as two of Europe’s largest 
powers warred. As a member of the Geneva Convention, the Russian relief organization 
dispatched a handful of doctors to treat the wounded. When medical observers returned 
home, they quickly published reports outlining what worked well with the Prussian military 
medical services and how to apply these lessons to Russia. 
The Franco-Prussian War compelled the Russian Red Cross to review its commitment 
to aiding the wounded and question its relationship with the military and civilian society in 
the 1870s. If anything, Germany’s accomplishments on the battlefields and in the lazarettos 
convinced the Russian aid society that to exist as a list of names on paper and a series of 
paltry accounts in state banks hardly prepared the empire for modern warfare. As the 1870s 
progressed and Europe digested what had happened between Berlin and Paris, the Russian 
Red Cross expanded its peacetime activities.296 When a new crisis in the Balkans threatened 
Europe’s security later in the decade, Russia felt confident that it possessed the experience, 
resources, and license to intervene in a foreign conflict. Additionally, the Geneva 
Convention’s mandate to provide assistance to the wounded in in conflicts between member 
states gave Russian Pan-Slavists a pretext to draw the tsarist empire into a war with the 
Ottoman Empire in 1877, a process in which humanitarian impulse masked imperial 
aggression. 
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The Russian Red Cross and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 
Because Russian doctors volunteered to treat the wounded in the Franco-Prussian 
War, Red Cross advocates viewed this war as a great opportunity to learn how to mobilize 
philanthropy for war. In July 1870, the Main Directorate initiated plans for activities in case 
war broke out between France and Prussia. Acknowledging that its primary purpose was to 
care for Russia’s sick and wounded, the tsarist relief organization pledged to assist the 
International Committee in case of a war between Geneva Convention signatories and set up 
a special committee to oversee aid delivery to Basel. A. A. Zelenoi, the aid society’s 
chairman, petitioned Pirogov to serve as the Russian representative in Basel. Should Pirogov 
refuse this assignment, Zelenoi named Professor von Giubbenet the alternative.297  
Pirogov initially declined the Red Cross’s request, so the Main Directorate budgeted 
26,375 rubles for von Giubbenet’s team of twenty-three surgeons to operate in the theater of 
war for three months.298 The first sixteen members of this group traveled to Germany in 
August, but Prussian military authorities interfered with the mission so much that von 
Giubbenet wrote to St. Petersburg at the end of the month requesting they send no more 
physicians.299 In total, the Russians dispatched thirty doctors and sixteen transports of 
supplies to France and Prussia between 15 August 1870 and 15 February 1871. The total cost 
of the Russian effort came to 54,177 rubles, a small commitment compared to those of 
European rivals.300 
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Prussian military authorities greeted foreign doctors with a “cold, even repulsive 
reception,” demanding that foreign volunteers undergo a two-week probationary period 
before being assigned to a hospital in the rear.301 The Russians sent their most talented 
surgeons. Most were Baltic Germans who trained in the universities of Dorput and Berlin, 
but the Prussians deigned their Eastern neighbors were little more than “lazaretto tourists.”302 
A few Russian surgeons, such as Doctors Morits and Marsikani, found independent positions 
in lazarettos because they had personal connections with their former German mentors, but 
most felt the Prussians refused to recognize their guests’ talents. And the Prussian authorities 
gave other private aid groups, such as the Johanites, privileged appointments because they 
were German, even though the Geneva Convention supposedly lent foreign workers equal 
status in war zones.303 Inconsistent policies and ethnic preference irked the surgeons from the 
East.304          
By September 1871, Pirogov had changed his mind and accepted the invitation to 
conduct an official report on private aid facilities in Germany. Elena Pavlovna acquired 
letters from Queen Augusta of Prussia granting Pirogov and his assistant, I. V. Bertenson, 
permission to conduct the survey. When these two arrived in Berlin, they met bureaucratic 
difficulties in obtaining Red Cross armbands, and it took a personal visit to Queen Augusta to 
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obtain the necessary permissions from the Ministry of War.305 During the next five weeks, 
Pirogov and Bertenson visited up to seventy Prussian medical facilities.  
Pirogov drew several important conclusions from this war, all of which shaped the 
discussions on private aid’s purpose in Russia in the 1870s. Since Russia was burdened by 
lower levels of material and cultural development than its Western neighbors, Pirogov argued 
that the Red Cross had to be much more than a charity to benefit wounded soldiers. Coupling 
the Red Cross’s wartime mission to the intelligentsia’s calling to better Russia, he dreamed 
this organization would treat peasants in peacetime and encourage educated society to 
improve the empire’s welfare. Inspired by Prussian efforts in peacetime to prepare for war, 
Pirogov questioned how similar activities might reshape the relationship between state and 
society in Russia.  
Pirogov believed the argument that modern warfare harkened a new type of 
civilization that required private aid. He reiterated how the Russians invented wartime 
private aid during the Crimean War, although Florence Nightingale’s project, while “not as 
organized as ours,” more effectively reduced mortality in British camps. Public opinion in 
Britain, Pirogov surmised, provided the secret to Nightingale’s success, a force that remains 
“unthinkable” in Russia, and which inspires “fervent participation in public affairs.” The key 
to enabling a national relief organization to flourish in Russia, he ascertained, was not the 
German model, by which elites at court forced it through the “administrative stronghold.” 
Instead, these organizations should act in peace and war according to their own initiative, 
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since “needless dependence kills private aid at the first moment.”306 The Russian Red Cross 
took steps to follow this advice in the 1870s. Even though many of its members were 
statesmen and the Main Directorate in St. Petersburg exercised considerable control over 
local chapters’ self-initiative, the Russian Red Cross never intended to be a state agency, and 
this separation from the government, Pirogov believed, gave this organization an opportunity 
to expand its operations to transform Russian health care.  
Following the Prussian example, Pirogov stressed the need to prepare for war in 
peacetime. He believed “our societies should . . . appear on the battlefield with full 
complements—lazarettos, doctors, nurses, and orderlies (sanitars)—or not at all.” Only 
independent sanitary brigades served their function without burdening the military. To outfit 
and train these brigades, the Main Directorate needed money, and to raise these funds they 
needed to attract participation from all levels of Russian society. Pirogov lamented that he 
had heard that in one province members of the Red Cross tasked the zemstvo police with 
collecting donations. When the police seek donations, they give this organization a 
“compulsory character” (obiazatel’nyi kharakter).307 Pirogov wanted the Red Cross to better 
Russia by expanding the opportunities for private initiative, an enterprise that would 
encourage the educated classes to work with the masses on common projects, and the police 
were not the instrument to attract peasants’ support for a charitable association led by elites. 
Most of all, this society must advertise its mission by conducting peacetime public health 
campaigns.  
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In the report, Pirogov discussed at length the use of temporary hospitals or lazarettos, 
an innovation he experimented with in the Crimean War. Burdened by its size, muddy roads, 
northern climate, and few doctors, Russia could overcome these physical handicaps by 
building temporary hospitals in tents, wattle huts, or wooden barracks throughout the country 
because of the lower cost and superior sanitary qualities this type of facility presented.308 
Temporary structures could be torn down or disposed of after short periods of time to prevent 
the lingering presence of miasmas. And, unlike Westerners, Russians had no problem with 
tents due to their nomadic character.309 Russia may have been backward, but the low 
standards of its peasants meant no one expected material comforts in a hospital. “You do not 
make palaces for the ill when the healthy live in shacks,” he professed.310  
Pirogov hoped that educated society, the state, and zemstvos would support his 
project to spread lazarettos throughout the countryside to treat the sick and train nurses. This 
niche in Russian health care would ensure the Red Cross’s longevity and also garner 
increased membership and donations. Additionally, by opening Russian health care to private 
initiative, Pirogov hoped to expand the opportunities for associational life in Russia. He 
concluded that the common Russian peasant or burgher needed to see the Red Cross in action 
before he would support it. The “American example” provided a model to emulate because 
the USSC refashioned itself following the Civil War to participate in disaster relief, public 
health education, and civilian medical services. For Pirogov, the Russians should assume that 
the needed donations would appear in wartime so long as tsarist subjects knew of the Red 
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Cross and its capabilities. Rather than hoarding monies and materials in peacetime, Red 
Cross planners must direct immediate activities to satisfying “the vital needs of the 
masses.”311 These ideas did not fall on deaf ears, and Russian Red Cross became much more 
willing to experiment with new types of activities after 1871.    
Other witnesses to the Franco-Prussian War reached similar conclusions. Von 
Giubbenet agreed that wartime relief could not work without local initiative and that the 
Prussian military’s control of private aid societies stifled the development of civil society. He 
believed, in Russia, where the social conditions were not favorable because the people had 
little influence on the state, the Ministry of War needed to create these organizations, which 
the population would then fill. However, too much state interference created a paradox for 
Russia: “In order to awaken overall trust in civil society (grazhdanskoe obshchestvo), our aid 
societies should eliminate any official or bureaucratic characteristics.” How was the state to 
create a national relief organization and then hand over the reins to private individuals to 
manage? Von Giubbenet did not proffer an answer. He knew the Russian organization lacked 
popular support since the Main Directorate had sent little materials to France and Prussia, but 
he believed an aid society supported by all segments (sloi) of the population was not out of 
reach. The only way for this organization to prosper was if it were decentralized and 
independent from the state, he remarked.312 
The Russian Red Cross also commissioned M. S. Sabinina and M. P. Frederiks, two 
nurses who had served in the Crimean War, to inspect the Germans’ private facilities in 
action. The resulting survey emphasized that both sexes were needed to optimize medical 
                                                     
311 Ibid., 144-48. 
 
312 Kh. Ia. fon Giubbenet, Franko-Germanskaia voina 1870-1871 g. i russkaia mezhdunarodnaiai pomoshch’ 
ranenym i bol’nym voinam (Kiev: I. A. Davidenko, 1871), 86, 96-97. 
 137 
 
care in modern war. In Prussia, Sabinina stressed, men and women worked together to collect 
supplies and donations, to maintain lazarettos and conduct evacuations, and to look after the 
moral wellbeing of soldiers, but each sex had tasks that were more specific to its capabilities. 
Men served as doctors, managers, bookkeepers, guards, and orderlies, while women’s talents 
best suited them to work as patronesses, fundraisers, seamstresses, and nurses. For Sabinina, 
the Prussian example undermined Filaret’s prohibition of the sexes intermingling in the 
Russian Red Cross. 
She likewise emphasized that the Prussians prepared for war in peacetime. The 
Germans established a beneficial legal relationship between the military and the aid societies, 
they trained women in peacetime sanitary courses, and they kept their skills honed with 
peacetime disaster relief. These activities have enormously expanded the size and 
endowment of these societies, and, despite protests that disasters dry up funds marked for 
wounded soldiers, the Prussian aid societies “remain convinced that aid to the people is aid to 
the army, since all in Prussia without an exception can be called on to defend the fatherland.” 
Ultimately, since 1866, the German relief societies, Sabinina emphasized, had done much to 
provide an outlet for female talent: “This new field, which fully satisfies the mental and 
spiritual strengths of women, delivers them from colorless and useless existences, and finds 
in them diligent agents, sufficiently prepared to direct lazarettos and care for the wounded in 
wartime.” 313  
To European general staffs, the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated the efficiency of 
universal conscription and the speed of railroad deployments, a military structure and a 
mobilization plan that escalated and accelerated warfare. To social reformers, this conflict 
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revealed that modern warfare required the mobilization of large segments of the civilian 
population. Russian observers recognized that they needed to expand the Red Cross’s 
capabilities and resources by engaging educated society with peacetime campaigns and 
soliciting help from the Ministry of War for instructions on how best to serve in case of war. 
In the years following the Franco-Prussian War, the Russian Red Cross embarked on new 
campaigns designed to draw more supporters toward the organization and its missions. 
However, overtures to the Ministry of War for greater coordination and assistance fell on 
deaf ears prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.  
Postwar Reforms of the Russian Red Cross 
The founders of the Russian Red Cross included no war plans in the organization’s 
founding charter, and this question remained unresolved in the years following 1867. The 
Main Directorate solicited input on this question from the provincial committees, and eight 
submitted proposals to St. Petersburg for review. In the spring of 1870, the Main Directorate 
discussed these findings and presented summaries to the Ministry of War. Miliutin responded 
that any policies needed to be written with the Ministry of War’s participation, so he named 
General M. N. Annenkov and several members of the military’s Legal Committee to head 
this project. This group’s work came to a sudden halt when France declared war on Prussia 
and General Annenkov, the military attaché to Prussia, departed for the front.314    
Once initial reports from Prussia reached St. Petersburg in December 1870, the Main 
Directorate created another special committee with the Ministry of War to revise the 
society’s charter. This time Miliutin added several military doctors to the group, a few of 
whom had volunteered in Prussia. Negotiations between the military planners and the Red 
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Cross broke down over Miliutin’s demands that all private aid must be subordinate to 
generals and army medical inspectors, a policy that came directly from Prussia. The Minister 
of War also insisted that the Red Cross’s monies and materials be placed at the disposal of 
army commanders. These demands infringed on the Red Cross’s freedom to act 
independently, an original component of Dunant’s vision for private aid in war, a right 
guaranteed in the Russian organization’s 1867 charter, and necessary component of 
Pirogov’s vision for the aid society.315 
Recent experience convinced some advocates of private aid that civilian medical staff 
needed unfettered access to battlefields because, in France, the wounded remained where 
they had fallen for up to four days before stretcher bearers reached them.316 And the Red 
Cross’s resources were private property, not plunder for the military’s taking.317 Men such as 
Pirogov had seen the way the Russian army treated its wounded during the Crimean War and 
expressed little faith that commanders would use privately-raised funds for their intended 
purpose. A. D. Bashmakov, another supporter of private aid, argued that too much state 
restriction would “depopularize (depopuliarizirovat’)” this organization.318 Still, Miliutin 
remained unbending: War plans must follow the Prussian example, by which, all private aid 
was confined to the rear and under the army’s control. The Russians failed to resolve this 
debate during the 1870s, and it affected relations between the military and the Red Cross 
during the Russo-Turkish War.             
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To improve the internal function of the Red Cross and accelerate its growth, the Main 
Directorate held a congress in 1872. Prior to this meeting, planners invited feedback from all 
provincial committees and women’s committees; in total, fourteen provincial boards, two 
women’s committees, and Frederiks and Sabinina submitted suggestions to the committee. 
These responses called on the Main Directorate to adopt many of the recommendations the 
Russian observers to the Franco-Prussian War published in their reports. At same time that 
the Ministry of War demanded the relief organization become more regimented and 
formalized like the Prussian organization, the rank-and-file sought to take a page from 
Pirogov’s account and encourage self-initiative within the local chapters. 
The most significant of these concerns centered on the sex divisions within the Red 
Cross. The Astrakhan committee asked that the organization cast away its strict division of 
sexes in its managing bodies. Metropolitan Filaret had insisted on these divisions when the 
original charter was drafted in spring 1867, but he perished shortly thereafter. With the 
metropolitan dead and buried, it seemed reasonable for Astrakhan’s chapter to point out that 
the women’s committees felt “superfluous or at best nominal.” Astrakhan’s proposal 
suggested that women be allowed to join provincial committees and men be allowed to join 
the women’s committees. This change still enabled the provincial committees to “assign 
women to those activities which they were better able, such as forming nursing communities 
or preparing stores of clothing and dressings.”319 Poltava’s chapter expressed similar 
discontent with the divisions between the sexes. They disliked the policy that enabled any 
male member of the provincial committees to attend sessions of the Main Directorate but 
permitted only one female representative from the women’s committees to attend these 
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sessions. The solution, they insisted, was to eliminate any references to gender or women’s 
committees in the charter.320   
Another group of concerns centered on the relationship between the provincial 
committees and the Main Directorate. Provincial members disliked how they had to solicit 
permission from St. Petersburg for any local initiative. Branch chapters, particularly from the 
empire’s borderlands, wished to conduct aid work as they saw fit. For example, the Perm 
chapter decreed that the Main Directorate’s habit of reassigning provincial boards’ capital, 
property, and personnel violated the “independence of provincial committees to dispose of 
their resources” as they wished. The Main Directorate, they insisted, should only interfere 
with local organs in the case of war of dire necessity.321 Ultimately, much of the provincial 
chapters’ concerns involved money. Provincial committees final demand insisted on seeing 
detailed publications of how the Main Directorate divulged the funds in its care, especially 
because local organs raised much of this capital.322  
The Main Directorate discussed these proposals and conceded to three it viewed as 
the most important. First, it rewrote the charter to make women equal to men in the 
provincial committees and enabled men to join the women’s committees. It gave provincial 
chapters greater freedoms to spend their funds on local projects and prepare for war as they 
saw fit. And it revised the charter to permit local boards to conduct peacetime relief so long 
as they received permission from St. Petersburg before spending their wartime capital on 
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peacetime projects.323 The additions to the charter were finished by 19 November 1872, and 
the emperor confirmed the new charter on 9 February 1873.324 
These reforms in the Red Cross’s charter opened the door to peacetime relief work, 
but they did not encourage more women to take on leadership positions in the organization. 
The governing bodies of the Russian Red Cross always remained a male preserve. Still, St. 
Petersburg’s loosening of controls enabled local committees to experiment with different 
types of initiatives designed to promote public welfare and win hearts, minds, and 
pocketbooks for the Red Cross. 
Temporary Hospitals 
The Red Cross tried to attract support during peacetime by developing temporary 
hospitals and mobile lazarettos to treat peasants. Discussions at the society’s 1872 congress 
in Moscow emphasized the need to transform Russia by improving access to medicine in 
provincial towns and villages. For members of this congress, the shortage of state-run 
medical facilities and cold attitude bureaucrats took toward patients undermined Russian 
health care. By 1870, the congress’s transcript estimated, only two or three million Russians 
(out of a population of nearly eighty million) sought out doctors for medical care. The rest of 
the population relied on village quacks and spiritual healers. Consequently, the congress 
lamented, Russian mortality rates were shamefully high.325   
Provincial clinics, managed by the Red Cross, provided one means for improving the 
peasantry’s access to health care. Since this organization drew its membership and funding 
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from private sources, Pirogov and others hoped temporary hospitals would serve a dual 
purpose: sites for healing the sick and mending Russia’s fractured relationship between state 
and society. With the Zemstvo Statute of 1864 only six years old, much of provincial Russia 
lacked any kind of medical facility, and barracks were cheap and easy to construct.326 
Furthermore, these facilities connected provincial government with the local elites, because 
provincial governors, landowners, zemstvos, clergymen, medical professionals, philanthropic 
societies, and common subjects all had a role to play in the clinic’s upkeep.327  
Early designs for the lazarettos came in two types: permanent shelters that could be 
winterized and operate year-round and mobile clinics based in tents. Members of the St. 
Petersburg women’s committees funded the first prototypes for these projects. After 
collecting blueprints of similar barracks from the American Civil War and the Franco-
Prussian War, Empress Maria Aleksandrovna established the St. Petersburg Women’s 
Lazaretto Committee in October 1870 to create prototypes for Russia. This special committee 
included Sabinina, Frederiks, Pirogov, and I. V. Bertenson, all key figures in the Red Cross. 
The first project constructed four barracks on land near a state hospital in Gatchina, a suburb 
of St. Petersburg, in December 1871. These designs were made of wood and cement, and 
varied slightly by size, cost, and whether they were winterized or not.328 I. V. Bertenson 
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penned an academic study on these facilities in 1874, which argued they met all of the 
organizers’ goals: The barracks were sanitary, warm, well ventilated, and cheap. Records 
from 1872 and 1873 showed a decrease in the fatality rate of typhus patients when they were 
moved from the main, brick hospital building into the wooden barracks. Also, patients in the 
wooden structures suffered fewer cases of gangrene or other infections after surgery.329 In 
May 1872, the St. Petersburg Women’s Lazaretto Committee reported to the Main 
Directorate that it had established a school to train feldshers in a house near the summer 
barracks.330     
With Pirogov and Bertenson’s stamp of approval, the most active provincial 
committees began to construct barracks. In early 1872, the Odessa Provincial Committee 
requested permission to use ten thousand rubles from its wartime reserve fund to construct 
barracks, and the Main Directorate approved the request.331 Also in this same year the 
Simbirsk Provincial Committee established a twelve-person mobile lazaretto. This facility 
traveled around the province during the summer treating peasants that lived far from zemstvo 
hospitals or clinics. The mobile clinic must have been useful because the Simbirsk Zemstvo 
helped subsidize its costs and the Main Directorate asked for reports to see how the facility 
could be reproduced elsewhere.332 The Kiev Women’s Committee worked with the city duma 
to construct two twenty-bed barracks. Saratov set up a similar facility that by 1875 treated 
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over eleven thousand ambulatory patients.333 These public projects helped increase the Red 
Cross’s membership in the provinces. For example, the Saratov Committee increased in size 
from 82 to 137 persons from 1871 to 1875 and earned support from the city dumas and 
zemstvos. Pirogov’s prediction seemed to be coming true in that temporary medical facilities 
would draw greater support to the Red Cross.         
The Main Directorate commissioned a study to determine how to use these barracks 
in war, which concluded that “people’s wards” were excellent for war because of their 
inexpensive costs, ease to set up, and the fact they could be arranged along railroad lines.334 
During a prolonged conflict, the managers of the shelters would report to the military on the 
status of the patients and the number of free beds in each facility. The military governors in 
each province, in turn, would appoint officers to keep track of wounded soldiers and ensure 
they did not run off. The authors of this report stressed that “people’s shelters must operate 
independently, and not be burdened by any kind of formalities in arranging or 
accommodating the wounded, who might be housed in homes, barracks, peasants’ huts, tents, 
wattle shacks (depending on the year), so long as they observed adequate medical and 
hygienic conditions.”335  
During the 1870s, the Red Cross attempted experiments such as this one with limited 
success.336 Projects to set up temporary or mobile clinics or wards show that the Russian Red 
Cross had come to view public health initiatives as a means of expanding membership and 
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preparing for war, but budgets and membership rolls experienced little boon from these 
initiatives. Still, in 1877, when the empire went to war with the Ottomans, the Red Cross put 
this program to use and set up temporary hospitals along railroad lines going from Kishinev 
to Moscow.   
Peacetime Disaster Relief  
Timely aid to civilians suffering from the consequences of natural disasters proved to 
be a far more successful method for winning supporters of the Red Cross. Prussia was the 
first nation to use disaster relief activities as а method for preparing aid personnel for war, 
and the American Red Cross’s primary activity during the nineteenth century was assistance 
to communities ravaged by floods, storms, earthquakes, and fires. The Russians expressed 
initial reservations to this form of action because it appeared to be a tall commitment in large 
and underdeveloped empire, but the importance of advertising for the Red Cross opened the 
door to new activities in the 1870s. Despite fears from the pro-military faction in the Main 
Directorate, which claimed peacetime work would produce a perpetual drain on resources, an 
official history emphasized that disaster relief turned out to be relatively inexpensive and 
helped expand the organization’s chapters in new areas and increase its membership.337   
Although the sources fail to mention the Russian Red Cross leadership’s intentions, 
the first attempt at disaster relief was probably a calculated experiment. On 16 January 1872 
an earthquake destroyed the Caucasian town of Shemakhi. The Red Cross likely viewed 
Shemakhi as an ideal opportunity for intervention because the campaign would be visible and 
the costs limited. When news of the disaster soon St. Petersburg, the Main Directorate turned 
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to provincial committees with instructions to collect donations and dispatched an agent to 
Shemakhi with twenty-two thousand rubles from the Romanovs’ personal fortune to spend 
on relief.338 Without precedent for this type of work, the agent, S. I. Kreslovskii, erred in 
distributing the cash appropriately. The Governor of Baku intervened by creating a 
commission made up of the head of the county (uezd), the justice of the peace, the inspector 
of schools, and respectable individuals from the Russian, Armenian, and Muslim 
communities to oversee the distribution of funds. By the time the relief campaign ended, the 
Red Cross had raised an additional 27,628 rubles for the victims in Shemakhi plus the 
original donations from the Romanovs. These funds provided medical care for 246 families 
and seed money to rebuild 419 homes and repair another 397 that were damaged.339 
Believing this campaign enjoyed success, the Red Cross attempted a more ambitious project 
soon afterward. 
Beginning in 1869, yearly droughts struck the lower Volga provinces. For the first 
three years, the peasants of Samara managed on grain stores and assistance from the zemstvo, 
but by 1872 the zemstvo had exhausted its resources and petitioned the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs for six hundred thousand rubles.340 The following year drought returned, and even 
though the Red Cross’s charter contained no specific provision for famine relief, the 
Governor of Samara instructed the Samara Provincial Committee and Women’s Committee 
to use 2,600 rubles previously earmarked for a nursing community to purchase food for the 
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peasants.341 The local chapter justified this action as corresponding with the “Evangelical 
goals” of the society’s mission and to strengthen its bond with the people.342 Word of this 
activity reached the Main Directorate, and the empress interjected that even though the 
charter had not foreseen this type of work, the Samara chapters should continue these 
efforts.343  
To further endorse the project, the Main Directorate solicited donations to send food 
relief to Samara in the press and instructed neighboring provincial committees to assist with 
the relief efforts. Committees in Orenburg, Ufa, Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, and Bessarabia 
claimed they could not send materials to Samara because they needed to spend it on their 
own needy, suffering from the same droughts.344 Some of the largest donations came from 
provincial committees in Viatka, Novgorod, and Saratov, all provinces where the Red Cross 
had established temporary hospitals. The Main Directorate named Count V. P. Orlov-
Davydov as its agent and dispatched him to Samara to oversee relief work. By 1 June, Orlov-
Davydov announced that the Samara Women’s Committee had fed up to ninety thousand 
souls.345 Later reports revealed the Red Cross itself had raised nearly 500,000 rubles and fed 
more than 130,000 individuals.346 Much of these funds came from the Main Directorate, but 
they also raised significant funds from the press and donations from private individuals and 
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charitable organizations.347 The Main Directorate cited these donations, rather tangentially, 
as evidence that Russian society was prepared to provide mass support for national relief in 
wartime.348 The society’s newsletter confidently proclaimed, “These women’s initiative gives 
us certainty that we will find help and compassion for our sick and wounded soldiers in the 
rear.”349   
During the campaign in Samara, the zemstvo distributed grains and fodder to 
impoverished peasants to replenish the region’s agricultural production; alongside these 
efforts the Red Cross distributed food directly to the afflicted, giving preference to children, 
families without a male worker, and the elderly.350 Orlov-Davydov found the initial relief 
system, set up by the women’s committee, disorganized and suffering from “shortages of 
human intermediaries,” which gave it a “dry, impersonal—even bureaucratic—character, 
removed from any sympathy for the impoverished.” This system of relief failed to provide 
“moral support that encouraged and inspired [in the peasants] awareness of the necessity to 
try to prevent similar misfortunes in the future with their own efforts.”351 To overcome these 
shortcomings and making use of his mandate from the autocracy to get the campaign on 
track, Orlov-Davydov restructured relief work according to a hierarchical system that 
included both volunteers from the Red Cross and local government officials such as justices 
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of the peace. Relief workers fixed rations at one pood of grain per person, per month. At 
some point the governor of Samara attempted to alter these rations, and members of the local 
women’s committee responded with complaints to Empress Maria Aleksandrovna. The 
empress settled this dispute by having Minister of Internal Affairs A. E. Timashev order the 
governor of Samara to give the women’s committee the independence to determine the size 
and distribution of aid.352 Trips around the province convinced Orlov-Davydov that shortages 
of livestock posed a serious threat, so he purchased over six hundred horses to distribute to 
the poorest families.353  
When dividing tasks with the zemstvo, the Red Cross preferred the more public duty 
of providing food and material relief instead of the zemstvo’s grain loans to peasants to 
restart planting. Over the next four decades, the Russian Red Cross played some role, large or 
small, in all of the empire’s crop failures and famines. With smaller financial resources than 
the state, but a body of volunteers ready for when famine struck, the Red Cross often set up 
canteens in the villages and dispatched sanitary brigades to areas affected by epidemics. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and zemstvos more often concerned themselves with rebuilding 
agriculture through grants of seed and fodder to farmers and incentives for improving 
farming practices.      
The year 1875 saw the Red Cross dispatch relief to several towns stricken by fires. 
On 25 May a fire destroyed the town of Morshansk in Tambov Province. Soon after Empress 
Maria Aleksandrovna voiced wishes to the Minister of Internal Affairs and General A. K. 
Baumgarten that the Red Cross send help. The Main Directorate then informed the Tambov 
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Provincial Committee to mobilize the local women’s committee to collect funds. Also, elites 
in the city of Morshansk established their own provincial committee and named the head of 
the local nobility, as its chairman. The Red Cross first sent supplies to Morshansk committee, 
and then the empress dispatched Senator A. A. Polovtsov as her personal agent in charge of 
operations in Morshansk.354 The Main Directorate informed all organs of the Red Cross to 
begin taking special collections for the fire victims. The reason they held a special collection 
drive, similar to the campaign to relieve the Samara crop failure, was to ensure that relief for 
fire victims would not come from the regular endowment marked for wartime.355 The Main 
Directorate also established a collection point for clothing and other goods at the Ministry of 
State Domains and advertised for donations in cash and kind in newspapers and on fliers 
posted around the capital.356 The collection drives sparked the public’s interest, and in 
eighteen days the Red Cross had gathered thirty-six thousand rubles in donations.357  
Instructions from Maria Aleksandrova informed Polovtsov that he had thirty-two 
thousand rubles at his disposal and that the head of the Moscow Provincial Committee, 
Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, was sending all additional donations to Morshansk. Once 
Polovtsov arrived in Morshansk, he was to oversee the distribution of tents and other items 
that had already been dispatched from St. Petersburg. Money was not to be given out directly 
to the victims; instead Polovtsov was to give the poorest families clothing and monthly 
rations of food. The Main Directorate demanded that he provide frequent reports for 
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publication in the press on how he spent the money.358 By September, Polovtsov had spent 
twenty-eight thousand rubles to establish a new hospital with the children’s ward, a new 
parish school, and a shelter for forty-four families.359 The head of the Assuage My Tears 
Community, Princesses N. B. Shakhovskaia, traveled with a group of nurses from to 
Morshansk, where they worked with sisters from the Tambov order to treat ill survivors.360 
Polovtsov also distributed small cash payments to 108 families with damaged homes, and 
several regiments of infantry moved to the town to assist with rebuilding. In August, the 
Tambov Women’s Committee petitioned the Main Directorate for more aid because it 
believed that recovery work thus far would prove inadequate once cold weather arrived in 
autumn.361 
The Red Cross also provided fire relief to Pułtusk, Briansk, Rzhev, and Vol’sk. In 
total, the Main Directorate raised 106,499 rubles for fire relief in 1875.362 Red Cross reports 
deemed these campaigns successful because outside donations funded them, and Morshansk 
and Briansk opened provincial committees as a result of their efforts. Similar to European 
Red Cross societies at the time, disaster relief was never the Russian national relief 
organization’s primary mission. Still, the Red Cross participated in large and small disaster 
relief campaigns in Russia almost every year before the outbreak of the First World War.     
In most cases, the Romanovs themselves either initiated these campaigns or made 
large donations to them. Russian society often followed the royal family’s lead and offered 
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donations to these causes. Although limited in scope at first, the Red Cross’s participation in 
disaster relief helps to explain why the autocracy was so willing to deny the zemstvos a 
larger role in tackling national problems. In each of the following campaigns, the Red Cross 
worked with the local zemstvos to restore stricken provinces and towns. But tsarist law 
prevented zemstvos from different provinces from uniting to confront large-scale calamities 
out of fears that the zemstvos together might pose a challenge to the state. This reluctance on 
the part of the autocracy to let the zemstvos undertake empire-wide projects, a policy that 
later came to frustrate many zemstvo activists, appears less perplexing when the perceived 
success of these campaigns is taken into consideration. For Alexander II, an empire-wide 
zemstvo organization to combat national problems would have been superfluous because the 
Red Cross had already proven that it could fulfill this role when acting alongside the state 
and organs of local government, as they had in Samara. From the perspective of an autocrat, 
it comes as little surprise that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, working in conjunction with 
the national aid society and zemstvos, provided the best opportunity to address sudden 
problems.  
But the tendency for the autocracy to mobilize state agents for Red Cross work came 
at a cost as well. Once the autocracy became involved in directing disaster relief, Red Cross 
plenipotentiaries frequently ignored Pirogov’s insistence on keeping the organization 
separate from the state and often used mandates from St. Petersburg to mobilize local 
government agents in these campaigns. When Red Cross workers disagreed with provincial 
governors’ policies, as members of the Samara Women’s Committee did, they could appeal 
directly to the empress for change. These tendencies undermined the Red Cross’s mandate to 
operate independently from the state, and, even though this organization maintained it was 
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separate from the bureaucracy, local elites and members of the zemstvo came to view this 
agency as nothing more than a state-sponsored charity. This attitude would later spawn 
complaints that the Red Cross lacked adequate oversight, suffered from bureaucratic 
mismanagement, failed to serve the interests of Russian society.  
Red Cross Aid to the Central Asian Expeditions of the 1870s 
In hopes of reasserting Russia’s strength as a major power and to placate frustrations 
at home, the 1860s and early 1870s saw tsarist forces expand control over the khanates of 
Bukhara and Khiva in Turkistan. Also parts of East Asia fell within the tsar’s control during 
this time. The Red Cross refused to remain inactive during these exciting pursuits for new 
lands and markets. Direct support for the troops was supposed to be the most exciting part of 
the Red Cross’s mission, and members believed that they needed to participate publicly in 
wartime relief to keep educated society interested in the empire’s national relief organization. 
Meanwhile, the Russian military had little knowledge of or experience with the empire’s 
national aid organization. Hoping to earn the trust of the commanders and increase 
membership from Russia’s military caste, the Red Cross provided assistance to troops during 
several campaigns in Central Asia during the 1870s. These experiments provoked no 
substantive changes in the Red Cross’s size or mission, and the military’s reaction to aid 
workers associating with soldiers disappointed many advocates of private aid in Russia. Still, 
the Red Cross viewed its participation in these campaigns as successful because the 
organization actually mobilized personnel and materials for wartime relief, even if few 
members of educated society knew of or cared about these endeavors.   
In fall of 1870 the Russian military informed the Red Cross that it would dispatch 
forces to Urga (present day Ulan Bator) the following spring. This proposal excited the 
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Irkutsk Regional Committee, which solicited support to fund a sanitary brigade to 
accompany Russian troops. The Irkutsk Regional Committee succeeded in raising 1530.22 
rubles from local merchants and Buryats as well as another 300 rubles from the Yenisei 
Provincial Committee, and it used these funds to purchase medical supplies and instruments 
to set up a temporary lazaretto. State Councilor O. Ia. Dubinskii oversaw the facility housed 
in several yurts with the help of two nurses and three soldier-orderlies from the Irkutsk 
Military Hospital. Bureaucratic delays and the extreme distances between Urga and European 
Russia prevented the supplies or staff from arriving until May 12, by which time some of the 
Russian troops had already fallen ill. Slowly, more patients arrived as the spring turned to 
summer, and Dubinskii’s report mentioned they treated 91 soldiers out of a brigade of 657 
over the next two months. The initial plan called for the Red Cross only to assist the military 
doctors embedded with the troops, but the military medical staff accompanying this mission 
seemed to lack the proper supplies and housing to outfit a hospital. As a result of the 
military’s shortcomings, the Red Cross’s mobile ambulance provided all of the hospital stays 
for Russian troops in Urga from May until November 1871. In total, they treated 112 soldiers 
for 1,399 hospital days in the lazaretto. Once the military opened a hospital in November, the 
Red Cross closed its facility and the staff returned to Irkutsk.363 
A far more significant effort to deliver assistance to Russians in Central Asia 
occurred during the 1873 campaign against the Central Asian Khanate of Khiva. The stronger 
Khanate of Bukhara fell to Russian pressure in the 1860s, but Khiva proved more 
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challenging due to its location amid a desert, which enabled Turkman militants to use it as a 
staging area for raids against Russian caravans in the area east of the Caspian Sea.364 The 
Governor-General of Turkestan, K. P. von Kaufman attempted to pressure the local khan, 
Muhammed Rahim, with several armed incursions beginning in 1869, but the Turkman tribes 
felt no intimidation and even escalated tensions by seizing several Russian merchants as 
hostages. Von Kaufman, frustrated that the Russians’ demonstrations of force had failed to 
bring Muhammad Rahim to his senses, invaded the khanate in 1873. In the face of 
overwhelming defeat, Rahim tried to avert an attack by freeing his hostages, but von 
Kaufman did not relent. On 29 May 1873 Russian troops seized Khiva, and Rahim fled into 
the desert. Von Kaufman temporarily replaced the khan with a divan, a governing council, 
made up of Russian officers and local elites. This divan abolished slavery in the khanate, 
signed a peace treaty with St. Petersburg that established Russian military and economic 
power in the region, and demanded two million rubles indemnity from the local inhabitants. 
Russia’s conquest was swift and merciless. Even though the Red Cross’s members 
accompanied the tsar’s armies on this campaign, the Geneva Convention never entered von 
Kaufman’s mind when dealing with non-Europeans. When the Youmuts, a Turkman tribe 
that measured wealth in livestock found themselves unable to come up with von Kaufman’s 
tribute, the Russians massacred tribal members and slaughtered the livestock.365 The Red 
Cross’s reports from Khiva paid no attention to troops’ behavior or the enemy’s wounded. 
Agents in the field only faulted Russian soldiers for not recognizing the benefit of private aid 
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in war. Provisions for the enemy’s wounded were probably as absent from the minds of 
Russian soldiers on an imperial offensive as they were in the later reports.                
The best source for the Red Cross’s participation in the Khiva expeditions comes 
from a report submitted to the Main Directorate in early January 1874. Von Kaufman, the 
Governor-General of Turkestan, addressed the meeting, where he expressed his heartfelt 
appreciation for the assistance and pointed out a few items that the state failed to provide 
adequate supplies of for the Russian soldiers. In charge of a force of 1,500 soldiers, von 
Kaufman possessed the needed numbers of tents and beds, but only two military doctors to 
treat patients. Similar to the USSC’s surveys of Federal medical stores, the Main Directorate 
established a board to review what supplies von Kaufman’s medics likely needed and 
procured these items. The initial delivery consisted of twenty-four puds of dressings as well 
as a sum of money that agents in Tashkent and Orenburg were supposed to spend on tea, 
sugar, and other items to raise the morale of sick soldiers.366 Later, the Red Cross formed a 
sanitary brigade and dispatched it to Central Asia. This brigade included two doctors and 
four feldshers, whom the Red Cross payed. Doctor I. V. Grimm, a volunteer in the Franco-
Prussian War, led the expedition. He was accompanied by four army feldshers and an active-
duty sergeant for security.367  
Grimm traveled from St. Petersburg to Saratov by railroad and then to Kazalinsk by 
postal road, where the supplies arrived on 25 February. He delivered medical supplies, 
foodstuffs, alcohol, and tobacco to the soldiers. Since, troops in Central Asia suffered 
difficulties finding potable water, the Red Cross agreed to purchase a water filter for 255 
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rubles and send it to Tashkent.368 Grimm believed the remarkable sanitary performance of the 
Khiva expedition was a testament to the benefits of training soldiers in military sanitation. 
While the desert climate helped reduce the dangers of miasmas and contamination from 
rotting corpses or human wastes, Grimm emphasized that the Russians paid proper attention 
to sanitation. Besides the helpful supplies, the Red Cross’s participation in the campaign, 
Grimm believed was superfluous. He noted that soldiers had no knowledge of the Red Cross 
or its mission, and they viewed him as a camp follower, whose supplies were theirs to 
plunder.369  Von Kaufman eyed the Red Cross favorably, but Grimm still recommended that 
information about the Geneva Convention and private aid societies needed to find its way 
into soldiers’ manuals to avoid misunderstandings in the future.370 
The Orenburg Regional Committee sent a second delivery of supplies to von 
Kaufman’s troops and published a report on its assistance in Voennyi sbornik the next year 
with the intention of informing military readers of the Red Cross’s purpose. Similar to 
Grimm, this caravan’s agent, Ovodov, complained that most rank-and-file soldiers knew 
nothing of the Red Cross or its mission. Since the military had provided adequate medical 
personnel and supplies for the campaign, Ovodov found the Red Cross’s primary 
contribution came in the form of non-medical items to enliven the troops. He gave out copies 
of Vestnik evropy (Herald of Europe) and Voennyi sbornik to the literate soldiers as well as 
postcards and writing utensils. The stores of tea, coffee, hardtack, and alcohol improved 
morale for everyone. As the report stated, since the Russians had an abundance of supplies 
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for this mission, there was no harm in using the donated surpluses to benefit Kirgiz and 
Persian prisoners who suffered from medical ailments.371  
Even if the Red Cross’s contributions to the Khiva expeditions appeared superfluous, 
the efforts to outfit and man sanitary brigades indicated that this organization had committed 
to its mission in the years following the Franco-Prussian War. From Khiva, von Kaufman 
wrote the Main Directorate to thank it for the assistance, a remark the Red Cross published in 
its newsletter. Still, the Ministry of War, trusting in the reforms of its sanitary services, made 
no effort to integrate private aid into military plans or regulations during this period.372 Red 
Cross planners hoped that empire’s adoption of universal military conscription in 1874 would 
change educated society’s and the army’s attitudes to private aid. Discussions in the Red 
Cross’s newsletter speculated that armies made up of conscripts from all social classes would 
compel tsarist subjects to embrace private aid, but the military reform of 1874 drew little 
response from educated society. Instead, conflict in the Balkans spurred tsarist subjects to 
embrace the Red Cross because the Geneva Convention’s permission to deliver humanitarian 
aid in armed conflict gave the Russians an exciting entry into this conflict.                 
Universal Conscription Reform of 1874  
Invented by the French as part of the concordat with the masses established during the 
French Revolution, universal military conscription required all able-bodied males serve in the 
army in exchange for civil and political rights. This political and military innovation changed 
the relationship between state, army, and civilian subject in all nations where it was 
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applied.373 Gone were the early-modern, professional armies characterized by lifetime terms 
of service and a military caste far removed from civilian society. Instead, universal 
conscription turned militaries into schools for nation-building by assimilating various social 
estates and ethnic and regional identities into a unified whole.  
In prereform Russia’s case, the army compelled serfs to serve for long-periods of 
time, usually twenty-five years. This system provided a means of social control for the gentry 
and autocracy over the peasantry because for most male serfs entry into the army was a fate 
worse than death and recruitment deprived families of male laborers. The Great Reforms 
ended serfdom in Russia in 1861, so the army should likewise follow. Miliutin’s 1874 reform 
called on conscripts from most social estates (soslovie) and ethnic groups to serve for terms 
that ranged from five to one years in the ranks. Following the stint in the army, conscripts 
returned home where they served for periods of up to fifteen years in the reserves.374 Miliutin 
and his reformers varied the terms of service because they believed better-educated 
conscripts learned the soldier’s craft more quickly and they recognized that removing talent 
from the Russian labor market harmed the empire’s economy. Various exemptions and 
provisions for literate and educated soldiers drove Russians of all estates into primary and 
secondary schools in hopes of shortening service commitments. In Russia, like elsewhere on 
the continent, universal conscription changed the relationship between the army and society. 
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Service in the Russian army could no longer be a death sentence for short-term conscripts. 
Alongside universal conscription, Miliutin introduced improvements in every facet of 
military service: Everything from food rations to education to medical care to punishments 
improved for the Russian rank-and-file.      
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that some Russians imagined the Geneva 
Convention and the introduction of private aid to war as vital components toward facilitating 
universal conscription. Russian observers knew that private aid encouraged the civilian 
population to help protect conscript soldiers from harm, an important innovation because the 
military sought to return as many conscripts as possible back to their villages in working 
condition. Also, in Russia’s case, by giving society a limited role in the protection of 
soldiers’ health, the state shifted some responsibility for this burden onto society.375  
The first hint of the relationship between universal conscription and private aid in 
Russia appeared when Lieutenant General I. E. Gangardt, the future military governor of 
Bessarabia, wrote a letter to the Red Cross’s Vestnik summarizing the changing strategic 
landscape and structural weaknesses of tsarist Russia immediately following the Franco-
Prussian War. This letter appeared before the State Council implemented the 1874 
conscription reform, but numerous committees within the Ministry of War and Council of 
Ministers were already debating this issue in 1871, so most reformers knew change was 
coming.376 Gangardt noted that recent events on the continent revealed that “we await 
conscription, a widening care for the sick and the wounded, and a resurrection of the Black 
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Sea fleet.”377 Naval matters should not concern us here, but Gangardt’s connection of 
universal conscription to improved care for wounded soldiers affirmed the idea that a 
nation’s security rested on the health of its population, an idea with which Pirogov would 
have agreed. “The time has come when every citizen is required to yield all of his facilities 
and knowledge to the state; when voluntary associations should be inundated with the goals 
of the army and the people, amalgamated together by conscription,” Gangardt insisted.378 
He continued by stressing that Russia must emulate the United States and Prussia, 
developed countries in possession of large and diverse voluntary organizations, numerous 
collection points and mobile sanitary brigades, and who pay widespread attention to 
sanitation, a subject they teach with modern curricula in the barracks and schoolhouses. He 
believed that merely propagating the mission of the Red Cross to the masses, as earlier 
writers in the Vestnik suggested, would win little popular support. Instead, following 
Pirogov’s recommendation, educated society must see the Red Cross in action. They must 
train people to handle life threatening accidents in factories, on railroads, and in remote 
places where there were few doctors. Finally, he advocated that national relief societies 
expand the number of trained sanitary workers in peacetime and practice sanitary tasks under 
the guidance of professionals from the military medical corps.379 
Members of the Red Cross agreed with Gangardt’s views, and the introduction of 
universal conscription in Russia provided a stimulus to expand the membership, endowment, 
and mission of this organization. Advertisements soliciting donations for and membership in 
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the Red Cross repeated these themes. An exposition in Odessa in October 1874 emphasized 
private aid’s hope of how universal conscription would resonate with educated society: 
In the past, the majority of the nobility, according to their higher calling, willingly 
entered the army and nearly to a man went into the home guard (opolchenie), when the 
defense of the motherland demanded it. Now the nobility meets the new law with gratitude, 
whereby military service has become obligatory, as it was before and during Peter I’s rule. 
The first levy is upon us by virtue of the new law. Both fathers and sons must turn attention 
to the goals of the Red Cross and the limited means at its disposal. The provincial chapters of 
the society have demonstrated useful activities.380 
 
The Red Cross turned to the newspapers as well to emphasize its benefit for a 
citizens’ army. An article from Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, reprinted in the Vestnik, 
stated that mandatory service for members of the higher classes would encourage wealthy 
elites to participate in national relief, prompting a boon in donations and consistent support 
for this organization. The author of this article admitted that commitments from zemstvo and 
city hospitals to support the Red Cross had been disappointing: When the Main Directorate 
surveyed hospitals for numbers of how many wounded soldiers each facility would accept, 
only seventeen hospitals responded with a total capacity of 711 beds. This paltry contribution 
alarmed the Red Cross’s planners, so they invented all sorts of methods for improving 
civilian care for soldiers. One example was a proposal to deduct small sums of money from 
each conscript’s pay and give it to the Red Cross to guarantee satisfactory medical treatment 
for the soldier should any harm befall on him. If the soldier needed no medical treatment by 
the end of his period of enlistment, the contributions would be returned to him.381 This 
project was never put into practice, but it shows one of the new ways the Red Cross 
envisioned expanding its mission to accommodate universal conscription.  
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For members of the Red Cross, Russia’s adoption of universal conscription in 1874 
provided a new rhetorical tool to try to solicit donations from an unenthusiastic population. 
With the empire at peace, public fervor for the Red Cross had never taken off. After 1874, 
Russia possessed a people’s army, recruited from all social groups. Red Cross planners 
hoped this reform would prompt a wellspring of donations, and they reminded Russians in 
their publications that a people’s army required greater commitment from civilian society to 
sustain its wellbeing.   
Conclusion 
None of the Red Cross’s activities during the early 1870s inspired educated society to 
respond with a sudden increase in donations or membership. Slow and steady growth in 
membership and endowment characterized the organization’s expansion during its formative 
years. Famine relief to Samara Province, which totaled nearly half a million rubles in 
expenditures, attracted some new donors but involved few members of the Red Cross. 
Russia’s contribution to the Franco-Prussian War was modest, and the organization’s 
involvement in the Central Asian expeditions to Urda and Khiva drew little attention. On 
paper and in practice the Russia’s national relief society remained underfunded and poorly 
staffed by mid-decade. What the Red Cross had closely guarded was its independence, the 
lesson advocates for private aid took away from the USSC and the Franco-Prussian War. 
This independence would enable Russia’s national aid organization to undertake a 
tremendously popular project that was likely at odds with the state’s and military’s best 
interests.    
The Russian Red Cross’s evolution during the first eight years of its existence was 
relatively mundane, but this narrative changed dramatically at the end of 1875. On 30 
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October 1875, Metropolitan Michael of Serbia petitioned Russia to help the Christians of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in revolt against the Muslim Turks. In his appeal, Metropolitan 
Michael noted that the International Committee of the Red Cross had already placed agents 
in Dalmatia, Serbia, and Montenegro to distribute aid from Austria-Hungary for the 
wounded, but the Europeans had thus far provided little material assistance. He implored 
readers that “there are few doctors, orderlies barely know their tasks, and there are very few 
compassionate female hands.” The Main Directorate responded by appropriating ten 
thousand rubles for immediate Balkan relief, but even the Vestnik admitted that this sum was 
far too little.382 Soon after Russia gleefully dispatched sanitary brigades to Herzegovina and 
Montenegro, two corners of Europe whose low level of medical services made the tsarist 
empire look advanced.   
The conflicts in the Balkans in the late 1870s prompted Russian Pan-Slavists to view 
the Red Cross as way to back their Slavic brethren in a holy war for Orthodoxy and empire. 
This novel enthusiasm for the Red Cross provoked new challenges as well. The more 
Russian subjects supported the Red Cross, the more tsarist educated society sought to direct 
its missions and demanded accountability for all expenditures. The military entered the 
picture as well. For Miliutin, soldiers’ health posed a challenge far too important to be left in 
the hands of enthusiastic volunteers. In the conflicts between Slavs and Turks in the Balkan 
during the 1870s, the Red Cross walked a tight rope between satisfying popular demands, 
and fulfilling its mission as Russia’s national relief organization.
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CHAPTER 5 – THE RUSSIAN RED CROSS, MEDICAL DIPLOMACY, AND THE 
RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1877-78 
 
In the fall of 1875, Ottoman Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina rose up against 
their Turkish overlords. Russian officialdom had little interest in Balkan insurrections, since 
tsarist foreign policy had preferred to work over the past two decades within the Three 
Emperor’s League, the compact with Prussia and Austria-Hungary, to solve continental 
problems through general consensus. Alexander II and his governing clique, especially 
Minster of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Gorchakov and Dmitrii Miliutin, sought every means 
to keep Russian foreign policy detached from the unpredictable national awakenings in small 
Europe.     
What Alexander II was reluctant to acknowledge was that educated Russia, the 
consumers of newsprint and partakers in associational life, had come into being as a political 
force a decade prior, during the Great Reforms. As the Christian uprisings spread from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria, a new group of Russian 
imperialists demanded tsarist armies intercede to expel the Turks from Europe. Wielding 
high-ranking political positions and cultural capital, the Pan-Slavists counted among their 
ranks N. P. Ignat’ev, the tsarist ambassador to Constantinople, M. N. Katkov, the publisher 
of the newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti, M. G. Cherniaev, an imperialist general, also 
known as the Lion of Tashkent, and Empress Maria Aleksandrovna. This group enjoyed 
unprecedented success. Within a year and a half, Pan-Slavist pressure and Ottoman
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 recalcitrance had drawn Russia into a crusade to give the little brother Slavs national 
autonomy and the fruits of European civilization, long deprived them by the Ottoman yoke. 
This chapter begins with a survey of the Russian Red Cross’s humanitarian relief 
missions to Montenegro and Serbia in 1875 and 1876. Usually portrayed as a footnote to the 
Pan-Slavists’ campaign to drive the Turks from Europe and establish Russian hegemony over 
the South Slavs, these missions are crucial for the history of the Red Cross and tsarist 
medicine more broadly. These missions helped spread modern medicine among the South 
Slavs and provided an opportunity for Russian surgeons to show off their skills on the 
world’s stage. The aid campaigns to Montenegro and Serbia proved that the Red Cross could 
raise private funds successfully and deliver medical professionals to play what it believed 
was a substantive role in wartime relief. The outcome of these missions cast doubt on how 
many hearts and minds the Russians actually won (or saved) in Serbia and Montenegro. But 
the Red Cross’s success was difficult to quantify when the moment for reflection was so 
short. Less than a year later, a new challenge arose in the Balkans, and the Red Cross again 
mobilized to engage it. During Russia’s war with Turkey, Red Cross planners paid more 
careful attention to how they coordinated with the military and whom they dispatched as 
volunteers.     
The second half of this chapter analyzes how Russians addressed the lessons from the 
conflicts of 1876 in the Russo-Turkish War the following year. This conflict enabled tsarist 
generals to test the Great Reforms of the military, and this study focuses on one of these 
small innovations, Russia’s use of private medical aid in war. The Red Cross’s mobilizations 
in 1876 and 1877 exemplified a unique moment in the evolution this institution. At the 
outset, in 1876, this organization was still very much a private association; however, 
 168 
 
problems that resulted from the aid missions to Serbia and the public’s subsequent loss of 
confidence in the Red Cross led planners and tsarist statesmen to intervene more heavy 
handedly in Russia’s wartime national aid society. By the end of 1878, the conflicts in the 
Balkans had accomplished what the limited efforts at civilian relief and aid shipments to 
imperial campaigns in the early 1870s had failed at: All of educated Russia knew the country 
possessed a Red Cross, which enabled eager civilians to support tsarist armies abroad and 
influence tsarist foreign policy.  
The South Slavic Wars and Russian Humanitarian Intervention 
Cultural affinity gave the Pan-Slavists the impetus to involve themselves in the 
Balkans, but Russia’s acceptance of the Geneva Convention provided the legal opportunity to 
send medical aid to foreign conflicts. During the Franco-Prussian War, many European Red 
Cross societies dispatched funds and materials to the International Agency’s Special 
Commission for wartime relief in Basel, Switzerland, or they mobilized doctors and medical 
teams to work behind the lines. Russian doctors viewed this conflict as a chance to study 
innovations in military medicine and learn from the Prussians how to mobilize private 
philanthropy for wartime use. The Prussians met these Russian volunteers with chilly 
embraces and rigid bureaucratic restrictions. Slighted by the Prussians, Russian 
humanitarians sought another chance to demonstrate their medical talents and civilized ethos. 
When Christian Ottoman subjects in Herzegovina and Bosnia, frustrated by high 
taxes and corrupt governors, rose up against their Muslim rulers in the autumn of 1875, 
Russian Pan-Slavists recognized an opportunity to intervene in the Balkans. The Ottomans’ 
clumsy response to the insurgency drove refugees across borders, challenging Montenegro 
and Serbia to enter the conflict. Ignat’ev, the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, 
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attempted to pacify the crisis by asking the Turks to enact reforms, which the sultan decreed 
in October and December 1875. However, a regime change in Constantinople, the ambitions 
of rogue tsarist officers, and rivalries between Montenegro and Serbia led both South Slavic 
states to war with the Ottomans in the summer of 1876. Educated Russia escalated the 
conflict: Donations poured into the Pan-Slavic committees; Russian officers left their posts to 
join the Serbian army; and the empress directed the Russian Red Cross to deliver aid to 
victims.383  
With neither a mandate from the International Committee of the Red Cross nor 
precedent established by the Geneva Convention for intervention in civil wars or 
insurgencies, the Red Cross tiptoed carefully into the crisis in the Balkans. The Russians 
feared that Austro-Hungarian relief organizations, operating out of Croatia, would beat them 
to the needy Orthodox Slavs. Heeding calls from the press, the Main Directorate on 3 
September 1875 announced ten thousand rubles would be sent to the Russian consul in 
Dubrovnik for refugee aid in Montenegro.384 To test the Russian public’s support for this 
campaign, the Main Directorate circulated a petition to local chapters asking for donations, 
and this drive netted nearly a hundred thousand rubles for Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Bulgaria.385 The Russians wanted to deliver aid directly to the insurgents in Herzegovina and 
Bosnia, but the Ottoman Red Cross denied these requests on the grounds that the Geneva 
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Convention did not cover insurgencies and that aid to Christian partisans would result in their 
recognition as belligerents.386 By November 1875, members of the Main Directorate had 
consulted with the empress and decided to initiate “practical activities.” This same month, 
Prince Nikola of Montenegro informed the International Committee of the Red Cross that his 
nation had adopted the Geneva Convention, which made him legally eligible for foreign 
aid.387 Fearing that the Austro-Hungarian Red Cross would seek to make bedfellows with the 
Montenegrins, the Russians dispatched a medical brigade of thirty-three people to Cetinje, 
where they set up a hospital with one hundred beds. The Main Directorate budgeted sixty 
thousand rubles from its wartime reserves to fund this outfit for six months.388   
The initial brigade to Montenegro, headed by P. A. Rikhter, contained eight nurses 
led by E. P. Kartsova, a veteran of the Exaltation Society who had served in the Crimean 
War. This group was soon joined by another Russian brigade, and the two set up medical 
facilities in in the towns of Cetinje, Grakhov, and Danilovgrad, where they treated more than 
one thousand patients during the period from January to September 1876. Most doctors were 
volunteers from the Russian military, while the nurses came from the nursing societies in 
Russia’s two capitals. Since the Montenegrins had no military or civilian medical services, 
the Russians outfitted special mobile ambulances (letuchie otriady) to serve in the rear of the 
army and dress wounds near the front at Nikčiś. The number of patients the Russians treated 
in Montenegro was small because of the difficulty of transporting patients in the mountains 
and because Montenegrins at first feared modern medicine, especially surgeries, and sought 
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treatment from village healers if they could find them. Soon, however, the locals warmed to 
European medicine and sought out the Russian facilities. For the foreign volunteers, this 
modest relief effort spread the “civilizing mission” that “would not disappear from memory 
in this corner of the Balkan Peninsula.” The Montenegrins impressed their guests by 
allegedly mastering the Geneva Convention; despite their bellicose nature, the Slavic 
tribesmen resisted the urge to target Turkish medical facilities and permitted the Russians to 
treat wounded Muslims.389  
The Russian Red Cross’s plans for Serbia were initially modest, but the escalating 
conflict, Serbia’s military failures, and pressure from tsarist subjects for greater involvement 
led to a broad expansion of the mission by late summer 1876. The Main Directorate initially 
provided its agent in Serbia, V. N. Tokarev, with one hundred thousand rubles to open a two-
hundred bed hospital outside Belgrade for six months. Tokarev’s instructions tasked the 
privy councilor with ensuring that the funds, supplies, and Red Cross arm bands were 
distributed and used properly.390 By September, additional medical teams had arrived, and 
the Russians set up a network of medical facilities throughout the country with a capacity of 
around one thousand hospital beds.391 The largest concentration of medical workers was in 
the village of Jagodina, about eighty-five miles south of Belgrade. In total, the Russians 
treated over five thousand wounded Serbs during this conflict.392 A steady stream of 
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dressings, bedding, and clothing traveled from warehouse in St. Petersburg to the lazarettos 
in Serbia.393 These quantities of goods and services, however, did little to benefit the Serbs.     
By many accounts, Russia’s humanitarian mission in Serbia exposed serious 
problems within the Red Cross and with Tokarev’s leadership. The Serbs, whose political 
leadership was divided on the war, seemingly gave the Russians carte blanche to provide aid 
without making any preparations for how the network of hospitals would be arranged. One 
Russian author surmised that the Serbs took the Prussian plan from 1870, translated it into 
Serbian, and “checked out.”394 Personnel, supplies, and coordination existed only on paper. 
Poor communication with Serbian authorities and transportation meant that Russian doctors 
had no idea when lazarettos would be inundated with hundreds of wounded patients.395 
Russians found Serbian women unfit for nursing because of their low education and 
unwillingness to interact with foreign professionals, and trustworthy male laborers were 
similarly difficult to find among the locals.396 Some Russian doctors even brandished pistols 
to drive Serbian shirkers from the lazarettos and back to the front.397 It appears as if the 
Montenegrins welcomed foreign aid, whereas the Serbs seemed displeased that foreigners 
had overrun their country and pushed it into an ill-fated war. 
                                                     
392 Kekher, “Zametki o deiatel’nosti Russkogo Obshchestva popecheniia o ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh v 
Serbii,” Vestnik obshchestva popecheniia o ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh (April-May 1877): 3. 
 
393 “Otchet iz Serbii,” Vestnik obshchestva popecheniia o ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh (November 1876): 5. 
394V. A. Studitskii, “Materialy dlia sanitarnogo ocherka Serbii vo vremia voiny 1876 goda,” Moskovskaia 
meditsinskaia gazeta, May, 14, 1877, 579. 
 
395 V. A. Studitskii, “Materialy dlia sanitarnogo ocherka Serbii vo vremia voiny 1876 goda,” Moskovskaia 
meditsinskaia gazeta, April 9, 1877, 433-34. 
 
396 S. Kolomnin, Obshchii meditsinksii ocherk Serbo-Turetskoi voiny 1876 g. i tyla armii v Bessarabii i Rumynii 
vo vremia Turetskoi voiny 1877 goda, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: A. Suvorin, 1878), 4-5.    
 
397 V. A. Studitskii, “Materialy dlia sanitarnogo ocherka Serbii vo vremia voiny 1876 goda,” Moskovskaia 
meditsinskaia gazeta, April 9, 1877, 430. 
 173 
 
Lacking experience with this type of aid campaign, the Russians created many of 
their own problems. Critics noted the uneven distribution of medical resources throughout 
the country and shortages of surgeons. Doctors from the Russian military quarreled with 
brainy surgeons from university medical faculties. One witness explained how the search for 
scientific knowledge may have harmed patient care: “The doctors try to concentrate in their 
hands the most difficult and serious patients out of honest scientific interest, but it seems to 
me that the head doctor should spread the difficult cases among different lazarettos in order 
to prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases, even if this measure impairs the doctors’ quest 
for medical knowledge.”398 Many of the hospital staff, medical students, and adventure-
seeking nurses behaved poorly; some even abandoned their assigned posts to travel to the 
front. The Russians failed to establish a monopoly over aid workers, as tourists and amateurs 
purchased Red Cross armbands in shops to visit medical facilities or wander the theater of 
operations unmolested. At the same time, Tokarev upset workers at medical facilities run by 
Old Believers and Pan-Slavist organizations by forbidding them to use the Red Cross 
symbol, thereby denying these volunteers the securities promised by the Geneva 
Convention.399 Suitable carts and wagons were in short supply as well, which meant that 
evacuation from the front was slow and uncomfortable for the wounded. Neither the Russians 
nor the Serbs deigned to set up a bureau to track patients or keep tabs on the number of free 
beds. Some hospitals became so crowded that the wounded slept in wagons, while other 
facilities lay empty.400 Not surprisingly, the press responded by reproaching the Russian 
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relief organization for these shortcomings. An article in Novoe vremia from 17 September 
1876 titled “Is Our Red Cross Society Prepared for War?” was indicative of these 
frustrations. Frustrated with the war, and more likely the Russian autocracy for sending 
nurses instead of soldiers, Katkov quoted Cherniaev for the readers of Moskovskie vedomosti 
as stating “the local Red Cross, which is occupied with formalities alone, provides 
nothing.”401  
In the end, however, Cherniaev and the Pan-Slavs had done little to benefit the Serbs; 
Ottoman advances in late October routed the Serbs and opened the road to Belgrade. These 
setbacks compelled Russian officialdom to issue an ultimatum to the Turks, forcing an 
immediate truce. Russia’s bold wager, that the threat of invasion would control Ottoman 
behavior, almost guaranteed war would break out shortly.  
The interventions in the Balkans in 1876 revealed that Russians had not yet learned 
how to deploy humanitarian relief in foreign conflicts. True, the Russians found 115 doctors, 
118 nurses, 70 feldshers, and 41 medical students to volunteer to go to Serbia, and the Red 
Cross spent 526,276 rubles on the mission to Serbia and another 369,141 on the campaign in 
Montenegro, incredible sums for tsarist charities at the time.402 But these vainglorious efforts 
depleted the Red Cross’s coffers while drawing Russia into a major war with the Ottoman 
Empire. The most important lesson from the Franco-Prussian War, that private aid worked 
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best to supplement military medical services, passed over the Russians’ heads.403 Rather than 
assisting state-sponsored medical services, the Russians attempted to deliver to Serbia and 
Montenegro institutions that should have existed already.  
A second consequence of the interventions in Montenegro and Serbia was that 
Russian surgeons’ unfettered access to the war wounded provided them with an opportunity 
to hone their medical skills and assert their expertise within the Russian and international 
medical communities. Pirogov called for greater cooperation between military surgeons, even 
proposing that doctors on opposite sides of a conflict should share information on medical 
innovations and statistics, and some medical men hoped the Red Cross would serve as an 
instrument for spreading military medical knowledge across borders.404 This yearning for 
medical knowledge helps explain why these conflicts attracted Russia’s best medical minds, 
famous physicians such as S. P. Botkin, N. V. Sklifosovskii, A. S. Tauber, and others. When 
these physicians returned to Russia, they published accounts of their activities in Russian 
medical journals, evidence that they regarded wartime volunteer work as means for 
advancing scientific knowledge and promoting the reputation of Russian medicine. And 
many authors’ reports confirmed the conclusions of Russia’s greatest surgeon, Pirogov. Both 
A. S. Tauber and M. N. Kolomnin argued in favor of conservative surgical practices, the use 
of gypsum casts, triage, and housing patients in temporary wooden facilities or tents instead 
of large, permanent hospitals, all innovations Pirogov had advocated for in his textbook on 
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battlefield surgery.405 Since Russia possessed the medical talent, it came as no surprise that 
educated Russia viewed its surgeons as a mark of a highly developed civilization.  
From 1876 onward, Russia recognized the potential for medical diplomacy as a 
means for attracting political support in foreign countries. In Montenegro’s case, a country 
without any professional doctors in 1876, the project, at least in Russian minds, had won over 
Slavic tribesmen to the benefits of modern medicine and demonstrated the Russian empire’s 
benevolence. The Serbian case proved more problematic, since the war had failed and many 
of the guests had behaved poorly. Still, Russia continued to dispatch medical volunteers to 
foreign nations, with varying degrees of success, to the end of the tsarist period.  
The campaigns in 1876 revealed that the Russian Red Cross had not figured out how 
to use the public sphere to its advantage. Despite institutional growth, the Russian Red Cross 
suffered from low levels of public support and an inadequate endowment prior to 1876, a 
sign that this organization’s mission was far greater than its means.406 The press as well 
proved a double-edge sword for the Red Cross. Enthusiasm for Balkan undertakings was 
manufactured by Pan-Slavist writers, and positive reports certainly translated into donations 
and support. But what public opinion giveth, the editor’s reproof could just as quickly taketh 
away. Negative accounts from Serbia undermined the public’s trust in the Red Cross as the 
empire itself prepared for war. The Main Directorate recognized this danger and in the future 
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followed, editor of Grazhdanin (The Citizen), V. P. Meshcherskii’s advice by countering 
slander in the press with published accounts of the organization’s income, expenses, and 
results.407 Thus, the foreign relief missions to the South Slavs in 1876 entangled the Red 
Cross in missions for which it turned out to be poorly prepared and which placed its 
reputation and capabilities at the whims of a fickle press. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 
would prove a boon for the Red Cross, but the nature and scale of the war drew the private 
aid society away from the public and embroiled it within the machinery of the state. 
Henceforth, the Red Cross’s endeavors in Russia’s wars would never be a non-governmental 
affair.  
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 surprised contemporary observers and the 
historians who have studied it over why tsarist Russia’s military performed so poorly.408 
Victory was supposed to be easy, but frustrations at the front and with the postwar settlement 
led generals, statesmen, and the reading public to doubt whether this conflict improved 
Russia’s foreign policy in regard to the Eastern Question. The Ottomans’ violence against 
Orthodox Slavs ceased, but Russia gained little besides free naval passage on the Black Sea, 
and this concession came at tremendous cost in lives and rubles. The weight of this burden, 
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coupled with the embarrassing retreats at the Congress of Berlin and the generous 
constitution tsarist diplomats bequeathed to Bulgaria, ignited the political crisis of the early 
1880s in St. Petersburg.409 Russia, as Miliutin and Gorchakov feared in 1876, was ill-
prepared for the strategic, social, and economic consequences of a major war at the moment 
when the Great Reforms were beginning to take root. The historical coup may in fact have 
been that Russia avoided drawing Britain into the conflict, while at the same time limited the 
domestic upheaval to economic crisis, political discontent, and the life of a tsar. This was a 
storm nonetheless, but one the state weathered in the 1880s.  
For the purposes of this chapter, the Russo-Turkish War revealed the transitional 
nature of private aid in Russia. The Red Cross and military did not yet know how to apply 
private aid to war, and the experiences in Montenegro and Serbia provided few lessons for 
what might happen when Russia mobilized its own forces. By war’s end, however, Russian 
medical services and advocates for private aid had drawn important conclusions from this 
conflict that would enable the organization to grow and thrive in the decades following 1878.  
A brief survey of this conflict’s kinetics provides a sense of how transitional this war 
was for Russia’s armies and military medical services. The Russo-Turkish War began as a 
result of Russian humanitarian motives, Ottoman obstinacy, Austro-Hungarian meddling, and 
mixed messages from Britain to the Porte suggesting aid might be forthcoming should tsarist 
armies threaten Constantinople.410 In October 1876, with the Serbian war effort collapsing, 
Russia imposed an armistice to prevent the Turks from marching on Belgrade. At the end of 
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the year, delegates from the European powers convened in Constantinople in hopes of 
convincing the Porte to establish autonomous Christian provinces in Ottomans’ European 
holdings. The Turks rejected a pair of heavy-handed peace settlements, and the Sick Man’s 
defiance prompted Russian mobilization.411  
Ottoman strategic confidence rested on several advantages: The sultan’s armies 
possessed superior Peabody-Martini rifles, the Black Sea was closed to the Russian fleet, and 
Turkish generals had several months to prepare for war. Russia needed to transport its armies 
through Romania, cross the Danube, and push through the Balkan passes to threaten 
Constantinople, an enormous logistical assignment. Tsarist generals bested their Ottoman 
rivals by a long shot, but talents such as M. I. Dragomirov, I. V. Gurko, M. T. Loris-Melikov, 
and E. I. Totleben had to respect the autocratic imperative that insisted Grand Dukes 
Nicholas and Michael Romanov lead the armies. Confusion and error at the main 
headquarters often compromised Russian commanders’ ingenuity.412  
Permission from Romania for military transit came on 4 April, and eight days later 
Russia declared war. War plans called for a speedy two-pronged campaign on either side of 
the Black Sea. In the western theater, Russian troops would cross the Danube, force the 
Balkan passes, and reach Constantinople before the British could intervene. In the Caucasus, 
Russian forces would make less ambitious advances along a broader front, seizing principle 
towns and fortresses and tying up Turkish forces. The first and third phases of the war turned 
out to be highly successful, as Russian commanders demonstrated careful planning and adroit 
maneuvers. The second phase, a protracted and costly campaign for the town of Plevna, 
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which lasted from July to December 1877, nearly led to a Russian failure on par with 
Sevastopol.  
In the first phase of the war, the Russians brilliantly executed M. I. Dragomirov’s 
risky plan for crossing the Danube at Zimnicea and pressed on to the village of Svistov and 
nearby high grounds. Once reinforcements arrived on the south shore of the river, the 
Russians split into three echelons and fanned out in Bulgaria, and the popular General I. V. 
Gurko pressed forward in the center and took the town of Turnovo and later the crucial 
Shipka Pass by 5 July. This daring push into the mountains incited panic in Constantinople, 
but Gurko lacked the manpower and supply network to exploit the initiative. The Turks 
recalled Mehmet Ali Pasha from Montenegro and rushed in reinforcements to drive the 
Russians from Shipka. Miliutin, fearing that Gurko might be cut off by Turkish garrisons 
along the north side of the Balkans, convinced the tsar to slow down the offensive to defend 
the Shipka Pass. Meanwhile, the Russians’ emphasis shifted to reducing Turkish strongholds 
at Rushchuk and Nikopol to the east of Sistovo and amassing troops in the west for an assault 
on Plevna.413 
Early on, speed had carried the day for the Russians, but this situation changed at 
Plevna, where infantry columns’ inability to best entrenched defenders armed with modern 
rifles became apparent. As the famous surgeon S. P. Botkin put it, “First Plevna was careless, 
Second Plevna a mistake, and Third Plevna a crime.”414 In the initial engagement on 8 July, 
the Russians broke through Ottoman trenches and briefly fought along the streets of Plevna 
before frightening losses and a lack of reinforcements forced them to retreat. Ten days later, 
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tsarist forces repeated their mistakes in an engagement known as Second Plevna. All of the 
sudden, a hasty strategic victory in the war was thrown into question. Russian commanders 
altered their war plans by shifting to the strategic defensive as the tsar called for a new 
mobilization of 110,000 men and initiated discussions aiming to bring Romania into the war. 
To the south, the Russians dug in along the Shipka Pass and resisted an intense Turkish effort 
to drive them from the mountains in mid-August.415 With Shipka successfully held and 
Russian and Romanian reinforcements arriving around Plevna, Grand Duke Nicholas 
Nikolaevich and Prince Karol of Romania believed they had the necessary forces to oust 
Osman Pasha at month’s end. Even though the Christian allies enjoyed superiority in 
manpower and artillery, the third assault on Plevna on 30 August produced no charm. 
Turkish rifles again massacred Russian frontal assaults. Despaired of these bloodlettings, the 
Russians shifted tactics and recalled Gurko and Totleben to surround and besiege Plevna. 
Another costly victory at Gorni Dubnik completed the Russian encirclement in October, and 
the Turks, weakened by illness and starvation, capitulated in early December.416 
The frustrations at Plevna exposed the cracks in Russia’s military capabilities 
following the Great Reforms. A loss of confidence in the generals undermined support for 
the tsar at home. The autumn of 1877 renewed fears of unrest in Russia, as the ruble 
collapsed, peasants grew restless, and the Senate conducted a show trial of 193 populists 
(narodniki).417 While Russian resolve for the war weakened at home, the military situation at 
the front suddenly appeared more sanguine. Miliutin recognized that Plevna’s capitulation 
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afforded Russia the strategic offensive, and he urged Grand Duke Nicholas to force the 
mountain passes in the winter and threaten Constantinople before the British could intervene. 
The Russians completed an advance across the mountains by the turn of the new year at the 
cost of many fingers and toes to frostbite. The city of Philippopolis (Plovdiv) fell after a 
three-day battle in early January, and the Russians reached San Stefano, a village seven miles 
from Constantinople, where they began negotiations for an armistice on 7 January.  
Russia’s second front in the Caucasus lacked a strategic objective other than stymying 
Turkish forces and preventing the Ottomans from deploying reinforcements to the Balkans. 
In this theater, the Grand Duke Michael Nikolaevich enjoyed moderate success due to the 
skills of his subordinate generals. Similar to the western theater, the Russians advanced 
quickly in four columns across the Ottoman border and enjoyed initial successes in capturing 
several Turkish forts, but shortages of troops and problems with supply forced the grand 
duke to switch to defensive operations by midsummer. In the autumn, General N. N. 
Obruchev led reinforcements against the Turkish citadel of Kars, which the Russians took in 
an impressive victory. The Russians then besieged the town of Erzerum, which the Turks 
surrendered once the war in the west had ended.418 The Caucasian campaigns were truly a 
sideshow in this conflict; Russia’s strategic interests and popular enthusiasm directed all eyes 
south of the Danube.      
Medical Services in the Russo-Turkish War 
In many ways, the same leadership failures that escalated the conflict and cost tens of 
thousands of lives undermined the Russian military medical service’s performance during the 
Russo-Turkish War. Miliutin had made reforming the medical services a component of his 
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transformation of the army, but if military sanitation in 1877-78 is used as a litmus test, then 
the results of these efforts were decidedly ambiguous. The Russians, eager to repeat the 
Germans’ medical performance in 1870, failed to overcome the scourge of epidemic 
diseases, the single biggest killer in war prior to the Prussians’ remarkable feat.419 Tsarist 
observers identified many causes for this outrage: Russians’ poor practice of military 
sanitation; shortages of supplies and ambulances; misplacement of personnel and hospitals; 
the climate and environment; and contact with Turkish prisoners.420 In sum, a storm of 
unforeseen problems and human errors threatened Russia’s military medical services, but the 
real culprit appears to have been a failure to communicate: Russian military operations did 
not correspond with medical services.421 Ambulances, hospitals, evacuation trains, dressings, 
food, and doctors never appeared where they needed to be. And despite Botkin’s doubt that 
any improvements had been made, some scholars have argued the Russian military 
performed much better than in the Crimean War.422 Therefore, a short survey of Russia’s 
medical effort in 1877-78 will identify where the problems lay. 
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As war became likely in the fall of 1876, the Russian general staff worked out a plan 
for medical services in the Balkans and Caucasus. Envisioning a short war, the army 
concentrated medical facilities along the southwestern border of the empire and the 
Caucasus. By December 1876, plans called for sixty-four wartime hospitals in the Danubian 
theater of war with over forty thousand beds and another seventy-eight smaller hospitals in 
the Caucasus with a capacity of sixteen thousand patients. By war’s end, major engagements 
such as Plevna and the deteriorating sanitary situation on the south side of the Balkans forced 
the Danubian army to increase its capacity to 130,000 beds and mobilize the Red Cross to set 
up facilities in the rear for at least 12,000 beds. Also, prior to the war, the Russian army had 
hired civilian doctors, recalled reservist physicians, and mobilized medical students to serve 
as physicians, decisions that had increased the complement of medical professionals at the 
army’s disposal.423 
But capacity was not the issue; location, timing, and behavior were far more crucial 
for success. Losses in all three Plevnas were far worse than anyone expected, and the 
Russians never managed to arrange the military medical services to handle a casualty load 
that reached five thousand wounded in a single day.424 Shortages of ambulances and the 
difficulty of evacuating soldiers by railroad caused unforeseen crowding and delays. In order 
to free doctors from administrative tasks, regulations stipulated that staff officers without any 
specialized training govern medical facilities. The result was a dual-power structure 
(dvoevlastie) between doctors and staff officers in which quality of care was often given 
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short shrift.425 In the Balkans, this structural problem was clear from the differences between 
V. I. Priselkov, the Field Military Medical Inspector, an experienced surgeon who had toured 
lazarettos in the Franco-Prussian War, and the Field Inspector of Hospitals, V. D. Kossinskii, 
a line officer turned administrator.426 Lastly, the Russians forced the Balkan passes in the 
winter, leaving the rear medical services in their wake. While the armies shivered outside 
Constantinople waiting for a peace settlement, epidemics decimated the ranks. Official 
statistics held that Russian soldiers in Balkans suffered 875,542 cases of illnesses, or 1.5 
cases per soldier, and soldiers in the Caucasus a terrifying 1,198,023 cases of illnesses, or 4.7 
cases per soldier. In all, disease killed a recorded 81,847 soldiers during the campaign. In 
comparison, 6,542 Russians perished from wounds between the two theaters combined.427 
Contemporaries viewed the typhus and dysentery epidemics that plagued Russia’s 
armies as products of nature and negligence. Nicholas I’s armies had suffered tremendously 
from typhus during the campaign of 1829 in the same region, but the mobilization in autumn 
1876 occurred with almost no cases of illness, an unexpected surprise that may have lulled 
Russian commanders into a false sense of security.428 The Main Military Medical 
Department recognized this danger and produced two directives titled the “Instructions for 
Protection of Troops’ Health in the Mobilized Army” and “Instructions for Measures to 
Protect Against the Spread of Infectious Diseases,” but field commanders simply ignored 
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these orders.429 Botkin reproached medical staff for neglecting to boil water, complained that 
commanders refused the advice of medics, and commented, “our soldiers are infected by 
their own waste.”430 Lieutenant Greene, the American military attaché to the tsarist army, 
provided the most colorful diagnosis: 
Six or seven officers of the Emperor’s suite. . . are seriously ill with the fever. . . I 
suppose it is considered almost an epidemic there. I cannot but think that it is due. . . 
to the defective—or rather the total lack of—sanitary precautions about the camp. . . 
There are no sinks or latrines whatever for the officers or men. . . [and] the streets 
and lanes of the village are filled with human excrement, which is never covered and 
which gives forth at night a stench of the most unhealthy nature. I have also been 
informed by correspondents who have been with other parts of the Army that it is the 
same thing about their camps and even about their field hospitals.431 
 
If the tsar was up to his ankles in shit, the rank-and-file’s hygiene must have been deplorable. 
A later study by Dr. K. K. Iskerskii placed responsibility solely on human errors. 
Overcrowded, poorly-heated hospitals, abominable latrines, inattention to sanitation, and the 
mixing of sick and wounded soldiers in the wards produced the epidemic. Iskerskii repeated 
the complaint heard often from medical professionals all over tsarist Russia: The solution lay 
in freeing military physicians from the arbitrary tyranny (proizvol) of field commanders and 
empowering the doctors to use their own talents to police the health of the army.432 
Nevertheless, the concern here should not be the causes of these medical shortcomings or the 
establishment of the guilty parties. Instead, as the next section will argue, pressing medical 
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necessity expanded the scale and scope of activities the Red Cross conducted in the Russo-
Turkish War, especially in the Danubian theater. However, as we shall see, expansion of 
mission did not translate into freedom of action.    
The Russian Red Cross in the Russo-Turkish War 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, military planners at the Main Headquarters 
(Glavnaia kvartira) largely ignored the Red Cross in the plans for war. Believing that the war 
would be short and swift, the generals permitted private aid a restricted, supportive role in 
Romania and the border provinces inside the Russian empire. These were not outlandish 
plans, considering the Red Cross suffered from limited resources and a weakened reputation 
after its campaign in Serbia. A 6 March letter from the Main Headquarters to Prince V. I. 
Cherkasskii, the Red Cross’s Main Plenipotentiary in the Danubian theater, instructed the 
organization to set up a series of etappe points along railroad lines in Romania.433 The army 
intended for these private facilities to feed evacuated soldiers and provide small lazarettos 
where the most critical patients could convalesce.434  This role for the Red Cross made sense 
to Russian generals, who envisioned thousands of casualties during the initial operation to 
cross the Danube and feared that the limited number of sanitary trains in Romania would 
make it difficult to evacuate all patients to Iaşi, the border town with Russia.435 But tsarist 
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troops executed the river crossing excellently and suffered few cases of disease during the 
war’s first act, so the few Romanian sanitary trains proved adequate at first, and these etappe 
stations seemed unnecessary.436 
The Russians’ crossing of the Danube caught the Red Cross by surprise, since 
General Dragomirov had kept the time and location of the assault secret. Once the Russians 
secured the southern shore of the river, Cherkasskii sent volunteer parties to search for 
wounded soldiers concealed in the reeds along the Danube, and these parties found a few 
casualties as late as six days after the crossing.437 Still, the Red Cross lacked plans for how to 
help beyond the Danube, which led organizers such as Cherkasskii and N. S. Abaza, the 
Main Plenipotentiary in the Iaşi-Kishinev region, to expend too many resources improving 
their facilities in the rear in Romania and within the Russian empire. 
By August, after the first two battles of Plevna had made it apparent the Russians 
were in for a slog and needed medical facilities closer to the front, Cherkasskii met with the 
army’s chief medical officers to discuss how to involve the Red Cross in Bulgaria. A report 
on this meeting delivered to the Main Directorate indicated that the military wanted outside 
help, but generals remained hesitant to give private aid too much leeway in the theater of 
war. This meeting concluded that it was unwise to increase the number of independent, 
nonmilitary medical facilities south of the Danube, but the Red Cross should provide 
complements of doctors and nurses to the overtaxed military hospitals in Bulgaria and deliver 
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dressings and medicines to these facilities. Additionally, the military requested they extend 
the network of etappe points along the evacuation lines in Bulgaria.438  
Russia’s system for evacuating the wounded was inadequate for handling the 
numbers of casualties produced at Plevna. Fallen soldiers received first aid at the dressing 
station, were examined next at the division lazarettos, and then were evacuated to Zimnicea if 
their wounds were serious. From Zimnicea, they crossed the Danube over a pontoon bridge 
and boarded trains bound for the Russian border at the Romanian town of Frăţeşti. Prior to 
August, this system was slow and inefficient, but the bottlenecks in Romania did not too 
grave a threat there were very few evacuees. After the outrages at Plevna and as the summer 
weather turned cold and rainy, the military medical authorities requested that the Red Cross 
become more involved with evacuation by building winterized barracks in Zimnicea.439  
Under P. A. Rikhter’s oversight and with additional funds from several banks in St. 
Petersburg, the Red Cross set up barracks for three hundred patients and managed the 
transfer of evacuees, who arrived by cart from Bulgaria and left Frăţeşti by train. At this 
facility, Red Cross workers sorted, fed, cleaned, and tended patients as they awaited the 
sanitary trains. Patients too seriously wounded or sick for travel were removed from the main 
body of evacuees and housed in nearby military hospitals or private lazarettos. In an odd 
reversal of roles, the military put rank-and-file troops at the disposal of the civilian 
volunteers to help with orderly duties and sanitation. The Red Cross’s Zimnicea facility 
served as the major evacuation point for soldiers from Plevna until April 1878, when the 
spring thaw and end of hostilities enabled the Russians to evacuate patients by boat along the 
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Danube. In total, no fewer than eighty-five thousand Russian patients as well as forty 
thousand Turkish prisoners from Plevna passed through the Zimnicea evacuation point.440 
The logistical burden of sorting and transporting this mass of people proved a tremendous 
task for the Red Cross.  
The Balkans posed an unusual challenge for railroads, because all transports had to be 
unloaded and reloaded at the hubs in Iaşi or Bender, where the narrower European tracks met 
the Russian ones. Despite advice from the Germans on railroad evacuation and two borrowed 
trains from Dresden and Berlin, it took the Russians months to begin rail evacuations. 
Success in this endeavor was due in part due to the efforts of M. S. Sabinina, Maria 
Aleksandrovna’s agent, tasked with overseeing evacuation in Kishinev.441 
 Inside Romania, the Red Cross at first established four evacuation commissions, but 
the profusion of administrative bodies proved so burdensome that they centralized all 
operations in Bucharest. With ten sanitary trains at its disposal, the evacuation commission 
moved evacuees across Romania to Iaşi, where they boarded Russian trains or placed the 
most serious patients in nearby lazarettos. The Iaşi commission initially sought to distribute 
all of its patients to temporary medical facilities along rail lines in the Kiev, Odessa, and 
Kharkov military districts. To prevent epidemics from spreading to civilian population 
centers, the military ordered that patients with the most serious diseases remain close to the 
Romanian border. Patients with less serious illnesses were sent deeper into Russia. Wounded 
soldiers were often dispatched to their home provinces to convalesce.442  
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Civilian doctors worked out a system of identifying evacuees by colored cards. The 
most serious cases were assigned red cards and required to stay in Frăţeşti, green cards went 
to the second category who were admitted to lazarettos along the railroad lines in Romania, 
and yellow cards went to soldiers healthy enough to make it to Iaşi and beyond. This system 
presented problems after the battles of Plevna, when the number of evacuees arriving in 
Frăţeşti reached three thousand per day; patients lost their cards and exchanged tickets with 
one another; or the staff ran out of cards all together. Frăţeşti became another bottleneck in 
the evacuation network. Here, agents outfitted several barracks and warehouses near the 
railroad station to house over two thousand patients. The volunteer medical team numbered 
only a few dozen and could process no more than several hundred patients per day, but the 
number of arrivals kept growing during the siege of Plevna. In total, the facility in Frăţeşti 
processed over eighty thousand patients during and after the war.443  
Russian forces in Bulgaria began to suffer from the typhus epidemic well before 
hostilities commenced in January 1878, and Red Cross agents feared the slow speed of 
railroad evacuation posed a threat to the army’s health. Again Sabinina sped off, this time to 
Vienna, to rent and outfit barges for water evacuation along the Danube when the ice broke 
in the spring. Even though water evacuation demanded a costly investment up front, the 
system worked well, and at no point in Reni or elsewhere did patients suffer the bustle or 
overcrowding that occurred at railheads in Zimnicea, Frăţeşti, or Iaşi.444 In the autumn of 
1878, with the Black Sea reopened to Russian navigation, the Red Cross began transporting 
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men from wharfs along the Danube to the port cities of Nikolaev, Odessa, Sevastopol’, and 
Feodosia.  
From June 1877 to March 1879, the Russians evacuated over 200,800 patients and 
Turkish prisoners; of these, roughly 126,000 traveled by train, and the other 82,000 went by 
sea. One Red Cross agent noted that only ninety of these evacuees died on the crossing to 
Odessa, a low number he found fantastic.445 Over half of all evacuees received shelter and 
treatment in Red Cross facilities in Russia.446 Despite delays, miscommunication, and 
discomfort, evacuation was one area in which the Russians enjoyed success in the Russo-
Turkish War. The army and Red Cross worked together, not without occasional friction, to 
move tens of thousands of soldiers from remote war zones to medical facilities within the 
empire in spite of logistical challenges involving poor roads, different types of railroad, and 
no access to the sea for the first half of the project.   
The Red Cross significantly reduced its activities in Bulgaria and Romania in July 
1878 as troops returned home. Only two sanitary trains operated in Romania by midsummer, 
and the evacuation barges made their final trips at the beginning of October. In the autumn, 
the Red Cross kept five small hospitals in Northern Bulgaria, and most staff returned to 
Russia. Henceforth, the army intended to provide all medical care for soldiers. What the 
army did not foresee was that the sanitary situation would worsen as epidemics struck in the 
winter of 1878.447  
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In September, E. K. Veis became the new director of Red Cross operations in 
Bulgaria. His tours of military hospitals in the autumn revealed startling shortages of supplies 
and poor care. It seems that, as the Red Cross withdrew, the military did nothing to expand 
its medical capacities in Bulgaria. Veis redirected supplies destined for Bucharest, but he 
soon realized that the sanitary problems were more serious than the Red Cross or army could 
handle. As the need grew, the Red Cross again expanded operations in Bulgaria. In mid-
October, the Red Cross renewed evacuations by water and train. A dispute with Romania 
soon shut down Russian access to rail lines across the country, so Dr. A. N. Veis, the new 
Red Cross agent in Bulgaria, had to rent and outfit additional barges to conduct evacuation 
by water. In July 1879, Russian forces began to leave the Balkans en masse. As the troops 
left, the Red Cross halted operations. Once the military hospitals closed, the Red Cross 
distributed back-pay to its remaining employees and purchased nurses second-class rail 
tickets home. A post-occupation report claimed the Red Cross spent 158,518 francs on 
operations south of the Danube from September 1878 to August 1879.448 This sum was 
considerably smaller than expenditures during the war, but so was the mission. 
With fewer soldiers located in the theater of war and the duress of battle not weighing 
on army medical services, generals should have ended the Red Cross’s mission. Still, even in 
peacetime, the Red Cross found duties the military was ill-prepared to handle, such as 
providing the troops warm clothing and helping with evacuation. One author complained that 
the quality of the medical care fell substantially in military hospitals once the Red Cross was 
shut out.449 
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Mobile Ambulances 
Dreamed up by Henri Dunant as an alternative to military first responders who were 
apt to abandon the wounded in retreats, this type of sanitary unit won little love from military 
commanders, who demanded civilians stay away from the front. To the Russian Red Cross, 
these types of units provided volunteers with the romantic opportunity to serve at the front as 
Pirogov had fifty years prior. Highly-mobile, adaptable units also seemed to complement 
Russian military tactics and needs in war. Mobile ambulances could follow cavalry units on 
raids deep within enemy territory and set up isolated medical stations in the Balkan and 
Caucasus mountains. Russia experimented with these types of ambulances during the 
interventions in Serbia and Montenegro, and they appeared to be a useful way of delivering 
civilian medical aid to a shifting battlefield. The Russian military also desperately needed all 
types of help after major engagements produced unforeseen numbers of casualties. Even 
though the army wanted to keep civilians away from the front, commanders reluctantly 
admitted mobile ambulances when they needed them.450       
In the Russo-Turkish War, Romanov princesses and court favorites sponsored at least 
five of these brigades, which were often attached to privileged Guards units. Reportedly, in 
August 1877, after the Turks repulsed the initial Russian advance at Plevna, Empress Maria 
Aleksandrovna personally interdicted to support the Guards at the front. The empress first 
solicited approval from Count I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, the Chief of the Staff of the Guards 
Corps and an early Red Cross advocate, to sponsor several mobile ambulances to dispatch 
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with this corps in August 1877 for the penultimate assault on Plevna. Arriving in Bulgaria at 
the end of the month, Rikhter initially directed the brigades to work in military hospitals in 
Zimnicea and Sistovo; these facilities suffered staff shortages because all of the doctors had 
left to man the dressing stations around Plevna. As the main medical station between the 
multiple fronts in Bulgaria and the evacuation route through Romania, Sistovo’s Wartime 
Hospital Number Fifty saw over ten thousand patients during these period.451 Coordinating 
directly with General Gurko, these brigades provided relief at the Battles of Gornyi Duniak 
and Third Plevna. Even though these units were mobile and independent, they seem to have 
offered assistance to divisional lazarettos inundated with tremendous numbers of wounded, 
as they did at Plevna, or followed orders from military doctors to set up dressing stations and 
collect the wounded at the front, tasks they performed at Gornyi Duniak.452     
In the rear of the army, the mobile ambulances set up etappe stations to feed wounded 
soldiers during the evacuation by cart, a journey that might take several days from the front 
to Sistovo depending on traffic and weather. When needed, these etappes could set up 
lazarettos in tents or houses to treat ambulatory patients or provide spaces for evacuees to 
convalesce. Once the cold weather set in, the mobile ambulances distributed blankets, boots, 
hats, and other winter clothing to the poorly supplied troops. When the mobile ambulances 
crossed the Balkans with Russian forces in December, the agents who led them ran out of 
funds and found themselves unable to wire Cherkasskii for help. Military authorities 
intervened by providing loans to Red Cross agents to continue relief activities. The mobile 
ambulances’ journey ended when Russian forces occupied the Bulgarian city of Plovdiv in 
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January. At the time, typhus wracked the remaining population, so the civilian aid workers 
quarantined and treated sick civilians and disposed of corpses and dead animals. The 
epidemic took its toll on the occupiers, and several of the Red Cross workers perished from 
disease during this campaign.453 
Despite the setback in Plovdiv, the Red Cross upheld the mobile ambulances as ideal 
for deploying private aid to the theater of war.454 Commanders such as Gurko appreciated the 
hasty and diverse types of aid the mobile ambulance could deliver. The Red Cross believed it 
had provided invaluable help to armies on the move by listening to the generals’ needs and 
adroitly adapting to meet a diverse range of challenges.455 Mobile ambulances seemed an 
attractive and cheap option for the Red Cross, but Russia’s unfamiliarity with controlling 
independent sanitary units in a war zone posed new problems for coordinating between the 
military and private aid. For example, Sklifosovskii tore out of Zimnicea with a mobile 
ambulance destined for Plevna with sixteen Red Cross nurses, all of whom were supposed to 
work at an army hospital that was already over-capacity. One witness lamented that dressings 
went unchanged for days and rank-and-file soldiers failed to receive provisions in a timely 
manner at this facility.456 Still, additional care at critical junctures prompted the Red Cross to 
embrace the mobile ambulance as the primary method for delivering aid to the battlefield. As 
a result of the experiences from the Russo-Turkish War, these small, independent units 
became central to the Russian Red Cross’s understanding of its wartime mission.             
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To facilitate the disbursement of supplies to military and private aid facilities near the 
front, the Red Cross established a warehouse in Bucharest. From Bucharest, supplies were 
disseminated to the smaller Red Cross depots located near all of the major hospitals. Despite 
the delays, Rikhter was pleased with the Red Cross’s ability to deliver materials to medical 
facilities in Romania and northern Bulgaria, but military doctors complained that supplies too 
often arrived unevenly and in poor condition.457 Other large orders of supplies were 
purchased in Vienna or Berlin by agents abroad.458 Most of the supplies seem to have been 
bedding, clothing, underwear, shoes, and other items to keep wounded soldiers warm and 
comfortable. The newspaper Golos listed donations of 130,000 shirts, 80,000 pairs of long 
johns, 50,000 sheets, 27,000 sweaters, and nearly 1,000,000 bandages by November 1877, 
much of which was sewn by the ladies of St. Petersburg and Moscow. The Russian wounded 
may not have been eager to put their noses in the thirty-five thousand books donated for their 
enjoyment, but the Romanovs and other elites showed they had the troops’ best interests in 
mind when they donated thousands of cases of wine and liquor for convalescents.459     
One frustration for the Red Cross was the many formalities burdening the delivery of 
luxury materials, such as certain foods, tobacco, or alcohol, and the fact that military 
facilities had to request these items before agents could make such deliveries. Red Cross 
volunteers at times felt the wounded deserved greater food and comforts during hospital stays 
than the military allowed, but the decision to permit these luxury items lay solely with the 
military medical authorities. Worried that this opulence undermined discipline, one military 
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doctor remarked that the food in the Red Cross hospitals was on par with the best restaurants 
in St. Petersburg and “this luxury was not useful and even in few cases downright 
harmful.”460 Some military hospitals rebuked the Red Cross’s offers of help, which led to 
shortages of bedding and clothing.461 In total, the storehouse in Bucharest cost the Red Cross 
more than 270,000 rubles, an expense that indicates the amount of material this organization 
distributed in Romania.462   
The Ministry of War relied on the Red Cross to provide carts and ambulances to 
transport wounded soldiers to evacuation stations, a task some officials regarded as a burden 
well suited for private aid in war. Agents outfitted around one thousand horse-drawn wagons 
and ambulances in both the theater of war and within the borders of the empire during this 
conflict.463 The most popular type of vehicle was the Zavadovskii-type ambulance, a two-
wheeled, springed cart that could fit two supine patients or four sitting soldiers. The Main 
Directorate held a campaign to raise funds to purchase these vehicles, which netted seventy 
thousand rubles in the autumn of 1877 as well as donations of individual ambulances and 
wagons.464 Red Cross officials hoped to organize these carts into independent convoys, but 
the military had designs of its own for these carts. Tsar Alexander II interceded on behalf of 
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the army and insisted Cherkasskii surrender the vehicles, a move that upset members of the 
Main Directorate, who felt the Red Cross’s resources were not for the army to commandeer 
arbitrarily.465   
In the theater of war, a medical student or feldsher usually headed Red Cross 
convoys, with local peasants hired as drivers. In total, from October 1877 to early March 
1878, the Red Cross transported roughly 4,700 patients by road from Zimnicea to Frăţeşti, 
and delivered cargo, sanitary personnel, and even healthy soldiers to the front, a violation of 
the Geneva Convention. Citing confusion and cost, the army took control of all road 
transportation on 1 March 1878, after the war had ended. For the Red Cross, road 
transportation turned out to be very costly: It spent nearly eight hundred thousand francs on 
vehicles, drivers, horses, and fodder during this war.466   
Red Cross Personnel 
During the Russo-Turkish War, an unprecedented number of Russians subjects 
volunteered for the Red Cross for altruistic and patriotic motives. This group ranged from 
talented bureaucrats and medical professionals to amateurs and opportunists. In St. 
Petersburg, the chairman of the Red Cross, A. K. Baumgarten, oversaw the Main Directorate 
and reported directly to Empress Maria Aleksandrovna. Baumgarten seemed a logical 
candidate for this post because he had led troops during the Hungarian campaign of 1848, 
seen a great deal of the Crimean War, participated in the Great Reforms as a member of the 
Military Council—the state body that oversaw changes to the army—and later headed the 
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Main Military Hospital Committee.467 During the Russo-Turkish War, Baumgarten oversaw 
the day-to-day activities of two special commissions, the Executive and Revision 
committees, to manage the Red Cross’s operations in the theater of war and finances.468 
Maria Fedorovna, the wife of Tsarevich Alexander, appeared more frequently at Red Cross 
meetings during the war as well. The written records are silent on what she did at these 
gatherings, but this campaign must have served as a training opportunity for her to learn the 
ropes of the national aid society that she would soon head.  
In the theater of war, the Red Cross deployed a network of agents to run individual 
facilities. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the empress named Prince V. A. Cherkasskii to 
be the head of the Red Cross in the Danubian theater. Cherkasskii’s role as the chief Red 
Cross administrator was problematic because Alexander II also tasked him with being the 
head civil administrator in occupied Bulgaria. The responsibility of managing a nascent state 
in Bulgaria, a duty complicated by local Slavs’ violent retributions against their Muslim 
neighbors, overburdened this aged prince. He further gaffed by trying to circumvent the Main 
Directorate with indirect appeals to the empress and direct appeals in the press, moves that 
won him no love from Red Cross advocates.469 Overwork took its toll on Cherkasskii, who 
died suddenly on 19 February 1878. His successor, S. F. Paniutin, was a former officer and 
civil servant in Poland who had participated in Red Cross work in Serbia the year before.470 
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Besides Cherkasskii, the most important Red Cross agent was the military physician 
and governor of Riazan, N. S. Abaza, who was headquartered in Kishinev and managed Red 
Cross services throughout southern Ukraine (Novorossiia). Once Cherkasskii passed into 
Bulgaria in the summer of 1877, the Main Directorate recalled P. A. Rikhter, the former Red 
Cross agent to Montenegro, and sent him to manage operations in Romania. General M. N. 
Tolstoi acted as the agent in the Caucasian theater of war. These men often fought with the 
Main Directorate and one another over funding allowances. Conversely, the Main Directorate 
regularly questioned whether all the requests for additional funding were warranted.471 The 
responsibility for relief operations in the theaters of war made the agents easy scapegoats for 
bureaucrats in St. Petersburg, generals, and journalists. 
The most crucial personnel in the field were doctors, and patriotic sympathies 
attracted some of Russia’s best medical minds to Red Cross service in the Balkans and 
Caucasus. Abaza at first entrusted his subordinate S. P. Kolomnin to gathering a brigade of 
doctors with experience in the Serbian-Turkish War to serve in the rear lazarettos in southern 
Russia. Later, S. P. Botkin, the second most famous doctor in tsarist Russia behind Pirogov, 
selected many of the Red Cross doctors for the Danubian theater. Pay for doctors was fixed 
at two hundred rubles per month, a salary lower than many would have enjoyed at home, but 
pay was surely not the motivating factor that caused these men to volunteer. The Red Cross 
had no trouble recruiting famous physicians such as K. K. Reier, E. V. Pavlov, S. P. 
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Kolomnin, and N. V. Sklifosovskii. Even Pirogov, at age sixty-seven, offered his services as 
a consultant and inspector.      
Most of these volunteers had graduated from the Medical-Surgical Academy and 
knew the demands of battlefield surgery. To supplement the professionals, the Red Cross 
welcomed fifth-year medical students from the universities and a few women who had 
completed the medical course in St. Petersburg.472 In total, Abaza’s region had 126 doctors 
and 8 female physicians serve during the war.473 Rikhter employed forty-six doctors and 
pharmacists in the evacuation points and lazarettos in Romania and Bulgaria.474 In temporary 
hospitals within Russia, zemstvo doctors and private practitioners donated their skills or 
received payments from local Red Cross committees. 
Women doctors made up a small group of medical volunteers in the Russo-Turkish 
War. Miliutin had created this cohort at the Medical-Surgical Academy as an experiment in 
the 1870s, but Russian law limited opportunities for these women to practice medicine 
independently or even call themselves “doctors.” P. A. Ilinskii, the chief physician for the 
military secondary schools in St. Petersburg and a well-known medical publicist, listed forty 
female doctors who distinguished themselves during the Russo-Turkish War. Their success, 
Ilinskii argued, demonstrated women’s professional talents and proved that Russia must 
expand medical opportunities for women.475 
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The popular discourse on medicine in the Russo-Turkish War upheld female nurses’ 
accomplishments as the brightest spot on the Red Cross’s record. The Crimean War showed 
that this project was possible, and the experience in the Balkans again convinced observers 
that nurses provided a necessary component to wartime medicine. At first, the Red Cross 
called on Sisters of Mercy from the nursing societies, and up to three hundred of these 
women answered, but these numbers were far too few to meet the army’s or private aid’s 
needs. Russia’s largest nursing society, Assuage My Tears in Moscow, provided only about 
150 nurses throughout the conflict, and some of these women joined the order during the 
war.476 To avoid the problems encountered in the Serbo-Turkish War, when Russian women 
of questionable skill and character presented themselves at lazarettos as nurses, the Main 
Directorate organized accelerated nursing courses at major hospitals. These courses trained 
as many as 3,000 nurses during the war, and P. A. Ilinskii estimated that up to 1,300 nurses 
served in the theaters of war, with 270 in the Caucasus, and perhaps an additional 1,000 on 
the home front.477 Many of these women worked as Red Cross liaisons to the largest military 
hospitals, where women received salaries of thirty rubles per month.478 Even if nurses were 
in short supply, these women’s commitment to their work, one proponent stressed, 
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demonstrated that Russian women had become conscious of their “obligations as citizens 
(grazhdanskie obiazannosti).”479  
Russian nurses came from diverse backgrounds and careers, and observers tended to 
conflate social class with medical talent and trustworthiness. Pirogov, who supported nursing 
societies as a means for training a professional cadre, chastised the accelerated nursing 
courses for failing to impart appropriate medical knowledge to the graduates and for 
admitting women with questionable moral characters.480 Rikhter would have liked to have 
received more women such as Sabinina, Bakunina, or Kartseva, highly educated nobles and 
veterans from the Crimean War, but they were few and older. When noblewomen were 
employed, they often served as head nurses, managing groups of underlings in a single 
hospital.481  
Most nurses entered service during the war through the accelerated nursing courses. 
Lasing eight weeks, these programs provided rudimentary training in anatomy, applying 
dressings, doling out medicines and food, and assisting the doctors. The courses were 
popular, and often more women tried to enter than spots permitted, but the academic 
demands weeded out amateurs. In one case, of the 250 candidates who took the final exam, 
only 171 women passed.482 One memoirist believed, “the real trial was to pass the training 
course in the hospital; those who survived it could be certain of their strengths and cross the 
Danube without fear.”483 The nurses’ salary of thirty rubles per month, a low wage in tsarist 
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Russia, was a level of compensation that still encouraged women at the bottom of the 
educated classes to volunteer.484 Literate and possessing some secondary education, these 
women gave military nursing the legitimacy it needed to survive in tsarist Russia. At least 
half of the nurses came from the lowest social classes, and their capabilities and discipline 
were suspect.485 The Red Cross, it appears, wanted nurses who served out of selfless 
devotion to Russia and its soldiers, not women of questionable background or repute seeking 
payment or adventure.  
Although advocates for private aid such as Pirogov and Ilinskii stressed that these 
women’s self-sacrifice and commitment to duty won them places in military medicine, the 
commanders of military hospitals often displayed cool attitudes toward the nurses, a new 
group of intruders whom they not know how to employ or control.486 Some medical officers 
found it irritating that civilian nurses drew salaries from the state but were formally 
subordinate to the head nurse and Red Cross agents, members of a voluntary association.487 
When medical officers treated nurses as employees of the army (voennye sestry miloserdiia) 
subjected to military discipline, they drew obloquy from Red Cross advocates who wanted to 
keep private aid independent.488 
 Several accounts suggested that the nurses worked better during the war and 
evacuation because burdensome work schedules provided little opportunity to misbehave. 
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After the peace and epidemic, when the glut of wounded and sick decreased, discipline 
among the nurses grew lax. Some women stopped changing dressings, visiting tents, or 
distributing food, and quarrels between nurses and non-nurses broke out more frequently.489 
Shakhovskii believed that the small number of Red Cross agents overseeing relief work in 
northern Bulgaria encouraged nurses to neglect their duties in hospitals to pursue 
amusements. Nurses socialized and cooked for officers or doctors, rented rooms in private 
homes away from the hospitals, traveled the countryside, or slipped into civilian clothes to 
frequent cafes and theaters.490 As violations grew more visible, Red Cross agents, head 
nurses, and hospital commanders identified the bad apples and sent them home. For Rikhter, 
the remedy was to exclude poorly educated or lowly bred women from nursing work and 
keep the pace of duties strenuous so that quiet periods did not lead to boredom.491 Pirogov 
believed that the Red Cross must keep “soldiers’ views of women” in mind when they 
selected nurses, a prescription intended to bar coquettes from military hospitals.492    
Red Cross nurses were always in short supply and overworked for much of the war. 
Prewar plans sought to outfit sixteen nurses per wartime hospital, which would have created 
a nurse-to-patient ration of 1:40, hardly a guarantee of attentive care. However, shortages of 
nurses and overcrowding in hospitals made the ratio often exceed one hundred patients per 
nurse.493 Nurses also served in the evacuation stations, rear hospitals, and on sanitary trains 
and barges. The stresses of war took their tolls on these women. Crowded, disease-infested 
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hospitals caused many to take ill. Of the 131 nurses from the Crimean Blagoveshensk 
Society who served in the war, 124 came down with typhus or dysentery, and two died. 
Ilinskii estimated that more than forty Red Cross nurses perished during the war.494 Golos 
reported that wartime traumas led one female volunteer to commit suicide.495 And the 
postwar reception many of these women received gave little respite from their hardships. 
Unlike soldiers, nurses won no pensions, housing, or easy access to medical care from the 
state. Health and mental problems as well as poverty plagued many of these women for years 
after they returned home.496 Ivan Turgenev captured this indifference in his poem “To the 
Memory of U. P. Vrevsky,” an ode to a Red Cross nurse dying of typhus in Bulgaria: “But 
grievous it is to think that no one said thanks even to her dead body, though she was shy and 
shrank from all thanks.”497 The Crimean War made Bakunina and Kartsova heroines, but 
these were women of means, and they remained heroines after the Russo-Turkish War. 
Repeated calls in the 1880s and 1890s to establish pensions for Red Cross nurses reveal the 
true state of affairs for many of these women.  
Private Aid in the Caucasian Theater 
The Red Cross’s activities in the Caucasian theater of war were far more limited than 
in Europe, and the geography and war in the east posed different challenges than in the 
Balkans. It seems as if the Ministry of War had fewer ambitions to incorporate private aid 
into its war planning in the Caucasus, and the Main Directorate devoted fewer resources to 
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this theater. Inclement terrain and weather coupled with the Russians’ inadequate clothing 
weakened the soldiers’ capacity to ward off diseases. Firewood grew in short supply in many 
places, so the men had to burn dung for fuel, which one report argued spread typhus and 
dysentery.498 Soldiers in the Caucasus were over three times more likely to come down with 
typhus than soldiers in the Danubian theater of war even though mortality rates among 
infected soldiers in the Balkans were slightly higher.499 Much of the Red Cross’s activities 
involved evacuating sick and wounded soldiers and dispatching nurses and supplies to army 
hospitals.500 The army informed the Red Cross that it possessed fifty-six military hospitals in 
the Caucasus, over half of which were functioning by 1 July 1877, so private aid need not 
concern itself with setting up etappe points along lines of march and evacuation routes.501 
 The Main Directorate only budgeted sixty thousand rubles per month for these 
activities and planned to send medical facilities for up to one thousand patients to the theater 
of war.502 The Caucasus Regional Committee outfitted a hospital, which spent most of the 
war in Gyumri, in present-day Armenia, and later moved to Tiflis. The other four voluntary 
hospitals in the region came from private initiatives by Grand Duchess Ol’ga Fedorovna, the 
Moscow nobility, the Finish Red Cross, and the Dutch Church in St. Petersburg. These 
lazarettos operated in several different places during the campaign, but all moved to Tiflis 
around 1 January 1878 as hostilities died down.503 Prince V. A. Sheremet’ev acted as the 
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chief agent of the Moscow nobility’s lazaretto. He seems to have directed much Red Cross 
work in this region and even dispatched a mobile ambulance that traveled with forces all the 
way to Erzerum in Asiatic Turkey. Sheremet’ev’s wife, Natal’ia Afanas’evna, the Duchess 
Ol’ga Fedorovna, and even the sixty-five-year-old E. M. Bakunina all managed lazarettos 
and oversaw nurses in this region.504  
Since this region contained no railroads, all evacuation had to be conducted by horse-
drawn cart. The Moscow nobles sent Sheremet’ev forty ambulances, which he used to 
evacuate the wounded. A second innovation the Red Cross experimented with was the horse-
drawn stretcher, a canvas stretcher affixed to two mules instead of carried by soldiers.505 The 
advantages of this type of arrangement were that each stretcher could carry three patients, 
two lightly-wounded soldiers riding the animals and one supine, and it moved more easily 
along rough mountain paths. Unlike in Europe, in the Caucasus, long distances and the threat 
of ambushes made road evacuation a much more sporadic affair. The Red Cross set up rest 
areas along the major roads where evacuees could receive food and medical care. In some 
places, they even rented houses where the evacuees could sleep. The numbers demonstrate an 
impressive effort to evacuate sick and wounded soldiers; for example, in January and 
February 1878, 5,700 patients traveled from the captured fortress of Hassan-Kala to Kars, a 
distance of nearly two hundred kilometers, and another 8,500 evacuees made the trek from 
Kars to Gyumri, a shorter and easier haul.506 In April 1878, the army asked the Red Cross to 
expand its help with evacuation, which led to more rest stations and more frequent convoys. 
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Still, a postwar evaluation lamented that the Red Cross had devoted too few supplies to the 
Caucasus and hoped for greater participation in the future.507 The Red Cross’s contribution to 
the Caucasian front was relatively small, which contrasts sharply with private aid’s 
commitment within the borders of the Russian Empire.    
Red Cross Activities within the Russian Empire 
After war was declared on April 12, provincial committees of the Russian Red Cross 
with the assistance of city dumas, zemstvos, and wealthy individuals prepared hospitals and 
lazarettos throughout the empire. The Red Cross promised the army sixteen thousand 
hospital beds inside Russia, which were housed in facilities that ranged from expensive 
lazarettos to private homes to barns.508 In total, the Red Cross set up at least 238 hospitals 
with as many as 25,000 beds during the Russo-Turkish War. These facilities treated 116,296 
persons for a total of 2,696,998 sick days.509   
A published report on the Lefortovo City Hospital demonstrates the efforts civilian 
authorities directed toward treating evacuees in the rear. Following the declaration of war, 
the Moscow City Duma appropriated one million rubles to the Red Cross. Some of these 
monies were set aside to outfit one thousand beds for convalescents, spread among seven of 
Moscow’s hospitals. Administration of these temporary wards was to be shared by the duma, 
the provincial committee of the Red Cross, and by agents such as Prince V. M. Golitsyn, the 
manager of the facility at the Lefortovo City Hospital. The first wards opened in June, and by 
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August all were in operation.510 In total, Moscow constructed eight large wards for one 
thousand soldiers and furnished an additional twenty-one small lazarettos with another five 
hundred beds, some of which were even founded by groups of workers or artisans.511 The 
number of evacuees arriving in Moscow waned in May 1878, so the duma began to close 
smaller facilities the following month. By 1 October, all temporary wards for wounded 
soldiers had been shut down.512  
The hospital complex at Lefortovo was perhaps the best temporary ward because it 
contained the Assuage My Tears nursing society. Within the nursing society’s main building, 
workers constructed a lazaretto divided by tents into six-patient rooms. This facility prided 
itself on its advanced ventilation system and indoor plumbing. Also, in the summer months, 
workers at Lefortovo pitched large tents in the society’s garden. Most of these patients came 
from the Balkan theater of war and arrived by railroad to the Kursk Railway Station, where 
they met ambulances arranged by the organization Christian Aid (Khristianskaia 
pomoshch’). Founded by Colonel A. N. Vishevskii as a way to support the troops, Christian 
Aid acquired thirty-five new ambulances and transported and fed over three thousand 
evacuees in Moscow during the course of the war. This organization won royal patronage, 
which helped fund its endeavors, two of which included outfitting a sanitary train and 
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funding an ambulatory clinic for veterans.513 In total, the Lefortovo facility saw 1,321 
patients over the span of fourteen months.514 
The Ministry of War intervened in Moscow’s efforts to support the troops in two 
ways. Military doctors toured the wards to determine which patients should be released: Of 
the 807 patients examined by a commission of doctors from the Moscow Military Hospital, 
422 returned to the army. The remaining soldiers entered invalid brigades or were discharged 
from service. The Ministry of War also paid the society fifty kopecks per day to feed each 
patient, but this payment was not enough, and the duma subsidized additional costs for 
sustenance. In total, the Lefortovo facility spent only 49,347.80 rubles to support 1,321 
patients for 57,605 days in the hospital.515 This facility saw a significant number of the total 
evacuees to Moscow, since Moskovskaia meditsinskaia gazeta reported that, during the ten-
month period from June 1877 to March 1878, only 3,985 evacuees arrived in the city.516 
Private aid in war opened new opportunities for self-initiative, and the Red Cross’s 
mission drew support from a broad swath of patriotic civilians. Crowds impatiently greeted 
the first train full of Russia’s heroes to arrive at the Kursk Railway Station on 6 July 1877. 
One poor Turkish prisoner, the twenty-four-year-old Omer Suleiman, burned all over and 
feverish with typhus when he arrived, became a trophy of Russian humanism when he 
recovered at Lefortovo.517 For a task as mundane as outfitting ambulances, Christian Aid 
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raised at least twenty thousand rubles in donations.518 Clearly the call to participate in the war 
effort resonated with Muscovites, who viewed Red Cross work as evidence of Russia’s proud 
humanitarian tradition and highly developed culture. But it was easy for Moscow to obtain 
evacuated soldiers since the city sat on a juncture of multiple railways, possessed fine 
hospitals, and donated huge sums to the Red Cross. This experience was not shared by Red 
Cross organizers in all corners of the empire. 
The provincial Red Cross representative K. O. Glavatyi in Orel complained to the 
Main Directorate that his chapter had devoted significant time and effort to constructing 
lazarettos that went unused. During the 1870s, Orel featured a very involved chapter of the 
Red Cross for the city’s small size. Glavatyi wrote the Main Directorate to inform them that 
his volunteers had set up facilities for 940 beds in their province, but they received only half 
that number of patients. He added that the hospitals were beautifully constructed and 
possessed full complements of doctors, nurses, and supplies. To add further insult, the 
Ministry of War had recently opened a temporary hospital in Orel with two hundred beds, 
which was full. This move prompted Red Cross donors to berate Glavatyi, who prodded the 
Main Directorate, “Naturally our wish is to be given sick and wounded . . . so that our 
hospitals do not walk off (chtoby nashi gospitali ne guliali).”519 Public enthusiasm for the 
Red Cross’s mission waxed and waned with personal connection to the war effort. The 
residents of Orel wanted to honor these heroes by spoiling them during periods of 
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convalescence, but the military, which likely thought too much private aid would undermine 
discipline, stymied the Orel Red Cross’s contribution.   
The Red Cross in the Russian Press 
The tsarist press’s portrayal of the Red Cross reflected the empire’s hopes and 
frustrations beyond the Danube. Newspapers such as Golos lent support for the efforts to 
relieve the wounded, even if editors differed on their attitudes toward the war. For many 
readers drunk on Pan-Slavic jingoism, Russia’s declaration of war could not come soon 
enough. Finally, the tsarist empire had pledged itself to ending Turkish atrocities in the 
Balkans and reversing the embarrassment of the Crimean War.520 But as the sober realization 
that war was not an easy affair donned on Russian generals and newspapermen, the press did 
not shy away from scandalous exposés on the state of medical affairs in the south. The press 
proved to be a double-edged sword for the Red Cross throughout the history of tsarist Russia, 
especially when readers realized that an underfunded private aid organization could not 
relieve all of the empire’s suffering. Readers provided much of the donations needed to keep 
this organization in operation, but accusations of amateurism, inattention to duty, and misuse 
of funds often caused educated society’s support for the Red Cross to wane at the most 
critical junctures.  
Tsarist censorship forbade direct assaults on the autocracy, but the Red Cross was fair 
game in the press. Closely aligned with the empresses, this organization took flak for not 
doing enough and interfering too much with the war effort. Rumors of corruption, 
amateurism, and bureaucratic inflexibility always appeared when campaigns turned sour. At 
the same time, lavish facilities and maternal care undermined military discipline among the 
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sick and wounded. This vitriol served to denigrate the autocracy as well as the Red Cross; 
after all, did not the Romanov women oversee the Main Directorate? And these criticisms 
worked well for the radical intelligentsia’s opinion of the regime as a whole. Was not the 
bureaucracy stifling yet indifferent, and the empire over-governed and under-governed at the 
same time? These critiques constantly irritated the Red Cross in tsarist Russia, but the 
organization’s members did not sit by idly. At times they fought back in the press and their 
own newsletter, especially when individuals’ reputations were at stake.         
At war’s outbreak, newspapers such as Golos beseeched the public, and especially 
women, to provide for the wounded by bombarding the reader with daily reports on the Red 
Cross’s activities. On the first day of hostilities in April 1877, one writer acknowledged that 
the Crimean War showed that “care for soldiers suffering for the motherland had become an 
all-encompassing affair (obshchenarodnoe delo).” And newspapers reminded that aid was 
easy to deliver. Bulletins directed readers to Red Cross collection points for cash or material 
donations and printed lists of donors to let the public know who the most patriotic subjects 
were. Writers often played on gendered notions of men as warriors and women as caregivers 
to appeal to the home front for support. For those readers who wanted to add a personal 
touch, Golos reported on sewing circles, such as the one set up by the Romanov women in 
the Nicholas Palace, which, a  notice tactfully remarked, anyone “from princesses to 
dressmakers’ daughters” may attend.521 A description of the graduation ceremony at one 
nurses’ course quoted Princess Evgeniia Maksimilianova, who extolled the sisters that “all of 
Europe would come to realize what the Russian woman is capable of.”522 A feuilleton 
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upholding women’s achievements in Russian suggested that female achievements, such as 
Ekaterina Goncharova’s recent completion of the medical course at the Sorbonne, showed 
that “it is evident that our fatherland is resolved to decide the ‘woman’s question’ exactly as 
it has come to determine the Eastern [Question].”523 But none of this was really new. Women 
in 1812, without the benefit of an official charity, “carried the burden of war, not only with 
material donations but with active participation in it – they bore [this burden] not for pay, but 
voluntarily, prompted by the highest patriotic sentiments.”524 Whether in the fetid lazarettos 
outside Plevna or the best salons of the capital, newspapers such as Golos encouraged 
women to use opportunities provided by war as a means to fulfill their “duties as citizens.”525  
But similar to the Serbo-Turkish War, once Russia’s fortunes on the battlefield fell, 
the press set its sights on the Red Cross as a culprit. In Golos’s melodrama, Cherkasskii 
played the role of the villain. Cherkasskii committed a grave error when he broke unspoken 
protocol by admonishing the readers of Golos to provide warm clothing to the troops after 
the Main Directorate denied one of his requests. This move caused a minor scandal in the 
press and offended the Main Directorate, because it suggested to the public that the Red 
Cross was hiding the true state of affairs in Bulgaria. In response to the rumors, P. A. Ilinskii, 
a Red Cross supporter, took his revenge.526 Ilinskii investigated medical activities in northern 
Bulgaria and found that, unlike in Romania and Moldavia, the Red Cross had virtually no 
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presence in Cherkasskii’s zone of responsibility.527 This bickering went back and forth on the 
pages of Golos throughout the war. Abaza had to pen a long account addressing rumors he 
misappropriated funds, overpaid workers, held lazarettos in his region in inactivity, and 
committed many other abuses.528 But the Red Cross had recognized the challenge of dealing 
with newspapers the year prior, and the Main Directorate undertook countermeasures to ward 
off this type of harassment. 
The man who would become Russia’s greatest defender of autocracy since Nicholas 
I, K. P. Pobedonostsev, at this point tutor to Tsarevich Alexander and a member of the Red 
Cross’s Main Directorate, led the charge aimed at encouraging mass participation and 
winning educated society’s trust. The Red Cross’s own newsletter, Vestnik Rossiiskogo 
obshchestva popecheniia o ranenykh i bol’nykh voinakh, altered its format to provide more 
timely information to a broader audience as the military activities in the Balkans intensified 
in spring 1877. From 5 June 1877, this periodical appeared weekly and changed its name to 
Vestnik narodnoi pomoshchi. A change in format and content accompanied the revision to 
the title, and this move may have been designed to make Russia’s aid society more open. 
Gone were the pedantic debates on the relationship between private aid and international law 
or military practice. Instead, the newsletter focused on reproducing news from the front, 
inspection reports, and statistical records without touching on political topics. This type of 
material may not have competed with Golos for entertainment, but meticulous records of 
expenses and patients treated might be seen as Pobedonostsev’s means for responding to the 
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sensational stories appearing in the press. Pobedonostsev gave himself oversight of the 
journal and named L. A. Spichakov the new editor tasked with governing the content.529     
But Pobedonostsev could not resist for a second the allure of addressing his critics 
directly. Russians had to learn the true nature of their Red Cross, lest they lend their ears to a 
bunch of nonmilitary poltroons in Geneva or pacifist socialists from the worst coterie of the 
intelligentsia. The first issue in the new format featured an article titled “What the Red Cross 
Stands For,” which summarized the Russian interpretation of the Red Cross movement. 
Humanitarianism for the Russian combined the Christian imperative to help others, state-
sponsored welfare, and nationalism. Pobedonostsev insisted readers know that Russia waged 
a “people’s war” against the Ottomans and this journal “connects the activities of the troops 
with the public” by informing readers how the Red Cross spent its donations to support the 
troops.530 Rhetorically, instead of promoting the abstract and universal ideals found in the 
Geneva Convention, the editors of this journal sought to translate “Christian citizenship 
(khristianskaia grazhdanstvennost’)” into public and material support for the Red Cross.531 
And even though the readership of this journal must have been low, the propagandistic 
rhetoric seemed to work, at least in the short term. An empire with tremendously 
underfunded philanthropic institutions still raised a significant amount of monies for relief 
during the Russo-Turkish War.    
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Red Cross Finances during the Russo-Turkish War 
As a private organization the Russian Red Cross was supposed draw its funds solely 
from outside donations. During the first decade of its existence the endowment grew slowly, 
which disappointed many members, but the conflicts in the Balkans produced a windfall in 
donations that enabled this organization to undertake large-scale operations in 1877. At the 
same time, the army had greater needs than the Red Cross could satisfy. The imbalance 
between private aid’s capacity and the military’s needs caused the Ministry of War to draw 
the Red Cross closer to the state by providing it with large subsidies to continue wartime 
operations during the Russo-Turkish War. This convergence demonstrates that the Russian 
military, which mistrusted aid organizations, had come to depend on the Red Cross for 
modern war making. This drift toward the state ensured the Red Cross’s longevity in tsarist 
Russia but also deprived the voluntary association of some of the independence for which 
Pirogov clamored and opened it to new criticisms.  
The Russian aid society’s financial resources at the beginning of this conflict are 
difficult to trace because funds were divided between the Main Directorate and the provincial 
committees. At war’s outbreak, neither of these two institutions probably possessed 
significant financial reserves since missions to Serbia and Montenegro had depleted 
accounts. One source listed the Main Directorate’s available cash on hand in April 1877 as a 
mere 100,000 rubles, while the provincial committees held 550,000 rubles. By 29 November 
1877, these accounts had grown to over five million rubles for the Main Directorate and four 
million for the provincial committees. And the expenses in 1877 were immense: The Main 
Directorate by November had spent over 4.5 million rubles and the provincial committees 
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nearly 2.3 million rubles.532 The majority of resources went to the Danubian theater of war 
and rear services in southern Russia. Expenses for the Caucasian theater were considerably 
lower. The Main Directorate began spending fifty thousand rubles per month on the 
Caucasus and slowly increased this sum to one hundred thousand rubles per month over the 
course of 1877.533 According to one estimate, the Russian Red Cross spent 16,788,142 rubles 
during the Russo-Turkish War.534 This sum paled in comparison to the amounts spent by the 
United States Sanitary Commission during the American Civil War or the German Red Cross 
societies in the Franco-Prussian War, but no contemporary expected underdeveloped Russia 
to surpass the West in private initiative.535  
The Red Cross drew funds from private and public sources during the Russo-Turkish 
War. The largest donations came from the St. Petersburg and Moscow city dumas, which 
each pledged a million rubles. The St. Petersburg Merchants Society provided 500,000 
rubles, and the Finns added another 374,000, a large amount for an ethnic group exempt from 
military conscription. Donations of one hundred thousand rubles each came from the Holy 
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Synod, city dumas in Kiev, Kazan, Saratov, Orel, and Tula, the nobility of Nizhnyi 
Novgorod, and the Moscow Credit Society. Significant personal donations came from the 
Romanovs and other elite landowning and merchant families.536 Even though many Red 
Cross supporters voiced Pan-Slavist or nationalist sentiments, non-Slavic groups such as the 
Kirgiz of Semipalatinsk and the Jews from Berdichev still donated several thousand rubles to 
support the wounded.537 Enthusiasm for the Red Cross grew from many strata of the 
population. Red Cross membership tripled during the war from 9,877 members in 1876 to 
33,102 the following year.538 The Holy Synod permitted the Red Cross to place coin boxes in 
churches, and charity concerts and balls raised in the larger towns and cities.539 Newspapers 
helped by advertising for donations and publishing the lists of donors. Private donations 
brought the Main Directorate around 150,000 rubles per month by the fall of 1877, a number 
far below the Red Cross’s monthly expenditures, which at this time averaged about 
673,000.540 But the outpouring of public support encouraged Red Cross advocates to believe 
that the public would cough up the cash for relief work in future conflicts. 
The Red Cross’s second source of funds came from the Ministry of War, and these 
funds kept essential medical facilities in the rear operating during the final stages of the war 
and after the armistice. Russian generals did not anticipate a prolonged and costly conflict, so 
they neglected to establish an adequate medical support network in the rear until mounting 
casualties compelled the army to expand institutions to house the wounded in summer 1877. 
                                                     
536 Golos, December 17, 1877, 1.  
 
537 RGVIA, f. 12651, op. 1, d. 57, ll. 1, 8. 
 
538 P. Bogaevskii, Krasnyi Krest v razvitii mezhdunarodnogo prava, vol. 1, 161. 
 
539 RGVIA, f., 12651, op. 1, d. 57, l. 10. 
 
540 RGVIA, f., 12651, op. 1, d. 40, l. 9. 
 222 
 
The Red Cross exceeded its initial obligations by supplying lazarettos in the rear with as 
many as twenty-five thousand beds instead of the initial sixteen thousand beds, and sixteen 
sanitary trains instead of ten.541 Initially, the Ministry of War paid the Red Cross forty 
kopecks per soldier per day, which was intended to provide the soldier’s food and might help 
with the heating and lighting costs of the ward, but this sum left most of the burden to private 
aid. In Romania, for example, payments for soldiers’ sustenance only amounted to 200,660 
rubles, but the Red Cross as a whole spent well over 2,000,000 rubles in this region during 
the war.542 Contributions declined as Russia’s successes beyond the Danube turned to 
frustrations and scandalous articles in newspapers undermined the public’s trust. Meanwhile, 
growing numbers of casualties required the army to depend on the Red Cross more than ever, 
and cold weather added new expenses for clothing and winterizing hospitals.543  
The challenge of keeping medical services running on diminished budgets forced 
Chairman A. K. Baumgarten to ask for subsidies from the Ministry of War in the summer of 
1877. Promising to reduce costs, Baumgarten devised plans to cut expenses on Red Cross 
services from over 700,000 rubles per month to 430,000 per month over the first several 
months of 1878, if only the Ministry of War would provide a subsidy of 330,000 per month 
to overcome the shortfall.544 Miliutin endorsed this project, and, in exchange for the subsidy, 
the Ministry of Finance demanded that the Red Cross provide careful records for all 
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expenditures. Still, the state refused to take over direct administration of the Red Cross. 
Baumgarten, the Main Directorate, and agents in the field continued to decide how the 
money was spent. These subsidies diminished in size as the Russian army returned home, but 
payments from the state for Red Cross sanitary services in occupied Bulgaria continued into 
the autumn of 1878.545 
State subsidies ensured the Red Cross’s capacity to deliver aid to the army in times of 
war, but they also undermined one of the Geneva Convention’s tenets of private aid, namely 
that national aid societies be independent from governments. The Russian Red Cross did not 
protest help from state; instead, Baumgarten begged for it, and advocates who wanted to keep 
this agency firmly rooted in associational life (obshchestvennost’), such as Pirogov, voiced 
no objections to this decision. The consequences of this shift in many ways shaped the later 
institutional development of the Red Cross in Russia. Future campaigns to relieve famine-
stricken provinces in 1891 and conduct wartime operations in 1904 were planned and 
managed through close coordination with state ministries and funded by large donations from 
the Romanovs. This support from the state and autocracy enabled the Red Cross to deliver 
unprecedented volumes of assistance in both crises. However, alliances with the bureaucracy 
and autocracy opened the Red Cross to new criticisms from those who wanted greater public 
accountability in tsarist Russia. In Russia’s next major war, members of the zemstvo would 
come to view the Red Cross’s alliance with the state as liability. For these men, 
disappointments in the Far East exposed the Red Cross as nothing more than a corrupt and 
arbitrary appendage of the state. 
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Conclusion 
Every serious commentator on private aid in the Russo-Turkish War believed it had 
proved itself a necessary component of modern war making. Universal conscription, 
nationalism, and the press had escalated the passions behind warfare, mobilizing more troops 
and wider strata of civilian populations for war. The physician N. V. Sklifosovskii, shortly 
after the Russo-Turkish War, summed up this development: “The sphere of [private aid’s] 
activity should widen more and more; this flows from the natural way of war of our time—it 
is a war of entire governments, entire peoples, because the army of the present is the people 
(narod).”546 Russian society had responded to this call in 1877 by donating millions of 
rubles, volunteering to work in sanitary brigades, and setting up temporary hospitals across 
the European and Caucasian parts of the empire. The public had embraced the autocracy’s 
imperative of working with the state to improve Russia, and this is why stalwarts of the 
autocracy like Pobedonostsev defended the Red Cross so vociferously in the press. But 
everyone also knew that hundreds of thousand casualties in the theaters of operations meant 
Russia had failed the medical test of modern war and changes were needed to make its 
private aid organization operate better. These debates centered on the question of how 
independent a national aid society should be from the military and whether allowing civilian 
organizations to intervene in war undermined military discipline and effectiveness.   
The Red Cross’s charter established it as an organization independent from the tsarist 
state’s control, but by 1878 the military’s struggles with disease in the theaters of war had 
caused the government to subsidize this organization, patronage many activists for private 
aid welcomed. Only the elderly Pirogov took the radical stance that private aid must be 
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totally independent from the state in all circumstances. The Ministry of War should not be 
able to hinder or obligate a private society for goods or services, and private aid societies 
should have the freedom to undertake any endeavor they wished, he surmised.547 S. P. 
Botkin, who spoke little on the issue, thought the venerable surgeon was losing his mind in 
1877.548 Other physicians voiced the militarist sentiments of the era. Sklifosovskii believed 
that private aid societies must be subject to state control and be restricted to wartime 
activities alone, but, as a doctor in tsarist Russia, an autocratic state that deprived 
professionals of corporate autonomy, he demanded that physicians head the Red Cross.549 
Doctors Kolomnin and Iskerskii went further, arguing that the Red Cross must be integrated 
as a supply and training organ within the military.550 As the Red Cross’s finances 
demonstrated, the drift toward the state was already underway during the Russo-Turkish 
War, but this trajectory did not mean integration into the army. Opportunities during the next 
two decades of peace kept Russia’s aid society in a confused, liminal position between 
preparing for war and managing civilian disaster relief. When natural disaster and military 
conflict struck again during the next three decades, the Red Cross frustrated tsarist critics 
who wanted an aid organization that would be able to overcome all of the empire’s 
unexpected ills.      
The second major concern for most observers involved the inequality between the 
army sanitary services and Red Cross hospitals. Private aid societies provided better food, 
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more comfortable beds, and more attentive care to patients, and commentators worried this 
inequality would discredit the military and adversely affect discipline.551 Peasant conscripts, 
Sklifosovskii suspected, were unable to differentiate between shortages caused by wartime 
difficulties and problems that resulted from inept officers.552 But the disorders these doctors 
feared never broke out in the rear hospitals in the Russo-Turkish War, even though conscripts 
had more than a few reasons to revolt. Protests are difficult to pull off when the outraged are 
dying of typhus. Doctors, too, objected to unequal privileges. Military physicians disliked 
how professors of medicine used these wartime opportunities to conduct research on sick and 
wounded conscripts to advance their own scientific authority. Displeased by the inequalities 
in comforts and medical accoutrements, V. I. Priselkov, an army surgeon, complained that 
Red Cross doctors worked under no duress and therefore “could keep this or that patient for 
as long their scholarly interests demanded.”553 In the postwar decade, Russian enthusiasm for 
its military waned; meanwhile, the army retreated into its own affairs and ignored the Red 
Cross. When war broke out again a quarter of a century later, the Russians had to revisit the 
same lessons of how to apply private aid in war.   
Mission creep from the humanitarian missions to the Balkan Slavs helped produce the 
Russo-Turkish War. Believing that Russia was unready and the risks of escalation too great, 
Miliutin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Gorchakov did not want war in 1877. In the future, 
despite the public’s fervor for medical interventions in Africa and the Balkans, the Russian 
Red Cross carefully tailored its international aid missions to support the empire’s foreign 
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policy goals at minimal cost and risk. But the decision to bring the Red Cross more closely 
under the state’s purview came at a cost as well. During the following decades, educated 
society in Russia remained largely indifferent to its Red Cross during periods of peace and 
often became frustrated with this organization during wars and natural disasters. During the 
famines of the 1890s and the Russo-Japanese War, the state and autocracy needed to 
subsidize the Red Cross to overcome the Russian public’s unwillingness to cover the costs of 
this organization’s activities.            
 
 228 
 
CHAPTER 6 – THE INTERWAR DECADES, 1880-1909 
The Russian Red Cross struggled to reinvent itself in the period following the Turkish 
War, as the experience in the Balkans demonstrated the potential and limitations for 
deploying private aid in military conflict. In 1877, the Red Cross had mobilized 
unprecedented resources, and Russian educated society had responded to the call with 
donations and willing volunteers, but popular support did not make the Russo-Turkish War 
quick or easy. Disappointments on the battlefront and medical front and disillusionment with 
the Treaty of Berlin, at which the Great Powers snatched an enlarged Bulgaria, newly created 
and friendly to Russia, from Alexander II’s fingers, caused many tsarist subjects to lose 
interest in their national aid society. One existential problem for an organization of this type 
persisted: With no wars to fight and a public losing interest in military prowess, how might 
the Red Cross retain the attention and support?   
Arkadii Iakobii, a Red Cross advocate, found the solution to this problem lay in 
having private aid delve into as many peacetime campaigns as possible. In early 1880, 
Iakobii gave a speech, “The Tasks of the Russian Red Cross,” at Kharkov University, in 
which he argued that “Inactive societies gradually cease to attract donations and little by little 
fade from people’s imaginations.” The public must read about the Red Cross’s peacetime 
campaigns in the press and see these activities with their own eyes. Iakobii concluded his 
address by calling attention to the diphtheria epidemic currently affecting fifteen provinces in 
southern Russia, to which “our zemstvo and city institutions pay scant attention, so let’s
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solve this problem.”554 Over the next two decades, the Red Cross expanded its operations in 
the fields of public health and epidemic and famine relief.  
Although the autocracy harbored suspicions that private charities might serve as 
fronts for revolutionary agitation, a fear that briefly cramped associational life in the decade 
that followed Alexander II’s assassination, the period from the Russo-Turkish War to the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904 saw a tremendous growth in philanthropic activities across the 
Russian empire, and the Red Cross shared in this expansion.555 On paper, the Red Cross grew 
in size, endowment, and mission. By the Russo-Japanese War, nearly every city and town in 
the empire had a chapter, and the organization had become an important partner to the state 
and zemstvos during the major famine-relief campaigns of the 1890s. The Red Cross’s 
routine had evolved and ranged from treating everyday ailments afflicting workers in St. 
Petersburg to providing first aid to fishermen in the Arctic. 
These missions came at a price, however, since Russian subjects’ support for this 
organization was never adequate. With civilian or private resources lacking, the autocracy 
stepped in to ensure Red Cross services were forthcoming, decisions in line with the Russian 
monarchy’s moral imperative to protect the welfare of the empire’s subjects. But these moves 
also opened Russia’s national aid to society to frequent criticisms that the Red Cross was 
nothing more than a cumbersome appendage of the bureaucracy. And the delivery of 
nonmilitary aid in wartime was problematic as well. When Russia intervened in China in 
1900 to keep the window for imperial expansion wedged open, Red Cross aid for tsarist 
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armies was tardy, haphazard, and erratic.556 These problems mirrored the poor planning of 
the Balkan campaigns and foreshadowed the problems to come. Consequently, when the 
tsarist empire faced a more formidable threat in westernized, industrialized Japan, the 
Russian Red Cross careened into the war without adequate cadres of medical professionals, 
significant popular backing, or even instructions from the military on how to coordinate with 
the army. Scandals and rumors in the press during this conflict provoked a new challenge to 
the Red Cross, this time from the zemstvos, over who should organize national aid, but this 
challenge is the subject of the next chapter.      
Institutional Development 
Under the stewardship of Maria Fedorovna, the wife of Emperor Alexander III, and 
M. P. von Kaufman, the son of the famous governor of Turkestan during the reign of 
Alexander II, the Red Cross grew substantially in membership and reserves during the 
quarter-century before the Japanese attack on Port Arthur in 1904. Over these three decades, 
the endowment more than doubled, and the number of trained nurses increased more than 
six-fold. Royal patronage and state support surely saved this organization during the 1880s, 
when the autocracy briefly discouraged private initiatives and the educated Russia’s 
disregard for military adventurism caused membership and the number of Red Cross chapters 
to briefly dip. Despite this hiccup, the Red Cross as a whole entered the twentieth century as 
Russia’s most well-endowed private charity.   
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Table 3. Red Cross Institutions and Chapters, 1880-1896 
Year Number 
1880 402 
1882 415 
1884 374 
1886 356 
1888 350 
1890 339 
1892 335 
1894 390 
1896 457 
Source: Federov and Botsianovskii, Istoricheskii Ocherk, 136. 
 
Table 4. Red Cross Funds (in rubles), 1880-1904 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fedorov and Botsianovskii, Istoricheskii ocherk, 137-38; Doklad Ispol’nitel’noi 
Kommisii Glavnago Upravleniia Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta Obshchemu Sobraniiu 
chlenov Obshchestva 28 Maia 1906 goda (St. Petersburg: V. Kirshbaum, 1906), 3.  
 
Even if the enthusiasm of some members waned in the 1880s, the numbers of 
individuals, and particularly women, who sought medical education in Red Cross institutions 
increased throughout this period. Peacetime public health initiatives and famine-relief 
campaigns also helped swell the number of women who chose to be Red Cross nurses in the 
1890s, as the following chart reveals. 
 
                                                     
557 The Red Cross charter prevented the society from investing its wartime endowment in government bonds or 
touching the endowment during peacetime without special permission from the Main Directorate. Fedorov and 
Botsianovskii, Istoricheskii ocherk, 136-38. 
Year 
Wartime 
Reserve Fund557 Total Endowment 
1880 1,943,004 4,018,372 
1882 2,695,614 4,676,654 
1884 2,939,256 5,186,541 
1886 3,206,491 5,609,844 
1888 3,552,830 6,063,560 
1890 3,941,816 6,836,572 
1892 3,951,961 7,727,325 
1894 4,758,030 9,571,016 
1904 5,527,183 ----- 
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Table 5. Number of Red Cross Nurses, 1888-1896 
Year Total Number of Nurses 
1888 593 
1889 1309 
1890 1782 
1891 1890 
1892 2047 
1893 2207 
1894 2468 
1895 2628 
1896 2812 
 
Source: Fedorov and Botsianovskii, Istoricheskii ocherk, 121. 
 
And women participated disproportionately in Red Cross first aid classes, created by the 
military surgeon K. K. Reier in 1881. These courses, which consisted of five ninety-minute 
lectures on anatomy, wound treatment, and sanitation, entitled auditors to a certificate if they 
passed a written examination upon completion of the course. Over the next year, the Red 
Cross held twenty-seven courses, which educated a total of 938 St. Petersburg residents in 
first aid. Of the attendees, 555 were women and 382 men, but nearly equal numbers from 
both sexes made up the 658 persons who passed the final exam. The overwhelming majority 
of the participants in these classes were students, with 205 of them female university 
students, 172 students at the midwives’ institutes, and 119 male students from the seminaries 
or commercial schools.558 Although the empire enjoyed two decades of peace, tsarist subjects 
in urban areas continued to believe in the functions performed by Red Cross during this 
period.  
The St. George Society (Obshchina Sviatogo Georgiia) operated as one of St. 
Petersburg’s premier nursing orders during the late imperial period, and this institution’s 
history shows how the Red Cross altered its mission to provide health services to the urban 
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masses. Founded in 1870 by Countess E. N. Geiden to prepare women for war work, this 
order was first housed in the private home of Dr. P. A. Naranovich. In 1879, the Ministry of 
War donated a property located at 9 Vyborg Embankment to the St. George’s Society, which 
then purchased the neighboring buildings and transformed them into hospital wards, a 
church, and dormitories. By the end of the decade, this nursing society operated a surgical 
ward, a free ambulatory clinic, and an experimental institute for physical therapy, which 
included hydrotherapy, electrotherapy, massage, and other types of physical rehabilitation. 
Sponsored by private donations and a yearly subsidy from the St. Petersburg city duma, this 
hospital provided healthcare to tens of thousands of patients each year. A rotating staff of 
doctors, many of whom were professors at the Medical-Surgical Academy, performed 
general and surgical care, ambulatory services, and, on specific days, specialized pediatric, 
gynecological, ophthalmic, dermatological, and neurological treatments. Nurses from this 
society managed the wards and also moonlighted in many of the capital’s military and 
civilian hospitals. Some women even went on sanitary expeditions within Russia or abroad to 
study medical treatments or unusual diseases.559 
Records for this medical facility, printed in the Russian Red Cross’s newsletter, show 
that, on average, this St. George’s Society treated over 500 patients per day, most of whom 
came from the lower classes of the population. The vast majority of the visitors needed 
ambulatory care, but patients with serious illnesses or requiring surgery were admitted to the 
stationary wards to convalesce. Red Cross advocates believed that this facility helped attune 
the urban masses to the benefits of modern medicine and taught them to trust medical 
doctors. 
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Table 6. Number of Patients to the St. George’s Society Hospital and Clinic, 1884-1889 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Deiatel’nost’ obshchiny sv. Georgiia v 1885,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta, 
September, 28, 1886, 306; October 5, 1886, 314; “Deiatel’nost’ obshchiny sv. Georgiia v 1886,” 
Vestnik Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta, August, 9, 1887, 238-39; October 18, 1887, 333-
34; “Deiatel’nost’ obshchiny sv. Georgiia v. 1887,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo 
Kresta, October 2, 1888, 313-15; October 9, 1888, 321-22; October 16, 1888, 329-30; “Deiatel’nost’ 
obshchiny sv. Georgiia v. 1890,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta, April 21, 1891, 
122-23. 
  
For the medical staff, however, the high volume of patients proved taxing. One doctor 
confided in his memoir that he saw as many as one hundred patients per shift in the 
ambulatory clinic, and the diverse ailments that afflicted these people kept him on his toes. 
This number of patients was, for this memoirist, “a profanity against science and art,” but the 
stipend of seventy-five rubles per month for part-time work and access to professors and the 
head nurse, V. E. Vrangel, with her state and high society connections, made the time spent 
in the diagnostic room worth this doctor’s effort.560 Red Cross hospitals such as the St. 
George’s Society existed not only in principal cities such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and 
Warsaw, but also in larger provincial towns such as Yaroslavl, Vladimir, and Viatka. The 
public benefit of operating free hospitals attracted support from society ladies, medical 
professionals, and city and zemstvo governing bodies. Red Cross also activists looked 
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Year Patients 
Requiring 
Hospital 
Stays 
Year Visits to the 
Ambulatory 
Clinic 
1884 312 1885 107,464 
1885 980 1886 158,798 
1886 881 1887 155,575 
1887 848 1888 153,647 
  1889 167,138 
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outside the walls of their institutions for exciting ways to hone their skills for war by 
conducting first aid for victims of workplace and transportation accidents.     
Urban First Aid 
The Red Cross recognized early on that disaster relief helped to prepare members for 
war work and encouraged individuals to donate to its coffers. When disasters struck, the 
Main Directorate usually voted whether or not to direct resources toward providing relief. All 
disaster relief was conducted on an ad hoc basis, with little premeditated planning or post-
disaster reflection. For example, in 1887, when an earthquake struck the city of Vernii 
(present-day Almaty, Kazakhstan) and left twenty-five thousand people homeless, the Main 
Directorate dispatched a medical team to run a clinic and help feed the local population. In 
total, the Red Cross spent 121,577 rubles on this campaign, an expensive endeavor, but it 
made no serious effort to study this campaign to prepare for future disasters.561 In another 
example, the Red Cross’s dispatch of medical workers to Poltava province in 1880 to help 
with diphtheria relief came at the request of the local zemstvo, which donated one hundred 
thousand rubles to initiate this campaign. Outside donations plus the addition of its own 
funds enabled the Main Directorate to hire thirty doctors and send three hundred nurses to 
Poltava to supplement the overburdened provincial zemstvo.562 Published accounts on these 
activities made no recommendations for mitigating the effects of or preventing similar 
disasters in the future, but Red Cross workers knew that more could be done to refashion this 
charity into a professional aid organization. 
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One opportunity for this type of change came to the Red Cross’s doorstep in St. 
Petersburg. On 4 November 1897, the Neva breached its banks and flooded several working-
class districts of the capital. Three days later, the Main Directorate of the Red Cross 
apportioned ten thousand rubles for flood relief and appointed N. K. Shvedov as the head of a 
temporary relief committee. Tasked with providing aid through existing medical institutions, 
organizing ambulatory medical points, and distributing warm clothing and food to the 
victims, Shvedov included representatives from the police, private charities, and medical 
associations serve on the committee. On the evening of 7 November, Shvedov petitioned the 
Chief Military-Medical Inspector with a request to transfer army doctors to Red Cross 
service. Three days later, the Red Cross set up a clinic in the Suvorov District of 
Petrogradskii Island. Three military doctors and three nurses staffed this facility. From its 
opening in November to late December 1897, the Red Cross facility saw almost four 
thousand ambulatory patients and dispatched doctors and nurses on at least one thousand 
house calls. Soon after, the Red Cross set up an another clinic with a children’s ward in a 
poor neighborhood near Galern Harbor, an area on the edge of Vasilievskii Island close to the 
shipyards. From these points, Red Cross workers distributed nearly ten thousand bottles of 
pasteurized milk to mothers and gave clothing or shoes to another nine hundred recipients by 
the time the campaign ended around the New Year’s holiday. Shvedov’s experiences with 
urban disaster relief inspired the Red Cross to attempt to form a permanent team of stretcher 
bearers and paramedics to act as first responders for emergencies in the capital.563 
In 1897, the Red Cross began to coordinate with St. Petersburg’s city authorities to 
establish the first ambulance service for the capital, the Society to Provide First Aid in 
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Disasters. This project demonstrates how the Red Cross collaborated with local governing 
bodies to promote sanitary services in peacetime Russia, which, coincidentally, served as 
training programs for wartime triage. The Red Cross and state shared the costs for this 
project, and the organization’s foundational charter stipulated that the yearly financial reports 
would be forwarded to the Main Directorate and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This 
society’s headquarters and chancellery were located at the Maximilian Clinic, a free hospital 
managed by the Red Cross. Initial plans called for the establishment of a dozen sanitary 
brigades at each of St. Petersburg’s twelve fire stations. These brigades were led by Red 
Cross-employed doctors, preferably surgeons, with access to telephones to be ready at a 
minute’s notice. The initial budget figures estimated start-up costs for the ambulances and 
sanitary equipment at thirty-five thousand rubles, while yearly expenditures for the 
physicians’ salaries were not to exceed six thousand rubles, all of which the Red Cross 
promised to cover. The city vowed to pay for the ambulances’ horses and hire the thirty-six 
medics by increasing the funds for the fire brigades. Derived from western precedents for 
specialized ambulance services that rushed through the urban morass, Red Cross planners 
envisioned that this project would help train physicians and medics for wartime triage and 
enabled them to innovate with ambulance designs. And since St. Petersburg lacked modern 
ambulances, a shortcoming that sometimes led to ill or wounded patients being ferried 
around town in taxis in search of an unoccupied hospital bed, this project, the planners 
hoped, would improve health care in the capital and win support for the Red Cross from 
members of the urban elite.564 
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This proposal must have enjoyed a degree of success because a second petition to the 
city duma, dated two years later, indicated that the Red Cross had set up ambulances at five 
of the capital’s fire and police stations. This petition, authored by N. A. Vel’iaminov and N. 
K. Shvedov, two Red Cross agents, again argued that the project needed to be expanded to all 
twelve fire districts in the city for humanitarian and economic reasons. Citing statistics from 
Berlin, which possessed a more developed ambulance network, these agents argued that calls 
for emergency aid had increased substantially, while insurance payments for workers 
crippled on the job had decreased sharply during the 1890s. At present, large precincts such 
as Vasilii and Petersburg Islands and the Vyborg District were not serviced by 
ambulances.565 The archives cannot confirm whether Red Cross agents’ requests for 
additional funding fell on willing ears after 1899, but this project reveals that the Russian 
Red Cross, like national aid societies elsewhere, sought to institutionalize relief work through 
the creation of an ambulance service, the very same type of activity these societies prepared 
to conduct in the immediate rear of the army at war. But Red Cross work did not always have 
to be related to wartime preparation; other initiatives directed specialized aid to small, high-
risk groups on the margins of the empire.   
 Activities in the Arctic 
In response to popular cries for intervention in Slavic uprisings in the Balkans, a 
group of notables in Archangelsk founded a provincial committee of the Red Cross in 1876. 
Since the town in the far north of Russia lacked surplus medical personnel to dispatch 
anywhere, the committee decided to send 720 rubles in donations to the Main Directorate for 
aid to the Serbs. The Russo-Turkish War inspired a boom in membership, and the 
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Archangelsk committee grew to 1,893 members, a group that raised nearly 24,000 rubles for 
the war effort. Peace led to a decline in membership, and this provincial committee could 
only muster a little over eight hundred rubles for famine relief in 1891 and three hundred 
rubles to purchase grain in 1902, when crop failure struck one district in Archangelsk 
province. In 1891, with help from the governor, Prince N. D. Golitsyn, the chairman of the 
Red Cross, P. M. von Kaufman, and even a small donation from Father John of Kronstadt, 
the most famous religious and social activist in tsarist Russia at the time, the committee built 
its first hospital to house a small nursing society. To fund peacetime operations, the society 
received about a thousand rubles per year from the Main Directorate, a subsidy of two 
thousand rubles from the provincial zemstvo, and another five hundred rubles annually from 
the State Treasury. The Russo-Japanese War again prompted the committee to action, and it 
raised over fifty thousand rubles and dispatched a medical team with a fifty-bed hospital to 
Harbin.566 Although modest in size, these initiatives show that Archangelsk Red Cross 
activists sought to participate outside their home province in the Red Cross movement. 
Locally, this provincial committee took the initiative to conduct specialized relief activities 
for fishermen along the Arctic and White Sea coasts.    
Beginning in 1881, the Archangelsk Provincial Committee paid for several nurses and 
a doctor to shelter on the Arctic coast and treat fishermen. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
sent a doctor, who traveled with a mobile medical station and a staff of one feldsher and five 
nurses, all veterans of the recent Russo-Turkish War. Once they overcame the fishermen’s 
initial reservations—it seems the seafarers feared the Red Cross would insist on teaching 
moral instructions and sanitary guidelines—these facilities became widely used. The 
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following year, the Red Cross dispatched two medical brigades to the Arctic coast and, with 
the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, set up a tiny clinic in the Norwegian town of 
Kiberg. This project seems to have been fruitful, since the State Treasury in 1885 began to 
provide the Archangelsk Provincial Committee with a yearly subsidy of two thousand rubles 
to outfit sanitary brigades for fishermen. A group of seasonal Red Cross colonies sprung up 
in the villages of Teriberka, near present-day Murmansk, which drew approval from the 
minister of finance, Sergei Witte, who toured the facilities in 1896. By the turn of the 
century, the Red Cross’s Arctic colony treated as many as six thousand ambulatory patients 
per year and as many one hundred patients needing serious hospital care.567 This vignette 
demonstrates how a provincial Red Cross society, on the northern border of the empire, won 
support from state bureaucracies to help Russia exploit its economic resources along its 
imperial periphery. Here the state viewed local associations as a means to spread the imperial 
project by protecting tsarist subjects’ welfare in new areas where the government had little 
presence.  
Red Cross Nurses, an Unprofessional Caste 
The Red Cross’s endowment, membership, and mission expanded in the period after 
the Russo-Turkish War, but nurses, the key group within the Red Cross, failed to win 
concessions that might have enabled their trade to develop as an autonomous profession. All 
professional groups in tsarist Russia fought for autonomy from the state and a degree of 
latitude to self-govern through professional societies, but Red Cross nurses found themselves 
restricted from two different angles: the state and the zemstvo. Russia’s situation, similar to 
that of Germany, contrasts most starkly with Britain and the United States, where militarism 
                                                     
567 Ibid., 21-41. 
 241 
 
helped advance the nursing profession.568 Unlike in the West, where the free professions 
developed outside the purview of the state, tsarist Russia created the medical caste as an 
estate, with duties and obligations to the bureaucracy. In Britain, Florence Nightingale fought 
for and gradually won professional recognition and autonomy for nurses in the decades 
following the Crimean War. Despite Pirogov’s recommendations that Sisters of Mercy be 
given salaries and standardized education, Russian nurses earned no similar exemptions to 
their western counterparts.569   
The autocracy refused all professional groups autonomy up to its collapse in 1917, a 
practice that chagrined doctors especially. If western standards for professionalization are 
considered the norm, then Russian doctors enjoyed professional status in the most limited 
sense of the word.570 Most Russian physicians suffered from material destitution and 
persistent bureaucratic impediments prior to World War I; they found few opportunities to 
promote public welfare through zemstvo service and advance their corporate and scientific 
interests in medical associations such as the Society of Russian Physicians in Memory of N. 
I. Pirogov (hereafter Pirogov Society). When cholera struck in 1892, national disaster 
compelled the bureaucracy to loosen the reigns on physicians to treat the sick and impose 
sanitary reforms in the towns and countryside. Russian doctors, it seemed, had finally won 
the authority to enact measures as they saw fit, and success in containing cholera earned 
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many zemstvo doctors greater recognition and trust from the masses. But this newly found 
autonomy proved ephemeral; in 1900 Minister of Interior Plehve began to restrict zemstvo 
physicians’ freedoms out of fear that many rural professionals harbored radical political 
views. Russian physicians struck back at the Ninth Congress of the Pirogov Society in 1904, 
when they demanded a comprehensive list of political and social reforms from the autocracy. 
However, the violence that followed in the Revolution of 1905 demoralized many of these 
same activist-physicians who hoped they had finally won the respect of the masses. Peasant 
Russia deemed professional authority as foreign and arbitrary as bureaucratic power, and this 
frightening realization drove many Pirogov Society members to reconnect with the state. 
Those physicians who persisted with their political demands on the state were silenced by 
Stolypin’s Ministry of Interior.571 The Russian physicians’ example helps set the context for 
why nurses had little chance of obtaining a degree of professional autonomy from the 
autocracy. 
The Russian state denied Red Cross nurses professional recognition in the form of 
salaries and autonomy to govern their trade out of a gendered view of nursing that degraded 
it to motherly or Christian duties. This attitude sought to keep nurses closer to the quasi-
religious standards of the pre-reform Russian nursing communities, the Sisters of Mercy. In 
peacetime, nurses received no pay from their communities for their services. The nurses who 
worked in military hospitals received stipends, and many Red Cross nurses found side jobs 
tending to the sick in private homes, but this work was little better than domestic service. Not 
until the 1880s did the Red Cross begin to establish pension programs for nurses who had 
served twenty-five years and made yearly contributions to the fund. While these payments 
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might be as high as two hundred rubles per year for the most senior nurses, one study of 
retired nurses in Perm revealed that pension payments averaged a miserable twelve rubles per 
year, which probably indicates the impoverished state of provincial Red Cross chapters.572 
There was surely an abundance of needy women who sought shelter in the widows’ home for 
elderly nurses set up by Praskov’ia Uvarova, a key figure in the Moscow Women’s 
Committee of the Red Cross, in 1911; the greater surprise was that it took planners so long to 
set up such a shelter.573  
Russian nurses also had to live under strict, quasimonastic rule in their communities, 
which forbade them from marrying, limited their mobility and free time, and compelled them 
to tend to the sick selflessly. Compassion for suffering may have drawn some women to this 
trade, but it seems that many nursing societies struggled to retain nurses. A study of the 
Viatka Nursing Society, which was attached to one of the more active provincial chapters of 
the Red Cross, revealed that the average age of all of the nurses was twenty. Idealistic or 
opportunistic youth probably joined these societies, passed through the training regiment, and 
then used their newly acquired skills to secure employment or marriage outside the Red 
Cross. Nurses who left the communities were supposed to have their names listed as 
“reservist” nurses until age fifty. These women were to promise to reenter Red Cross service 
in case of war or disaster, but the fact that the Main Directorate had to permit accelerated 
nursing courses during both the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Japanese Wars to overcome 
shortages of nurses suggests that many “reservists” never looked back.                
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A third problem with professionalizing the Russian nursing corps lay with training, 
which varied greatly from society and overseer. Famous medical men trained some of the 
nurses, who later earned high praise from wartime observers. Pirogov trained the Exaltation 
nurses prior to his departure for the Crimea, and S. P. Botkin trained the women of the St. 
George’s Society in St. Petersburg prior to the Russo-Turkish War, but the need to rely on 
accelerated courses in wartime and the complaints from military doctors of inconsistent 
quality among Russian nurses suggest considerable variations in the quality of the teaching 
between the societies. In 1896, the Main Directorate attempted to standardize training by 
issuing a “Program for the Preparatory Course for Red Cross Sisters of Mercy,” which 
demanded a two-year program in general and specialized medicine. During the first year, 
nurse-trainees studied anatomy, physiology, pathology, epidemiology, and pharmacology, 
while the second year added optional specialized courses in gynecology, pediatrics, 
psychiatry, or skin, nerve, or eye disorders. Pupils also received practical training in the 
infirmaries located in most nursing societies. All aspirants had to pass a final exam devised 
by doctors in St. Petersburg to attain the title of Sister of Mercy.574 The intention of these 
courses, one can infer, was to prepare nurses primarily for civilian medical service in 
peacetime. Left off the list were any special instructions in wounds or military sanitation. 
This diverse curriculum also suggests that the Red Cross intended for nurses to be able to 
perform a large number of medical tasks independently, an aim that may have put nurses into 
direct competition with another quickly growing medical contender in tsarist Russia, the 
zemstvo-employed feldsher. 
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Originally trained as army medics, Russian feldshers became a necessary evil for 
peasants to turn to when the doctor was on the other side of the province or the zemstvo too 
poor to hire physicians. After the 1874 Universal Conscription Law reduced the terms of 
service, the army released many “line” feldshers who found employment in zemstvos, 
hospitals, and factories. These veterans carried a well-deserved reputation for drunkenness, 
coarseness, and medical malpractice. Since the little training “line” feldshers received came 
from on-the-job lessons in bloodletting and bandaging, the state established a few civilian 
feldsher schools, which greatly improved the medical preparation for these “schooled” 
feldshers. The result, historian Samuel Ramer calculated, was that, by 1900, twenty thousand 
feldshers worked in civilian medicine, most employed by zemstvos.575  
Even though Russian doctors mistrusted feldshers’ medical skills, and no sober 
feldsher prior to 1917 believed their training put them on par with a physician, this group 
showed tremors of professionalization in the 1890s. Articles in the journal Feldsher 
expressed concerns with poor standards of living and insecure relations with doctors, and 
authors stressed that community solidarity between all feldshers might end the worst of these 
abuses. Still, feldshers never won the degree of professional autonomy that they hoped to 
earn. They remained a group deeply divided between the “schooled” and “line” feldshers. 
Additionally, Russian physicians refused to take up the feldsher cause because they viewed 
the path to achieving their own professional ambitions lay in replacing all feldshers with 
more physicians.576 But Russian medical schools never succeeded in producing a sufficient 
number of physicians to meet the empire’s needs. Thus, Russia’s zemstvos, army, hospitals, 
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factories, prisons, and even Red Cross had to rely on inferior medical specialists, who might 
fill in when the situation demanded first aid treatment, but who should not have been relied 
on for serious procedures. Russia’s greater numbers of feldshers and the feldshers’ push for 
professional recognition probably diminished opportunities for nurses to achieve similar 
status. 
The feldsher challenge to nurses became more formidable as the feldsher trade 
increasingly became a feminine occupation around the turn of the century. By 1910, 70 
percent of the students in feldsher courses were women, many of them training to be 
feldsher-midwives. These students often had more education than their male counterparts, 
with 80 percent of the female students having studied for at least four years at a 
gymnasium.577 Several causes explain the preponderance of women in this occupation. 
Stringent admission policies to medical courses and the lengthy course of study limited 
careers as doctors to the wealthiest or ablest women. For most women, feldsher classes 
presented the best (or only) opportunity to further their education. Fearing higher education 
might have a greater likelihood to infect the subordinate half of the population with radical 
sentiments, the Ministry of Interior often looked upon female physicians with a degree of 
suspicion, but feldsher-midwives posed no such threat. And, since the overwhelming 
majority of feldshers worked in rural areas, those subjects who wanted to serve the masses 
found an easy avenue to do so in this line of work.578 In many ways, as humble as the 
feldshers were, they enjoyed stable, albeit low, pay and freedom from the rule of the 
                                                     
577 Samuel Ramer, “The Transformation of the Russian Feldsher, 1864-1917,” in Imperial Russia, 1700-1917: 
State, Society, Opposition, Ezra Mendelsohn and Marshall S. Shatz, eds. (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1988), 147-48.  
 
578 Ibid., 152. 
 247 
 
quasireligious nursing order, privileges antithetical to the communal, self-sacrificial nature of 
Russian nursing. 
Women’s medical courses provided the second opportunity for scientific and 
professional advancement in tsarist Russia for an even smaller number of women. Initially 
set up by Minister of War Miliutin in 1872 at the Medical-Surgical Academy, this 
experiment trained seven hundred women to serve as advanced midwives or physicians 
during the 1870s and early 1880s. For the intelligentsia, these courses proved that the Great 
Reforms had launched a new era of progress and opportunity in Russia. Some of graduates 
from these courses served in the Russo-Turkish War, but most, it seems, struggled to survive 
as physicians in the face of legal restrictions on where and how women could practice 
medicine and the same series of problems that frustrated the Russian medical profession as a 
whole. The women’s courses at the Medical-Surgical Academy closed as part of the reaction 
led by D. A. Tolstoi and K. P. Pobedonostsev following Alexander II’s assassination in 1882, 
but Nicholas II revived these courses in 1897 when he founded the Women’s Medical 
Institute in St. Petersburg. This institution admitted well over one hundred students per year. 
By 1913, Russia possessed additional Women’s Medical Institutes in Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, 
Kharkov, Kazan, Dorpat, and Ekaterinoslav; hence, the feminization of Soviet medicine 
began before the Bolsheviks seized power.579 The diverse opportunities for women in 
medicine help explain why nurses made so little gains at establishing nursing as a profession 
in Russia during the years prior to 1914. With so many opportunities available, and the 
intelligentsia and press giving the most weight to calls for women’s advancement in the 
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doctor’s trade, it comes as little surprise that Russian nurses made little headway toward 
establishing their own craft as an independent profession.  
Still, the argument for the professionalization of nurses had become an issue by the 
turn of the century, and this movement in many ways resembled the feldshers’ collective 
calls for professional recognition. Russian Sisters of Mercy lived lives of destitution and 
obedience. Confined to a near monastic lifestyle and receiving no payments for their services 
until they earned a pension in old age, these women were hardly the talented, independent 
group that Pirogov hoped would transform Russia. One nurse, Mirkovich, writing after the 
Russo-Japanese War, complained that quasireligious aspect of Russian nursing communities 
was worthless, especially because the charters for these institutions made it clear that they 
were not under the auspices of the Orthodox Church, nor must the members live as nuns. 
Those nurses who had seen war gained a taste of freedom and came back empowered, so 
they had no reason to remain in the nursing communities, while those who stayed were often 
too old and frail to conduct epidemic relief in the provinces. And material destitution and a 
lack of independence caused too many of these aging nurses to develop a malevolence to the 
Red Cross and nursing societies, the institutions that exploited these women’s labors. The 
activist Mirkovich argued in favor of a new set of laws that standardized and professionalized 
nurses. She called for a common, more practical curriculum to be taught in all of the nursing 
societies and asked for the Red Cross to work with city and zemstvo hospitals to ensure that 
they only hire women who completed the nursing courses, a policy similar to German law.580 
This critique, unfortunately, won no ardent supporters. Even though many women entered 
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the communities, Russian nursing remained a quasi profession until the collapse of the Old 
Regime.581 The leaders of the Red Cross, which had the influence at court to at least voice 
these concerns, were either ignorant of the problem or viewed professionalization as a path 
that would make nursing unattractive to noblewomen, the ideal nurses Pirogov took to 
Sevastopol.  
The Famine of 1891-1892  
In summer of 1891, tsarist Russia suffered its worst crop failure in recent memory, as 
drought affected the Volga and the Black Earth regions, an area twice the size of France and 
inhabited by thirty-five million people. Dry soil caused the crops to fail, and cereal harvests 
in certain places fell to half the levels seen during the good years of the mid-1880s. By 
autumn, famine and epidemic engulfed central Russia. Contrary to arguments by 
contemporary critics—a group that ranged from Grigorii Plekhanov, the “Father of Russian 
Marxism,” on the left to Count Sergei Witte, the soon-to-be minister of finance, on the 
right—peasant backwardness and the lack of state intervention in the agrarian economy 
probably did not cause the weather to turn dry or the crops to fail. This massive disruption to 
rural Russia prompted the autocracy to undertake an unprecedented relief campaign to save 
the peasantry from starvation. Russia halted all grain exports in 1891, a measure that risked 
unhinging an economy geared toward supplying industrial Europe with cheap foodstuffs, and 
the state severely restricted vodka sales, a decision intended to halt distillation but which also 
undermined the state’s tax base. Coupled with these macroeconomic measures, the autocratic 
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state and Russian society collaborated on an unprecedented scale to provide relief to the 
afflicted provinces.   
Historian Richard Robbins has viewed the famine of 1891-92 as a test the Old 
Regime confronted and weathered in the short term, especially in comparison to British 
attempts to alleviate famine in India in the 1890s or the Soviet attempts to do so in 1921 or 
1932-33. In 1891, the autocracy was neither nonchalant nor unresponsive when natural 
disaster threatened society and state. Confronting a humanitarian crisis, the autocracy hardly 
skimped on the largess; one estimate puts the state’s expenditures on rural welfare at 196 
million rubles over two years, an amount that made up 10 percent of the state budget in 1891. 
At its peak, the Russian state gave loans of grain to nearly twelve million peasants. The 
zemstvos, which distributed much of this grain to the peasants, cooperated with the 
bureaucracy, and the provincial governors permitted the zemstvos to perform their duties 
without interference. Private aid from the Red Cross, Orthodox Church, and other religious 
and philanthropic organizations coordinated with the bureaucracy under the oversight of the 
Special Committee, led by Tsarevich Nicholas, the future tsar. And despite the economy’s 
agrarian base, this calamity did not produce long-term damage to Russian agriculture. 
Bountiful harvests enabled a quick economic recovery in 1893.582    
Notwithstanding these successes, the famine of 1891-92 undercut public trust in the 
autocracy and became one of the many causes of the Revolution of 1905 in Russia. The 
government did little to publicize its successes because Russia was a world power, and 
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developed nations were not supposed to suffer famines. Russia’s hindrances toward greater 
success in famine-relief efforts were largely structural: An inadequate rail network could not 
deliver grain quickly where it was needed; communication delays caused vertical delays in 
conveying policy decisions from St. Petersburg to the countryside; and the under-government 
of rural Russia meant there were too few land captains and no zemstvos in the villages.583 
Thus the state had almost no presence in the mir, the peasant commune. For future opponents 
of the regime, such as the Kadet V. A. Maklakov, the mismanagement of the famine marked 
the first irreparable break between state and society in the post-Reform era.584 Some private 
associations, such as the endowment started by the renowned author Lev Tolstoy, refused to 
participate in the tsarevich’s Special Committee, which fanned the public’s mistrust of 
charitable directives that partnered with the regime. Disgust and indignation incited a 
resurgence in the revolutionary movement, largely dormant or in exile during the decade of 
reactionary counter-reforms designed to protect the state after the assassination of Alexander 
II, and another generation of youth became seduced by the long-departed populists’ “to the 
people” campaign, a romantic effort by educated young people to inspire the peasantry to rise 
up in revolution.585  
The autocracy’s retort to society’s discontent merely exacerbated the tensions 
between the two. Economic concerns over the famine prompted Alexander III to replace 
conservative Minister of Finance I. V. Vyshnegradskii with the pro-industry Sergei Witte, a 
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change that promised to overcome the burden of rural backwardness but, in reality, only 
added another group of troublemakers to Russian society: the rebellious proletariat. Then, in 
1894, Alexander III died suddenly, and his son, Nicholas II, ascended to the throne. Early in 
his reign, Nicholas fell under the influence of V. K. Plehve, the deputy minister of internal 
affairs, who encouraged the young tsar to turn on the zemstvos. Citing problems with 
coordinating aid on the Special Committee, Nicholas II consolidated all famine relief in the 
hands of the bureaucracy after 1895, denying the zemstvos a role in the relief campaigns 
during crop failures in 1898 and 1900.586 Zemstvo advocates read this move as a betrayal by 
the young tsar of his former rural allies, a group that had worked with him on the Special 
Committee and hoped to expand the zemstvos to the county (volost’) level and into additional 
provinces outside Central Russia.587 The assassination of Minister of Internal Affairs D. S. 
Sipiagin, Plehve’s accession to the vacant post, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ reports 
on revolutionary activities within the Samara zemstvo, incited the new minister to conduct a 
witch hunt amid the zemstvo ranks for the “third element,” a group of suspected provocateurs 
and revolutionaries working as doctors, teachers, and agronomists in the provinces. This 
campaign to purge rural Russia of its most progressive elements incensed many zemstvo 
activists against the state.588 The divergence between the bureaucracy and its sober and 
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talented rural partners set the stage for zemstvo opposition in 1904-05, a subject of the next 
chapter. 
The Red Cross participation in the famine-relief efforts of 1891-92, 1898, and 1900. 
In the first of these campaigns, the Red Cross worked alongside the state and the zemstvos. 
In the second two campaigns, Nicholas II began to limit the zemstvos from widespread 
participation. With the Red Cross unable to raise sufficient funds to satisfy rural hunger 
during these latter campaigns, Nicholas II diverted monies from the Ministry of Finance and 
his own fortune to sponsor relief operations, a decision that drew Russia’s national relief 
organization closer to the autocracy.  
The Russian Red Cross participated in relief efforts during the famine of 1891-92 on 
a large, but not unprecedented, scale. In 1873, the Red Cross had raised about half a million 
rubles for the peasants of Samara Province, a campaign that some recognized as evidence 
that the Red Cross was ready for a major wartime mobilization. Twenty years later, when a 
series of crop failures affected a much larger region, the Red Cross responded by working 
beside the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the zemstvos to provide nearly two million rubles 
of aid in 1891-92. For Red Cross activists, these campaigns proved that Russia’s aid society 
needed to undertake greater planning for large-scale peacetime activities, the very types of 
campaigns that mirrored wartime deployments. This type of exercise, they argued, enabled 
the Red Cross to practice mobilizing independent medical brigades to serve in faraway 
locations. Visibility to the public during these campaigns won greater support and donations 
from Russian subjects, whose enthusiasm for the Red Cross had dwindled in the years 
following the Congress of Berlin.      
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The Red Cross’s involvement in the famine relief campaigns of 1891 began as a 
series of provincial initiatives. The Saratov Provincial Committee, for example, began to 
spend monies from its disaster relief fund in July, and other provincial committees arranged 
networks of volunteers during the summer. In late August, however, after hearing disturbing 
reports from the provinces, the Red Cross initiated Russia’s first empire-wide disaster relief 
campaign. At a meeting on 22 August, the Main Directorate elected to begin collecting 
donations for crop relief at all of the organization’s chapters. Reports from local agencies 
indicated that seventeen provinces were in need of immediate relief, so planners in St. 
Petersburg selected provincial committees in nearby regions of Russia not affected by crop 
failure to serve as designated “sponsors” on 31 August. Hence, the provincial committees in 
Moscow and Vladimir sent grain to Nizhgorod Province along the rail line that linked 
Moscow to Nizhnyi Novgorod. Fertile areas in the Caucasus sent aid to Saratov. Each 
provincial committee, St. Petersburg instructed, would compose a bimonthly report on the 
monies they raised and the grain or funds they sent or received in recently printed account 
books. To review these reports and direct surpluses to the neediest provinces, the Main 
Directorate established an Oversight Committee. Throughout the “sponsoring provinces,” the 
areas free from crop failure, the provincial committees set up charitable boards staffed by 
individuals who enjoyed the “public’s trust,” such as clergymen, state administrators, and 
prominent merchants and townspeople. Governors or the heads of the provincial Red Cross 
committees usually chaired these boards, but zemstvo delegates sometimes also served as 
chairmen.589 These groups’ tasks were to solicit charitable contributions, send these funds to 
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neighboring provinces, and deliver reports to the Oversight Committee in St. Petersburg. 
Within the provinces suffering from crop failure, the Red Cross bureaucratic network 
stretched down to the county (uezd), district (uchastok), and sometimes even village level in 
a series of wards (popechitel’stva). By 1892, this network numbered 22 provincial, 145 
district, 1279 county, and 352 village wards. At the village-level, the Red Cross had to 
entrust the distribution of aid to the few literates available, which often meant relying on 
landowners, priests, teachers, or land captains, all non-peasants. To ensure this structure 
came into being quickly, the Main Directorate sent preliminary funds totaling 170,000 rubles 
from its wartime endowment to the twenty-two provinces then suffering from crop failure.590  
Collections for the hungry came from multiple sources. In 1891 alone, the Red Cross 
gathered 1.8 million rubles for famine relief, a sum far larger than any amount directed 
toward peacetime activities prior to this point. The Romanovs, several prominent 
landowners, and merchants’ groups made public donations. Maria Fedorovna contributed 
twenty thousand of her own rubles, while Count A. V. Orlov-Davydov gave one hundred 
thousand rubles, and the Petersburg bankers added another fifty thousand. These donations 
were advertised in the press. Led by St. Petersburg province (which included the Main 
Directorate), the Caucuses, and, the Congress of Poland, the provinces free from crop failure 
raised well over one million rubles for the Red Cross during the campaign of 1891. At the 
local level, the Orthodox Church allied with the Red Cross, and priests encouraged 
parishioners to part with a few kopecks in coin-boxes located in every parish. Over the 
fourteen months from August 1891 to October 1892, the Red Cross collected 2,762,054 
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rubles in cash and 508,256 poods of donated grain, which was worth another 600,000 rubles. 
When contributions from the state were added to these sums, the Red Cross oversaw nearly 
five million rubles in cash or kind during this welfare campaign.591 
Of these funds, the sponsoring provinces sent 531,732 rubles directly to their 
designated target provinces, but, beginning with the establishment of Tsarevich Nicholas’s 
Special Committee in November 1891, the Red Cross routed another 448,959 rubles, or 45 
percent of the total, through this body. The Special Committee, designed to coordinate aid 
work between multiple charities and ensure philanthropic work did not overlap with state or 
zemstvo aid, was not a bureaucratic attempt to undermine private initiative, as some 
contemporaries suspected. Instead, the idea for the Special Committee came from Count I. I. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, a longtime Red Cross supporter. The Red Cross’s chairman, P. M. von 
Kaufman, as well as K. P. Pobedonostsev, at the time a high-ranking Red Cross official, were 
members of this committee.592 In only six provinces did the Red Cross committees remain 
independent of the Special Committee after 1 January 1892; the rest became partially 
managed by the provincial organs of the Special Committee. This committee transferred 
468,163 rubles and over 600,000 rubles-worth of grain to provincial Red Cross agencies over 
the next year. In total, the Special Committee gathered about thirteen million rubles and spent 
nearly twelve during the campaign, many of which went to charities sponsored by the 
Orthodox Church. Only two million rubles came from donations to the Special Committee, 
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while eight million came from charitable lotteries sanctioned by the state, and 2.5 million 
were transfers from independent institutions such as the Red Cross.593   
 
Table 7: Red Cross Funding for the 1891-92 Relief Campaign (in rubles) 
 
Source: “Obzor deiatel’nosti Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta v 1891 i 1892 godakh po okazaniiu 
pomoshchi naseleniiu, postradavshemu ot neurozhaia 1891 goda,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo Obshchestva 
Krasnogo Kresta, March 7, 1893, 84. 
 
On the ground, Red Cross agents preferred to distribute food to peasants at cafeterias 
(stolovaias), even though they were more expensive, than by handing out bread from 
bakeries or packets of flour. This policy ensured that food reached those ineligible for 
zemstvo relief, such as the elderly, unmarried women, children, and landless peasants.594 By 
following the delivery of food into the mouths of the recipients, Red Cross agents could 
know that grain was not distilled into vodka or sold to purchase spirits. If nurses ran the 
cafeterias, they could look out for typhus and other diseases that afflicted the 
                                                     
593 Ibid., 108. 
 
594 The state preferred to distribute aid as seed loans or grants to zemstvos, which would then distribute the 
grain to male members of the peasant commune (obshchina) according to a series of regulations determined by 
the Ministry of Interior. This strategy was designed to support village patriarchy by connecting the zemstvo 
with the heads of households, the traditional bastion of authority in the village. The problem with this method 
for doling out aid was that many village inhabitants did not have a direct connection to a male member of the 
commune. For example, widows, the elderly, children, landless peasants or artisans all lacked formal 
membership in the commune. Robbins, Famine in Russia, 50. 
Funds Raised from 
Reserve Accounts
Funds Donated by 
Various Individuals 
and Corporations
Funds From the 
Special 
Committee
Funds from Local 
Church Committees
Funds from 
Temporary 
Charitable 
Committees
Funds 
from the 
Sales of 
Donated 
Items Total
The Main Agency 170,000 362,105.66 0 0 0 1,252.30 533,357.06
Provincial and Local Red 
Cross Committees in Areas 
with Successful Harvests 208,408.48 863,454.85 0 0 29,803.22 1,545.57 1,103,202.12
Provincial and Local Red 
Cross Committees in Areas 
Suffering from Crop Failures 175,910.68 720,935.01 468,163.66 25,348.12 98,907.74 258,441.61 1,747,706.82
Total 554,319.16 1,946,495.52 468,163.66 25,348.12 128,710.98 261,239.48 3,384,276.90
 258 
 
malnourished.595 In total, the Red Cross opened 2,703 cafeterias, 60 cafeterias for children, 
40 shelters for migrant workers, 357 bakeries, and 231 grain storehouses. By one estimate, 
this network of facilities fed nearly 1.7 million people in provinces affected by crop failure 
and gave hot food for another 3.5 million subjects in cafeterias. The Red Cross spent only 
about seventy thousand rubles on medical aid, a comparatively small amount, and most of 
this sum went to dispatching medical brigades to areas with scurvy or infectious epidemics. 
Incomplete reports from the medical brigades indicate that as many as eight formed, which 
were staffed by 9 doctors and 104 nurses, and these brigades may have treated as many as 
35,000 patients. 596 Only a small portion of the Red Cross’s funds, 39,414 rubles, was 
distributed as cash payments, and officials insisted that this type of aid only be used in cases 
where the affected peasants lived so far from rail lines that delivery of grain to them was too 
costly.597 Grain deliveries continued in 1893, but this time the Red Cross ceased its activities 
distributing food and let state and zemstvo institutions take the lead in Russia’s agricultural 
recovery.598   
Despite the Red Cross’s considerable contribution to this campaign, liberal elements 
from Russian society criticized the organization for indifference, inflexibility, and corruption. 
The Russian novelist and playwright Anton Chekhov wrote a letter to a friend in December 
1891, in which he referred to rumors of graft in the Moscow Provincial Committee of the 
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597 “Otchet o deiatel’nosti Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta v 1891 i 1892 godakh po okazaniiu 
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598 “Prodovol’stvennaia pomoshch’ v 1893 godu,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta, April 15, 
1893, 116. 
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Red Cross. When a group of intellectuals and businessmen from Moscow reached out to 
Minister of Interior I. V. Durnovo for permission to mobilize their own relief efforts, the state 
ruled that all aid had to go through the Red Cross or Orthodox Church, a decision that 
dispirited these activists. Chekhov refused to follow the state’s prerogatives and helped to 
organize his own subscription for famine relief.599 The American Red Cross also yearned to 
help, but journalists and diplomats slowed international aid efforts by accusing the Russian 
Red Cross of graft. Ultimately, American public initiative overcame suspicions, and the 
Russian Famine Relief Committee, made up of prominent politicians and barons of industry, 
as well as the representatives from the Millers’ Fund and the Iowa Famine Relief Fund, sent 
four shiploads of grain to Russia.600 With public obloquy directed toward the autocracy 
forbidden by Russian censorship laws, the Red Cross again became the target of allegations 
of callousness and ineptitude from a diverse group of voices in liberal society. This slander, 
however, did not cause the Red Cross to change its activities or undertake measures to 
improve its image. Instead, tireless action followed by the publication of dry reports, the Red 
Cross hoped, would silence critics.  
As the Old Regime came to grips with the food supply problems, cholera reared its 
ugly head along the empire’s southern border in 1892. By June, the disease had spread from 
Persia to Baku, the capital of modern day Azerbaijan, where General A. N. Kuropatkin, the 
head of military forces in the Caspian region, turned to the Main Directorate and Caucasus 
Regional Red Cross Committee for aid. Initially, the Red Cross hired military doctors to man 
                                                     
599 Anton Chekhov, Letters of Anton Chekhov, Avrahm Yarmolinsky, ed. (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), 
194-98. 
 
600 One historian estimated that the value of American aid was as high as 800,000 dollars or 1.6 million rubles. 
See James Young Simms, “The Impact of the Russian Famine of 1891-92: A New Perspective” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Michigan, 1976), 63-74. 
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two sanitary brigades that monitored civilians for the disease around Ashkhabad, present-day 
Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. Later, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Railroads, and various 
private and city institutions issued requests to the Main Directorate for nurses to staff 
temporary medical facilities throughout the empire. Lacking willing volunteers, nursing 
societies in St. Petersburg and Moscow established shortened courses to train women for the 
diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of cholera. In total, the Red Cross mobilized 710 nurses 
to work on the cholera epidemic in 1892 and 1893. The largest group of these women, 169 in 
total, stayed in St. Petersburg to deal with the epidemic in a network of temporary hospitals. 
Another 321 nurses left Russia’s capitals to work in hospitals and in sanitary brigades in the 
Caucasus and Volga provinces, a campaign Red Cross agents believed won public supporters 
to its cause. Medical brigades often set up small clinics to isolate those suffering from 
epidemics or enable patients with scurvy due to malnutrition a chance at recovery. With 
doctors in short supply, a village’s clinic and the cafeteria attached to it might be managed by 
a nurse or medical student. These brigades also monitored sanitary conditions in the villages, 
inspecting wells, latrines, and cemeteries.601 Despite these efforts, this cholera epidemic 
quickly spread across Russia, claiming as many as three hundred thousand lives and 
prompting widespread violence against the police and medical workers tasked with stopping 
it. Red Cross documents are suspiciously silent about the popular response to the cholera 
epidemic, but these workers certainly faced the same backlash that drove many doctors to 
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become disillusioned with the state’s heavy-handed policies to exscind and quarantine the 
infected.602  
Famine Relief from 1897 to 1901 
Crop failure returned to the Russia in 1897, and with it the Red Cross began yearly 
mobilizations to feed starving peasants that continued until the outbreak of the Russo-
Japanese War. The autocracy, fearing that members of the Third Element might incite 
suffering peasants to revolt, denied the zemstvos widespread freedoms to innovate during 
these relief campaigns, a policy that would lead progressive zemstvo activists to form their 
own rival Red Cross during the Russo-Japanese War. With the zemstvos’ role circumscribed 
to the province-level, the Red Cross, an organization that many already equated with the 
autocracy, appeared more than ever to be a state agency, impinging on provincials’ rights to 
govern themselves.603    
In 1897, Red Cross Agent S. V. Aleksandrovskii directed relief work in Voronezh, 
Tambov, and Riazan, three of the worst hit provinces. During this campaign, the Main 
Directorate raised about a million rubles, half of which came from a large donation from 
Nicholas II. The Main Directorate selected to keep nearly half of these funds in its permanent 
disaster relief fund, and only 550,000 rubles went to providing food, fodder, or outfitting 
sanitary brigades in 1897-98.   
The following year, in 1898, the harvest failed again in six provinces of Central 
Russia, and Aleksandrovskii returned to the provinces to conduct relief work, but this time he 
                                                     
602 For more on these policies and the responses from peasants and medical workers, see Nancy M. Frieden, 
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603 In the 1890s, the Ministry of Finance sought to limit and reduce spending on rural projects. See Thomas 
Fallows, “The Zemstvo and the Bureaucracy,” 217. 
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was joined by N. K. Shvedov. In the seven provinces affected, the Red Cross opened 7,518 
cafeterias, which fed more than 1.5 million people. If bread and flour distribution programs 
are included, Red Cross aid reached nearly 3.7 million people. Also, about 1,200 medical 
professionals, including medical students, conducted relief work in the affected provinces. To 
combat illness, the Red Cross set up nearly 450 clinics for patients suffering from scurvy, 
which treated around 15,000 patients, and they gave ambulatory care to another 125,000 
patients. By June 1899, visible cases of scurvy had disappeared, so the makeshift Red Cross 
medical facilities were shuttered and their responsibilities transferred to zemstvo facilities. 
The Red Cross also set up shelters for migrant workers and established a workers’ bureau to 
hire the unemployed. Help with famine relief came from the Ministries of Railroads and 
Finance; the former paid many of the workers’ salaries, and the latter provided reduced-
priced tickets for laborers to travel to areas with better employment opportunities. The Red 
Cross boasted of sending thirty thousand men to work, a large portion of which seems to 
have been procuring medical supplies for wartime stores and producing clothing for the poor. 
Perhaps the most impressive achievement the Red Cross organized was a massive winter-
time delivery by cart of three million puds of grain from the lower, navigable parts of the 
Volga to Kazan, Viatka, and Ufa. Again, during this campaign, Red Cross donations came 
mostly from the Romanov family, with Nicholas II providing 3 million rubles in aid, but 
local committees added another 1.75 million rubles.604 In July 1899, it appeared that the 
harvest would succeed, so Shvedov began to close or transfer Red Cross facilities to the 
zemstvos. Reports differ, but the Red Cross seems to have spent between 3.9 and 4.7 million 
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rubles on delivering aid to the provinces wracked by crop failure in 1899, most of which 
went to peasants in Ufa, Kazan, Samara, and Simbirsk.605    
Initial forecasts in 1900 indicated that Russia would enjoy a bountiful harvest, so the 
Red Cross concentrated activities in areas still suffering from crop failures, such as Kherson, 
or aided settlers whose empty stomachs had driven them to Siberia. By this time, the Red 
Cross had become more attuned to conducting famine relief, and the organization kept 
780,000 rubles in its disaster relief budget. Late in the fall of 1900, however, the crops failed 
again in the Black Earth region, so the Red Cross came to the need of peasants without 
access to the state or zemstvo aid. During this campaign, the Red Cross opened 428 
charitable committees, which operated 1,500 cafeterias and bakeries. This network fed over 
two million people during the next two years. Medical teams that included 42 doctors, 207 
nurses, and 284 volunteers treated 155,000 patients as well. This campaign saw cooperation 
between the Red Cross and the state, as the Main Directorate won permission from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs to appoint a representative to the state’s Famine Relief 
Committee. The Ministry of Railroads provided the Red Cross with discounted shipping rates 
for grain and free tickets for sanitary workers, and the military seems to have donated stores 
of dried cabbage for areas affected by scurvy. This campaign’s cost amounted to 1.2 million 
rubles for the Red Cross by January 1903.606  
Red Cross agents viewed famine-relief work as preparation for war, and the Red 
Cross’s performance during the 1890s did not bode well for wartime mobilizations in the 
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future. Agent R. A. Pisarev, who worked in Tula Province during the famine of 1891, 
complained that the cafeterias, bakeries, and sanatoriums for the sick suffered because they 
were set up in an “arbitrary” manner as the result of poor preparation. Still, the Red Cross, 
Pisarev conceded, managed to cope with famine relief, an activity outside its purview, but 
one that would help the organization prepare for “wartime philanthropy (voinstvuiushchiaia 
blagotvoritel’nost’).” Shortcomings in the Red Cross’s efforts might be prevented if the 
organization adopted a culture of “orderly discipline” and “permanent preparedness.” A 
militarized Red Cross would better serve in war and peace, and the best way to create this 
type of organization would be to collaborate further with the zemstvos and Ministries of War 
and Interior. Pisarev concluded that the Red Cross needed to balance its two obligations, to 
war and peace. Still, the solution to this problem lay in military preparedness for peacetime 
sanitary work, an activity Pisarev believed the zemstvos were too poor to undertake. He 
proposed that the Red Cross secure funds through public lotteries to spend on provincial 
sanitary brigades, a project he ambitiously estimated might save as many as one million lives 
per year.607         
A report by Shvedov on famine-relief measures in 1903 in Starorusskii District, 
Novgorod Province, provides a window into how the Red Cross mobilized resources to 
provide relief to peasants. While this report presents a brief survey of these activities from 
the Red Cross’s perspective, it portrays the zemstvos and other local elites as willing and able 
to help the Red Cross with its famine-relief campaign. Later zemstvo advocates would 
attempt to monopolize relief work, but at this time, it seems, many provincial elites viewed 
the Red Cross as an ally. The trouble in Starorusskii District began after a succession of poor 
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harvests around the turn of the century. Crop failures had depleted the zemstvo’s resources 
and left the peasants heavily indebted to the state for loan arrears, and the disastrous harvest 
of 1902 left the region impoverished by spring of 1903. The provincial governor reported 
that scurvy had broken out in the province in April 1903, which, with zemstvo resources 
already dwindled, prompted the Ministry of Internal Affairs in St. Petersburg to turn to the 
Main Directorate for Red Cross aid. The Main Directorate quickly dispatched Dr. S. A. 
Zil’berberg and four nurses from the Aleksandrovskii Nursing Society with equipment to 
open medical clinics and cafeterias.608 
By May 13 Zil’berberg’s brigade had diagnosed more than two thousand people with 
scurvy, and this news persuaded the Main Directorate to send Shvedov to the district to 
coordinate Red Cross activities with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and zemstvo. Shvedov 
arrived with ten advanced students from the Medical-Surgical Academy, who teamed up with 
zemstvo sanitary personnel to conduct surveys of the district and set up clinics. He attended a 
conference chaired by the governor made up of all the different aid organs in the district, 
such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, zemstvo, nobility, Orthodox Church, and even 
schools. This conference raised several thousand rubles, the majority of which came from 
wealthy landowners. Next, Shvedov divided the district into eleven zones and arranged for a 
sanitary brigade, made up of one doctor and several nurses, to circuit each zone, treating 
scurvy patients and managing cafeterias. Shvedov was assisted by twenty-eight Red Cross 
nurses, thirty nuns from local monasteries, and forty-two village teachers, all of whom were 
hired at a rate of fifteen rubles per month to manage the ninety-one cafeterias in the district. 
These cafeterias served shchi (cabbage soup) and pea soup with meat as well as giving 
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lemons and vinegar to those suffering from scurvy. Operating for the summer and fall of 
1903, this campaign fed nearly thirty thousand peasants over 1.2 million meals and treated as 
many as fifteen thousand persons afflicted with scurvy. The Red Cross spent nearly thirty-
eight thousand rubles on this campaign. Shvedov believed this campaign was an 
overwhelming success since the number of peasants who succumbed to malnutrition or 
related diseases was low and the peasants’ behavior improved as a result of the “moral 
influence” of the Red Cross, which reduced cases of village drunkenness and violence.609   
After more than a decade of conducting periodic famine relief, Shvedov believed the 
Red Cross needed to normalize this type of activity by working out careful plans for different 
types of peacetime relief efforts. On the surface these recommendations only involved 
peacetime activities, but Red Cross planners might easily adopt Shvedov’s designs in 
wartime to military ends. First, he suggested that the Main Directorate create a Mobilization 
Section to come up with detailed inventories for outfitting sanitary and famine-relief brigades 
and directing their operations. This section would also draw up detailed lists of all doctors, 
pharmacists, nurses, and even monks and nuns in each province or district to provide the Red 
Cross with an accurate picture of human resources at its disposal. Shvedov must have been 
aware that many members of the medical profession and segments within the zemstvo 
movement viewed the Red Cross with suspicion, which was why he found it useful to 
catalogue the human landscape within the country and no doubt identify loyal partners. 
Second, as a private organization divorced from the Church, the clergy were under no 
obligation to serve the Red Cross, but Shvedov viewed monasteries, especially nunneries, as 
wellsprings of untapped talent, where “[we] could, in institutions with clinics, train a 
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trustworthy contingent of nurses, who would be useful in peace and wartime.” At only thirty 
kopecks per day—the wages the Red Cross paid nuns during the 1903 campaign—these 
women came at bargain prices, and their political loyalties were more trustworthy than 
zemstvo doctors or feldshers, whose political leanings might tilt toward the Third Element of 
provincial radicals.610  
Most significantly, Shvedov’s appraisal of famine-relief efforts demonstrated that the 
Russian Red Cross was infected with the same militarism that gripped all national aid 
societies at the turn of the century. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, this Red Cross 
advocate was already planning for a war that would require unprecedented mobilization of 
nonstate resources. One method for maximizing the Red Cross’s potential was the careful 
cataloguing of all useful and loyal human resources. In this case, the Red Cross, under the 
guise of famine relief, devised plans to enlist support from potential allies and direct these 
efforts toward future campaigns in war or peace.611 
Shvedov’s recommendations to militarize the Russian Red Cross fell on deaf ears 
until after the Russo-Japanese War, and the reason for this lack of concern may have been 
autocratic prerogative. Maria Fedorovna acted as the titular head of the Red Cross and 
generals manned the Main Directorate, but this organization always remained true to its 
charter that kept it at arm’s length from military. Even though they remained silent on the 
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issue, the Romanov empresses appeared to have taken seriously the provisions in the Red 
Cross’s charter that the organization remain neutral and private, stipulations that Dunant 
insisted on in the original Geneva Convention of 1864. The Russian military made little 
attempt to subsume the Red Cross under its tutelage, even though certain generals hungered 
for its sizable endowment, and the nurses in their quasireligious societies seemed easier to 
ignore than remake. Ultimately, by preserving its independence from the military, the 
Russian Red Cross retained its flexibility to engage in campaigns the patronesses and 
governors deemed fit. This independence from the whims of popular demand preserved the 
Red Cross’s endowment so that resources were available when the empire found itself at war 
with Japan.               
Ultimately, the Russian Red Cross had too few resources at its disposal to meet the 
needs of Russia’s masses during the decade of famine and epidemic. A. I. Novikov, a land 
captain who witnessed the famines of the 1890s in Tambov Province, believed the Red Cross 
did all it could during the years of hunger. Although he admitted that bureaucratic regulations 
and reports to St. Petersburg slowed aid work, the land captains or peasants who cried the 
loudest received the most assistance, subverting the outsiders’ attempts to deliver resources 
to those in the greatest need. He admired the sanitary brigades, whose nurses did outstanding 
work, but wrote little on this topic. With zemstvo doctors few and far between, greater 
numbers of nurses and feldshers needed to be on hand to flock to the countryside at the first 
sign of famine. For Novikov the Red Cross did not provide the answer for feeding peasants 
during periods of famine. The provincials more often duped the Red Cross, a stiff 
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organization led by outsiders to rural Russia, unsure of how best to deliver philanthropic aid 
to civilians.612    
Conclusion 
The two decades between the Russo-Turkish War and the Russo-Japanese War saw 
the Red Cross expand its size and capacity to confront national emergencies during the 
decade of famines in the 1890s. Famine relief was not the Red Cross’s rasion d’être, and 
while fund raising efforts during this decade raised considerable sums, these monies often 
came from large donations from the Romanovs and the wealthiest elites. Still, the Red Cross 
expanded its presence throughout Russia by organizing canteens and food distribution points 
during periods of hunger and providing free medical care in hospitals and clinics. Many 
members of educated society likely welcomed this kind of activity, but two factors prevented 
this organization from more effectively confronting Russia’s medical needs in peacetime. 
The Red Cross’s overt modus operandi demanded that all philanthropic activities be directed 
toward war or preparation for it, which meant that famine relief and civilian campaigns never 
garnered serious attention from activists in St. Petersburg. But preparation for war was 
hampered by the Russian autocracy, which refused to grant women professional status as 
nurses. Red Cross nurses were supposed to perform their trade selflessly without 
remuneration. The lack of pay and security for these women coupled with opportunities for 
women to become doctors or feldshers, both positions that promised greater compensation 
and freedom surely estranged many talented nurses from Red Cross service. As a result of the 
Red Cross’s peacetime underdevelopment, Russia again faced shortages of voluntary medical 
personnel when war broke out with Japan in 1904.  
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War in Asia again drew educated society to the Red Cross, which raised considerable 
funds to send dozens of sanitary brigades to the Far East. Still, much of Russia supported the 
Red Cross’s mission, which was the application of private aid to warfare, rather than the 
organization headed by Maria Fedorovna. During the Russo-Japanese War, the zemstvos 
broke away from the Red Cross and formed their own, rival private aid organization. This 
additional agency, the General Zemstvo Organization, sought to portray the Red Cross as a 
corrupt organ of the autocracy and itself as the true aid organization for the Russian public. 
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CHAPTER 7 – THE RUSSIAN RED CROSS IN WAR AND REVOLUTION, 1904-07 
Tsarist Russia stumbled into a tragic war with Japan in 1904. Blinded by racism and 
imperial arrogance, statesmen in St. Petersburg scoffed at Japanese threats and overestimated 
Russia’s military strength in Asia. Count Sergei Witte’s economic policies demanded a push 
into Manchuria to finance industrialization, and the tsarist state regarded imperial expansion 
as a way to redirect public attention away from internal troubles and toward Russia’s 
assumed strength, adventurism in the East. When the Chinese threatened Russian commercial 
interests by seizing much of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1900, 170,000 tsarist troops 
pacified the Boxers and took greater land and commercial concessions in Manchuria than 
even Witte had anticipated. But this victory proved to be a short-lived gamble. The Japanese, 
embarking on their own imperial project in Asia, correctly appraised Russia’s hold on the 
region as tenuous. After St. Petersburg wasted much of 1903 dodging Tokyo’s proposals for 
a settlement over the territorial integrity of China and Russia’s privileges in Korea, the 
Japanese commenced hostilities with a sneak attack on Port Arthur in January 1904. 
Russia’s burden of waging modern war thousands of miles from its European center 
as well as the tsarist military’s traditional problems with mediocre leadership, inferior 
weaponry, and poorly-motivated soldiers led to a series of disappointments on land and sea 
in this conflict. The next year, military defeat in the Far East exacerbated long-standing 
political antagonisms at home, and 1905 saw unprecedented urban protest and rural unrest 
throughout Russia. Exhausted and startled by domestic violence, the tsarist regime excused
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itself from this costly war in the summer of 1905 to rebuild the state’s relationship with 
society.613 
The first half of this chapter surveys the Russian Red Cross’s involvement in the 
Russo-Japanese War. The first “total war” prompted the Red Cross to mobilize its resources 
on an unprecedented level in the Far East. Hundreds of doctors and nurses made the trek 
across Siberia to the eastern border of the empire, where they established a huge network of 
hospitals, lazarettos, mobile ambulances, and canteens. These facilities made use of state-of-
the-art technologies, such as the x-ray machine, and experimented with new types of medical 
treatments, such as psychiatric care for mentally traumatized soldiers. Medically, despite 
much confusion and finger pointing, Russia performed better in this conflict than it had in 
previous wars in part because of greater attention to wartime sanitation and in part because of 
blind luck—infectious diseases, which had crippled tsarist armies in the Crimea, Balkans, 
and in World War I, took only a minor toll in the Far East. Instead, disputes between the 
military and the Red Cross tended to be over small, localized mishaps. But the breadth of the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad amplified rather than diminished any hints of incompetence or 
mismanagement by the Red Cross.   
This chapter also analyzes a peculiar Russian problem—the General Zemstvo 
Organization’s challenge to the Red Cross during this war and the famine that followed the 
Revolution of 1905. In this case, zemstvo advocates won a personal intervention by Nicholas 
II to enable provincial assemblies to man, outfit, and dispatch medical brigades to the Far 
East. These brigades set themselves apart from the Red Cross in that they claimed to 
represent the public’s interest. Once peace with Japan had been concluded in early 1905, and 
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with society’s future role in the management of the Russian state very much in flux due to 
welcoming gestures from the autocracy, the General Zemstvo Organization 
(Obshchezemskaia organizatsiia, hereafter GZO) turned its eyes toward feeding the rural 
population suffering from crop failure, a task that had previously been conducted by the 
Ministry of Interior and Red Cross. What resulted was not a result of friction between state 
and society, a precursor of the struggle Lenin dubbed Russia’s “kto-kogo” dilemma. True, the 
GZO won recognition by the state, which deemed the zemstvos the primary vehicle to 
conduct famine relief, but this decision did not signify the Red Cross’s defeat, since it had 
never put up a fight with the zemstvos. Instead, I suggest that the tsarist Red Cross, weary 
from war work, may have been happy to take a step back from being on the hook for 
Russia’s welfare in peacetime. 
As I noted above, the Japanese attack on Port Arthur in January 1904 caught the Red 
Cross unprepared for war. Prior to the conflict, the Red Cross’s only permanent facilities in 
the Far East were nursing societies with small hospitals in Port Arthur, Dalian, and 
Vladivostok. As tensions with the Japanese simmered throughout 1903, the Russian Ministry 
of War even refused to let the Red Cross send materials to the east so as not to provoke the 
Japanese. Once war came, the Red Cross jumped to action, and the educated society 
responded with large-scale donations for the war effort.614 
To manage operations from the capital, Dowager Empress Mariia Fedorovna oversaw 
the creation of an Executive Commission made up of high-level Red Cross members to direct 
wartime operations. This commission was chaired until February 1905 by I. I. Vorontsov-
Dashkov, a former general and the future viceroy of the Caucasus; later, A. D. Obolenskii, 
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Witte’s deputy minister of finance, took charge. Contrary to accusations that arose in the 
press, this commission was not devoid of medical minds. Famous physicians, such as V. N. 
Sirotinin, and former military medical inspectors V. K. Anrep and V. S. Kudrin held 
positions on this board.615 Subcommittees appointed by the Executive Commission managed 
individual tasks such as fundraising, accounts, supplies, transportation, and recruitment. 
During the war, the Executive Commission met at least 245 times in 1904, 132 times in 
1905, and 75 times in 1906; at these meetings, Vorontsov-Dashkov and his staff displayed 
great energy and a tact for cutting through bureaucratic red tape.616 This managerial body 
oversaw the creation of independent sanitary brigades, established a network of warehouses 
to collect and store supplies destined for the theater of war, and outfitted railcars to evacuate 
wounded to the Russian interior. At first the military gave no instructions and asked nothing 
from the Red Cross, and this oversight forced bureaucrats in Petersburg and agents in the 
field to predict where shortcomings in the military medical services might occur.617 After the 
first battles in the spring of 1904, the military medical services demonstrated they were ill-
equipped for modern war, a painful realization that encouraged the Red Cross but also 
confused the delivery of private aid.618 
In the theater of war, Red Cross agents directed operations. Empress Mariia 
Fedorovna first tasked General F. F. Trepov to serve as the chief agent of the Red Cross in 
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the Far East in February 1904, but, two months later, Trepov resigned this post to serve as 
Chief Sanitary Inspector for the Manchurian Army. To manage operations on the ground, the 
Red Cross set up four districts in the Far East and Siberia. The Northeast District, 
immediately outside the theater of operations, spanned from Ussuriysk to Vladivostok, where 
B. A. Vasil’chikov, Stolypin’s future minister of agriculture, served as the chief agent. P. M. 
von Kaufman, the former president of the Red Cross, oversaw the Western District that 
stretched across Siberia from Lake Baikal to Samara, while Prince Shcherbatov, an elderly 
Red Cross veteran of the Russo-Turkish War, headed operations with his wife, a former 
nurse, in the region that spanned from Baikal to Harbin. Lastly, S. V. Aleksandrovskii, the 
chief agent for the Red Cross campaign during the Boxer Rebellion, oversaw operations in 
Manchuria in 1904. These men were no doubt well intentioned, but all lacked professional 
medical training that might have helped them ward off criticisms of ineptitude and 
amateurism. And even though many of these individuals had served for the Red Cross as 
administrators in the past, they had taken few steps to ready the organization for this 
campaign. Former agents from the recent Chinese intervention had yet to publish their 
reports, and, instead of studying the recent past, the Executive Commission collected oral and 
written reports by veterans from the Russo-Turkish War.619 
In late January 1904, the Executive Commission invited Russian nursing societies to 
outfit and staff hospitals for service in the Far East. Initial plans asked the seven St. 
Petersburg societies and another ten provincial committees to recruit personnel and acquire 
equipment for two-hundred-bed hospitals each, while a second tier of societies would deploy 
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smaller, more mobile facilities. Not knowing how many nursing societies would answer the 
call, the Executive Commission encouraged activity by drafting inventories of required 
supplies for the various facilities, distributing advances of up to ten thousand rubles for the 
purchase of medical supplies, and promising to help locate hard-to-find items. Russia’s local 
committees answered this call quickly; seven brigades were formed and ready to dispatch by 
the end of the first week in February.620 
The outburst of patriotism that followed the Japanese attack enabled the Red Cross to 
recruit personnel for war work with ease. Within the first month of the war, the Red Cross 
dispatched more than three hundred nurses from the nursing societies to work in military 
hospitals in the Far East. These women possessed nursing certificates, had trained by giving 
primary care to civilian populations in peacetime, and some had even served in the Russian 
intervention in China during the Boxer Rebellion. For most women, patriotic sentiments 
surely provided the key motivation for service since the salary of thirty rubles per month 
would not have enticed much talent. By the beginning of 1905, over 730 Red Cross nurses, 
or one-quarter the total number of nurses in Russia at war’s outbreak, were serving in regular 
military hospitals.621 With far too few trained nurses to satisfy the military’s need and outfit 
its own brigades, the Executive Commission ordered many Red Cross societies to establish 
accelerated nursing courses in major cities. These courses lasted six weeks, and they 
familiarized women with bedside care and first aid.622 The quality of the “volunteer” nurses 
varied greatly depending on the education level of the women and their commitment to the 
                                                     
620 M. Strukov, “K otchetu,” Vestnik Krasnogo Kresta 6 (May 1912): 714-16. 
 
621 Ibid., 711. 
 
622 See “Uskorennye kursy po uxodu za bol’nymi i ranenymi voinami pri Khar’kovskoi obshchine sester 
miloserdii Krasnogo Kresta,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta 29 (July 21, 1905): 437-440. 
 277 
 
war effort. More than a few were wives and daughters of soldiers or reputed to be unseemly 
camp followers.623 In total, the Red Cross had nearly 1,500 women serving as nurses in its 
own facilities during this conflict.624 
Outfitting sanitary brigades with doctors posed a different type of challenge for the 
Red Cross. During peacetime, the Red Cross employed few doctors at the nursing societies, 
so a cohort had to be quickly secured in early 1904. The Executive Commission offered 
civilian doctors salaries of 500 rubles for senior surgeons and 350 rubles for hospitalists to 
staff its medical facilities, payments that would have seduced most doctors in tsarist 
Russia.625 At the same time that the Red Cross sought civilian physicians, the army called 
forward its reservist cadre of doctors and even tried to hire civilian doctors to fill shortages. 
One account claimed the Russian army possessed 3,342 doctors in the theater of war during 
the conflict, and, of these, 2,364 had been reservists or military doctors sent from elsewhere 
to the Far East. By contrast, the Red Cross mobilized only 360 doctors for work in its own 
brigades.626 In addition to these physicians, the Red Cross sent forty-four medical students 
and eighty-three feldshers to the Far East. Later studies indicate that the Russian army 
suffered deficiencies in the number of doctors in the Russo-Japanese War, and, as a result, 
military doctors often bickered that the private aid organizations had hired all of the best 
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physicians.627 Red Cross agents responded that without their help the military would have 
suffered an even greater dearth of medical expertise.628 
Most participants praised the talents of the Red Cross doctors and nurses, but male 
orderlies (sanitars) received rebuke from all sides. Orderlies played important roles in 
everyday hospital operations, and the Red Cross used them as porters and stretcher bearers. 
The majority of Red Cross volunteers in all of its interventions were orderlies, and planners 
always suffered problems with finding competent workers on a shoestring budget. At first the 
Executive Commission looked to the Petersburg Committee for First Aid in Disasters, a 
civilian organization that trained urban aid workers, for orderlies, but this organization lacked 
a ready pool of candidates that could fulfill the Red Cross’s needs. Instead, the Red Cross 
had to rely on admitting candidates on the basis of recommendations and clean police records 
and then training these applicants in an accelerated course that touched on first aid and the 
transport of the wounded. The result was a varied quality of male orderlies. Some were 
undoubtedly proficient, but, with pay set at the low rate of thirty rubles a month, many 
earned such reputations as drunks, thieves, or hooligans. Railroad gendarmes even had to 
watch over this unruly bunch during the journey east and cull the worst offenders from the 
ranks.629 Even a few radical members of the intelligentsia passed admission but were exposed 
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when they voiced their political opinions.630 One estimate claimed the Red Cross hired 1,433 
sanitars during the war and conscripted an additional 584 soldiers in this capacity.631 
One of the great sanitary challenges in the Far East involved collecting and 
transporting large numbers of wounded across expansive battlefields. The front at battles 
such as Mukden stretched as far as sixty versts (39.6 miles), and, when defensive flanks were 
included, the deployed army’s width measured nearly 120 miles.632 Although the Prussians in 
1870 had demonstrated the usefulness of special brigades of stretcher bearers and ambulance 
teams and the Russo-Turkish War had exposed this deficiency to the Russians, tsarist armies 
still suffered tremendous shortfalls of men and vehicles assigned to collect and remove the 
wounded from the battlefield in the Russo-Japanese War. The Red Cross approached these 
deficiencies from two angles. First, they purchased hundreds of ambulances and wheeled 
stretchers and directly donated these vehicles to the army.633 The second solution involved 
private aid workers directly intervening on the battlefield. 
The Red Cross again deployed mobile ambulances, believing that these brigades 
would best suit Russia’s needs along a large, open front and they could set up isolated 
medical stations in mountains of Korea.634 What they had not considered, was that, by the 
Russo-Japanese War, civilian volunteers operating on the battlefield while enjoying freedom 
from enemy fire was divorced from the reality of modern combat. Often the members of 
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these sanitary teams became the victims of Japanese bullets themselves.635 And the high cost 
of these units coupled with their long periods of inactivity caused observers and readers to 
cast doubt on whether the Red Cross should be deploying mobile ambulances at all.636 
Aleksandrovskii sent these units to the front in spring 1904 because the regular army medical 
services were so overwhelmed; however, this concentration of resources at the front meant 
the Red Cross neglected setting up facilities in the rear, an absence that newspapermen made 
known widely.637 As the war of movement and maneuver in 1904 bogged down into trench 
warfare around Mukden, a battle that foreshadowed the Western Front ten years later, the 
mobile ambulances converted to rear lazarettos and disappeared from Red Cross’s arsenal.638 
The number of Red Cross stationary facilities in the theater of war was 
unprecedented, and Trepov was correct when he telegrammed his superiors in St. Petersburg: 
“Never has the work of the Red Cross been as diverse and productive as in this war.”639 In 
the theater of operations and the Primorskaia region, the Red Cross had eighty-eight wartime 
hospitals and mobile ambulances that could accommodate over sixteen thousand patients. 
The largest concentration of these facilities was in Harbin, a city transformed by the war into 
a behemoth infirmary made up of thirty-three army hospitals and another twenty-five 
belonging to aid organizations. From June 1904 to April 1905, the facilities in Harbin treated 
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and released or evacuated nearly 220,000 patients.640 Other cities that featured large 
concentrations of Red Cross hospitals were Khabarovsk, Spassk, Ussuriysk, and Vladivostok. 
Red Cross facilities had a reputation for extravagant food, personal care, and state-of-
the-art medical devices.641 O. P. Oleinikov, an observer of forty Red Cross hospitals from 
Harbin to Vladivostok, surmised that the care in these institutions was never worse, and often 
better, than the care in the best civilian facilities in St. Petersburg. The only patient complaint 
this reporter could recall involved less than satisfactory wine vintages.642 Even though the 
Executive Commission recommended that the costs for outfitting a two-hundred-bed hospital 
should not exceed twenty-six thousand rubles, rumors ran that provincial committees had 
spent as much as sixty thousand rubles per hospital. And Red Cross institutions definitely 
spent more on food than their military counterparts; snippets in the press hinted at 
abundances of vodka, cured meats, and caviar in Red Cross facilities, a diet impossible to 
produce on the military’s budget of forty-four kopecks per soldier per day and highly 
unlikely in private aid facilities with their fifty-kopeck daily budget for food.643 A network of 
storehouses and workshops in Russia’s cities supplied these facilities at the front with 
superior bedding and gowns, the most famous of which were produced by the sewing circle 
set up in Moscow by Princess Elizaveta Fedorovna. First meeting in the Rumiantsev 
Museum, this group of women soon moved to the Kremlin where they met day and night to 
sew dressings, bedclothes, and underwear.644 
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Red Cross facilities possessed inventories of medical supplies superior to regular 
army hospitals because, as one postwar report stated, the military was unable to provide care 
tailored to seriously wounded or sick patients. Thus the Red Cross, with greater funds and 
fewer obligations, could give the most serious patients all that science demanded.645 And 
again some civilian specialists flocked to the ranks of the Red Cross to gain access to 
challenging patients, whose successful treatment would win certain doctors prestige within 
the medical community. The Red Cross outfitted special hospitals and wards for patients 
suffering from venereal, otorhinolaryngological (ear/nose/throat), and dental ailments, as 
well as separate wards to study those with infectious diseases. They also dispatched 
individual teams to study sanitation and conduct water purification. Specialists such as N. A. 
Vel’iaminov experimented with x-ray technology to locate bullets in wounded bodies.646 
To remove soldiers from the theater of operations and deliver them to medical 
facilities deep in the rear, the Red Cross outfitted twenty-five special sanitary trains. They 
also borrowed sixteen barges and seven tugboats from the Eastern Chinese Railroad and 
Resettlement Agency to transport evacuees along the Sungari and Amur rivers. By one 
estimate, Red Cross trains and barges evacuated more than 115,000 men.647 The region 
around Lake Baikal posed a particular challenge because the Trans-Siberian railroad beside 
the lake had not been completed at the war’s outbreak, so all trains coming from Russia had 
to stop and unload for the ferry journey across the lake before continuing on via the eastern 
section of track.648 At first the Red Cross established twelve hospitals in the region for nearly 
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two thousand beds, but the increasing number of casualties and delays with water transport 
forced them to expand the number of beds around the lake to over five thousand by 1905. In 
total, over forty-seven thousand patients entered hospitals in the Baikal District.649 
Activities in Port Arthur provided a microcosm for the Red Cross’s actions in the 
Russo-Japanese War as a whole and revealed how the Geneva Convention empowered 
private aid workers to play new roles as intermediaries in conflicts. Prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities, Port Arthur possessed a Red Cross committee with its own nursing society and 
small hospital. Once hostilities commenced on the Liaodong Peninsula, the local Red Cross 
official, I. P. Balashev, expanded its size from fifty to over three hundred beds. He also spent 
the nursing society’s endowment on medical supplies and food, which he distributed among 
city’s various medical facilities.650 As the Japanese advanced down the Liaodong Peninsula 
in the spring of 1904, the Russians evacuated the city of Dalian, which brought another Red 
Cross brigade to Port Arthur. The Red Cross also housed patients on the hospital ship 
Mongolia but transferred this hospital onto land once the Japanese artillery came within 
range of the port. Since most civilian doctors had left the city by the time the siege began in 
August, the Red Cross took the lead in providing medical care for the local population as 
well as for soldiers who had found no space in the army lazarettos.651 A report on the main 
Red Cross hospital indicated that they treated over two thousand wounded and sick patients 
in the hospital, and they gave ambulatory care to over ten thousand visitors.652 With the 
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Japanese siege tightened in the fall of 1904, Russian food stores ran low, and a large number 
of malnourished soldiers fell victim to scurvy and beriberi. After a month of bombardment 
from Japanese artillery, the Russians hoisted the white flag on 20 December. 
As a neutral actor with rights protected by the Geneva Convention, I. P. Balashev, the 
Red Cross agent, intervened in capitulation negotiations in January 1905 to protect the large 
number of captured convalescents in the city. The Japanese enabled the Red Cross facilities 
to continue operations independently, but they regarded all military doctors and patients as 
prisoners of war. Balashev complained in his postwar report that the Japanese mistreated 
Russian military patients by transferring them to inferior facilities and placing them in the 
hands of Japanese doctors. He repeatedly protested these moves, which he claimed violated 
the Geneva Convention. In one incident, the Japanese proposed sending the Russian military 
medical staff back home but keeping the remaining two thousand Russian patients in 
Japanese care, a ploy to which the Russian military doctors shamefully agreed. Balashev 
threatened to leak word of this violation to outside powers and the press, and his insistence 
won the Red Cross personnel permission to evacuate with the remaining patients. In April 
1905, with hostilities winding down, Balashev and the Red Cross volunteers boarded a 
neutral ship and traveled with the remaining eight hundred patients to Shanghai and then 
Odessa.653 
The Russians’ most significant contribution to military medicine in the early 
twentieth century was the application of psychiatry to war, and the Red Cross managed this 
project in 1904-05. Historian Jacqueline Friedlander credits G. E. Shunkov, a military doctor, 
with the creation of the first psychiatric ward at Harbin’s First Consolidated Hospital in April 
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1904. This facility, staffed by army psychiatrists, gave care to 94 officers and 239 soldiers by 
the end of the year. Unable to cope with the large number of patients suffering from 
psychiatric ailments and unwilling to transform its institutional structure and culture to adopt 
to psychiatry, the Russian army transferred all mental health patients to the care of the Red 
Cross in the fall of 1904. Professor V. N. Sirotinin, a member of the Red Cross’s Executive 
Commission, and P. M. Avtokratov formed a commission of able psychiatrists to organize 
the first comprehensive system of mental health care in a war zone. A review of statistics 
from the Franco-Prussian War predicted that psychiatric cases might increase to two 
thousand by the end of the 1904, so the Red Cross established a Central Psychiatric Hospital 
for fifty patients in Harbin. Here Dr. Avtokratov led a group of ten psychiatrists that treated 
evacuees with psychological trauma. This program worked well, so the Red Cross 
established additional facilities in Chita, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk, Mukden, Gundzhulin, and 
other points.654 In total, these psychiatric wards treated and evacuated at least eight hundred 
patients during the war. Russia mobilized around one million men for service in the Far East, 
and P. M. Avtokratov suspected far more men suffered from psychiatric problems than this 
small number.655 Russian psychiatrists deserve credit for developing the modern practice of 
treating psychiatric cases as soon as they appeared in special facilities near the front. Many of 
the diagnostic categories for psychological ailments that European armies used during the 
First World War likely came from the Russian experiment in the Far East.656 
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The Red Cross’s tremendous engagement in the war effort came at an unprecedented 
cost. In total, the Red Cross spent 31.7 million rubles on operations during the Russo-
Japanese War.657 A postwar financial report indicated that most of the Red Cross’s income 
came as individual donations from private sources. The Main Directorate raised 8.3 million 
rubles, and the provincial committees contributed another 12.3 million. Contributions peaked 
at around 2.5 million rubles per month in February and March 1904, when the public’s 
enthusiasm for war was at its highest. After the disappointments of summer 1904 and 
scandalous reports appeared in the press, private contributions to the Red Cross fell to levels 
under one million rubles per month in September and never recovered. Fearing a loss of 
services, the state intervened to support the Red Cross by requiring purchasers of telegraphs, 
passports, and first-class railway tickets to make mandatory donations. These taxes raised 
1.42 million rubles for the Red Cross, a small but not insignificant sum. Direct state subsidies 
contributed far more to the Red Cross’s budget. The Ministry of War transferred 4.3 million 
rubles to the Red Cross throughout the war as payments for treating the wounded, and the 
Ministry of Finance added a subsidy of 3.75 million rubles on 29 June 1905, the date of 
which indicates how badly this organization needed funds by the end of the war.658 
As the Russian army demobilized in autumn 1905, the Red Cross altered its mission 
to aid civilians negatively affected by the war and by the uprisings that came in response to 
the frustrating defeat. For three days beginning on 30 October, soldiers and sailors in 
Vladivostok joined the local riffraff (sbrod) in a series of pogroms that targeted shops and 
taverns and left much of the Chinese quarter of the town in ashes. At first targeting Chinese-
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owned taverns and brothels, the drunken soldiers moved on to one of the Red Cross 
warehouses, which contained wine and other medical items destined for Russian prisoners in 
Japan. As a result of the violence, much of the Russian civilian population fled the scene, but 
many Chinese residents remained in the city without food or shelter.  
In response to this troublesome incident, and surely aware that continued violence 
against the Chinese might undermine Russia’s imperial holdings in the Far East, the local 
Red Cross agent, V. A. Vasil’chikov, moved to address the needs of wounded civilians and 
some military men in the town. On the first day of the pogrom, he opened a dressing station 
in a home previously used as a naval headquarters to treat civilians wounded by the mob and 
officers injured trying to restore order. Once the mobs had dissipated after November 1, the 
Red Cross met with the governor to agree on a plan for distributing food and clothing in 
coordination with the local militia. To avoid exacerbating tensions in the future, Vasil’chikov 
planned to open two free teahouses for Chinese and Russians, with a Chinese resident in 
charge of the facility for his co-nationals. He later established a free cafeteria and shelter for 
homeless civilians, some of whom were Russians evicted from Sakhalin by the Japanese. By 
the end of the month, a Chinese Red Cross delegation visited Vladivostok and provided ten 
thousand rubles in additional funds out of concern that needy Russians received an unequal 
share of the aid.659    
Problems with the Red Cross in the Russo-Japanese War 
Despite the numerous achievements, the Russians’ lack of plans for how to use 
private aid in war harmed medical care, caused much consternation among military doctors 
and generals, and resonated negatively in the press. The first problem the Red Cross faced 
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was cooperation with the military. At the outset, the military refused to give the Red Cross 
instructions on how and where to deliver aid, in part because the High Command hoped for a 
short war. But, as the conflict escalated, mounting casualties compelled the military to turn to 
the Red Cross to reprieve overtaxed army medical services. G. P. Oleinikov reported that the 
First Consolidated Military Hospital in Harbin, one of the largest medical facilities 
assembled during the war, suffered from shortages of medicines, but army doctors refused to 
turn to the Red Cross for help.660 Military doctors whispered of circulars that forbade them 
from reaching out to the Red Cross, as doing so would be admission that the Ministry of War 
failed to outfit its hospitals properly and could lead to charges of sedition. Army doctors were 
allowed to accept supplies from the Red Cross only in cases of absolute necessity. Any 
exchanges required clearance from the Military Medical Department, which feared that 
material assistance from the Red Cross would lead to wastage and undermine discipline. The 
contrast between the Red Cross’s abundance of material and the military’s poverty led to an 
unhealthy rivalry between the two medical agencies.661 And they fought over personnel as 
well, the most common complaint being that the Red Cross overpaid its personnel. One 
commentator remarked that the Red Cross paid feldshers 125 rubles per month, while the 
army feldshers got 90 rubles per year.662  
For military commanders, the Red Cross could not operate in a zone of operations as 
an independent agency. V. B. Giubbenet, the chief army surgeon in Port Arthur, expressed a 
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commonly held view in his postwar report: “The activity of the Red Cross in wartime should 
be more strictly demarcated and defined by a predetermined framework.”663 The army 
surgeon V. V. Vreden located the problem in the Red Cross’s “abnormal status 
(nenormal’noe polozhenie).”664 Professor E. V. Pavlov summed up the opinion that many 
military men surely shared: “If the Red Cross is a governmental, state (gosudarstvennyi, 
kazennyi) organ, then it should be under state control.”665 The impoverished army objected to 
the private nature of Red Cross aid and felt the army could best determine how to use civilian 
resources. 
Once it became clear to the Russians that the Japanese were committed to a protracted 
war, the army began to make arbitrary and unexpected demands of the Red Cross. P. M. von 
Kaufman, the Red Cross agent for Siberia, found it impossible to house and staff hospitals in 
Irkutsk for the fifteen thousand patients the army wanted to evacuate to the city in the fall of 
1904.666 General Kuropatkin, for example, asked that the Red Cross establish an ice factory 
in Harbin in May 1904. The Red Cross agreed to this request but acknowledged that it might 
not be operational until September due to difficulties transporting supplies along the Trans-
Siberian Railroad.667  
Another complaint was that the Red Cross encouraged the military to neglect its 
medical facilities and, by extension, the health of its troops. Many Red Cross facilities 
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doubled or even tripled their patient capacities as the war escalated but struggled to hire 
additional medical personnel. The Georgievskii Hospital in Liaoian increased its capacity 
from two hundred patients to five hundred, but it was only able to increase the number of 
physicians from five to seven and nurses from fifteen to twenty-seven. By the end of the 
month, this facility housed up to 680 patients. The agent for the region, Aleksandrovskii, 
justified the Red Cross facilities’ expansion on the grounds that the military had not opened 
additional hospitals, but a writer from the medical press surmised that the Army Medical 
Department refused to expand its operations because the Red Cross had shown it was willing 
to bear a greater burden.668 
Within the Red Cross, doctors often quarreled with the nonmedical agents tasked with 
managing hospitals or ambulances. This rivalry was nothing new for tsarist Russia. 
Professional bureaucrats headed the Ministry of Interior’s health department and the Military 
Sanitation Department, much to the doctors’ chagrin, and amateurs at the top of the Red 
Cross had upset doctors in the Russo-Turkish War.669 Professor E. V. Pavlov lamented that 
Red Cross agents had started to read guides on military sanitation after the war had begun. 
He conceded that many had come to grasp hospital management by war’s end, but the 
learning curve had wasted time, resources, and lives. Dr. Prussuen remarked that the Red 
Cross had more aristocrats in its upper ranks than the ruling houses of Europe. These agents 
knew nothing about medicine and won little respect from doctors.670 The Red Cross often 
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assigned doctors to perform tasks for which they were ill-suited. Unable to find surgeons to 
man mobile ambulances, Aleksandrovskii allegedly gave this duty to psychiatrists and 
hygienists. Mariia Fedorovna sponsored her own Red Cross hospital, whose staff included a 
gynecologist and pathologist, but no surgeon. When Prussuen requested a surgeon for his 
mobile ambulance, he got a pharmacist.671 
To many participants and commentators, these mishaps were proof the Red Cross was 
nothing more than an inept finger of the autocracy. Bureaucratic immobility and a culture 
that required strict standards of decorum slowed and stymied aid work at the front. Every 
innocuous act required permission from multiple superiors. The purchaser of a horse, for 
example, needed multiple signatures before he could exchange money, and regulations 
stipulated that doctors be subjected to endless paperwork, a habit that detracted from the 
physicians’ ability to practice medicine. And the Executive Commission in St. Petersburg 
tried to micromanage every decision in the field.672 One doctor, fired for insubordination, 
complained that the Red Cross reduced him to “an errand boy.”673 
Red Cross agents sometimes disdained the medical staff they supervised. Agent 
Aleksandrovskii complained to the Executive Commission that many of the doctors sent his 
way were untrustworthy Jews who might undermine morale. The Executive Committee 
responded by enabling agents to fire any doctors they found unsuitable.674 The result was a 
rash of dismissals for charges such as cowardice, sedition, and scandalous behavior.675 Von 
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Kaufman fired Dr. Rezanov from the Odessa brigade in Harbin for slandering the Red Cross 
in a public lecture. Rezanov responded to these charges in editorials of his own, claiming 
everyone knew these problems existed since the General Zemstvo Organization’s separation 
from the Red Cross was intended to avoid them. Women fell victim to slander as well. The 
newspaper Syn otechestva (Son of the Fatherland) reported on the 18 July 1905 that a nurse, 
Berenshtein, was sent home from the theater of war for immoral behavior, an act that 
symbolically pinned on her a “yellow ticket,” thereby labelling her a prostitute, even after a 
medical examination performed by three doctors and two pharmacists deemed this woman’s 
virginity intact. The author of this article warned readers not to let their daughters serve in 
this institution or give donations to a charity outside public control.676 
For civilian critics, public accountability provided the only antidote to these 
shortcomings. Rumors circulated in the press that the Red Cross was “bureaucratic” and “not 
public (ne obshchestvennyi).”677 Public control (obshchii kontrol) was the only feasible 
solution to righting this slipshod organization and ensuring that the public donations (obshie 
sredstva) were spent in an appropriate manner.678 This moment, when Russia struggled at 
war and educated society clamored against autocracy and its aid organization, gave zemstvo 
activists the perfect opportunity to fashion themselves as the true representatives of Russia’s 
welfare. 
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The General Zemstvo Organization (GZO) 
The Japanese strike on Port Arthur prompted discordant groups within Russian 
society to rally behind the state in support of the war effort in the winter of 1904. This 
support would not last long; military failures in the Far East soon united Russian society 
against the regime and non-Russian minorities, but zemstvo moderates used the empire’s cry 
for help during wartime as a means for winning themselves a wider role in Russia’s future 
governance. In the spring of 1904, a group of zemstvo boards established the General 
Zemstvo Organization to unite resources and sponsor medical brigades in the Far East. The 
autocracy at first resisted union among the zemstvos, but problems with the Red Cross and 
demands by outside actors to intervene in the war effort wore down the state’s resolve. As 
the war slowed and Russia descended into revolutionary chaos in 1905, the state recognized 
the zemstvos as useful agents to conduct famine relief campaigns and help restore order to 
the Russian countryside.679 
Zemstvo intervention in the Russo-Japanese War affected the Red Cross in two ways. 
No longer could the Red Cross promote itself as Russia’s sole national aid organization. 
Mismanagement, bad press, and the tremendous burden of supplementing military medical 
services ill-suited for twentieth-century warfare had tarnished the Red Cross’s reputation 
before the public. From below, the zemstvos asserted themselves as more trustworthy agents 
to conduct philanthropy on a national scale. Peace with Japan in no way led to a pause in the 
zemstvo men’s activities; instead, the GZO used famine relief in the years following the 
Revolution of 1905 as a means to supplant the autocracy’s moral mandate to promote 
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Russia’s welfare. When Russia went to war in 1914, the Red Cross continued its traditional 
mission of delivering aid to wounded soldiers alongside an assortment of aid organizations 
from the zemstvos, towns, and nobles’ organizations.680 
The zemstvos’ enterprise also compelled the Red Cross to temporarily change its 
structure. Heeding calls from the press for greater transparency, the Red Cross’s Executive 
Commission created the Oversight Committee to subject itself to more careful scrutiny. 
Following the war, Red Cross supporters called for a conference of former aid workers to 
identify problems and suggest needed changes.681 Neither of these moves prompted the 
reformation critics demanded, but, during the decade that followed the Russo-Japanese War, 
the Red Cross acknowledged some of its shortcomings in the pages of Vestnik Krasnogo 
Kresta and communicated with the military on future war plans. 
By an unlucky twist of fate, Nicholas II and his government enjoyed some of their 
greatest popularity in the moments after Russia committed to ruinous war with Japan. In the 
first months of 1904, the zemstvos offered the Red Cross over a million rubles and set aside 
millions more to assist the families of soldiers on the home front.682 Red Cross leaders 
encouraged zemstvos to go even further. I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov welcomed outside 
assistance in the form of money and entire sanitary brigades in a letter addressed to zemstvo 
leaders. Red Cross leaders attended zemstvo congresses in February 1904 to provide 
instructions for how to outfit brigades and offered help in locating sanitary items. These 
brigades would operate “under the flag of the Red Cross,” which in Vorontsov-Dashkov’s 
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understanding enabled them to enjoy the benefits to private aid workers codified in the 
Geneva Convention, such as neutrality and protection from enemy fire.683 The Red Cross had 
a precedent for this type of private initiative, as Romanov women and other prominent 
individuals had sponsored sanitary brigades in the Russo-Turkish War and did so as well in 
1904. Patronage, in the Red Cross’s eyes, ensured that all sanitary brigades in the theater of 
war followed orders from agents, directed every effort toward the state-sanctioned mission of 
treating the wounded, and upheld standards of professional competency. The Red Cross did 
not want inconsistent aid at the front delivered by untrustworthy actors. When a group of 
miners in Irkutsk queried soldiers on their needs and delivered requested items, Red Cross 
agents dashed to root out this popular “separatism” and reminded subjects that all aid should 
be “under the flag of the Red Cross.”684 
For zemstvo activists, the “under the flag of the Red Cross” meant they paid for the 
brigades while bureaucrats in St. Petersburg directed operations and took the credit for the 
accomplishments. If the zemstvos were to intervene, they demanded full freedom from the 
state and any of its appendages. Thus, the zemstvo activists pledged not to accept any 
material aid or funds from the Red Cross. To avoid overlap with the Red Cross, the zemstvo 
activists organized their brigades as rear-area relief stations, which would not deploy at the 
front as mobile ambulances or open large hospitals in central transit points such as Harbin.685 
To coordinate activities in the Far East, eight zemstvos formed a committee in Moscow 
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under the chairmanship of D. N. Shipov, a move that led these activists into direct conflict 
with the minister of internal affairs.  
Archconservative V. K. Plehvе, who had stymied several zemstvo attempts at self-
initiative in 1903, recognized this move as a violation of the 1890 statute that forbade any 
inter-regional collaboration among zemstvo boards. Alexander III had enacted this policy to 
keep empire-wide campaigns the exclusive preserve of the state out of concern that zemstvo 
coordination might encourage the provincial boards to supplant the autocracy. To skirt this 
provision, the zemstvo delegates in Moscow pledged that each sanitary brigade would be 
funded exclusively by its sponsoring zemstvo, thereby avoiding any allegations that they had 
created institutions parallel to the tsarist state. Plehve, however, was too clever to fall for this 
ploy; in March he demanded the delegates in Moscow cease all activities without permission 
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and barred new zemstvos from admission to this 
committee. With the zemstvos’ schemes to bypass the law exposed, the activists moved to 
dodge the policeman. On 27 April, Tula zemstvo representative Prince G. E. L’vov met with 
Nicholas II and convinced the tsar to allow the zemstvos to continue their war relief work. 
The tsar’s blessing encouraged delegates from thirteen boards to rename their committee the 
General Zemstvo Organization in Moscow on May 2. This committee quickly amassed over 
one million rubles from member and non-member zemstvos and devised plans to outfit 
twenty-one sanitary detachments for relief work in the Far East. L’vov pledged to serve as 
the chief agent for the zemstvo detachments in the theater of war and traveled with the first 
brigades that arrived during the spring of 1904.686 In the Far East, the Red Cross put few 
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limits on the zemstvos, recognized their freedom of action and independence, and even 
offered them a seat on the Executive Commission.687 
The deluge of casualties during the summer of 1904 compelled Red Cross physician 
E. S. Botkin to turn to the zemstvo brigades for help. Initially, L’vov sought to isolate all 
activities to rear areas to avoid any contact with Red Cross brigades, but, after touring the 
front with Botkin, L’vov decided to enable zemstvo detachments to operate anywhere 
sanitary aid was needed.688 As a result, zemstvo brigades were converted, sometimes with 
material support from the Red Cross, from evacuation relief points into stationary hospitals 
or mobile lazarettos. 
The GZO’s campaign received a boon when a terrorist’s bullet downed Plehve in July 
1904. Plehve’s replacement as minister of internal affairs, P. D. Sviatopolk-Mirskii, took a 
hands-off approach in dealing with the zemstvos.689 Greater freedom of action in the Far East 
enabled these brigades to unite with one another and pool funds without police interference. 
In November, six additional brigades departed from Moscow. Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s laissez-
faire attitude toward private aid empowered other groups, such as nobles’ and merchants’ 
organizations, students and faculty of Kazan University, and even a group of Odessa Jews, to 
outfit sanitary brigades to conduct aid “under the flag of the Red Cross.”690 
Overall, the Red Cross conducted war relief on a much larger scale than the zemstvos 
in the Far East. Zemstvo brigades provided twenty-seven medical brigades and four sanitary 
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trains during the conflict. The GZO spent over two million rubles on relief work by 
September 1905 and treated over fifty thousand patients throughout the war.691 Zemstvo 
relief work won support from Red Cross leaders such as Aleksandrovskii and the Russian 
army commander A. N. Kuropatkin.692 Zemstvo brigades won admirers in the press, who 
remarked on their equality between doctors, cordial attitudes toward the patients, and cheaper 
costs.693 
The zemstvo challenge compelled the Red Cross to flirt with reform. To combat 
scandals in the press and mistrust from the zemstvos, the Red Cross created a new Oversight 
Committee in the spring of 1904. This board consisted of fourteen members, some of whom 
came from the GZO and the nobles’ and other aid agencies. Senator A. A. Bobrinskii, a 
longtime Red Cross activist, headed this committee, which allegedly subjected the Red Cross 
to “public oversight” (obshchestvennyi kontrol’) by reviewing agents’ reports from the field 
and comparing performance with expenditures.694 There is no evidence that this reform, 
coming as it did at the end of the war, inspired greater scrutiny over Red Cross coffers, but 
the move toward public oversight sent a message that Russia’s national aid organization did 
not exist in a vacuum. Educated society yearned for a role in the management of Russia’s 
largest charity. 
The year 1905 saw Russian society weaken the autocracy with violence and then 
force Nicholas II to concede to greater outside involvement in politics. Peace with the 
Japanese finally came in August, but for the Russian army, demobilization brought no end to 
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conflict. Soldiers and sailors set their sights on authority figures and demanded 
improvements in the ranks and for the peasantry at home.695 Medical professionals, long 
silent in political debates, stunned educated Russia by demanding a long list of political and 
economic reforms at the Ninth Conference of the Pirogov Society.696 Amid this climate, 
Prince Vasil’chikov met with angry medical professionals in Chita, who decried Russia’s 
application of private aid in wartime. This group demanded a general congress of 
representatives from all of the aid organizations and the ministry of war that would set 
empire-wide policies regarding medical care during war.697 Veterans from the zemstvo 
brigades proposed to D. N. Shipov, the former president of the GZO, to hold their own 
congress in Moscow. Shipov, rather than consent to these demands and attempt to 
outmaneuver the Red Cross, suggested that the Main Directorate needed to participate in any 
policy discussions, so he recommended the zemstvo doctors participate in Vasil’chikov’s 
proposed congress.698  
In the fall of 1905, doctors and administrators from the Red Cross, zemstvo and other 
brigades, and military met to discuss forming a program for the first All-Russian Congress of 
Former Aid Workers for the Sick and Wounded in the Russo-Japanese War. Vasil’chikov 
chaired the preliminary meeting, which determined that this congress would review errors in 
the past war, determine appropriate relations between voluntary aid organizations and the 
military, and work out a plan for how Red Cross committees should prepare for war work 
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during peacetime. The most interesting item of discussion would be public control for the 
Red Cross, which the planners regarded necessary because the lack of oversight during the 
last campaign had led donors to feel that their donations were wasted.699 Domestic turmoil 
followed by indifference prevented this congress from meeting for nearly another decade. 
The traditional narrative of 1905 in Russia focuses most attention on military defeat 
and revolutionary violence, but a third crisis, in the form of crop failure and famine, 
threatened millions of peasants living in agricultural regions of central Russia and along the 
Volga. Russia had faced widespread hunger before, most notoriously in 1891-92, when 
famine affected twenty-five provinces, and the tsarist state responded by mobilizing the Red 
Cross as an important component in the peacetime relief campaign. This time, Russia 
possessed an additional philanthropic instrument in the GZO, which clamored for a role 
addressing national issues in peacetime. 
By the summer of 1905, it had become apparent that crop failures and rural unrest 
would damage the harvest. The GZO took the first step toward addressing the crisis by 
demanding the government permit the zemstvos to conduct relief work at a conference in 
Moscow on 8 July. The most pressing question was whether the zemstvos would work again 
“under the flag of the Red Cross” or conduct their work independently. In August, L’vov met 
with members of the Red Cross’s Main Directorate to discuss another coordinated campaign 
to target rural hunger. Wartime necessity had compelled the GZO to coordinate with the Red 
Cross, but this time Red Cross intervention in the zemstvos’ activities prompted provincial 
activists to cry foul. 
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At a 30 August conference, recalcitrant zemstvo advocates complained that the Red 
Cross enjoyed no support from the public, that local Red Cross chapters were under the 
influence of the governors and police and could thus not be trusted, and that the Red Cross 
would obstruct any efforts at famine relief. L’vov and his supporters took a more calculated 
approach by insisting that famine required the zemstvo advocates to set aside their political 
struggle to relieve the peasants. The Red Cross’s flag enabled the zemstvos to operate freely 
in the provinces without police interference, coordinate with other provincial boards, share 
funds, and accept donations of clothing and other supplies, and ship freight on state-owned 
railroads at discounted prices.700 In the end, zemstvo moderates won a split vote over whether 
to work with the Red Cross. The following day, L’vov again met with the Main Directorate 
of the Red Cross, which admitted the GZO to operate under its flag and pledged not to 
interfere with the zemstvos’ famine relief efforts.701 Mariia Fedorovna justified this decision 
in a 29 September letter to the Minister of Finance on the grounds that the Red Cross had 
expended much of its resources during the war and could not handle famine relief by itself on 
the scale needed.702 Further discussions centered on how to coordinate activities between the 
two institutions so their aid work would not be redundant.703 Over the next year and a half, 
governing members of the Red Cross and the leaders of the GZO met at least ninety-eight 
times to coordinate famine relief activities.704 
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In October 1905, the GZO began to arrange a network of cafeterias, bakeries, and 
other charitable institutions in the regions affected by famine. Zemstvo activists set up 
management boards at the provincial and county levels. In the counties and villages, activists 
sought help from teachers, priests, and rural elites to oversee the canteens. The Red Cross 
arranged a similar network of cafeterias that operated beside zemstvo institutions on a 
smaller scale in 1905, in part because many personnel returned slowly from the Far East. 
Coordination between the GZO and the Red Cross’s Executive Commission attempted to 
prevent the duplication of efforts, but Red Cross organizers at times complained that they 
received no information on the activities the zemstvos had already conducted or agents they 
dispatched to the countryside.705 The Red Cross alarmed zemstvo advocates by dispatching a 
Red Cross agent to inspect zemstvo work in Penza, Samara, and Viatka in early 1906. This 
move drew a telegram of protest from the GZO, which feared the Red Cross was spying on 
its activities. If a degree of mistrust or concern between the two was understandable, 
bureaucratic interference in this campaign should not be overstated.706 
Instead, the two organizations worked together on several projects. Nicholas II early 
in the campaign transferred one hundred poods of hard tack (sukhar’) from the navy to the 
Red Cross to distribute to the needy. L’vov asked the Red Cross for these victuals, and the 
Red Cross shipped the hard tack to affected provinces for the GZO activists to distribute.707 
When local zemstvo doctors asked for Red Cross brigades to treat typhoid among the 
Bashkirs of Samara Province, the GZO approved of the plan, and the medical teams set 
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out.708 Lastly, the Red Cross satisfied requests from the GZO for advances on monies owed 
them from the Ministry of War for wartime relief. As of May 1906, the Ministry of War still 
owed the GZO 186,000 rubles for operating hospitals at the Battle of Shaho in the Far East, 
and, when L’vov pleaded that they needed the funds to continue work in provinces, the Red 
Cross forwarded the sum.709 
The scale of expenditures reveals the great disproportion between the GZO’s and Red 
Cross’s contributions to the 1905 campaign. The Red Cross spent a total of 238,774 rubles on 
famine relief, while the GZO spent 600,000 rubles that remained in their coffers from war 
work and received at least two grants from the Ministry of Finance for one million rubles 
each. The Ministry of Internal Affairs distributed the overwhelming majority of aid, thirty-
five million rubles worth, as non-repayable seed loans disbursed by provincial zemstvos 
individually. Donations to the Red Cross failed to eclipse a measly sixty thousand rubles in 
1905, which likely indicates the low regard many tsarist subjects had for this organization in 
the wake of the Russo-Japanese War.710 The Red Cross was far from broke at this time, as 
wartime reserve capital exceeded five million rubles, but the organization’s charter forbade 
the use of these funds for peacetime endeavors without special permission from the Main 
Directorate. With Russia’s armies still deployed in the Far East, it should come as no great 
surprise that the Red Cross embraced famine relief slowly in 1905. 
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The year 1905 had produced a disappointing harvest, and rural unrest disturbed 
planting and destroyed stocks of seed, guaranteeing problems the following year. By June 
1906, reports had reached St. Petersburg that crop failure would affect at least twenty-three 
provinces. Facing a greater disruption in agriculture than in 1905, the tsarist state followed 
the precedent set in 1891 by forming a permanent commission made up of representatives 
from the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Finance, and State Domains along with members of 
the Red Cross, GZO, and Trudovaia Pomoshch’, a state-sponsored labor initiative. The Red 
Cross’s representative was M. E. Nirod, and Prince L’vov again stood in for the zemstvos. 
Spurred on by state encouragement and subsidies, and likely concerned by accusations in the 
press of inactivity and indifference, the Red Cross greatly expanded its famine relief 
campaign in 1906. At a 30 July congress, the Main Directorate apportioned one million 
rubles from its wartime reserves for famine relief. In early October, they added another 
million rubles to famine relief and began directing all mandatory Red Cross donations from 
the sale of train tickets and passports toward immediate aid to the peasants. A post-campaign 
report cited that the Red Cross spent at least five million rubles of its own funds and state 
grants in 1906, with Samara, Simbirsk, Kazan, and Ufa receiving the most aid.711 One 
estimate claimed the Red Cross provided 358,086 meals per day from October 1906 to July 
1907.712 As the Red Cross expanded its work in the countryside, the GZO encountered 
unexpected troubles from provincial nobles, who criticized L’vov for mismanagement of 
funds and demanded no further zemstvo monies be used for famine relief in early 1906.713 
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On the ground, the Red Cross work mirrored efforts in 1891-92 to combat hunger 
among the neediest strata of the population. The Main Directorate instructed provincial 
chapters to appoint village and hamlet agents to oversee distribution of aid alongside the 
zemstvos. In some villages, teachers, priests, or trustworthy peasants could not be found, so 
the Red Cross again relied on land captains, tax assessors, or police constables, a decision 
that drew ire from the zemstvo advocates and surely little love from the peasants.714 Aid 
work targeted women, children, and the elderly, who were ineligible for seed loans from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Red Cross preferred to feed the population in cafeterias 
because these institutions provided better control over the delivery of aid; free distribution of 
bread or flour still occurred in many places without cafeterias, but charity workers avoided 
handing out cash alms at all costs. In some cases, Sisters of Mercy in the service of the Red 
Cross, many of whom had recently returned from the Far East, worked in lazarettos set up by 
the zemstvos in areas affected by typhus and scurvy.715 
Even though the Red Cross put forth greater efforts at combating hunger in 1906, 
problems still undermined the efficiency of this campaign and stirred tensions with the GZO. 
Samara Province, the most devastated by the 1906 famine, might serve as a case study for the 
challenges that the Red Cross and zemstvos faced in their relief campaign. To begin with, the 
assassination of Governor I. L. Blok in June by a terrorist’s bomb and the subsequent 
confusion that followed over the nomination of a replacement delayed Red Cross work until 
autumn 1906. When the new governor took over, he found Red Cross relief in the province 
lacked coordination and was exceeding budget forecasts. The GZO had established cafeterias 
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and bread distribution points the following year, but, when zemstvo finances ran dry, they 
transferred many of these stations to the Red Cross for management. The new governor, V. 
V. Iakunin, streamlined the aid distribution to reduce expenditures and increase 
accountability, but these improvements did little to relieve the situation in the northern three 
uezdy of the province, where famine had struck the non-Russian population particularly hard 
and far more people were relying on the cafeterias than activists had intended. And Mother 
Nature harmed work as well, as heavy snowfalls in November delayed the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs’ deliveries of grain to peasants, which drove many more families to Red 
Cross aid stations. Despite these problems, the Red Cross claimed it took the lead in handing 
out free meals in Samara Province in 1906: By the end of the year, the Red Cross operated 
1,178 cafeterias or bread distribution points, whereas the GZO managed 190 and the Samara 
provincial zemstvo 450. As this author estimated, 240,000 of the 300,000 needy in Samara 
received aid from the Red Cross in 1906.716 
If the total amount of state subsidies provides any indication of favor, then the GZO 
triumphed over the Red Cross in 1906. By the end of the year, the Red Cross claimed to have 
spent as much as 7 million rubles, and only 2.5 million of this amount came from state 
subsidies.717 During the same year, the GZO raised nearly nine million rubles with six of 
these coming from state subsidies. L’vov faced resistance from members within the zemstvo 
boards and the state, which believed he had overstepped the bounds of what was permissible 
in an autocracy. But L’vov had supporters as well. The new Minister of Interior, Petr 
Stolypin, may have viewed the GZO as an appropriate organ of civil society by 1906 and one 
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that the Kadets in the Second Duma, the liberal party whose support the reformer minister 
sought, deemed willing to back. In spring 1907, the state came forth with an additional six 
million rubles for famine relief, and much of this appropriation went to the GZO, while the 
Red Cross received no mention.718  
The harvest of 1907 recovered, and the GZO scaled back its famine relief activities 
by the autumn. The Red Cross, overlooked for major state subsidies, continued to provide 
medical aid and famine relief on a smaller and much cheaper scale to areas on the periphery 
of the empire that had no zemstvo presence.719 It seems likely that the Red Cross may have 
wanted to cease managing large-scale famine relief campaigns by 1907. As we already saw, 
the Red Cross reluctantly dipped into the coffers of its wartime relief funds only when the 
scale of the disaster was tremendous and press reports demanded this organization do more to 
help the needy. Throughout 1906, the Red Cross struggled to raise donations for famine relief 
and had to rely on state subsidies and compulsory donations from taxes on passports and 
train tickets. In at least one case, the Saratov Provincial Red Cross Committee discussed 
outsourcing the operation of several cafeterias in the city to private individuals, but this idea 
ran counter to the practices of past famine relief campaigns and might draw charges of 
corruption.720 With no political agenda to prove, many Red Cross activists were probably 
relieved that three years of hardship were coming to an end. 
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The Red Cross’s lengthy post-famine report did not shy away from the fact that the 
GZO took the lead in civilian relief efforts following the Russo-Japanese War.721 The next 
major famine to hit Russia occurred in 1910, and, by this time, many leading figures within 
the autocracy had turned against the zemstvos. In this campaign, the Red Cross enjoyed 
renewed support from the state, but the new Prime Minister V. N. Kokovtsev relegated the 
GZO to fundraising only, an activity the zemstvo activists still undertook successfully.722 A 
national zemstvo organization did not reemerge until events in the Balkans put Russia on a 
seemingly unstoppable path to war in the summer of 1914. 
Conclusions 
To many zemstvo advocates, the famine relief campaigns of 1905-07 took on the 
dichotomy of the state-society struggle, the “kto-kogo,” that colored most political and social 
issues in late tsarist Russia. The members of the GZO believed the confrontation with 
empire-wide tragedies had won this political organ a role in governance beyond the borders 
of the province or county. This passion would upset the tsarist regime as its political mood 
shifted from an openness to experiment with a constitution and civil rights to a reaffirmation 
of autocracy. For the Red Cross, zemstvo advocates’ behavior during the campaign may have 
seemed confusing and improper. Founded to supplement the military medical corps in war, 
the Red Cross seemed naturally poised to fulfill a supplementary and supportive role to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs when peacetime disasters struck, as it had in 1874 and 1891. This 
attitude may help explain M. Burdukov’s reaction to the GZO advocates’ arrival in Ufa in the 
winter of 1906, when they refused to coordinate efforts with existing institutions and sought 
                                                     
721 Otchet Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta, 1-2. 
 
722 Polner, Zhiznennyi put’, 103. 
 309 
 
only to work according to a preordained program tailored to the region and their fixed 
budget.723 But the reluctance by the Red Cross to undertake anything more than a private role 
also helps explain why members of the press protested whenever Russia’s national aid 
society failed to solve or even address its many problems. Upset by reports of Red Cross 
failures in the Far East in 1904 and empowered by the First Duma’s decision to support the 
GZO in 1905, a different faction within educated Russia, in this case zemstvo liberals, briefly 
positioned themselves as protector of Russia’s welfare. For the Red Cross this may have been 
a welcome respite. This organization, staffed mostly by volunteers, was exhausted from the 
Russo-Japanese War. Famine relief was not the Red Cross’s raison d’être, and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs had traditionally handled this problem in concert with the zemstvos. Still, 
for the tsarist public in 1905, Russia’s aid society did not unite the tsar and people, but 
instead incited the latter against the former. 
The decade before World War I saw the Red Cross’s journal publish many accounts 
that identified its shortcomings in the Russo-Japanese War, but the Main Directorate 
undertook no restructuring to make this organization accountable to the public. These authors 
wanted the conference Vasil’chikov had proposed in 1905 to come to terms with past 
problems. Calls for this reckoning became most pronounced in 1908 after M. S. Tolmachev, 
a former GZO doctor, published an article titled “On the Needs of Private Aid in War” that 
outlined the failures of 1904.724 Soon after this article appeared in print, Tolmachev died, 
which added to the impetus to hold this conference while veterans from the Far East were 
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still alive.725 Instead, the Red Cross answered the demands for accountability by publishing 
its own lengthy account of the Russo-Japanese War justifying much of its activities, while 
former agents penned individual rejoinders to their critics.726 The last peaceful years of tsarist 
Russia saw the Red Cross continue to plod along with autocratic protection, intervening in 
famines in 1911 and 1912, and dispatching medical teams to intervene in the Balkan Wars of 
1912 and 1913. Not until these conflicts alarmed the State Duma to the immanence of a 
European conflagration did the special congress of military planners, veterans of the Russo-
Japanese War, and Red Cross officials convene in February 1913. This group met on several 
occasions in 1913 and devised timetables and locations for Red Cross facilities to deploy 
based on the experiences in Russia’s last two conflicts.727 Unlike in 1877 and 1904, when 
tsarist generals ignored the Red Cross until after war had broken out, Russia possessed 
detailed plans for how to use its aid society on the eve of World War I. 
If the original Red Cross advocates in Russia such as Pirogov sought to provide an 
avenue for tsarist educated society to play a greater role in the management of the empire, by 
spring 1914 the Russian state had taken the lead devising plans to hasten voluntary 
associations’ resources toward military ends. Once under the purview of the Romanov 
women and a small clique of bureaucrats, the Red Cross now was held responsible for tasks 
far greater than its talents, resources, or level of preparedness. When compared to two of the 
                                                     
725 P. D. Dolgorukov, “Krasnyi Krest v mirnoe vremiia,” Vestnik Krasnogo Kresta (Octobre 1908): 28-34.  
 
726 P. M. fon Kaufman, ed. Otchet o deiatel’nosti Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Krestavo vremia russko-
iaponskoi voiny, vol. I (St. Petersburg: Glavone upralenie udelov, 1911); Otzyvy Glavnoupolnomochennykh 
Rossiiskogo Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta na Dal’nem Vostoke v russko-iaponskuiu voinu 1904-5 gg. Kniazia 
B. A. Vasil’chikova, P. M. fon-Kaufmana i B. A. Khanenko na svedeniia o deiatel’nosti nazvannogo 
Obshchestva, pomeshchennye v otchete o deiatel’nosti Glavnoi Evakuatsionnoi Kommissii: za 1904-1907 (St. 
Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1911).  
 
727 See RGVIA f. 12651, op. 1, d. 1079, ll. 1-2; RGVIA, f. 12651, op. 3, d. 303, ll. 1-10.  
 311 
 
world’s most prominent national Red Cross societies at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
American Red Cross and the Japanese Red Cross, the Russian Red Cross appears to have 
been less a product of the tsarist regime’s bureaucratic inflexibility toward civil society and 
much more an example of an underdeveloped state trying to mobilize the public for large-
scale military and philanthropic ends. What the tsarist state failed to understand was that, by 
the turn of the twentieth century, educated Russia believed it could conduct relief work better 
on its own and wanted nothing to do with a state that resisted accountability and flexibility. 
The most outstanding Red Cross of the era, the Japanese Red Cross, enjoyed its success 
because of state control, compulsion, and discipline. At the same time, even the American 
Red Cross, the envy of Russian advocates of private aid from Pirogov onward for its 
enlightened commitment to public health and Texas-sized fundraising capacity, saw its 
independent characteristics cast aside by Washington bureaucrats after scandals following the 
Galveston Earthquake of 1904.728 In this sense, Russia was not unusual because the state 
meddled so much in its Red Cross, but instead exceptional because the Old Regime seemed 
so indifferent to calls from the public for reform of its aid society.  
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CHAPTER 8 – TSARIST HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS ABROAD, 1896-1913 
As a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1864, the Russian Red Cross possessed 
the right to send medical workers to intervene in foreign conflicts involving member nations. 
In 1876, Pan-Slavic newspapers stirred up trouble by inspiring a large number of Russians, 
including Maria Aleksandrova and other members of the court, to support humanitarian 
interventions in Montenegro and Serbia, two Orthodox nations that had recently adopted to 
the Geneva Convention to attract outside aid. On the surface, the Russian missions intended 
to provide medical care for the wounded and awaken the South Slavs to the benevolence of 
Russian hegemony in the Balkans. In actuality, for many Pan-Slavs, these missions sought to 
escalate conflicts between Serbia, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire and draw Russia 
into a larger war over the Balkans. The Balkan volunteers were successful in this endeavor, 
and humanitarian aid served as one component of the diplomatic and military series of events 
that pulled Russia into a war with the Ottomans, a conflict the tsarist Ministries of War and 
Foreign Affairs did not wish to wage in 1877.  
The mandate to intervene in foreign conflicts never went away, and following the 
Russo-Turkish War, Russia sent medical teams to provide sanitary aid to belligerents in 
several wars. Most of these missions were popular with the Russian public. In each case, 
however, the tsarist state carefully controlled the sanitary brigades to avoid disrupting the 
empire’s foreign relations or causing embarrassing incidents. This chapter examines four 
cases when the Russian Red Cross dispatched aid workers to work in foreign conflicts—the 
Italo-Abyssinian Conflict of 1896, the Boer War, and the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913—to
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see what Russia hoped to gain from these interventions. For the Red Cross, these wars 
provided the opportunities to practice medicine in foreign war zones and affirm Russia’s 
commitment to the international humanitarian movement. The Russian public viewed these 
missions as exciting opportunities to back underdogs in anticolonial wars of resistance and 
promote Russia’s stature abroad as a benevolent, civilized empire. For the autocracy, these 
interventions served as diplomatic gestures of good will, they allayed domestic pressures at 
home, and they affirmed Russia’s standing in the country club of European powers and 
Geneva Convention signatories.  
The Italo-Abyssinian War of 1896 
An observer in St. Petersburg in 1895 would have been surprised by how much tsarist 
Russia’s standing in international affairs had unexpectedly improved since the hangover that 
followed the inglorious Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Recent foreign developments, such as the 
conclusion of an alliance with France and St. Petersburg’s normalization of relations with 
Sophia in 1895, coupled with the successes of Witte’s economic reforms, prompted tsarist 
subjects to revisit the intoxicating allure of imperial expansion. Much attention has been paid 
to Nicholas II’s ill-fated push into East Asia, but the Russians endeavored an unexpected 
southern diversion to the Eastern Question as well. In 1896, in hopes of courting the 
Abyssinian Christian state led by Emperor Menelik II, which had just bested an Italian 
expeditionary force at the Battle of Adwa, the Russian Red Cross dispatched a team of 
doctors and nurses to treat the wounded and spread the benefits of scientific medicine to the 
not-yet-enlightened indigenes. 
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Russian newspapers, drunk on the elixir of the “journalism of imperialism,” 
enthusiastically backed the Abyssinians in this conflict.729 Eyewitness reports in Novoe 
vremia informed readers that the Abyssinians were hardly a ragtag group of “barbarians” but 
instead were “legitimate,” “well-armed,” “united,” and ready to continue the “holy war” until 
the enemy was driven from their lands. Similar to Russia’s late adoption of European 
civilization, one journalist remarked, Adwa was Abyssinia’s Poltava: Both battles marked the 
coming-out parties for the Eastern progenies.730  Menelik recognized that the superiority of 
European arms, railroads, and the telegraph, and he “must be considered seriously.” Another 
writer chided those who sympathized with the Italians, noting that Italy had abandoned its 
admirable “classical character” by committing this folly.731  
Even before Italian General Oreste Baratieri lost his army at Adwa, Russian 
newspapers encouraged the public to support the plight of the Abyssinian wounded. An 
exposé in Novoe vremia on 24 February, six days after the battle, sparked the Russian 
public’s desire for a humanitarian response. This article noted that the “Italian colony” of 
expatriates in Odessa had begun collecting donations for the Italian Red Cross. Outraged that 
patriotic Russians were asked to support the Goliath in this conflict, a group of Slavophiles, 
who included publicist Aleksandr Aksakov, war correspondent Viacheslav Rossolovskii, and 
mystic Aleksandr Nikol’skii beseeched readers of Novoe vremia to donate for a Red Cross 
brigade for “our coreligionists,” the Abyssinian wounded.732 The next day, rumors hit the 
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press that Menelik had adopted the Geneva Convention, which enabled foreign Red Cross 
societies to provide assistance to the estimated ten thousand Abyssinian wounded.733 Novoe 
vremia suggested that the Russian Red Cross in the past would have followed the examples 
of tsarist philanthropy in the Franco-Prussian War and Serbo-Bulgarian conflict of 1885 and 
outfit equal sanitary brigades for each side. But this author conveniently reinterpreted the 
Geneva Convention for the present conflict, insisting that the Russians should not waste 
efforts or materials on the Italians. Instead, all of the Russian aid should go to the 
Abyssinians, since Italian charitable societies were already collecting donations in Russia and 
Italian troops would surely receive enough help from their own Red Cross society. While 
acknowledging that the Italian Red Cross had the right to collect donations in Russia, this 
author stressed that only the Russians cared about the Abyssinians. Furthermore, Italian 
weapons were the most advanced and surely produced more harm to Abyssinian bodies than 
the Africans’ weapons would have on the Italians.734 
Since no one was looking out for the African Christians, Novoe vremia began a 
collection drive to fund a Red Cross sanitary brigade for the Abyssinians, and this decision 
drew rebuke from foreign newspapers as well as Russian statesmen and liberals who saw it 
as an affront to the international standard that aid under the Geneva Convention must be 
offered equally to each side in a conflict. In the first twenty days, this drive raised over eight 
thousand rubles for the Abyssinians. Donors, Novoe vremia boasted, came from all strata of 
society, and parents allegedly took the liberty to explain to their children that the donations 
are for “the struggle for the rodina, for its freedom and independence,” even though Italy was 
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defeated and never threatened Russia. True, the collection drive may have violated the spirit 
of the Geneva Convention, but the editors of Novoe vremia believed, “The widespread 
participation assures us that we have proceeded correctly with the project and movement.” 
They denied allegations that they were trying to turn the Red Cross into a “political tool” and 
emphasized that they would trust General Shvedov, the leader of the sanitary brigade, to use 
the funds as he saw appropriate.735  
The Newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti took up the Abyssinian cause in Russia’s 
second capital. The author A. I. Elishev warned readers that the British would intervene in 
the conflict by sending forces from Egypt to Abyssinia. Europe clearly sided with the 
Italians, since Britain, Germany, and Austria were sending sanitary brigades and France was 
doing nothing. Thus, it was up to Russia to protect the poor Abyssinians, who “did not 
possess European science or medicine.” Elishev acknowledged that the Geneva Convention 
prevented the Russian Red Cross from giving aid solely to the Abyssinians while remaining 
neutral in the conflict, but he justified Russia’s violating the convention’s rules by stressing 
the great inequality in foreign aid the two belligerents would likely receive from outside 
actors.736 A week later, a reader from Odessa connected the Abyssinian conflict with the 
Eastern Question and identified the Red Cross as a powerful weapon in this struggle. Evgenii 
L’vov, who had visited Red Cross hospitals in Belgrade and Sofia in 1885, believed medical 
volunteers produced “an influence stronger than that of the pope in Bulgaria” and that his 
ten-ruble donation would heal a wounded Abyssinian who will “again raise his sword against 
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the modern Saracens in defense of the motherland and Orthodoxy.”737 The “journalism of 
imperialism,” these excerpts make clear, enabled Russian readers to view the Red Cross as an 
arm with which to engage the Eastern Question on the Abyssinian front, and these incensed 
subjects demanded action.  
In contrast to the aggressive public, the Red Cross took a careful approach toward 
intervention in this conflict by selecting trustworthy brigade members and ensuring that the 
mission followed international standards. The scholar A. V. Khrenkov argued that tsarist 
state eagerly directed the bureaucratic machinery to create and dispatch sanitary brigades 
with the utmost speed, and this haste was surely in part an attempt to placate public fervor.738 
The meeting notes from the Main Directorate state that on February 25, a Liubov’ Pratasveta 
brought to the committee’s attention Novoe vremia articles from the same day that claimed 
that the Abyssinians had recently adopted the Geneva Convention, there were twelve 
thousand wounded from Adwa in need of treatment, and the Abyssinians would welcome 
Russian aid.739 This same issue of Novoe vremia announced the newspaper’s collection drive 
for Abyssinian wounded.740 Novoe vremia’s intelligence on Abyssinia predated that of the 
Red Cross, which responded to the newspaper’s initiative by requesting further information 
on Abyssinia’s needs for aid from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Asian Division of the 
General Staff, and the Swiss government.741 Replies from the Swiss government show that, 
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after brief confusion, Menelik had asked the Geneva Committee of the Red Cross for 
Abyssinia to be included in the Geneva Convention shortly after Adwa.742 During this same 
period, the Russian Red Cross ran announcements calling for volunteers in the major 
newspapers, and dozens of individuals submitted petitions to join the sanitary brigade. These 
applicants came from all segments of the Russian population—Sofia Gomberg, a Jewish 
doctor from Elizavetgrad, even sent in a petition—and these individuals frequently cited 
professional experience, personal contacts, and special skills or languages they would bring 
to the mission.743 Educated Russians yearned to take part in this adventure indeed. 
The Red Cross staffed the sanitary brigade with trusted personnel. By 6 March, Maria 
Fedorovna, the patroness of the Red Cross, had named General Shvedov the leader of the 
brigade. Konstantin Zviagin, Georgii Kokhovskii, and A. K. Bulatovich, both officers, acted 
as deputy agents, and the medical staff was made up of seven military doctors, ten feldshers, 
twenty-two orderlies, twelve trained nurses, a priest, and several other attendants, which 
brought the cohort up to sixty-one people.744 Shvedov was a logical selection to lead the 
mission since he had ample experience as an agent of the Red Cross during the Russo-
Turkish and Serbo-Bulgarian Wars.745 Zviagin had traveled Abyssinia before as a member of 
one of Leont’ev’s missions to Menelik.746 Several other members even consulted with 
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Russia’s premier specialist on Abyssinia, Professor V. V. Bolotov, before embarking.747 
When selecting personnel, the Red Cross gave preference to military medical workers or 
veterans because these individuals were better disciplined, experienced with wartime injuries, 
and acclimated to long marches and camp life.748 The Ministry of War permitted the use of 
its personnel, even preserving ranks and giving credit for time served for soldiers on this 
expedition, but it refused to provide any funds for the expedition.749 The Main Directorate 
delegated 130,000 rubles for the project and quickly acquired the necessary instruments, 
medicines, tents, clothes, and food in the capital. According to one account, the brigade had 
enough supplies to treat between eight and ten thousand patients and operate for three to four 
months in the theater of war.750 Additionally, the Ministry of War provided the brigade with 
rifles and ammunition.751 By the end of March, the brigade was equipped and ready to begin 
its journey to Africa.  
The Russians’ plan was to travel from Odessa to the Eritrean port of Massova, an 
Italian possession, where the brigade would split in two, in order to comply with the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention. The first group would stay in Massova to treat the 
Italians, while the second group would pass through Italian Eritrea to the Abyssinian capital 
Addis Ababa. This plan, unpopular with the Russian press, was necessary because “our Red 
Cross must not forget that its humanitarian tasks and formal responsibilities forbade it from 
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giving different quantities of aid to the victims of war depending on nationality.”752 Approval 
of the project was needed from the Italians, who, according to the Geneva Convention, had 
the right to refuse foreign aid. On 6 March, the Russian Red Cross sent a formal request to 
the Italian government via the embassy in Rome asking to let the brigade proceed to 
Massova. On 22 March, Rome replied with permission for the tsarist brigade to proceed 
through Massova, but this telegram also asked that the Russians redirect their brigade to 
Naples.753 There were two reasons for this divergence. First, Italy had relocated most of its 
wounded from Adwa to Naples. Second, reports in British, German, and Italian newspapers 
claimed that the Russian sanitary brigade contained over two hundred armed soldiers 
intended to reinforce Abyssinian ranks.754 It is unlikely the Italians seriously believed that the 
Russian brigade harbored a secret military agenda. Menelik’s army numbered over one 
hundred thousand at Adwa, so two hundred Russians would provide token reinforcement at 
best, and the Russian brigade planned to pass through Italian territory, so whatever military 
threat it posed would be obvious. More likely, it was the Russian press that frayed Italian 
nerves; Novoe vremia ostentatiously celebrated the outcome of Adwa and publicly endorsed 
supporting only the Abyssinians with material and medical aid, a position even the Russian 
Red Cross privately acknowledged would offend the Italians.755  
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To quiet any suspicions, the Russians sent a detailed description of its brigade to 
Aleksei Lobanov-Rostovskii, ambassador to Rome, in which they emphasized that the 
brigade had an “exclusively sanitary character” and the few armed sanitary workers were 
needed to defend the personnel from “wild beasts and outlaw gangs in the desert.”756 
Suspecting that Italy might renege on its promise of free passage, the Russians devised a 
contingency plan, whereby the brigade would continue its cruise along the Horn of Africa to 
the French possessions of Djibouti. From Djibouti, the Russians would travel to Addis Ababa 
via the longer and more difficult land journey through Harar.757 On 26 March, the Italians 
called off Russian and German sanitary brigades, claiming they were not needed in 
Naples.758 Two days later, Lobanov-Rostovskii informed St. Petersburg that the Italians 
denied the Russian brigade permission to travel through Massova due to public outrage over 
the expedition’s “military character.”759 While this confusion played out, the Russian sanitary 
brigade waited anxiously in Alexandria, Egypt.  
With Italian possessions closed to the Russian brigade, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs sought and won permission from the French to travel through Djibouti on 1 April.760 
Facing a longer and more arduous journey through desert and mountains, St. Petersburg 
informed the brigade to send the nurses home from Alexandria.761 Without the women, the 
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Russian detachment continued to Djibouti, where it landed on 18 April. In the French port, 
Shvedov faced several unforeseen difficulties. First, war had depleted the local stocks of 
pack animals. Only with the help of the French governor, Legarde, and at a great cost was 
Shevdov able to procure the mules and camels needed for the caravan.762 Second, time was 
of essence for the Russians, since the onset of the rainy season in June would make travel to 
Addis Ababa nearly impossible.763 The French helped the Russians hire Abyssinians, Arabs, 
and Somalis to serve as guides, guards, and interpreters to expedite the passage to Harar.  
The first caravan loaded with freight left for Harar on April 20. In hopes of aiding the 
movement of the personnel through the desert and informing the Abyssinians that the 
Russians were coming, the Russian agent Bulatovich pleaded with Shvedov to permit him to 
scout the route to Harar by camel. Shvedov acquiesced to the request mostly because the 
expensive sojourn to Djibouti depleted the brigade’s cash and it was likely that the Russians 
would face similar problems finding the animals to outfit a large caravan in Harar. 
Bulatovich traversed the distance of 350 versts in just under four days to deliver news of the 
Russians’ arrival.764 A week later, Shvedov and the remaining Russians left for Harar. The 
considerable size and length of the main caravan meant that travel through the desert was 
slow and uncomfortable, especially because over half the brigade suffered from 
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gastrointestinal maladies, but they encountered no unexpected difficulties and arrived in 
Harar on May 15.765  
The Abyssinians showed the Russians warm hospitality upon their arrival in Harar 
and provided the guests with lodging, but this friendly reception masked Menelik’s 
uncertainty over the Russians’ true intentions in Africa. Menelik had after all requested 
military aid from Nicholas II shortly after Adwa for dealing with continued violence by the 
Italians in the Tigre region; however, the Russians had failed to reply with an answer on 
whether arms were forthcoming.766 Shvedov recorded that he initiated negotiations with 
Menelik’s deputy and the governor of Harar on further travel to Addis Ababa, but the 
Russians received belated and confusing replies from the Abyssinian authorities on how to 
proceed. In response to this delay, the Russians opened a clinic in Harar to demonstrate to the 
mistrustful Abyssinians that the medical brigade had no masked intentions. The local 
residents first looked at this facility with reservation; few patients sheepishly visited the 
Russian doctors. Soon, as Shvedov wrote his superiors in St. Petersburg, friendly appeals to 
Makonen and successful treatment of sick Abyssinians won over the locals to Russian 
medicine, and the clinic was treating up to 250 patients daily.767 Also, the Russians again 
dispatched Bulatovich as the missionary to Addis Ababa to goad Menelik with diplomacy.768 
Bulatovich reported back to Shvedov via courier that a party in Addis Ababa was intriguing 
against the Russian’s presence in the country. A Russian adventurer, Leont’ev, then residing 
                                                     
765 RGVIA, f. 12651, op. 3, d. 153, l. 39, 48; “Russkii Krasnyi Krest v Abissinii,” Vestnik Rossiiskogo 
Obshchestva Krasnogo Kresta, January 4, 1897, 4-7.  
 
766 Krokhin and Rait, eds., “Nekotorye novye dokumenty,” 152-58. 
 
767 RGVIA, f. 12651, op. 3, d. 153, l. 104.  
 
768 RGVIA, f. 12651, op. 3, d. 153, l. 63. 
 
 324 
 
at Menelik’s court, probably was the source of this trouble because, as Shvedov reported, 
“the Emperor has known about the arrival [of the Red Cross] brigade to Djibouti since April, 
and up to this point T. Leon’tev has done nothing for the Russian Red Cross”; moreover, “all 
of the reports that they had received in Petersburg [from Leont’ev] on Abyssinia have been 
untrustworthy.”769 Finally, on 12 June, a notification from Menelik arrived, asking the 
Russians to hasten to Addis Ababa. Six days later, and with the help of the Abyssinians, the 
brigade had gathered the necessary pack animals and departed in two caravans. Shortly after 
departing, Shvedov was approached by a delegation of Abyssinians, which informed the 
Russians that up to 1,500 wounded were being transported to Harar and requested that a 
contingent of medical personnel stay behind in the city to treat the patients, who had not yet 
arrived. Shvedov left several doctors and staff members behind to open a hospital in Harar.770 
The trip from Harar to Addis Ababa proved more difficult than the first leg of the 
journey, due to its route over mountain passes and through patches of desert with no watering 
holes. Seasonal rains flooded streams and slowed travel as well. Numbering 842 animals in 
total, the caravan was by no means small or agile.771 On the way, the medical personnel 
provided medical aid to local inhabitants, treating several hundred patients.772 At the end of 
July, the sanitary brigade entered Addis Ababa. Menelik had outfitted the single European 
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estate house for the brigade and arranged a celebration to greet the newcomers. He also 
issued a decree to gather the wounded in one place for treatment.773  
The Red Cross hospital in Addis Ababa opened on 1 August, and, according to 
Russian sources, it won acclaims from the locals. Featuring a surgical ward, electrotherapy 
division, massage facility, and an ambulatory as well as over thirty permanent beds, this was 
the first European hospital in Abyssinia. Shvedov wrote in his report that Menelik was 
grateful for the medical assistance and the emperor obliged all of the Russians’ requests for 
help constructing the facility, manning it with janitors and laundresses and satisfying the 
Russians’ need for comforts in the capital. The emperor “now sees and values the unselfish 
friendship of Russia to Abyssinia and remains steadfast in his feelings of thanks to 
Russia.”774 Red Cross Agent Glinskii enjoyed similar assistance from the governor in Harar. 
After thieves made off with over five thousand francs from the Red Cross station in Harar, 
Abyssinian authorities found the culprits and returned nearly all of the money to Glinskii.775 
The Empress Taitu consulted with Shvedov on forming a Red Cross organization for her 
country and requested that the Russians train Abyssinians in medical techniques.776 Menelik 
himself made frequent visits to the hospital, revealing an interest in medical devices, 
treatments, and drugs.777 At the clinic in Harar, local officials as well observed the surgical 
removal of a bullet.778 
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The Russians ceased their activities on 5 October, when the hospital was formally 
transferred to the Abyssinian Red Cross under the patronage of Empress Taitu, but Doctor B. 
A. Rozevich and several other personnel remained in Addis Ababa to continue treating 
Abyssinian patients and Italian prisoners. With the creation of the Abyssinian Red Cross, the 
Russians reminded Menelik and Taitu about the Geneva Convention’s guarantees of 
neutrality for enemy medical professionals, and the Abyssinians allegedly enabled the few 
Italian doctors in their captivity to treat Italian prisoners of war.779 Also, as a final gesture of 
goodwill, the Russians placed an order for smallpox vaccine, which the detachment of 
personnel remaining in Addis Ababa would use to inoculate Abyssinians. The Russians left 
Addis Ababa on 10 October after working there for two months. They arrived in Harar on 8 
November and closed the sanitary station, which had operated for four and a half months. 
From Harar, the combined brigade traveled to Djibouti, where they departed for Russia on 30 
November and arrived in St. Petersburg on 23 December.780 The Russian medical team that 
stayed in Addis Ababa left on 11 January after it transferred the last of its patients to an 
Italian Red Cross team that arrived to treat Italian prisoners.781 All remaining medical 
supplies stayed with the Abyssinian Red Cross.782 During this period, a Russian doctor, P. V. 
Shchusev, authored a volume titled Medical Advice for Abyssinians, which was translated 
into Amharic and printed in St. Petersburg in 1897. This short guide, published by the 
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General Staff, contains basic instructions on cleaning and dressing wounds, setting broken 
bones, following a healthy diet, and avoiding venereal diseases.783 
Shvedov produced statistical reports for authorities in St. Petersburg, and the Red 
Cross published accounts of the brigade’s activities, both of which justified the expenses of 
the brigade to the public. The statistics differ between archival and published sources, but it 
seems clear that the Russians treated around thirty thousand patients at both facilities. Of 
these patients, not more than 761 were wounded and only 191 required major surgeries at the 
hospitals. The overwhelming majority of patients treated in the ambulatory clinic appear to 
have been ordinary civilians, but the Russians also treated Italian prisoners as well.784 
Shvedov remarked that there was a noticeable increase in the number of “repeat customers 
(povtornye bol’nye)” to the ambulatory clinics, which he attributed to the Abyssinians’ 
learning to trust in “the benefits of rational medical aid, so they come again for directions 
from the doctor.”785 In total, the Russians spent about 159,000 rubles on the expedition, a 
sum that was higher than that forecasted due to complications involving travel to 
Abyssinia.786    
Following the return of the brigade in December 1896, Shvedov and the Red Cross 
published a brochure on the expedition’s activities in Abyssinia. In print, the Red Cross 
justified its intervention in Abyssinia on the grounds that, as a signatory of the Geneva 
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Convention, Russia was obligated to provide aid to the wounded of warring nations as it had 
done during past conflicts. This brochure was supposed to be enlarged into a book, and the 
Red Cross set aside several thousand rubles for the project, but no monograph on the 
expedition ever appeared. One member of the brigade proposed to the Main Directorate that 
they create an exposition that would familiarize the Russian public with this “little known 
country and its inhabitants.” His account of organizing the exposition in St. Petersburg shows 
that the members of the brigade sought to teach the Russian public the benefits of 
humanitarian aid to Abyssinia.787 In the first hall of the exposition, visitors were shown 
examples of indigenous, Abyssinian medical treatments, such as copper plates for closing 
wounds or powders for treating eye infections. The inadequacy of Abyssinian medicine was 
underlined in this this room by the consequences of modern weaponry. Display cases showed 
bullets and shrapnel removed by Russian doctors from Abyssinian bodies. In the second hall, 
visitors became part of the Russian medical brigade, seeing modern medical instruments, 
medicines, tents, water purification filters, and other items used in Abyssinia. The third and 
final section provided an ethnographic journey to Africa, on which visitors were treated to 
exotic clothes, jewelry, weapons, money, religious items, as well as the mandatory stuffed 
animals, hides, and tusks from wild beasts.788 This exposition ran for thirty-two days from 31 
January to 3 March 1897 and attracted 6,500 visitors.789 
As I noted earlier, a small detachment from the brigade stayed in Addis Ababa to treat 
the remaining wounded after the main group left in October. Over the next three months, this 
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group performed over one hundred operations before it left for Russian in January 1897.790 
Menelik had requested additional help from the Red Cross in the future and even offered to 
cover some of the costs for these workers, but, at first, the Russians waivered in how 
forthcoming they would be with medical aid.791 M. P. von Kaufman, the chairman of the Red 
Cross, wanted to preserve this detachment because the original brigade did not fulfill its 
mission of treating all of the wounded from Adwa. When he petitioned the necessary 
government ministries for fifteen thousand rubles per year in funding and five medical 
staffers for the outpost, he was met with refusals. In several petitions to P. S. Vannovskii, the 
minister of war, von Kaufman asked for additional military doctors and insisted that state 
support was needed because the charter of the Red Cross provisioned neither “general 
medical aid to a population outside of Russia,” nor did it account for foreign aid during 
peacetime.792 Vannovskii refused von Kaufman’s requests on the grounds that the war was 
over and the Red Cross must pay for its own activities.793 The Ministry of Finance also 
walked away from the mission, claiming state funds would henceforth only be spent on 
efforts to counter public health problems within Russia.794 But state coffers did not dry up, 
and the Russian medical mission in Addis Ababa continued its activities into the twentieth 
century.  
In 1897, the Russian Red Cross again established a small hospital in Addis Ababa 
that lasted until 1902, when it was replaced with a medical staff attached to the tsarist 
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diplomatic consulate. The facility was popular, and Menelik looked on it with pride. One 
former doctor wrote, “in the dark consciousness of the people, it brought light, not with 
violence but with reason and the highest human virtue of giving aid to the sick and 
wounded.”795 A brief memoir by a military physician who served at this facility describes 
how the Red Cross won Abyssinians over to European medicine and Russian doctors in 
particular.796 This trust drew envy from other Europeans, and soon the French, Italians, and 
British joined the Russians in courting Menelik with medical diplomats. British travelers to 
the region complained of the gaudy Russian facility and chided the Abyssinians for flocking 
to it.797 This clinic continued its operations until 1907, when domestic problems within 
Russia and disagreements with the Abyssinians over import duties on medicine caused the 
Russians to retreat. 
The Russian Red Cross’s expedition to Abyssinia helps identify several sinews in the 
nexus between humanitarianism and imperialism in late tsarist Russia. First, the Russian state 
and public viewed the Red Cross as an important tool of soft-power imperialism. The Red 
Cross sent medical volunteers to Montenegro, Serbia, or Abyssinia to bolster friendly 
diplomatic relations with ethnic groups or political movements with which Russians 
sympathized, whether it be Orthodox Christians or Africans. The secondary, and unstated, 
goal of some of these endeavors was to enable weaker belligerents to conduct wars favorable 
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to Russian interests. In this case, Russia had a vested interest in seeing Abyssinia best Italy, 
Germany’s ally and therefore Russia’s continental rival.  
Second, the Red Cross channeled popular fervor for empire toward stable ends as 
well. Neutered by an autocratic system that prevented the Russian public from engaging 
political problems at home, foreign adventures provided the readers of Novoe vremia with 
opportunities to release their frustrations on easy targets abroad. Humanitarianism was one of 
many possible weapons Russia could use to engage in and interfere with foreign lands. The 
state was well aware of the benefits and pitfalls of these humanitarian endeavors abroad. 
Since the Red Cross was nominally headed by Maria Fedorovna and managed by bureaucrats 
and court favorites, the tsarist autocracy prudently controlled which foreign conflicts 
volunteers intervened in and who was selected to partake in these missions. Within Russia, 
the Red Cross enabled patriotic individuals to direct their energies toward making donations 
for and proclaiming solidarity with the Orthodox Abyssinians.  
Third, participation in this endeavor clearly elevated tsarist subjects’ sense of self in 
two ways. Educated Russia may have been burdened by the afflicted peasantry and stymied 
by the obdurate autocracy, but the 1896 mission to Abyssinia enabled Russians to reaffirm 
their membership in the fraternity of European empires and, for the moment, occupy the 
paramount moral position within this hierarchy. As the newsletter of the Russian Red Cross 
reported, this brigade “performed a service that raises the prestige of the Europeans in the 
eyes of the uncultured people” and “spread civilization to a country and prepared it to 
transition from a primitive to a cultured way of life (form obshchezhitiia).”798 The Russian 
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doctors earned the right to strut in front of the other Europeans in Addis Ababa because 
Russia was the first to “discover” the Abyssinians. 
The mission to Abyssinia also shows a desire by imperial Russia to work within a 
system of international norms and conventions that governed international philanthropy. 
Russian subjects may have disdained the fact that the Europeans seemed to line up to support 
Italy with aid, but the tsarist state made sure to plan a brigade to treat Italian soldiers in 
Naples. Tsarist Russia believed it was waging a war over hearts and minds in Abyssinia, and 
the best method to win over coreligionists was to demonstrate a commitment to abiding by 
international laws and Christian morality. Collections for the Italian Red Cross in Russia may 
have upset Novoe vremia’s readers’ sense of propriety, but only after Italy refused Russian 
aid did St. Petersburg commit all of its Red Cross resources to Addis Ababa.  
Russia’s attachment to Abyssinia was short-lived and largely symbolic. Even judged 
by lax nineteenth-century standards, seven doctors had little chance of providing medical 
care for an army of one hundred thousand. The Russian public’s interest in Abyssinia faded 
quickly as well. The daily news ticker shrank attention spans a century ago as it does today, 
but fresh fighting meant new adventures. By the time the Red Cross brigade returned for 
Christmas 1896 from Addis Ababa, wire reports from Transvaal already beckoned tsarist 
subjects to the next exotic undertaking, and this time the insidious British were the 
opponents.799 
 
 
                                                     
799 Apollon Davidson and Irina Filatova demonstrate that the Anglo-Boer War left a significant imprint on the 
Russian popular imagination.  See Apollon Davidson and Irina Filatova, The Russians and the Anglo-Boer War, 
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The South African War 
The outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1899 prompted another outpouring of 
support in the Russian press. The Boer colonies of Transvaal and the Orange Free State had 
both adopted the Geneva Convention in 1896 and 1897, which made them eligible for 
outside assistance, and the European powers lined up to dispatch ambulances to these 
romantic guerrillas resisting British colonialism. The Dutch, German, Swiss, Austrian, 
Swedish, and Belgian Red Cross societies all offered to send medical teams, and the French 
proffered medical supplies to outfit a field hospital. Russia followed the precedent it set for 
the Abyssinian intervention and initially offered equal medical units to the Boers and the 
British. However, Whitehall, which mobilized its own national aid society for its first 
imperial campaign, declined assistance from outsiders.800 The Russian Red Cross outfitted 
one sanitary team, composed of six doctors, nine nurses, and two dozen or so other members, 
and dispatched it to the port of Lourenço Marques in January 1900. This conflict saw 
unofficial Red Cross brigades travel to South Africa as well. The Dutch parish in St. 
Petersburg raised funds for a joint Russo-Dutch ambulance, and even a group of Irish-
Americans in Chicago sent their own medical team.801 
Led by State Councilor N. I. Kushkov, a professor at the Medical-Surgical Academy 
and senior surgeon at the Mariinskaia Hospital in St. Petersburg, the official Russian Red 
Cross brigade traveled through the East African port of Lourenço Marques and then by train 
to Pretoria. At the railway station, President Paul Kruger of Transvaal greeted the Russians 
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and promised to provide them food and hotel lodging, both of which had become costly due 
to the war.802 But hospitality was not what the Russians sought. After a period of idleness in 
Pretoria, the Transvaal Sanitary Command finally gave the Russians instructions to open a 
hospital at Colesberg, near the southern front, but the Boers apparently selected a Russian-
Jewish émigré to deliver the message to Kushkov, a gaffe that offended the highfalutin 
professor. Vexed with the Boers for their impudence and poor planning, Kushkov came up 
with his own design to set up a hospital in Newcastle, a town he erroneously believed was 
close the front. Instead, this poor placement earned the Russians a reputation for shirking 
from danger. With few soldiers to make use of the facility, the Russians welcomed the Boer 
population to use the hospital. Records indicate they treated nearly one thousand patients and 
performed 120 surgeries from February to April.803  
As the Boer front collapsed in the spring of 1900, the Russian brigade retreated inland 
to Pretoria and later along the rail line to the town of Waterval-Boven. They split the 
ambulance into smaller teams, which supplemented work at exiting hospitals, dispatched a 
mobile ambulance to the front, and outfitted a sanitary train, but it soon became clear to 
diplomats in St. Petersburg that the Boer forces had disintegrated and a conventional war was 
turning into a guerrilla insurgency. On August 10 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the 
Red Cross brigade to evacuate via Lourenço Marques. This unexpected message 
disappointed one participant, who felt that the brigade performed its best work during the 
summer months.804 In total, the Russian brigade treated over one thousand serious cases and 
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five thousand ambulatory patients during its six months of operations. The total cost for this 
campaign came to 112,096 rubles.805 
The Boers excited the Russian public, but this campaign did little more than provide 
symbolic support for the anticolonial war with Britain. Kushkov’s failure, however, was not 
shameful to Russian readers. Most important for Russia was that they, too, participated 
alongside the other European powers to help the Boer wounded. An article in the Red Cross’s 
newsletter surveyed the activities conducted by all of the foreign brigades and situated 
Russia’s contribution within the larger European project to intervene in warfare.806 By 
sending a medical brigade to South Africa, Russia affirmed its European power status and 
reminded other states, in Europe and abroad, that it stood behind the Geneva principles. But 
Russia’s contribution to this conflict had been small, a calculation no doubt intended to 
minimize expenses and footprint. When tide turned against the Boers, and St. Petersburg 
worried it might not be able to get its brigade out, the Russians quickly retreated to avoid any 
further involvement in South African adventures.   
The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 
The Russian Red Cross’s final campaigns prior to the outbreak of World War I 
occurred during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. The first of these conflicts featured the 
Balkan Christians driving the last of the Ottomans from Europe, a conflict that won popular 
support in Russia from the press and engagement from the Red Cross. But the Balkan 
Christians could not agree on the spoils of war, and all of the former allies renewed conflict 
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with an enlarged Bulgaria in 1913. Russian popular opinion greeted the second war with 
much less enthusiasm, and the Red Cross’s commitment to the conflict reflected this drop in 
morale. Russia’s interventions in these conflicts came from the humanitarian mandate to 
provide aid in war, affirm Russia’s status as a power, and channel domestic pressures toward 
the Pan-Slavic goal of freeing the Balkans for Eastern Orthodoxy. 
Historian Galina Shevtstova’s recent monograph argues that popular pressure from 
the press provided the impetus for the Red Cross to intervene in the Balkan Wars. Similar to 
Russia’s humanitarian involvement in the Italo-Abyssinian War and South African War, the 
newspapers demanded action when Orthodox coreligionists found themselves in a crisis. The 
Red Cross first hesitated to organize brigades in 1912 because they feared the empire would 
soon be at war with the Ottoman Empire or Austria-Hungary over the Balkans. Public 
opinion took the initiative to intervene. The Main Directorate only began preparations to 
dispatch brigades after the St. Petersburg and Moscow City Dumas threatened to dispatch 
their own brigades “under the flag of the Red Cross.” The Russian state first tolerated similar 
private initiatives to fund wartime sanitary brigades in the Russo-Japanese War, when it 
acceded to the General Zemstvo Organization’s petition to Tsar Nicholas II. Fearing that 
popular initiative from below might spread to the provinces coalesce around liberal 
opposition groups in the zemstvos and towns, the Russian state spurred its Red Cross to 
oversee all medical relief brigades beginning in October 1912.807 Similar to Russia’s past 
efforts in the Balkans and Africa, the Main Directorate sought to control all medical aid to 
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the belligerents to ensure that the distribution of relief followed international standards and 
the behavior of volunteers was kept carefully in check.  
The Russians again mobilized sanitary brigades capable of operating as independent 
hospitals for fifty or two hundred patients. Organizers had developed careful inventories for 
each type of facility during the Russo-Japanese War, and they had stockpiled the needed 
supplies in warehouses in St. Petersburg. All nurses came from the trained ranks of the 
nursing societies, and the doctors were military men, professors, or employed by the nursing 
societies, so their loyalties and talents were vetted.808 In the First Balkan War, private 
individuals and associations funded a couple of the brigades, but the Main Directorate 
controlled how all of the medical teams would be composed and deployed.809 To oversee 
operations in Balkans, the Red Cross appointed General P. A. Tyrtov to act as its 
plenipotentiary. In turn, Tyrtov delegated much of his management responsibilities in Serbia 
to A. P. Gartvig, the wife of a Russian diplomatic envoy to the country.  
The press again took great pride in its Red Cross’s mission to the Balkans in 1912. 
The Vestnik Krasnogo Kresta, the Red Cross’s journal, reprinted newspaper articles that 
described how locals in Bulgaria and Serbia welcomed the Russians with open arms and how 
these interventions had inspired women to take on new public roles in supporting private aid 
in wartime.810 The reality on the ground may have differed from these assessments since the 
Russians kept Serbian female volunteers under close supervision and deemed them suitable 
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for housekeeping duties only.811 Russian nurses, another report indicated, impressed foreign 
observers with their medical talents and admiration from male physician peers.812     
In total, the Russians sent four large hospitals, twenty small lazarettos, and outfitted 
one sanitary ship for these conflicts.813 Since Russian planners deemed that Bulgaria would 
suffer the worst casualties in the First Balkan War due to its location and the size of its army, 
the Russians dispatched fourteen medical facilities to the country, the most aid of any nation. 
Serbia received several hospitals, Greece three small lazarettos, Montenegro two, and Turkey 
one lazaretto. These numbers clearly show which side the Russians supported in this conflict. 
Russian medical staff numbered nearly seven hundred, with over one hundred doctors and 
two hundred nurses partaking in the campaign, Russia’s largest humanitarian mission in any 
foreign conflict.814 All of the medical facilities were stationary hospitals located in rear areas, 
and, unlike in Serbia decades before, the local authorities were responsible for delivering the 
patients to these facilities. In Bulgaria, the Russians treated 3,004 sick soldiers and 5,442 
wounded. Serbia followed with 822 sick soldiers and 2,457 wounded treated in Russian 
hospitals, and Montenegro tasked the Russians with looking after 333 sick patients and 412 
wounded. In total, Russia hospitalized 4,300 sick and 8,722 wounded patients during this 
conflict.815 
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Peace negotiations began in December 1912, and the Russians began to shutter Red 
Cross facilities in January the following year. A. P. Gartvig requested that the Russians slow 
the liquidation process in mid-January because infectious diseases had broken out among 
Serbian troops, but the Main Directorate insisted it did not have funds to keep brigades in 
operation. Still, many of the Russian brigades remained in the Balkans until patients had been 
transferred to local facilities by the spring of 1913.816 In April 1913, the Russian state paid 
the Red Cross to rent and outfit the Odessa-based steamer Peterburg to transport about 850 
Serbian patients from Durrës, Albania, to the Greek port of Thessaloniki, an action that 
would be Russia’s last humanitarian gesture in the First Balkan War.817  
News of the Second Balkan War prompted a more somber response in the Russian 
press. Slavic brothers were not supposed to fight one another, and the Red Cross feared that 
further involvement in the Balkans would waste resources needed when the great European 
conflagration broke out. Still, in response to Gartvig’s solicitations for help and the need to 
keep up appearances as a concerned great power, the Russians sent two large hospital teams 
to Serbia and Bulgaria in the summer of 1913.818   
These interventions did not come cheaply. At the beginning of the conflict, the Main 
Directorate permitted the use 650,000 rubles from the Red Cross’s wartime reserve fund to 
pay for the campaign. Donations, they hoped, would make up for these monetary expenses. 
The Main Directorate demanded control of all expenditures on this campaign. When the Red 
Cross’s chairman, A. Il’in, received word that provincial chapters were also spending 
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wartime reserves to outfit brigades, the Main Directorate ordered these expenditures halted 
immediately.819 In total, the Red Cross spent 1,058,450 rubles on the campaigns in 1912 and 
1913. During these conflicts private donations only provided 326,566 rubles with another 
68,918 rubles coming from a special fund that had been set up for Balkan operations in 1876. 
Of the costs, about 400,000 rubles went to acquiring supplies, 250,000 rubles funded salaries 
for the staff, and 130,000 rubles were spent on food for the patients and personnel.820 The 
Russian public’s calls for intervention vastly exceeded the popular enthusiasm needed to 
fund these missions.  
Conclusions 
The Russian Red Cross’s interventions in foreign wars reveal that the tsarist regime 
took its membership in the Geneva Convention seriously. As a great power, Russia felt 
obligated to offer aid to its European rivals when they found themselves at war and to 
support lesser powers, so long as these nations agreed to the legal terms of the Geneva 
Convention. Members of the Red Cross believed that the humanitarian movement acted as a 
civilizing agent for its little brother nations because it encouraged the South Slavs and 
Abyssinians to observe the rules of warfare, develop modern medical services, and allow 
women to serve as nurses. Russia was always open to expanding the Geneva club of nations 
so long as new members possessed states and militaries that to some degree corresponded 
with European standards. But Russia, like its European rivals, offered aid only to other Red 
Cross members, a convenient interpretation of the Geneva Convention that made 
interventions in imperial wars verboten. This gentlemen’s agreement ensured that the British 
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Red Cross stayed out of Central Asia, while the Russians looked away from their European 
rivals’ most unseemly actions in Africa and Asia. This habit explains why the Russians 
pulled out of South Africa once the Boers campaign dissolved into a guerilla war. In its own 
backyard, Russia had no intention of giving anyone the pretext to recognize a Polish Red 
Cross.  
Educated Russia backed the Red Cross as a means of influencing foreign policy. Few 
Russians outside the medical or military communities followed the doctors who went to 
Germany for the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, but when Orthodox coreligionists found 
themselves in need of assistance, the tsarist public pressured its Red Cross to send aid to the 
Balkans. Often these missions countered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ strategy of 
nonintervention, especially in the Balkans, where too much Russian interference might 
provoke the Europeans to respond with escalations of their own, a repeat of the mishaps that 
led to defeat in the Crimean War. In a sense, Russia’s humanitarian missions abroad placated 
its public’s calls for action while limiting the tsarist regime’s risk of escalating foreign 
conflicts or inflaming domestic opposition against the autocracy. At the same time, however, 
the aid missions abroad probably contributed to giving the Serbs too great a sense of 
expectation that Russian aid would always be forthcoming. Russian benevolence, to a degree, 
contributed to Serbian overconfidence, a cause of World War I and the downfall of the tsarist 
regime nearly three years later. 
Finally, Russia learned how to improve the delivery of foreign aid during these 
decades. No one knew how to assist the Germans in 1870 and the campaign to Serbia in 1876 
was bungled by amateurism, adventurism, and poor planning, but, by the twentieth century, 
the Russia Red Cross had professionalized and streamlined operations to deliver professional 
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medical aid at reasonable costs and without embarrassment. Careful coordination between 
the Russian state and Red Cross to outfit and control the foreign aid missions led to these 
improvements. And, despite what consumers of newsprint probably believed, the Russian 
public had little ability to alter this situation. Concerned Russians enthusiastically called for 
foreign interventions, but these same subjects time and again failed to come up with the cash 
to fund such expeditions, a pattern that enabled the tsarist regime to minimize its 
humanitarian obligations beyond the empire’s borders.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation argues that the Russian autocracy welcomed the idea of private aid 
in war as a means for involving educated society in the maintenance of the empire’s well-
being. This project began with Elena Pavlovna’s endeavor to dispatch nurses in the Crimean 
War to care for the wounded. Following this conflict, Pirogov and others publicized accounts 
of these nurses’ feats to convince elite Russia to embrace the idea of women working 
alongside men in military medicine. In this case, the Russian autocracy took the initiative in 
establishing a voluntary patriotic organization, and members of educated Russia worked to 
give this nursing order a permanent peacetime role in military medicine. Soon after the 
Crimean conflict, numerous European powers adopted the Geneva Convention of 1864, an 
international compact that established guidelines for treating the wounded and promised aid 
societies a place in wartime relief. Even though tsarist officialdom expressed concerns about 
opening the battlefield to civilian aid workers, subjects within the court persuaded Alexander 
II to join this compact and create an official aid society for the empire. For the Romanovs, 
the Red Cross provided an opportunity to demonstrate publicly the ruling family’s 
benevolence. This organization also created a means to involve educated society in the 
autocracy’s moral imperative to aid the empire’s needy.  
 In the 1870s, the Red Cross began to experiment with peacetime measures to 
promote the health of the empire in order to gain publicity and display the Romanovs’ 
generosity. Since the Red Cross was associated with the autocracy, it offered this 
organization’s members a degree of freedom from state agencies to test new projects, 
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whether they be temporary hospitals to treat peasants or public campaigns to deliver food to 
famine-stricken regions. The Red Cross often suffered internal tensions over what its true
mission should be, and nearly all of the peacetime activities the tsarist humanitarians devised 
had secondary military applications. Some initiatives enjoyed modest success in delivering 
aid, in part because the empire was poor and rival aid organizations were underdeveloped. 
The Red Cross’s expansion in the years after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 reveals that 
a group of elite tsarist subjects found participation in these endeavors worthwhile and 
exciting. 
When Russia waged the Russo-Turkish and the Russo-Japanese Wars, educated 
society initially supported the Red Cross with donations and volunteers, so long as the press 
delivered positive news from the front. In both of these conflicts, the Red Cross 
overcommitted its resources, and the state had to intervene to subsidize and direct private aid 
work. The military certainly resented enthusiastic volunteers interfering with armies at the 
front, but, despite the Ministry of War’s best efforts to reform its medical services, Russian 
troops always lacked the necessary supply of doctors, hospital beds, and ambulances in 
wartime. The regime’s decisions to give the empire’s aid society a role in war show that 
statesmen and war planners begrudgingly recognized that Red Cross relief work was needed 
to protect Russia’s conscript soldiers. Still, as the Red Cross’s role in war increased in 
importance, the autocracy grasped this organization more firmly in its own hands and 
deprived educated society and the army voices in this aid society’s structure or operations. 
Hence, it became increasingly obvious to everyone that “private aid” had become “autocratic 
aid.”  
 345 
 
The Red Cross’s campaign to relieve peasants during the famines of 1891-92 exposed 
the organization to new doubts after the Russo-Turkish War. In the famine-relief campaign, 
Tsarevich Nicholas oversaw the Special Committee tasked with coordinating relief work 
between the state and private charities, one of which was the Red Cross. Despite considerable 
efforts by the state and Special Committee to deliver aid, the Old Regime failed to convince 
many Russians that the autocracy was the best instrument to oversee the empire’s welfare. 
Even though the Red Cross’s endowment continued to grow in the 1890s, this organization 
struggled with mobilizing outside support for peacetime missions. Nicholas II attempted to 
blot this stain by spending his personal funds on famine-relief campaigns in the late 1890s, 
but vocal critics of the Red Cross instead wanted a Russia that would not need the 
Romanovs’  charity to survive.  
Educated society demanded greater oversight, transparency, and competent leadership 
before it would embrace the Red Cross. Still, the idea of a national aid society resonated with 
many nonstate actors in tsarist Russia. As soon as the empire found itself at war with Japan in 
1904, members of the zemstvos organized a parallel national aid society to benefit Russia’s 
soldiers in the Far East. This institution, the General Zemstvo Organization, continued to 
operate alongside the Red Cross during the famine relief campaigns that followed the 
Revolution of 1905. For the planners of the GZO, addressing the empire’s greatest problems 
offered a means to win popular backing for the zemstvos’ role in empire-wide politics. For 
the Red Cross, the zemstvos decision to take on a role in peacetime aid work probably came 
as a welcome reprieve for an exhausted voluntary organization. The autocracy tolerated the 
GZO’s efforts at famine relief during the brief constitutional experiment in Russian after the 
October Manifesto and Duma elections of 1905 and then quickly put an end to this 
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organization’s aspirations of grandeur on the empire-wide stage. Still, military mobilization 
plans for medical aid created on the eve of World War I indicate that state agents envisioned 
the zemstvos would participate alongside the Red Cross in wartime medical work in an 
extended conflict.  
This dissertation suggests that the Red Cross’s medical endeavors at home and abroad 
produced a paradoxical effect on many of its members. Service in Red Cross brigades created 
opportunities for civilian physicians to advance their scientific interests and authority in 
medicine. Red Cross doctors studied wounds, disease, and psychological ailments in war, and 
they published their findings in Russia’s leading medical journals. But the benefit for doctors 
came at the expense of the Red Cross’s rank-and-file, the nurses. Nurses in tsarist Russia 
suffered from cultural mores and budgetary constraints that prevented them from making the 
most of their medical talents. Unpaid, quasireligious nursing orders, the Sisters of Charity, 
often struggled to attract talented volunteers and financial support from educated Russia, 
especially during mundane periods of peace. At the same time, the Red Cross had to compete 
for educated women with the feldsher trade, which became increasing feminine as the 
decades progressed, and the few spaces in Russian medical schools for women to train as 
physicians.  
Since the Geneva Convention of 1864 enabled signatory states to participate in 
foreign conflicts as neutral aid workers, Russia used its Red Cross as a tool to promote the 
empire’s benevolence abroad and advance the state’s foreign policy ambitions. Too much 
humanitarianism abroad caused problems for the state’s foreign policy ambitions, as Russia 
learned from its interventions in the Balkans in the 1870s that helped draw the empire into 
the Russo-Turkish War. In this case, enthusiastic tsarist subjects used the Geneva Convention 
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as cover to escalate conflicts in Serbia and Montenegro, efforts that ran counter to St. 
Petersburg’s wishes to keep the peace in Europe. In 1877, Alexander II felt compelled to go 
to war on behalf of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans after it had become apparent that Pan-
Slavists’ support for the South Slavs only prompted more Turkish violence in the region.  
These humanitarian interventions in foreign lands also enabled Russia to assert its 
position as a great power and use medical relief to demonstrate its benevolence to smaller 
nations. In all of the Red Cross’s interventions after 1876, however, the autocracy carefully 
controlled the missions to promote Russia’s image abroad without wasting the empire’s 
resources or drawing it into a situation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not manage. 
Russians took great pride in the fact that they were the only European nation to provide 
humanitarian assistance to Abyssinia in 1896. And the tsarist regime had to affirm its great 
power status by providing aid to the Boers in the South African War and Balkan Christians 
during their conflict with the Ottomans in 1912. In all three of these cases, the autocracy 
oversaw the amount of aid dispatched and the workers chosen to travel abroad to ensure that 
adventurers would not besmirch the reputation of the Red Cross or Russian humanitarianism 
more broadly. 
In August 1914, Russia entered a war it was medically unprepared to wage. Hoping to 
avoid conflicts between the army and civilian medical services, the autocracy placed all 
medical resources—military and civilian—in the hands of its own agent, Prince A. P. 
Ol’denburgskii, who reported directly to the commander of the army, Grand Duke Nikolai 
Nikolaevich, and the tsar. Ol’denburgskii, who happened to be chairman of the Red Cross, 
privileged this organization, earmarking areas directly in the rear of the front as the sole 
preserve of Russia’s official aid society. He confined similar medical organizations set up by 
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the zemstvos and towns to areas deep inside European Russia. Many Russians reacted to this 
conflict with compassion for the wounded. By the end of 1914, as many as ten thousand 
subjects had entered Red Cross nursing courses, and three years later Russia employed three 
times this number to treat the nearly five million wounded and sick soldiers in hospitals run 
by the Red Cross, army, and civilian organizations. And this war saw impressive medical 
innovations by civilian doctors in Red Cross service. Despite these achievements, poor 
management and organization ensured that World War I turned into a public health 
catastrophe for tsarist Russia and contributed to the political upheaval that overturned the Old 
Regime in 1917. Still, the concept of private aid or a national relief organization did not 
disappear with the autocracy after 1917. The Russia Red Cross continued to operate after the 
February Revolution and during the Civil War, albeit in slightly different forms, and, in spite 
of Lenin’s initial suspicions, the Bolsheviks organized their own Soviet Red Cross, which 
continued the missions of training nurses and providing wartime and disaster relief during the 
decades that followed.821  
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